Four models leave the coverage-pending register with both ends and a
round-trip proof: PersonalRecord, UserAchievement, EnvironmentContext and
EnvironmentTravelLocation. Two new section modules hold reader and restore
beside each other, the arrangement the visits, vaccinations, reminders and
Coach sections already use.
The register understated two of them. The bests are "recomputable in
principle", which is true and does not help: nothing recomputes them, and a
recomputation over a restored history would find different rows, because
sample series and GPS routes never travel, a portable file omits deleted
readings, and a record set in a reading that has since been corrected cannot
be found twice. The badge's unlock date is worse. The evaluator prefers a
persisted date over a derived one, and several of the dates it can still
derive come from counters no backup carries, so a dropped row does not relock
the badge, it re-earns it today.
PersonalRecord.sourceMeasurementId is the reference that needed care, and it
is the dangerous kind. The schema declares no relation for it; migration 0054
created the column as a real foreign key against measurements. Writing it
blind is not a dangling pointer, it is a constraint violation that rolls the
whole restore back and hands the operator an empty account. Measured, with the
resolution removed: "Foreign key constraint violated on the constraint:
personal_records_source_measurement_id_fkey", HTTP 500, nothing restored. So
the restore runs after the measurements, resolves the pointer against the rows
it actually wrote, nulls what it cannot resolve and reports it under a new
personalRecordReference skip kind.
An unlocked badge names a definition in the code catalogue, which drifts
between the release that writes a file and the one that reads it. The id is
carried and written back verbatim rather than judged, the same answer the
vaccination restore gives an antigen slug it cannot resolve.
The readings and the location periods travel as a pair because carrying the
readings alone is worse than losing them. The environment resolver reads the
periods live, so with them gone the nightly seven-day lookback re-resolves
every trip day to the home location and upserts over the row: an account would
come back with a fortnight abroad and then have it quietly rewritten as a
fortnight at home, days after a restore that reported success. Day keys stay
strings end to end, and fetchedAt is restored verbatim so a two-year-old
provisional reading does not claim it was confirmed today.
The round trip seeds bests that share a metric type and an instant and differ
only in the sport slot, two badges earned years apart (one of them under an id
this build no longer defines), and a trip day beside a home day, then reads
each back column by column. Counting alone passes every one of the failures
worth fearing here: slots dropped so a 5 km best is presented as a 10 km best,
unlock dates stamped at restore time, a trip day re-attributed to the home
city, a location period whose bounds no longer cover the reading it explains.
Each of those was applied on purpose and each failed on its own assertion.
Two schema comments claimed no read path selects a column that this backup now
selects; both say what reads it instead of staying wrong.
The knip blind spot (ignoreExportsUsedInFile) left eight symbols carrying
an export nothing outside their file consumes — the modifier goes, the
symbols stay. The score series module goes whole: its only importer was
its own guard test, whose composite- and config-guarding suites survive
in place.
DocumentContentIndex.tokenizerVersion gains the consumer that was the
point of storing it: the content-index job now re-tokenises rows whose
version trails CONTENT_TOKENIZER_VERSION, from the decrypted index text
along the same path the rotation script uses, keyset-paginated and
fault-isolated per row — a future tokenizer bump migrates the index
instead of silently splitting it. ImportJob.uploadSha256 turned out to
already have its dedupe consumer (both kick-off routes short-circuit on
same-bytes non-failed jobs); its comment now names that instead of
pretending to be write-only. The remaining write-only columns carry
their honest annotations in the shape the audit sweep parses.
Migration 0334, all additive. MeasurementReminder gains snoozedUntil,
lastSkippedAt and skipCount; the new MeasurementReminderEvent table is the
append-only completion ledger (kind SATISFIED|SKIPPED, occurredAt, write-time
onTime, source). CustomMetricEntry gains the deletedAt tombstone for undo
parity with every other entry surface. Consumers land in the sibling commits
of this branch.
Refs #223
A content-index attempt that failed (raster failure, a scan with no
text layer, a provider error) recorded its reason only in the server's
observability stream. In the vault, hasContentIndex false looked
identical for a document nobody ever tried and one that failed three
times, and the detail sheet had nothing to say about either.
Apply the summaryState pattern to the index. Two additive columns on
InboundDocument (migration 0333) record when the last attempt finished
and why it produced no index, as a closed reason set: local-empty,
local-unsupported, decrypt-error, raster-failed, provider-error,
pdf-needs-anthropic, empty-transcription. The writer sits at the choke
point the auto job and the corpus backfill share, and in the manual
index route; a success clears the reason. The provider path's specific
failure now survives the local fallback, since "no text" is less
actionable than "the PDF would not render". rasterizePdf names its
failure class so a build that cannot rasterize at all is distinguished
from a PDF that would not render. New guard in both index paths: an
empty provider transcription never becomes a successful empty index.
