Post-publish verify proves the published image boots. Nothing proved that
on a running instance a person can sign in, write a reading and read it
back — which is exactly the shape of the defects this line keeps
rediscovering: a value written and never read.
`scripts/synthetic-journey.mjs` walks that journey in plain Node 22 with no
dependencies, so it runs from a workstation, a runner or the deploy host.
It warms `/`, `/api/health`, `/api/version` and the measurements list first
and discards those timings (the first hit on each route after a deploy is a
cold start), then asserts five legs in order: the served version equals the
expected one, the password flow signs in through a cookie jar, a weight
reading is written with an Idempotency-Key, the same row reads back with
its value, unit and source, and the reversible delete leaves the account
clean. One line per leg with the elapsed time; the first failure ends the
run non-zero with the status and a body excerpt that has every token shape
redacted out of it.
The workflow is `workflow_dispatch` only, with `base_url` and
`expected_version` as inputs and the credentials read from repository
secrets. It is deliberately not wired into the deploy path: the target
instance and the secrets are the maintainer's call.
Mutation proof, against a production build served from
`.next/standalone/server.js` on a throwaway Postgres.
Green:
warm 35 ms (discarded)
ok version 2 ms serves 1.38.13
ok sign in 78 ms session cookie held
ok write 64 ms wrote cmtup9lwu0007zhovn0mxajdz
ok read back 8 ms 77.7 kg (MANUAL)
ok delete 27 ms account left clean
synthetic journey green
Read leg broken deliberately — the same server behind a throwaway forwarder
that empties the `GET /api/measurements` list and changes nothing else:
ok version 4 ms serves 1.38.13
ok sign in 38 ms session cookie held
ok write 40 ms wrote cmtupa4ck000gzhovwnij64fz
FAILED read back 8 ms read back: the list came back without the reading
status 200
body {"data":{"measurements":[],"meta":{"total":0}},"error":null}
synthetic journey RED on "read back"
Version leg broken the same way, by asking the instance for the previous
tag:
FAILED version 3 ms version: instance serves "1.38.13", expected "v1.38.12"
synthetic journey RED on "version"
`--self-test` carries that proof in the repository: it runs the journey
against an in-process instance nine times, once with nothing broken and
once per broken leg, and fails if a broken leg still comes back green. The
workflow runs it before it touches the real instance.
Gates: typecheck, `node --check`, lint (the three known warnings, no
errors), prettier, the workflow and CI-determinism guards.
14 KiB
Deploy ordering
Coolify handles the standard deploy ordering automatically: the
container image is pulled, docker-entrypoint.sh runs
prisma migrate deploy against the live database, and only then does
the Next.js process bind to the listener. This page documents the
ordering explicitly for manual-rollback and partial-deploy scenarios
where the operator drives the steps by hand.
Migration ordering
Migrations land before the new app container takes traffic. The canonical command sequence on a single-instance host:
# 1. Pull the new image.
docker pull ghcr.io/mbombeck/healthlog:vX.Y.Z
# 2. Run migrations against the live DB using the new image. The
# production image strips pnpm/npm; use the entrypoint's node
# invocation of the bundled Prisma CLI instead.
docker run --rm --env-file .env.production \
ghcr.io/mbombeck/healthlog:vX.Y.Z \
sh -c 'NODE_PATH=/opt/prisma-cli/node_modules node /opt/prisma-cli/node_modules/prisma/build/index.js migrate deploy'
# 3. Recreate the app container so it picks up the new image.
docker compose up -d app
The entrypoint also runs prisma migrate deploy on container boot, so
step 2 is redundant in normal Coolify flow. It's listed explicitly for
the manual case so an operator can verify the migration result before
flipping traffic.
v1.11.0 notes
Migrations 0110–0114 are additive (new tables / columns for the
WHOOP provider hub, the longitudinal coach, and the clinician FHIR
record). They require no special steps — prisma migrate deploy runs
them in order on boot like any other.
WHOOP introduces two optional instance env vars, WHOOP_REDIRECT_URI
and WHOOP_WEBHOOK_SECRET (HMAC secret for WHOOP webhook signature
verification). Per-user WHOOP client id/secret live in Settings, not
in the environment. See docs/integrations/whoop.md. The shipped
docker-compose.yml already whitelists both under environment:; only
a forked or older compose file needs them added by hand, since vars not
on the whitelist never reach the container.
What goes wrong if you reverse it
If the new app container starts before migrations run, the legacy
schema is missing the columns / indexes / enum values the new code
expects. Symptoms: Prisma client throws P2022 column does not exist
on the first query that touches the new shape, the request path 500s,
and the dispatcher logs fill with the same error until the migration
catches up. Health checks usually keep the container marked "healthy"
because /api/version doesn't exercise the affected tables — so a
naïve load balancer will happily route real traffic into the broken
shell.
