import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest"; import { NextRequest } from "next/server"; /** * v1.17.0 — `/invite/` is the invite universal-link landing * (iOS #16). It is a thin shape-validated redirect onto * `/auth/register?invite=…` and carries no session, so an unauthenticated * visitor (scanning the admin QR) must reach it without the auth-gate * bounce to `/auth/login`. This guard locks the allowlist entry in place * so a future refactor of `src/proxy.ts` cannot silently re-gate it. * * v1.38.19 — the redirect moved here, to the edge. It used to be emitted by * `src/app/invite/[token]/page.tsx`, and Next does not answer that with a * server 307: it streams the root layout first and puts the redirect in the * flight payload, so `` mounted on `/invite/…`, read the pathname * as a protected route and raced its own `router.replace("/auth/login")` * against the redirect. Answering at the edge means there is no HTML, no * hydration and no race — the behaviour the page's doc comment already * claimed. The page stays as the fallback for any path that bypasses the * proxy matcher. */ vi.mock("@/lib/process-type", () => ({ shouldRunWeb: () => true, })); import { proxy } from "../proxy"; const VALID_TOKEN = `hlv_${"a".repeat(64)}`; function makeRequest( pathname: string, cookies: Record = {}, ): NextRequest { const cookieHeader = Object.entries(cookies) .map(([k, v]) => `${k}=${v}`) .join("; "); return new NextRequest(`http://localhost${pathname}`, { headers: cookieHeader ? { cookie: cookieHeader } : {}, }); } describe("proxy.ts /invite public-allowlist (v1.17.0)", () => { it("does not 307 an unauthenticated /invite/ to /auth/login", () => { const res = proxy(makeRequest(`/invite/${VALID_TOKEN}`)); expect(res.headers.get("location") ?? "").not.toMatch(/\/auth\/login/); }); it("does not bounce a pending-onboarding session off the invite landing", () => { const res = proxy( makeRequest(`/invite/${VALID_TOKEN}`, { healthlog_session: "sess-1", hl_onboarding: "pending", }), ); expect(res.headers.get("location") ?? "").not.toMatch(/\/onboarding/); expect(res.headers.get("location") ?? "").not.toMatch(/\/auth\/login/); }); it("hardens the token-in-path surface against cache / index / referrer leaks", () => { // Mirror the `/c/` edge defence — the secret rides in the path, // so no CDN may cache it and no crawler may index the URL. const res = proxy(makeRequest(`/invite/${VALID_TOKEN}`)); expect(res.headers.get("Cache-Control")).toBe( "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate", ); expect(res.headers.get("X-Robots-Tag")).toBe("noindex, nofollow"); expect(res.headers.get("Referrer-Policy")).toBe("no-referrer"); }); it("still redirects unauthenticated requests for protected pages", () => { // Negative check — confirms the fixture would catch a real // regression. `/insights` is not public. const res = proxy(makeRequest("/insights")); expect([307, 308]).toContain(res.status); expect(res.headers.get("location")).toMatch(/\/auth\/login/); }); }); describe("proxy.ts /invite edge redirect (v1.38.19)", () => { it("307s a shape-valid token straight onto the registration form", () => { const res = proxy(makeRequest(`/invite/${VALID_TOKEN}`)); expect(res.status).toBe(307); expect(res.headers.get("location")).toBe( `http://localhost/auth/register?invite=${VALID_TOKEN}`, ); }); it("307s a malformed segment onto a bare registration form", () => { // Never echo an attacker-controlled segment into the target — a // malformed token behaves exactly like a visitor with no invite. const res = proxy(makeRequest("/invite/not-a-token")); expect(res.status).toBe(307); expect(res.headers.get("location")).toBe("http://localhost/auth/register"); }); it("ignores anything after the token segment", () => { const res = proxy(makeRequest(`/invite/${VALID_TOKEN}/extra`)); expect(res.headers.get("location")).toBe( `http://localhost/auth/register?invite=${VALID_TOKEN}`, ); }); it.each([ ["an uppercase hex body", `hlv_${"A".repeat(64)}`], ["a short body", `hlv_${"a".repeat(63)}`], ["a long body", `hlv_${"a".repeat(65)}`], ["the wrong prefix", `hlk_${"a".repeat(64)}`], ["an empty segment", ""], ])("drops %s rather than echoing it into the target", (_label, segment) => { const res = proxy(makeRequest(`/invite/${segment}`)); expect(res.headers.get("location")).toBe("http://localhost/auth/register"); }); it("keeps the token hardening on the malformed redirect too", () => { const res = proxy(makeRequest("/invite/not-a-token")); expect(res.headers.get("Cache-Control")).toBe( "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate", ); expect(res.headers.get("X-Robots-Tag")).toBe("noindex, nofollow"); expect(res.headers.get("Referrer-Policy")).toBe("no-referrer"); }); it("carries the baseline transport headers on the redirect hop", () => { const res = proxy(makeRequest(`/invite/${VALID_TOKEN}`)); expect(res.headers.get("X-Content-Type-Options")).toBe("nosniff"); expect(res.headers.get("X-Frame-Options")).toBe("DENY"); }); it("redirects a signed-in caller the same way, with no session read", () => { const res = proxy( makeRequest(`/invite/${VALID_TOKEN}`, { healthlog_session: "sess-1" }), ); expect(res.status).toBe(307); expect(res.headers.get("location")).toBe( `http://localhost/auth/register?invite=${VALID_TOKEN}`, ); }); });