The upload route awaited an unguarded enqueueDocumentIndex after the
document was already committed. A transient boss.send rejection (a DB
hiccup) would then surface as a 500 for an upload that in fact stored the
file. Guard the send inside the enqueue (a failure annotates and no-ops,
matching the missing-boss path) and drop the await at the call site so the
response never blocks on or fails because of background indexing.
The PATCH detail route now reads the content-index provenance, so its route
test mocks documentContentIndex.findUnique; the searchable status spinner and
the Read-with-AI pulse pair with motion-reduce:animate-none per the coverage
guard.
Surface the content-search index's source (vision vs local extraction) on
the list + detail DTO so the vault UI can tell an AI-read document from a
locally-indexed one. Threads the source through both read paths and the
serialisers, regenerates the OpenAPI contract, and adds a narrowing helper
for the free-String column.
Index a document for content search automatically the moment it is stored,
instead of requiring a manual index action. A fire-and-forget per-document
job runs an AI-first decision tree: when a vision-capable provider is
configured and consented, transcribe the stored original (rich, handles
scanned PDFs and images), budget-reserved exactly like the interactive index
route; otherwise fall back to server-side text-layer extraction via pdf-parse
(no provider, no egress, milliseconds) so content search works at a baseline
even with no AI. Budget exhaustion, a provider that cannot read the file
(a text-layer PDF on a non-Anthropic account), and provider errors all fall
through to the free local path rather than leave a document unsearchable.
Both paths write the same blind, encrypted content index (AES-256-GCM text +
opaque HMAC token tags) — nothing readable at rest. The local path adds the
'local-pdf' / 'local-ocr' source values (free String column, no migration).
Server-side OCR for scanned images and scanned PDFs is left as a documented
seam. Pin pdf-parse + pdfjs-dist into the standalone trace so the wasm text
extractor ships in the runtime image.
The usage endpoint counted every DocumentContentIndex row for the user,
including those whose parent document has been soft-deleted (the index
row survives until the hard purge). Against totalCount, which filters
live documents, the gauge could read past 100 %. Scope the indexed count
to live documents so coverage never exceeds the corpus.
Also drop a redundant identical-branch ternary in the per-document
content-index status row.
P2-1. The list GET now issues a documentContentIndex lookup and unions a
content-token OR branch when a search term is present, so the existing route
test gains the mock + the third OR branch in its where assertion. Fix the
backfill test's findFirst mock signature under strict tsc.
P2-1. Unit tests for the token scheme (whole-word match, stopword drop,
de-accent, no plaintext at rest, subkey follows the active key), HKDF subkey
derivation, the suggest route (drafts only, writes nothing, provider-gated),
the summary route (session-only, budget+audit only), the index route (vision
transcribe→upsert, text posts OCR text, provider/local-OCR gated), and the
backfill (no-provider/no-consent no-op, indexes, budget-reached resume).
P2-1-T7/T8/T9.
- document-content-index-backfill: on-demand per-user pg-boss job that indexes
a user's not-yet-indexed image/PDF documents via one provider transcription
each. Consent + budget gated, id-cursor forward walk, capped per run, stops
on budget exhaustion, resumable. Queue + worker registered in the maintenance
registrar (no cron — deliberate action only). POST /reindex triggers it.
- rotation: register DocumentContentIndex.textEncrypted and add a dedicated
block that re-encrypts the text AND re-tokenises the blind index under the new
active HKDF subkey in one update (P2-D7).
- OpenAPI: suggest / summary / index / reindex paths; hasContentIndex on the
document schema; assistAvailable + contentIndex on usage. Regenerated
docs/api/openapi.yaml.
P2-1-T2/T3/T4/T5/T6.
- assist.ts + [id]/suggest: one provider call proposes a { title, kind,
documentDate } filing draft over the stored original or browser-OCR text.
Runs the full extract gauntlet (module → provider → consent → rate-limit →
budget) but writes nothing — never touches the fact rail or status.
- describe.ts + [id]/summary?mode=summary|text: session-only summary or raw
transcribed text. Descriptive only, no diagnosis; persists only the budget
ledger + audit.
- content-index.ts + [id]/index: normalise → tokenise (de-accent, stopword
drop, whole-word) → HMAC-SHA256 under an HKDF-derived subkey → store the
token array plus AES-256-GCM ciphertext of the text. Vision path transcribes
via the provider (consent + budget); text path indexes posted local-OCR text
(no egress). Gated on the existing AI consent — no new per-user toggle.
- crypto.deriveSubkey: HKDF-SHA256 purpose-bound subkey off the active key.
- list search now unions title/filename ILIKE with a GIN-accelerated
whole-word content-token match; DTO gains hasContentIndex.
- usage gains assistAvailable + contentIndex { enabled, indexedCount,
totalCount }; detail gains hasContentIndex.
