An account created through OIDC holds no password, passkey or second
factor, so the recent-proof gate in front of token minting, MCP
connections, exports and the admin reset had nothing to ask it for and
the web could only say "sign in again" (#1296).
GET /api/auth/oidc/reproof sends the browser back to the configured
provider with prompt=login and max_age=0, its own state, nonce and PKCE
verifier, and the signed-in account and session sealed into the state
cookie. The shared callback branches on that intent: it refuses unless
the browser still carries the bound session (checked before the code is
redeemed), the ID token names the account's linked issuer and subject,
and auth_time lies inside the gate's five-minute window. It then stamps
Session.reproofAt exactly as a password re-proof does, creates no
session, and returns to the page it left with ?reproof=done|failed.
recentProofMethods offers "oidc" only to an account without a second
factor whose identity is linked while a provider is configured, and the
fresh-factor gate never lists it. GET /api/auth/me/mfa publishes the
list as proofMethods, so the passkey card offers what the account can
actually give, and register-options takes { method: "oidc" } on a fresh
provider re-proof, so such an account can add a passkey as a second way
to confirm. Both re-proof dialogs offer the provider and a toast reports
the outcome on return.
The callback's missing-state branch and the passkey card's enrollment
flow move into their own functions to keep both handlers under the size
ratchet.
api-handler.ts held two modules: the route wrapper and thirteen guards. The
guards now live in lib/auth/guards/, one module per family (the caller,
the acting-account carrier, the record modes, the cookie-only helpers, the
fresh-factor and recent-proof gates, the Bearer elevation, MFA management).
api-handler.ts keeps the wrapper and re-exports every guard, so it stays the
one public entry and no route changes its import.
The bodies move verbatim; only the version prefixes of moved comments are
dropped. The structural guards that read the auth layer now find the module
that declares a guard by name (helpers/auth-guards.ts) instead of a fixed
path, and a new guard holds the entry: nothing outside the folder but
api-handler.ts imports a guard module.
The session lookup and the Bearer resolver loaded the whole users row on
every authenticated request, including the profile picture bytes, the
cached briefing text and every stored integration credential. Both now
select SESSION_USER_SELECT, a named allowlist of the small columns the
request path reads, and so does the owner load for a switched record.
The few routes that need a credential or a large column read it
themselves at the moment of use: the factor verifiers load the password
hash and TOTP secret, the profile response loads the insurance number,
and the snapshot read loads the cached briefing text. A structural guard
holds the lookups to the projection and keeps every Bytes and
secret-shaped column out of it.
An account whose only strong credential is a primary passkey was refused
auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled on every action behind requireFreshMfa, so it
could not create, edit, hand over or delete a managed profile or manage its
guardians, although a passkey sign-in or re-proof already stamps the
session the gate reads.
requireFreshMfa now defaults to the any-possession proof source: a passkey
makes the gate reachable, and a passkey re-proof through the dialog clears
it. The refusal offers passkey in meta.methods, never the password.
hasSecondFactorEnrolled keeps its narrow meaning on purpose. It decides
whether the conditional gates apply at all (account deletion, the data
reset, the password change, the export, offering manage access, the
recent-proof branches and the native Bearer rules), so none of those
change, and password sign-in still challenges only TOTP and security keys.
The MFA-management routes keep the second-factor source. The decision and
its limits are written beside FreshFactorProofSource.
Copy, the OpenAPI description and the sharing and key-rotation docs say
"second factor or passkey" where this gate applies.
Refs #959
On an account with a second factor, TOTP setup, security-key registration
and passkey registration no longer accept the password, a password re-proof
or a session younger than five minutes. A remembered browser skips the
second factor at sign-in and still creates a fresh session, so the password
alone could add a key that then satisfies every gate the factor protected.
Only a TOTP code, a security key, a passkey or a completed second factor
within five minutes opens enrollment there; the Bearer arm of TOTP setup and
security-key registration asks the same of its elevation. Accounts without
a second factor keep the previous rules.
The refusal names the proofs the account can give, and the enrollment
dialogs offer exactly those. A proof that verifies now gives its attempt
back to the shared re-proof budget, including the current password on a
password change.
Marc-André Bombeck