The proxy now answers `/invite/<token>` with a real 307 onto
`/auth/register?invite=…` (or a bare `/auth/register` when the segment fails
the `hlv_` shape gate), carrying the baseline transport headers plus the
no-store / noindex / no-referrer hardening the token-in-path surface has had
since v1.17.0.
Before this the redirect came from the landing page, which Next delivers in the
RSC flight payload rather than as a server 307 — the shell mounted first and
raced it. At the edge there is no HTML and no hydration, so there is nothing to
race. The page stays in place as the fallback for any path that bypasses the
proxy matcher.
Extend the /c/ edge defence (no-store, noindex, no-referrer) to the
/invite/<hlv_token> surface — the invite secret rides in the path, so no
CDN may cache it and no crawler may index the URL.
Encode the admin invite QR as a clean /invite/<hlv_token> universal-link
that the iOS app intercepts via the AASA wildcard matcher. Add the
matching web route as a thin, shape-validated redirect onto the existing
register flow, and open the path on the public allowlist so an
unauthenticated scanner reaches it. A malformed token segment is
indistinguishable from no invite — no database hit, no enumeration
oracle. The token is never logged.