The filter bar derived its condition chips from the loaded corpus, so an
episode whose only linked documents sat pages deep in the timeline never
surfaced a chip — the condition route into an older document silently
disappeared at four-digit corpus sizes. The usage endpoint (already read
on page mount) now returns `linkedEpisodes` — every episode carrying at
least one live document link, one indexed grouped query, no blobs — and
the view unions it with the active-filter fallback. Additive DTO change;
OpenAPI regenerated.
Concurrent uploads all read the same pre-insert usage SUM, so a burst
could overshoot the per-user quota by rate-limit x cap in one window. A
transaction-scoped advisory lock keyed on the user id serialises the
sum-and-insert; uploads by different users never queue on each other.
Integration probes pin both races: four parallel uploads against a
two-file quota land exactly two, and two racing identical uploads
collapse onto one row via the partial unique index.
Also aligns the round-trip integration test with the serve-route CSP
posture: the proxy carve-out owns the response CSP, the route sets none.
The one-shot deep-link consumption moves to the render-phase derived-
state pattern the view already uses for its search draft (the effect
variant trips the set-state-in-effect rule), gated on resolved auth so
a deep link never burns before the module flag is known.
Refs: document-vault plan W3-T4
The proxy's serve-route carve-out owns the response CSP (default-src
'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; no sandbox — Chromium force-downloads
sandboxed PDFs), and middleware headers overwrite route headers, so the
route-level sandbox value never reached a client. Remove it and point
both the route and its header-matrix test at the proxy pin.
Refs: document-vault plan W1-T10 posture reconciliation
POST [id]/restore clears the soft-delete tombstone inside the 30-day undo
grace; it answers 409 once the tombstone is purged (the undo window is
over) and 409 with meta.reason=duplicateExists when an identical live
document would collide with the live-dedupe index. Restoring an
already-live row is a no-op success, so a late undo toast never errors.
POST /bulk applies one action (setKind / linkEpisode / unlinkEpisode /
delete / restore) to up to 100 owner-scoped documents and reports per-id
outcomes — a partial failure never aborts the batch. GET /usage returns
usedBytes (tombstone-inclusive), the effective quota, the per-file cap,
and the accepted-extension list for picker accept attributes.
The serve route now derives its posture from the serving class: inline
types keep their true Content-Type and gain Content-Security-Policy:
sandbox as defence-in-depth for the PDF viewer context; attachment types
ALWAYS go out as application/octet-stream + Content-Disposition:
attachment. nosniff and private,no-store on both; RFC 5987 filename
handling unchanged; decrypt dispatches on the row codec and stays
fail-closed. Header matrix pinned per class in the route tests.
Tasks: W1-T8, W1-T9, W1-T10.
POST /api/documents/inbound now runs the policy layer end to end: bounded
read aborts at the admin-set cap (413 + meta.reason=fileTooLarge with the
limit), magic-byte classification (415 + unsupportedType), per-user quota
checked inside the insert transaction over every non-purged row —
tombstones keep counting, so deleted bytes are never invisible weight
(413 + quotaExceeded with the figures), sha256 dedupe (a same-bytes
re-upload answers 200 + meta.duplicate with the existing live row; the
partial unique index closes the race), an honoured Idempotency-Key, the
binary2 codec on write, and optional episodeIds[] pre-linking narrowed to
the caller's live episodes.
GET stops fetching the encrypted blob per row (omit: contentEncrypted —
a 50-row page dragged up to 50 × cap ciphertext before), learns kind[] /
episodeId / year facets on top of q/from/to, and returns conditionLinks +
servingClass on every DTO via one grouped link query (no N+1). PATCH gains
replace-set episodeIds with the same 404-shaped refusal for a foreign
episode. The extract path decrypts through the codec dispatcher.
The document-kind labels gain REFERRAL in all six locales.
Tasks: W1-T5, W1-T6, W1-T7.
Default documentDate at store time. A store-only upload no longer lands
with a NULL filing date: when the client omits one, default it to the
upload day so the column is always set on a stored row. The library list
sorts, groups, and range-filters on the same effective date the UI shows,
so undated uploads no longer mis-sort under nulls-last, break date-group
headers, or fall through the range filter. The date stays user-editable
and may be cleared back to NULL via PATCH.
Block re-extraction once any fact is APPROVED. A partially-confirmed
document stays EXTRACTED, which the CONFIRMED guard does not catch;
re-extracting would delete the approved facts (severing the committed
record's provenance) and re-stage them as PENDING, letting a second
approval duplicate the committed lab / condition / medication. The
extract route now refuses with 409 (documents.inbound.alreadyPartlyConfirmed)
when approved facts exist; the user must finish reviewing or discard first.
RFC 5987-encode the original-download filename. The Content-Disposition
now carries both an ASCII filename= fallback and a filename*=UTF-8'' value
so a non-ASCII name survives intact; the stored set is inline-safe by
construction, so the dead attachment branch is removed.
Add a light per-user rate-limit backstop to the original-read, PATCH, and
DELETE routes (generous; self-DoS only — the routes are owner-scoped).