Rollback
Rolling back migrations is generally one-way. Prisma's migration
history table tracks applied migrations by hash; the down step is
not auto-generated and most HealthLog migrations are forward-only
(column drops, enum additions, index rebuilds). If a release has to
roll back:
- Roll back the app container to the previous image tag.
- Leave the database schema at the newer migration. The previous app version reads forward-compatible-ish shapes for nearly every release pair shipped on the v1.4.x line.
- If a column-drop migration ships in the rollback target, hand-roll
the column back via a fresh forward migration (
pnpm prisma migrate dev --create-only --name vX_Y_Z_rollback_<col>), edit the SQL, commit, and re-deploy. Nevermigrate resolve --rolled-backagainst production unless you've taken a freshpg_dumpfirst.
Verify the served version
The queued-deploy status is not the source of truth — the version
/api/version actually answers is. A BuildKit layer-cache hit can
re-ship the prior image even when Coolify reports a clean deploy, so
always confirm the served build after a deploy:
# Asserts prod + demo serve 1.9.0, prints each target's buildSha,
# exits non-zero on a mismatch or timeout after a bounded retry loop.
pnpm dlx tsx scripts/assert-deploy.ts 1.9.0
Pass --only=prod / --only=demo to check a single target, or
--attempts=N --interval=ms to widen the retry window while a slow
pull settles.
Walk the synthetic journey
The version check proves the instance serves the right build. It does not
prove a person can use it. scripts/synthetic-journey.mjs walks the
shortest journey that touches the whole stack — sign in, write a reading,
read it back, delete it again — against a running instance:
# Plain Node 22, no dependencies: runs from a workstation, a runner, or
# the deploy host. Warms the instance first, then asserts each leg.
BASE_URL=https://review.healthlog.dev \
SYNTHETIC_USERNAME=<probe account> \
SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD=<its password> \
EXPECTED_VERSION=v1.38.13 \
node scripts/synthetic-journey.mjs
It prints one line per leg with the elapsed time and stops at the first failure with the status and a redacted body excerpt. The warm-up hit on each route is timed but discarded — the first request after a deploy pays the cold-start cost and says nothing about the instance's steady state.
The same journey is available as the Synthetic journey workflow
(workflow_dispatch, inputs base_url and expected_version), which
reads the credentials from the SYNTHETIC_USERNAME / SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD
repository secrets. Nothing calls it from the deploy path; run it by hand
after a deploy until a target instance is settled.
Two preconditions on the probe account: it must be password-only, because the password flow stops at the MFA ticket for an account with a second factor, and the target must not be the demo instance, where every mutation is blocked and the write leg would be red for a reason unrelated to the deploy.
A red result. The leg that failed names the layer:
| Red leg | What it means |
|---|---|
version |
The instance serves a different build than the tag you deployed. Check the image digest and the pull_policy before looking anywhere else. |
sign in |
Sessions are broken, or the probe account gained a second factor. A 429 here is the login rate limit, not the deploy. |
write |
The write path is down: database, encryption keys, or a migration that did not run. |
read back |
A value was written and cannot be read back — the shape this project keeps rediscovering. Roll back. |
delete |
The write path works and the reversible delete does not; the probe reading is still on the account and needs removing by hand. |
Run node scripts/synthetic-journey.mjs --self-test to confirm the check
itself still works: it walks the journey against an in-process instance
once per leg with that leg broken, and fails if any of them comes back
green.
Verify the image signature
Every release image (the multi-arch manifest index, covering both
amd64 and arm64) is signed keyless via Sigstore in the
docker-publish.yml merge job: GitHub's OIDC token is exchanged for a
short-lived Fulcio certificate bound to the workflow identity, and the
signature lands in the Rekor transparency log. There is no long-lived
signing key to leak or rotate.
Verify before (or after) a deploy with cosign:
cosign verify \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/MBombeck/HealthLog/\.github/workflows/docker-publish\.yml@refs/tags/v.*' \
ghcr.io/mbombeck/healthlog:1.16.4
A passing verification proves the image was built by this repository's
release workflow on a v* tag — not by anyone who merely obtained push
access to the GHCR package.
Prefer digest-pinned deploys
Tags (:latest, :1.16.4) are mutable aliases: a registry-side
compromise or an accidental re-push can repoint them. The digest is the
image's only immutable identity, and it is what the signature actually
covers. For any deploy where supply-chain integrity matters more than
convenience:
The compose file carries the hook for this: the app service image is
ghcr.io/mbombeck/healthlog${HEALTHLOG_IMAGE_REF:-:latest}. Unset, the
day-to-day :latest + pull_policy: always flow stays the documented
default for self-hosters. Set HEALTHLOG_IMAGE_REF in the compose
.env (or the deployment platform's env vars) to switch the reference
without touching the file:
HEALTHLOG_IMAGE_REF=:v1.16.5— pin to a release tag (still mutable).HEALTHLOG_IMAGE_REF=@sha256:<digest>— pin to the immutable digest.
