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Marc-André BombeckandClaude Opus 4.7
165a14afda
The hand-rolled extractor called `inflateRawSync(compressed)` without
a `maxOutputLength` option and never inspected the central directory's
advertised uncompressed size, so a 1 KB ZIP could expand to tens of
gigabytes during inflate and OOM the shared Next.js process. The route
already caps the upload at 1.5 GB and rate-limits to 3 / min per user,
but a single successful inflate would still take the whole container
with it.
Two layers of defence land here:
- Pre-flight refusal on the central directory's `uncompressedSize`
when it exceeds 8 GiB or when the advertised compression ratio
exceeds 200×. This is a coarse signal — the metadata is attacker-
controlled — but it catches honest-but-oversized payloads early.
- `inflateRawSync(compressed, { maxOutputLength: 8 GiB })` instructs
`node:zlib` to throw rather than expand past the cap, which holds
even when the metadata lies about the uncompressed size.
8 GiB leaves a wide ceiling for legitimate multi-year heavy-user
exports (the largest real-world ones settle in the low single-digit
GB range), while making the bomb class infeasible.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>