The detail sheet renders the reason in plain words (muted, six
locales). The DTO and OpenAPI carry the two fields; the disaster
recovery backup and restore carry them verbatim like their summary
siblings.
Refs #776
The upload path enqueued a summary job and stamped PENDING without
consulting the owner's auto-read opt-in; the job's opt-out branch then
deliberately left the state alone, so a document uploaded with the
opt-in off said "summary is being generated" forever. Two writers,
contradictory assumptions.
Both ends of the contract now agree. enqueueDocumentSummary checks the
opt-in first and refuses to mint a job (or a PENDING) it knows the job
cannot resolve; the job keeps its own check for a pref flipped between
enqueue and run and heals a stranded PENDING back to NONE, scoped so
READY / WITHHELD / UNAVAILABLE stay untouched. Migration 0333 drains
the rows already orphaned. The view needs nothing: NONE already
renders the manual summary action.
Refs #788
Add a nullable units_per_dose to medication_schedules so a split-dose
plan can consume a different unit count at different times of day (a
whole tablet in the morning, a half at noon) on ONE medication instead
of two. NULL inherits the medication-level units_per_dose, so every
existing row keeps its current behaviour. Migration 0332 adds one
nullable Decimal(10,4) column with no backfill.
Fold six nullable columns into user_health_profiles: three closed-set
enums (blood type, organ-donor status, advance-directive status) read as
plaintext, and three AES-256-GCM free-text columns (emergency contacts,
implants, ICE note). Migration 0331 is additive only: three CREATE TYPE
plus one ALTER TABLE with nullable ADD COLUMNs. An integration test
asserts the columns and enum types exist on the migrated schema.
The visit stage's second half landed while this was in flight and both
touched the same three places. Resolved as one set: the link facade
carries the reverse document-to-visit direction and the new dose pair
side by side, the sharing literals hold both sets of admissions with the
count re-added on top, and the language bundles take the shorter module
description the trunk settled on.
Research Mode was the opt-in behind the estimated GLP-1 drug-level curve:
turn it on, read a disclaimer, get the chart. The chart stopped consulting
the flag several releases ago and has painted for every account since, so
the switch on Settings → Advanced changed no screen in either position. An
inert control that promises to hide a chart is worse than no control.
The curve is simply part of the medication page now. Gone with the switch:
the acknowledgment dialog, `/api/auth/me/research-mode`, the shared status
DTO and its gate helper, the disclaimer-version stamp, the query key, and
the three user columns the acknowledgment wrote (migration 0321). The
Privacy page's second button pointed at the retired control and goes too.
Settings → Advanced is now what it reads as: reset the data, delete the
account.
- VaccinationRecord holds one administered dose: date, catalogue slug or
the Pass's own wording, dose and series numbers, batch code, site, and
optional links to a practitioner, a visit and a booster reminder
- VaccinationDocumentLink keeps the scanned Impfpass page beside the dose
- MeasurementReminder gains a nullable vaccination_antigen match key so a
logged dose can clear a booster without a second reminder engine
- migration 0330, additive apart from that one nullable column
`MoodPrediction` holds the expected value of a day beside the day's own
rating: one row per account per local day, with a band and the number of
days the fit used. Two tables rather than four columns on the entry,
because the point of the second value is that the person cannot correct
it into agreement with the first — the distance between them is the
finding, and a value the edit form can write is not a second reading.
The table stays out of the disaster-recovery backup and the reason is
written where the completeness guard reads it: every row is recomputable
from the entries, the contexts and the linked modules, and carrying one
would restore a forecast made by a model version that may no longer
exist against data the restore has just moved. It is in the wipe plan,
because a derived row is still a day-by-day statement about somebody.
The write-surface guard lands red on purpose and names what is missing:
`lib/jobs/mood-prognosis-refresh.ts` does not exist yet, so the writer
set is empty where it should hold exactly that one file. The job closes
it. The rest of the guard is green now — no route, page or component
writes the table, and the matcher proves itself against a call broken
across lines, an aliased client, a read and a different model.
A person's whole 'which doctor' history was one free-text column on a
reminder: they typed the practice name once and could reach nothing else
that happened there. This turns that string into a record.
