Account deletion and the record wipe both demand a fresh second-factor proof once a factor is enrolled, and that proof lived on the session row. A native client has no session row, so an account with TOTP or a security key could not delete itself from the app on any request it could build: requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled fell through to requireFreshMfa, which resolves via getSession and answers 401 to a perfectly valid token. App Store guideline 5.1.1(v) asks for exactly that deletion. Add requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled beside the cookie-only sibling rather than softening it. Its cookie arm is the sibling's, unchanged; its Bearer arm takes the single-use elevation the second-factor management routes already accept, with the fresh-factor rule pinned on, so a password-proved elevation cannot erase an account any more than a password login satisfies the gate on the web. No factor rides the request body: one mint surface, one redemption path. Scope stays fail-closed, so a narrow token is refused before the header is read. The elevation is spent immediately before the erasure, after the typed confirmation and the last-admin check, so a rejected request does not burn a proof against a 5-per-15-minute mint ceiling. The Bearer branch of requireMfaManagementAuth moves into a shared helper so both gates read and claim in the same place. The elevation guard grows a section naming the two routes, because the set of surfaces an elevation can unlock only stays small if adding to it is a visible edit.
src/app/
The Next.js App Router tree: the page surfaces a logged-in user sees and the REST API under api/. Server components are the default; "use client" is added only where a hook, state, or browser API needs it. Routing is file-based — a page.tsx is a page, a route.ts is an API endpoint.
API routes (api/)
Every endpoint wraps its handler in apiHandler (@/lib/api-handler), parses any body with Zod safeParse, narrows userId from the session or Bearer token (never from the body), and returns the { data, error, meta? } envelope. requireAdmin() is cookie-only, so api/admin/ is unreachable by Bearer token. Notable groups:
auth/— login, register, password, passkey (WebAuthn), refresh, Codex device-OAuth.measurements/,mood-entries/,medications/,sleep/— the core health-data CRUD + batch/bulk ingest.ingest/— external Bearer-token ingest surfaces.insights/,analytics/,dashboard/— AI insights, the Coach SSE stream, trend summaries, the first-paint dashboard snapshot.withings/,whoop/,fitbit/,integrations/,sync/— OAuth connect/sync/webhook surfaces and the offline delta feed.fhir/,share-links/,doctor-report/,export/,import/— clinician-facing FHIR R4 read API, shareable records, report + data export.notifications/,devices/,send/,telegram/— channel registration, device tokens, dispatch, webhook intake.admin/— operator panel APIs (cookie-only).health/,version/,meta/,internal/— health check, build-version probe, runtime metadata, worker-internal routes.
Page surfaces
measurements/, medications/, mood/, insights/, achievements/, notifications/, settings/, onboarding/, admin/, plus the public about/, privacy/, bugreport/, the share-record route c/, and the root dashboard (page.tsx). Shared shell + chrome lives in layout.tsx; error.tsx / global-error.tsx / not-found.tsx / loading.tsx cover the framework boundaries. layout.tsx holds the one nonce-bound dangerouslySetInnerHTML (theme bootstrap).
Conventions
See ../../CLAUDE.md. The request-flow walk in .planning/codebase/arch.md annotates each layer with file:line citations. Related dirs: handlers compose ../lib/; pages render ../components/.