Lean the list counts: tally facts for the whole page in one grouped count
instead of materialising fact-id rows, and exclude REJECTED facts from
factCount. Extend the documentDate index with deleted_at to cover the
list scan. Document the deliberate plaintext-title PHI tradeoff at the
column and the store site.
Invert the inbound-documents surface from an OCR inbox into a document
library: a file can be stored without any AI provider, and extraction
becomes an opt-in action on top.
- Migration 0222: add `title` + `document_date` columns, a
`(user_id, document_date)` index, the richer kind taxonomy
(lab/imaging/prescription/insurance/vaccination), and a STORED status
made the column default. The status enum is recreated so the new value
can be set as the default within the migration transaction; kind values
use ADD VALUE. Nullable columns, no backfill.
- POST /api/documents/inbound is now store-only: bounded multipart read,
magic-byte MIME sniff, AES-256-GCM at rest, persisted as STORED with no
provider/consent/budget call and no egress.
- POST /api/documents/inbound/[id]/extract carries the relocated
extraction gauntlet (resolve provider, consent, rate-limit, budget, run,
reconcile, stage facts) against an already-stored row; absent a provider
it 422s the enhancement only and leaves the stored document intact.
- PATCH /api/documents/inbound/[id] edits title/kind/documentDate
field-by-field, owner-scoped by session userId.
- GET /api/documents/inbound gains search, kind filter, documentDate
range, sort, and keyset pagination via the parameter-bound query builder.
- Extend the validation schemas + DTO, regenerate the OpenAPI contract,
and add route tests for the store/extract/edit/list paths.
The inbound-document store keeps the uploaded doctor letter encrypted at
rest (InboundDocument.contentEncrypted, AES-256-GCM), but there was no way
to read the original back — the decrypt helper had been dropped as unused.
- Restore decryptDocumentFromBytes in the document store, fail-closed on a
bad / missing key id.
- Add GET /api/documents/inbound/[id]/original: owner-scoped (userId-narrowed
query), module-gated, returns the decrypted bytes with the stored MIME
type. A PDF / image is served inline so the browser can render it; other
types download as an attachment. The filename is sanitised before it
reaches the Content-Disposition header. The bytes are PHI — never logged,
never served cross-user, and a decrypt error fails closed (500) rather than
returning ciphertext. Cache-Control is private, no-store.
- Surface a 'View original' action in the document review screen.
- Document the route in the OpenAPI registry and regenerate the spec.
- Cover the route with a test: owner-scoped success, attachment fallback,
404 for another user's document, and fail-closed on decrypt error.
i18n: viewOriginal across all six locales.
The inbound-document store encrypts the raw upload
(`inbound_documents.content_encrypted`) because it is sensitive clinical
data, but the per-fact staging columns persisted the same class of data in
the clear: `extracted_facts.data_json` held the transcribed clinical values
(diagnosis text, lab values, medication names, stated codes) and
`provenance_json` held the verbatim source span (up to 2000 chars copied
straight out of the report). The at-rest guarantee was defeated for staged
facts, which persist through PENDING and are retained after the decision.
Convert both columns to the AES-256-GCM `*_encrypted` BYTEA convention shared
with the note columns, going through the same Bytes codec. The upload and
fact-edit paths encrypt on write; the confirm path decrypts at commit time to
write into the normal structured stores, so the review-then-confirm flow is
unchanged. Reads are fail-closed (a bad key id throws).
Register both columns in the encrypted-columns registry and the key-rotation
script so a dropped legacy key cannot strand them (the guard test enforces
both). Migration 0220 swaps the plaintext JSONB columns for the encrypted
BYTEA columns; pre-confirm staged rows are ephemeral and cannot be
re-encrypted in SQL, so any left by a pre-release build are dropped rather
than retained as plaintext (their parent document keeps its encrypted
original).
Ingest an uploaded doctor report / discharge letter through the existing
dedicated OCR/vision provider rails (the v1.22 document-scan provider/key,
reused — no new provider) and transcribe structured facts into staging.
The safety line is extract, never interpret: the prompt frames the document
as untrusted data to reproduce verbatim. Diagnoses map to Condition,
measured values to Observation, medications to MedicationStatement — with
STATED status only. A code survives only when the document writes it and its
system matches the resource (SNOMED/ICD-10 for a diagnosis, LOINC for a
value, RxNorm/ATC for a medication); nothing is inferred, no value is
range-flagged, no condition is linked to a medication. Every fact carries
per-field provenance and a confidence score; a fact below the confidence
floor fails closed — it cannot be approved until the user edits it.
Routes (apiHandler + Zod + session-narrowed userId, opt-in module-gated):
- POST/GET /api/documents/inbound — upload+extract (vision or local-OCR
text), and list. The raw document is stored encrypted at rest.
- GET/DELETE /api/documents/inbound/[id] — review detail; soft-delete.
- PATCH .../facts/[factId] — correct a staged fact before approval.
- POST .../confirm — the only write path: approved facts flow into the
labs / conditions / medications stores through their normal create paths;
rejected facts are discarded; low-confidence facts are refused.
Marc-André Bombeck