Five tables in migration 0320, all additive: an encounter that happened
or is booked, the account's own address book of practitioners, and three
links from a visit to the documents, lab results and conditions it
produced. The encounter is slim on purpose — the diagnosis stays on the
linked condition, the address on the linked practitioner, and the reason
each field was kept or cut is written at the model. No module gate, and
the schema says why rather than leaving the absence to be read as an
oversight.
Every carrier lands with the tables rather than after them. All five are
classified as travelling both ways and are proven doing it: a seeded row
of each goes out through the real export builder, the account is deleted
so the schema's cascade decides what survives, and the rows are counted
back through the real restore route. Two references deliberately do not
survive and are named instead of dropped quietly — the reminder a visit
points at is not in the backup, and a link whose far side a portable
export does not carry cannot resolve. The wipe plan deletes the links
before the lab results and documents they hang off, or the audit row
would report zero for rows that existed. The three encrypted columns are
registered for key rotation, without which dropping a legacy key would
make those notes permanently unreadable.
Widening the reminder origin enum is a type error at the reminder DTO,
which is the right outcome: the mapper now refuses an appointment row
outright rather than relabelling it as a checkup.
- migration 0311 creates mood_contexts, keyed by the entry, cascading from
both the entry and the owner
- work, contacts, leisure and one notable event; every field nullable, and an
entry with nothing filled in gets no row at all
- notes_encrypted registered in ENCRYPTED_COLUMNS and in the rotation script,
so a key rotation cannot strand it
The pillar reads PHQ-9, GAD-7 and WHO-5 and cites the papers behind
every threshold. A daily self-rated slider is now available on nearly
every mood row, so leaving it out reads as an omission unless the
reason is written down: the two are different kinds of evidence, and
averaging them would weaken the line that makes the figure worth
showing to a doctor. Recorded at the pillar and at the columns.
- the five faces are untouched: pick one, save, done in a tap
- a closed section below them opens onto five sliders; picking a face
suggests a pleasantness value and moving that slider takes the
suggestion over, while the face selection stays where it is
- an untouched slider writes nothing, and clearing one takes the answer
back rather than leaving a middle value behind
- the list's edit dialog shows and changes the same five, so nothing is
written on one screen and invisible on the other
- correcting an entry no longer re-derives pleasantness when the label
did not move, which used to overwrite a hand-set value on any edit
- factor ratings are no longer offered on a new entry and nothing was
deleted: existing ratings still render, edit and feed the crosstab
- six locales, and the dimension table's keys are declared dynamic
- the migration fills mood_a1 from the five-point label for every row
that has none, and leaves the other four columns empty because there
is nothing in a label to derive them from
- guarded on the column being empty, so re-applying the migration is a
no-op rather than an overwrite of an answer somebody gave since
- the test reads the CASE arms back out of the .sql and compares them to
the runtime map in both directions, so neither can drift alone
- rows are asserted by value after the statement runs, and again after a
second run, including one hand-set value that must survive it
- migration 0310 adds mood_a1, stress_a2, energy_a3, connection_a4 and
stability_a5, all nullable, no table rewrite
- the schema comment states the four things a later reader needs: score
keeps its 1-5 axis, the columns are queryable plaintext on purpose,
stress is stored literally, and a read delegate sees them by design
- the backup guard is red until the carriers land alongside
A lab runs its own method on its own device, so the window a physician
evaluates a value against is the one printed next to it on that report,
not a catalog band averaged over every lab. Reading a report pulled the
value and dropped that range: the extraction asked for it, the commit
handed it to the biomarker resolver, and the resolver only uses it when
it mints a NEW marker. For every analyte the user already had — the
normal case after a first panel — the printed range was read and then
thrown away.
Add `sourceReferenceLow` / `sourceReferenceHigh` / `sourceReferenceText`
to `LabResult` and carry the range from the report to the reading. The
text is stored whether or not numbers can be read out of it, because
"bis 5,0" and "negativ" state a window too; a range that could not be
parsed is kept verbatim, never replaced with invented bounds.
`resolveEffectiveReferenceRange` is the one place the precedence lives:
the source window wins for that single reading, and the catalog stays
the net for readings without one. A printed string with no derivable
bound does not displace the catalog. Every surface that judges a
reading routes through it — the API verdict, the doctor report, the
insights blocks and per-marker assessment, the coach snapshot, the MCP
read and the FHIR `referenceRange` — so a value cannot read in range on
one surface and out on another.
The API keeps `referenceLow` / `referenceHigh` as the window in force,
so a client that reads only those two renders the right range and the
right verdict with no change of its own; the catalog band, the source
window, its origin and a divergence flag ride alongside for clients
that want to show both.
