mirror of
https://github.com/MBombeck/HealthLog.git
synced 2026-11-09 21:10:59 +00:00
Marc-André Bombeck
b882698a44
Check a newly chosen password against HaveIBeenPwned through the k-anonymity range API: only the first five hex characters of the SHA-1 digest leave the host, the suffix is matched locally, and Add-Padding hides the bucket size. A confirmed match is rejected so a fresh credential is never a known-breached one; the check fails open, so an unreachable HIBP never blocks the operation. Covers registration, password change, and admin reset. Existing passwords are never retroactively blocked at login. Also lands the six-locale strings for the password-breach notice and the account-security surfaces that follow.
78 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
78 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* v1.23 — HaveIBeenPwned password-breach check via the k-anonymity range API.
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*
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* Privacy contract (the whole point of k-anonymity): the password is SHA-1'd
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* locally and ONLY the first 5 hex characters of the uppercase digest leave the
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* server. The remaining 35-character suffix is matched against the response
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* locally; the full hash and the password itself never cross the network. The
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* request carries `Add-Padding: true` so the response size does not leak which
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* prefix bucket was queried.
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*
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* Resilience: any failure (egress disabled, HIBP down, timeout, non-200,
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* malformed body) returns `null` — "unknown". Callers treat `null` as
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* fail-open and never block on it; only a confirmed breach (`breached: true`)
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* is actionable. The check is therefore safe to run inline at password-set
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* time without making HIBP a hard dependency of account management.
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*/
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import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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import { safeFetch } from "@/lib/safe-fetch";
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import { getEvent } from "@/lib/logging/context";
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const HIBP_RANGE_URL = "https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/";
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export interface BreachCheckResult {
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breached: boolean;
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/** Number of times the password appears in the corpus (0 when not found). */
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count: number;
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}
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/**
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* Returns the breach status of `password`, or `null` when the check could not
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* be completed (fail-open). Never throws.
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*/
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export async function checkPasswordBreach(
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password: string,
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): Promise<BreachCheckResult | null> {
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try {
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const digest = createHash("sha1")
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.update(password, "utf8")
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.digest("hex")
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.toUpperCase();
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const prefix = digest.slice(0, 5);
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const suffix = digest.slice(5);
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const res = await safeFetch(
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`${HIBP_RANGE_URL}${prefix}`,
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{
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method: "GET",
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headers: { "Add-Padding": "true" },
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signal: AbortSignal.timeout(4000),
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},
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// The host is a fixed, app-controlled public endpoint, but pin the
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// public-host / DNS-rebinding guard anyway — it is a hard egress, and the
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// SSRF floor is cheap.
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{ requirePublicHost: true },
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);
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if (!res.ok) return null;
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const body = await res.text();
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// Each line: "<35-hex-suffix>:<count>". Compare case-insensitively.
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for (const line of body.split("\n")) {
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const sep = line.indexOf(":");
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if (sep < 0) continue;
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const lineSuffix = line.slice(0, sep).trim().toUpperCase();
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if (lineSuffix === suffix) {
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const count = parseInt(line.slice(sep + 1).trim(), 10);
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return { breached: true, count: Number.isFinite(count) ? count : 1 };
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}
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}
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return { breached: false, count: 0 };
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} catch (err) {
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getEvent()?.addWarning(
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`HIBP breach check unavailable (fail-open): ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
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);
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return null;
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}
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}
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