Environment settings show the home date, travel ranges and latest air
quality day as formatted dates instead of ISO keys, the backfill card
ends in its action row with the status lines above it, and the
attribution list sits on the page's reading edge. The sharing invite card
keeps a one-sentence description and says once, under the field, that
the person needs an account here. An expired claim link offers the
sign-in page instead of a dead end.
A guardian with a fresh second factor mints a one-time handover link
(hlp_ token, HMAC hash stored only, 1/7/14 days, at most one open per
profile, withdrawable) with a proposed access level per guardian: end,
view only or manage, view only by default. The link is shown once with a
copy button and a QR code; nothing is mailed. The panel sits at the end
of each managed-profile row and hints when the person is under 16.
The person opens /claim/<token>, sees a minimal preview (name, expiry,
who keeps which access, no health data) and chooses a username, a
required email and a password under the registration policy. The claim
is one transaction under the managed-profile lock: the token is
consumed, the credentials are set, the marker is cleared, every pending
invitation the record offered is withdrawn, each guardian's access is
set to its proposal, the disclaimer, onboarding and AI consent are
reset, and every step is audited on the record and on each guardian's
own account. A failure anywhere leaves the profile managed and the link
unused. Each guardian is notified on their own channels.
The new owner then sees each guardian's access on the first screen after
signing in and decides finally; until then the proposal holds, and the
decision waits at the top of Shared access. A guardian whose access
moved since the claim is left alone. The same screen points the owner
at their own notification channels, since reminders no longer reach the
guardians.
Both anonymous routes refuse a single-sign-on-only instance, refuse a
live session before spending the per-address rate limit, check the link
before probing names, and answer one 404 for every unusable token. The
token travels in request bodies only; hlp_ joins the redaction and
secret-shape rules and /claim/ the path-secret registry. Usernames
starting with managed- are reserved. The session-surface and acting-
account guards list the new surfaces with their reasons.
A server that issues Secure session cookies cannot sign anyone in on a
plain http:// page: the browser drops the cookie. The login request was
still verified, the MFA ticket minted and then claimed, and the next
attempt answered "Invalid or expired challenge".
The web client now sends an optional clientTransport on the browser
sign-in requests (password login, passkey start, both MFA completions).
When the server issues Secure cookies and the page is plain http on a
non-loopback host, the request is refused with 409
auth.session.insecure_transport before the password is checked, a
ticket is minted or claimed, a code is spent, or a passkey challenge is
issued. A request without the field is never refused. The SSO start
takes client_proto/client_host and sends such a page back to the login
page instead of to the provider.
GET /api/auth/registration-status publishes sessionCookieSecure, and the
login page shows the reason with both fixes and disables the sign-in
controls before anything is sent; on localhost it shows a note only.
SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE keeps its meaning; the header heuristic log line
stays.
The spec re-declared the server's algorithm, digit count and period as
literals, so a change to any of them would leave the spec generating codes the
server no longer verifies and blaming the product. It imports the three
exported constants instead; the recovery-batch size stays a literal, because
its module pulls in the database client and would drag the generated client
into the Playwright process.
The two credential fields on the login form are addressed by test id now, like
the submit button beside them, and the recovery toggle at the challenge is
renamed to the house's noun-verb order.
Enrol TOTP from the settings surface, sign out, sign back in through the
challenge, and step up for a recovery-code rotation — in a browser, against
a real server, on a throwaway account the journey seeds and drops itself.
Four refusals ride alongside the four positives: a wrong code at the
challenge (401, no session cookie, and the ticket's attempt counter moved),
the enrolment code replayed (401, refused by the monotonic totpLastStep
floor), the rotation once the session's mfaVerifiedAt has aged past the
five-minute window (401 with meta.errorCode auth.stepup.required), and a
recovery code presented a second time (401). Each was proved to fail by
removing the control it stands on and watching that one assertion break.
Codes are computed from the enrolment secret with the otpauth dependency the
server verifies against, at explicit timestamps, so nothing waits on a step
boundary: the sign-in code is generated one step ahead of now, inside the
±1 drift window and necessarily above the replay floor.
The fixture reaches Postgres for the two things that have no endpoint by
design — ageing the step-up stamp, and emptying the per-IP auth buckets
this journey would otherwise exhaust. The account carries the Playwright
project name so the two browser projects never drive one factor state.
Adds data-testid hooks on the TOTP card, the login step, and the password
form so the spec asserts on stable attributes instead of rendered text.
Add an opt-in "remember this device" at the second-factor step. On opt-in
a random token is minted, set in an httpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Strict cookie,
and only its HMAC hash is stored in a new TrustedDevice table. A later sign-in
from the same browser still requires the password (factor 1); a matching,
unexpired trusted device lets the login skip factor 2 only.
The token is never accepted for step-up — a trusted-device login does not stamp
mfaVerifiedAt — so a stolen device cookie cannot reach a destructive action.
Trusted devices are listed and revocable from the security surface, are revoked
wholesale when the second factor is removed or the user signs out everywhere,
and cascade away on account deletion. A recovery-code login never trusts the
browser. Migration 0204 adds the table (and the instance-wide mfa_required
policy column that the enforcement work reads).
When a password is accepted for an account with a second factor, the
login response carries a single-use ticket instead of a session. The
login page now renders a second step: a TOTP or recovery code, or a
WebAuthn security-key assertion scoped to the account's registered keys.
A WebAuthn-only account (no TOTP) is recognised at the password step and
offered the security-key path.
The security-key verify endpoints validate the open ticket, verify the
assertion against the user's second-factor credentials, and only then
mint the session through the shared login tail, so no session exists
before the factor passes. The login page also arms passkey conditional-UI
autofill on the username field.
Marc-André Bombeck