Read side: the chart draws the source window as a second, visually
distinct band with the reading it came from named beneath it, the
reading rows name the printed range and the catalog band where the two
disagree, and the doctor-report PDF prints the report's own string with
a footnote naming the saved range. Entry side: one optional field on
the lab form, folded away until asked for, and the printed range is
editable on the scan review screen.
The range parser covers the notations German and English reports
actually print — two-sided, one-sided, comma or dot decimals, thousands
separators, trailing units — reads units without ever converting them,
and refuses to guess on anything ambiguous.
Seven migrations, 0296 through 0302, apply to an empty database in order and
install both triggers. The allocation had been written down as four, and every
later document that quoted it inherited a range that had already moved.
`scripts/verify-v137-adversarial.ts` is the allocation as a runnable artifact
rather than a table somebody keeps in step by hand. It names all seven, refuses
a number allocated twice, asserts each trigger is in the migration that claims
it, and counts every release inventory against a written-down number instead of
against "more than zero" — a list that lost half its entries satisfies a
non-empty check and fails this one. It also refuses to report success when it
ran no checks at all.
It found two things on its first run. Eleven handler entries looked like
duplicates because the key ignored the action, and an `[id]` route carries an
update and a delete as separate contracts; the key includes the action now. The
journey-count leg was then falsified deliberately by expecting nine, which
failed on the count and exited non-zero.
The `push_attempts` principals are declared optional in the schema and NOT NULL
in the database, and that is deliberate rather than drift. The attribution guard
is a BEFORE INSERT trigger, so a write omitting both has them filled from the
legacy mirror before the constraint is checked; requiring them in the schema
would force every established self-delivery writer to name a pair it has no
opinion about, and relaxing the columns would let a partial pair reach the
table, which is what the trigger refuses. `migrate diff` reports the difference
because it cannot see triggers, so the reason is written at the columns and
names the test that proves the accommodation still works.
Measured rather than assumed: applying trunk's chain to its own empty database
reports the same classes of diff — truncated index names, timestamp precision,
foreign keys re-stated. The release adds eight lines to that, seven of them in
classes trunk already carries and one of them the deliberate pair above.
- the idempotency arm refuses only a wrongly-asserted context; an admin
route behind unfenced requireAdmin still serves a headerless request
- the epoch trigger does not fire on a statement that names record_epoch
without moving the selector; the source guard is what covers that
- add sessions.record_epoch, owned by a BEFORE UPDATE trigger so the
ON DELETE SET NULL path and raw SQL writes cannot skip it
- normalise pre-existing rows so epoch zero means never switched
- project the epoch off the row getSession already loads
- Exclude and erase egress claims with recipient-side lookup support\n- Serialize data wipes with managed-profile Guardian authorization\n- Cover last-Guardian and queued-claim wipe races
- Commit a final authorization claim under the lifecycle lock\n- Keep provider calls and retry outcomes outside database transactions\n- Retain authorization claims with notification delivery diagnostics
A grant has meant one thing since it shipped: the whole record, to read or to
add to. This lays the words for the two shapes the rest of the sharing work
needs — part of a record, and management of one — while changing what no
existing grant does.
`ShareDomain` is a closed set of eight sections in `src/lib/sharing/scope.ts`,
clustered from the delegable read surfaces rather than invented, plus the
distinguished `record` for the routes that read across them. It never converts
to a `ModuleKey` and never imports one: two masks, two questions, no shared
spelling, because the day they share a name is the day somebody makes one
imply the other, and a module the owner enabled is not a section the owner
shared.
`account_grants.scope_json` is NULL on every row that exists, and NULL is the
entire record — the answer those rows were consented as, so no backfill and no
re-consent. A non-NULL value is read through one fail-closed normaliser: a
blob it cannot parse opens nothing, including a section the blob happened to
name. That is the deliberate inverse of the module preference normaliser,
which fails open on purpose; both do the safe thing with a value nobody can
read, and the safe thing differs because one answers an authorization question
and the other a presentation question.
`MANAGE` joins the level enum, ordered above WRITE so a write grant can never
satisfy it, and carries no scope at all: management of part of a record
promises a boundary that cannot survive an edit, so the invite path refuses to
write one.
`requireRecordAuth` takes the section as a second required argument. The
requirement is the lever — a delegable route without a classification does not
typecheck, so the set of classified routes cannot fall behind the set of
delegable ones. All fifty-seven modules carry theirs. The structural guard
freezes each against the production vocabulary, fails when a module's own arms
disagree, and pins a non-zero count of resolved sections so a matcher that
stopped reading the argument fails instead of agreeing with everything.