Bumping a digest pin by hand
A digest-pinned instance never follows a release on its own — an image promote does not touch the pin, so moving it is part of shipping. The mechanic, end to end:
-
Resolve the new release's digest from the registry (the manifest-list digest, which covers both architectures):
docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/mbombeck/healthlog:v1.37.20 \ | grep -m1 Digest -
Set
HEALTHLOG_IMAGE_REF=@sha256:<that digest>where the compose environment lives — the.envnext to the compose file, or the deployment platform's env vars for the app service. -
Deploy as usual.
-
Verify
/api/versionon the target — and verify it three times a few seconds apart, not once: during the container swap a single probe can be answered by the outgoing container (or a cache) and read as success while the old release keeps running. Three stable answers reporting the shippedversion+buildShaare the signal; a deploy that finishes suspiciously fast (under ~30 s) is a warning that nothing was actually pulled.
A pin is sticky, and a stale pin is silent. Once set, every later deploy ships that reference until someone changes it. The deploy still reports success, the tag still builds, the image still publishes, and the running instance stays on the old release. If you pin, bumping the pin is part of shipping, not an afterthought. If you would rather not carry that step, leave the variable unset:
docker-publish.ymlrotates:lateston every release tag without a pre-release suffix, so the git tag stays the single place a version is declared.Two checks after any deploy, because the first alone can be served from a cache:
/api/versionmust report the version and commit you shipped, and the running container's image must be the one you expect (docker inspect <container> --format '{{.Config.Image}}'). A deploy that finishes suspiciously fast is a signal rather than good news. Also watch for a DUPLICATEHEALTHLOG_IMAGE_REFentry: Coolify accepts two rows with the same key without warning, and which one wins is not defined.
Promote a release to a pinned digest
scripts/promote-digest.ts automates the whole promotion after
docker-publish.yml has pushed a tag:
pnpm dlx tsx scripts/promote-digest.ts v1.16.5
It resolves the multi-arch index digest from the GHCR registry API
(anonymous pull token, no docker daemon), verifies the keyless cosign
signature against the workflow identity (fails closed — no cosign, no
promotion), and prints the resulting HEALTHLOG_IMAGE_REF=@sha256:…
value.
For a Coolify-managed deployment it can also apply the pin. Two facts about Coolify shape the mechanism (verified against the Coolify OpenAPI spec and a live instance):
- For a git-based "Docker Compose" application, Coolify re-reads the
compose file from the repository checkout on every deploy.
docker_compose_rawis its stored copy of that file, and the application-update API (PATCH /api/v1/applications/{uuid}) does not accept the field — editing the stored compose is neither possible via API nor durable. - Application env vars are durable, exposed via the documented
/api/v1/applications/{uuid}/envsendpoints, and interpolated into the compose at deploy time.
So the pin travels as the HEALTHLOG_IMAGE_REF env var. With
COOLIFY_API_TOKEN, COOLIFY_API_URL and COOLIFY_APP_UUID in the
environment the script creates/updates the var itself (add
PROMOTE_DEPLOY=1 to also trigger the redeploy); without a token it
prints the equivalent curl commands:
curl -sS -X PATCH "https://<coolify-host>/api/v1/applications/<app-uuid>/envs" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"key":"HEALTHLOG_IMAGE_REF","value":"@sha256:<digest>"}'
curl -sS "https://<coolify-host>/api/v1/deploy?uuid=<app-uuid>" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <token>"
After the deploy settles, confirm /api/version reports the released
version + buildSha on every target (see above).
Rollback: re-run the script with the previous tag (or PATCH the env
var back to the previous digest / to empty for :latest) and redeploy.
Digest pinning trades the automatic :latest pickup for determinism —
a pinned instance only moves when the var moves, so the promotion step
becomes part of the release routine, not an optional extra.
Digest pinning is the recommended hardening for operators with a
threat model that includes the registry; :latest remains the
low-friction default.
Deploy-status webhook: replay protection
POST /api/internal/deploy-webhook authenticates via the static
X-Deploy-Webhook-Secret header. Since v1.16.4 it additionally
enforces a freshness window: a request carrying an
X-Deploy-Webhook-Timestamp header (unix seconds, unix milliseconds,
or ISO-8601) is rejected with 401 {"status":"stale"} when the
timestamp lies more than 5 minutes from server time — so a captured
request cannot be replayed later to re-page admins or forge deploy
outcomes in the audit log.
Two modes:
-
Default (tolerant). Requests without the header pass — Coolify's stock notification sender does not attach one. A header that is present but stale or unparseable is always rejected.
-
Strict. Set
DEPLOY_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_TIMESTAMP=truein the app environment to make the header mandatory, closing the replay window completely. Use this when the sender (or a reverse proxy in front of the app) can attach the timestamp, e.g.:curl -X POST https://<host>/api/internal/deploy-webhook \ -H "X-Deploy-Webhook-Secret: $SECRET" \ -H "X-Deploy-Webhook-Timestamp: $(date +%s)" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"status":"success"}'