The batch endpoints have been capped at 60 calls a minute since they
were written. The per-record siblings a naive or older client loops
over — the measurement create, the mood entry, both medication-intake
writes, a lab result, a custom-metric entry, a cycle day-log, a
vaccination, an allergy, a biomarker and an encounter — had no ceiling
at all. That is backwards from the risk: the batch endpoint is the one
a well-behaved client uses, and the unlimited path is the one a broken
loop finds.
All eleven share one generous per-account bucket, `record-write`, at
300 requests a minute. Five writes a second sustained for a full minute
is beyond any hand-driven session and any sync burst, and every one of
these routes is already wrapped in `withIdempotency`, so an honest
retry storm is deduplicated before it is counted — the bucket exists to
cut off the pathological loop, not to shape traffic. It keys on the
ACTING account, the precedent the delegable medication routes set, so a
delegate burns their own allowance rather than locking the record's
owner out of their own log.
The eleven operations publish the bucket name and the cap instead of
the generic refusal, on the shared 429 that already declares
`Retry-After` and the rate-limit triple. A test pulls the key and the
window out of the query the limiter runs and holds the published
sentence to them, so the paragraph cannot drift away from the bucket it
describes.
Zod 4's `.meta()` clones the schema and registers the clone, so a bare
`someSchema.meta({ id })` statement registers nothing at all. Thirty-nine of
those across eleven route modules published neither the name nor the
description written for it: the schema inlined anonymously at every use site,
and a client generated from the contract got a duplicated nameless type where
one named model belongs. That last part is the cost that matters, because the
native client is the reason the contract is published.
Bind each annotated clone to a const and point the route table at that const.
Twenty-nine ids now emit under `components.schemas`, referenced from their
thirty use sites. Seven stay absent by design: they annotate
`requestParams.query` objects, which the emitter expands into inline
`parameters` rather than a component. `MoodTagLayout` stays absent too, for
the reason `Medication` and `CoachPrefs` already carry a forced registration
in the components block: its only consumer is an `.extend()`, and extending
builds a new object rather than referencing the base.
Two annotations in the illness module named ids that no route ever referenced,
`GetIllnessDayLogQuery` and `ListIllnessDayLogsQuery` — the day-log path
publishes the merged `GetIllnessDayLogsQuery` instead. They were dead twice
over, so they go rather than get wired to nothing.
`docs/api/openapi.yaml` grows the twenty-nine components and their refs. The
only other movement in it is thirty descriptions appearing where the text had
never reached the document. No request or response shape changes.
`withIdempotency` has made writes safe to retry since v1.5.x. It was described
in route comments and in no schema, so an app generated against
`docs/api/openapi.yaml` could not learn that a retry was safe. The iOS side
asked for it; the mechanism does not change, only what it says about itself.
34 operations now declare `Idempotency-Key` and the `X-Idempotent-Replay`
header, plus the 409 that refuses a duplicate still in flight. The description
leads with the one silent failure in the mechanism: a key that misses
`^[A-Za-z0-9_\-:.]{8,128}$` is IGNORED rather than refused, so the write
proceeds unprotected and looks exactly like a request that carried no key.
## What the work turned up
Three things the contract had wrong or missing, none of them the thing being
built:
- `/api/insights/chat` describes `withIdempotency()` in its header comment and
applies it nowhere. The Coach chat is not retry-safe. Its prose says it is.
- `/api/measurements` exports GET, POST, PUT and DELETE and wraps only POST.
Publishing the header per PATH would have promised a safe retry on two
methods that do not honour one — the dangerous direction, so the guard works
per OPERATION.
- `/api/insights/feedback` and `/api/admin/backups/{id}/restore` are not in the
document at all. Both are named in the guard's exemption list with a reason,
not filtered out silently.
## The guard
`idempotency-contract-publication.test.ts` reads the expected set out of the
route tree on every run — nothing is hand-listed, so it cannot fall behind the
code. It fails in both directions: a new wrapped route that forgets to publish,
and a published claim no handler honours.
A fourth assertion checks the exemption list itself is still true. It earned
its place immediately: the first draft exempted the whole `/api/medications`
family on the strength of a grep for path literals that came back empty. The
paths are not written as literals there; the emitted document carries 19 of
them. The test went red, the claim was wrong, the list is two entries now.
Measure the artefact, not the source that builds it.
Refs A3-11. Deleting a logged custom-metric value was the one hard delete
left on an entry surface — everywhere else a deletion tombstones and the
toast offers Undo. The DELETE verb now stamps deletedAt, every read
(list, latest-value, counts, revive check) filters the tombstone, and the
new entries/restore endpoint clears it scoped to owner and parent metric —
a foreign, live or mismatched id is a silent no-op, never an existence
leak. The history table's delete toast carries the Undo action.
Every route that resolves a record through the sharing fence can answer 403
`sharing.access.denied`, and until now that fact was published on the selector
header and on none of the 120 operations that produce it. All 120 carry it now,
byte for byte, from one constant: the refusal is deliberately indistinguishable
across a missing account, a missing grant, a scope that does not reach the
surface and a read grant on a write, so 120 paraphrases would invite a client to
tell apart what the server refuses to.
Where a delegable route already answered 403 for its own reason — a module
gate, the cycle gate, AI consent — the two share one description rather than one
of them going unpublished, since OpenAPI allows a single response per status.
The guard recomputes the delegable set from the route sources on every run and
classifies per verb, which matters: seventeen modules have a delegable read
beside a write that refuses a switch outright.
Add a user-defined custom-metric store alongside the built-in measurements
on the Measurements surface. A user defines an arbitrary metric (name, unit,
optional target window, decimals, description), logs values, and charts them.
The store is a separate generic catalog + values pair, isolated from the
closed measurement-type system: not synced, not in FHIR, not in insights —
log and chart only. Names and units are plaintext, mirroring the biomarker
catalog. The inline list lives beneath the measurement list (no new nav
entry); tapping a metric opens a detail page with the trend chart, target
band, stat strip, and an editable value history.
Migration 0224 adds custom_metrics and custom_metric_entries.
Marc-André Bombeck