/** * POST /api/admin/encryption/rotate * * v1.23 — admin-triggered encryption-key rotation. Enqueues the * `encryption-key-rotate` pg-boss job, which re-encrypts the whole encrypted- * column corpus to the configured ACTIVE key id. The CLI * (`scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts`) stays the canonical path; this is a * convenience that reuses the same column registry and is safe by construction: * * - ACTIVE-KEY-ONLY + NEVER ADDS / DROPS A KEY: the job only writes the active * key and never touches `ENCRYPTION_KEYS`. Dropping a key remains an env + * redeploy act. * - IDEMPOTENT: rows already on the active key are skipped; the singleton key * coalesces duplicate triggers into one queued run. * * Auth: cookie-only `requireAdmin` (Bearer can never reach admin) PLUS * `requireFreshMfa` step-up — re-encrypting the whole sensitive corpus is a * high-blast-radius action. An admin without a second factor cannot use the * button and falls back to the CLI (this is intentional: step-up cannot be * softened, and the CLI is the documented canonical path). */ import { apiHandler, requireAdmin, requireFreshMfa, MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS, } from "@/lib/api-handler"; import { apiError, apiSuccess, getClientIp } from "@/lib/api-response"; import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context"; import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit"; import { getGlobalBoss } from "@/lib/jobs/boss-instance"; import { ENCRYPTION_KEY_ROTATE_QUEUE, ENCRYPTION_KEY_ROTATE_SINGLETON, } from "@/lib/jobs/encryption-key-rotate"; import { getActiveKeyId } from "@/lib/crypto"; import { NextRequest } from "next/server"; export const POST = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => { // Cookie-only admin, then a fresh second factor. Both resolution paths are // cookie-only, so a Bearer token cannot reach either. await requireAdmin(); const { user } = await requireFreshMfa(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS); annotate({ action: { name: "admin.encryption.rotate.requested" } }); const boss = getGlobalBoss(); if (!boss) { return apiError("Background worker is not available", 503); } const jobId = await boss.send( ENCRYPTION_KEY_ROTATE_QUEUE, { requestedByUserId: user.id, enqueuedAt: new Date().toISOString() }, { // Coalesce duplicate triggers: at most one queued run at a time. singletonKey: ENCRYPTION_KEY_ROTATE_SINGLETON, retryLimit: 2, retryDelay: 60, }, ); await auditLog("admin.encryption.rotate.requested", { userId: user.id, ipAddress: getClientIp(request), details: { activeKeyId: getActiveKeyId(), enqueued: Boolean(jobId) }, }); annotate({ meta: { rotate_enqueued: Boolean(jobId) } }); // A null jobId means the singleton coalesced this trigger onto an already- // queued run — still "accepted" from the operator's point of view. return apiSuccess({ accepted: true, alreadyQueued: !jobId }); });