`requireGuardianAuth` is exported and reaches nothing yet. It gates on the
managed-profile marker rather than on the grant, so an adult who granted
management of their own record cannot arrive at that record's settings by any
argument about what MANAGE means: widening MANAGE would widen the record
resolver and would not touch this one. Its frozen list lands empty, with the
declaration site as the positive control that keeps "nothing reaches it" a
measurement rather than a renamed symbol.
`users.managed_profile_at` says since when a record is one somebody else runs.
A timestamp and not a boolean, for a reason the schema has to keep possible:
clearing it is the handover, and the grants and the activity trail span it
untouched.
A consent record has to answer who consented and when, and the grant row
already does. It does not have to answer from where, and an address kept for
as long as both accounts exist is personal data held past the point it
evidences anything. Nothing read the column, which makes it exactly the
write-only field scripts/audit-column-readers.ts exists to surface.
The acceptance stays evidenced: audit_logs records it with the caller's
address under that table's own retention. The column never reached the wire,
so the grant view and the OpenAPI contract are unchanged.
Written before the feature shipped, so migration 0295 drops an empty column.
Adds AuditLog.actorUserId (migration 0294) and threads it centrally, out
of the wide-event context the acting-account resolver already stamps. No
call site passes an actor, so no route can forget one.
NULL keeps meaning "acted for themselves" — the reading every existing
row carries. The threading fills the column only when a request resolved
an acting account AND the row is being filed under that account, so a
self-action, a refusal, and a delegate's row about themselves all stay
NULL rather than acquiring an id that would rewrite what the history says.
Delegated reads coalesce to one row per owner, delegate and day, through
a partial unique index and an insert that expects to lose the race. The
alternative is a row per request on the busiest table in the schema and
an activity view made of identical lines.
The column carries no foreign key, against the grain of user_id beside
it: SET NULL there erases an account from its own history, while here it
would turn "the delegate opened this record" into "the owner opened this
record". An id that no longer resolves reads as a deleted account; an id
that silently became NULL reads as a lie.
Migration 0293 adds `sessions.acting_as_user_id`. NULL, which is what
every session has carried until now, means the browser is acting as the
account it signed in as.
It is a selector and not an authorization. The resolver joins it against
a live grant on every request, so a value stranded here by a grant that
has since been revoked or expired confers nothing. Nothing sweeps the
column for correctness; the sweeps that exist are housekeeping, so a
delegate's browser lands back in its own account instead of on a wall of
403s.
ON DELETE SET NULL, not CASCADE. The two ends mean opposite things:
deleting the session's owner should take the session with it, which is
the existing `user_id` cascade, while deleting the account being acted on
must leave the delegate's browser session alive. A cascade on this side
would sign a delegate out of their own account because somebody else
deleted theirs.
An account grant is one account's standing permission to read another
account's record. The row is also the consent record for the act that
created it: there is no second receipt table, because two records of one
act drift and then nobody can say which is true.
That shapes the table. Revocation stamps revoked_at and revoked_by
instead of deleting, so the record can still answer who had access, from
when to when, and who ended it. The uniqueness constraint is therefore
partial — one live grant per (owner, delegate), with history accumulating
underneath — otherwise a re-invitation would either be refused or would
overwrite the first grant's acceptance. Both foreign keys cascade: a
grant naming a user who no longer exists is an authorization nobody can
resolve and nobody can revoke.
The state machine lives in src/lib/sharing/grants.ts and only there. The
acting-account resolver and the grant surfaces both read these rows, and
if each carried its own idea of "active" the drift would be silent in
exactly one direction: the resolver admitting a grant the panel shows as
ended. Pending confers nothing, expiry is checked against the clock of
the request that reads the row, and every transition is a conditional
update so two concurrent accepts cannot both win.
The access column carries READ or WRITE and only READ is ever written.
It exists from day one so that delegated writes become enforcement work
rather than migration work.
Three lifecycle paths, each proven against the real route:
- Delete All Data removes grants from either side. The wipe loop asks
every model for "this account's rows", and a table relating two
accounts has no user_id to answer with, so wipe-plan.ts now declares
the owner columns and translates. Wiping only the grantor side would
leave the account still holding access to other people's records.
- Account deletion removes them in both directions.
- An admin restore leaves them exactly as it found them. Grants are
classified NOT_IN_BACKUP: rolling data back is a decision an admin
makes, but rolling an authorization back is a decision nobody makes,
and a grant revoked on Tuesday must not come back alive out of
Monday's file. After a restore, sharing is off and both people
re-consent.
The backup classification guard was reading a user relation by field
name, so a model naming its account relations grantor and grantee read
as instance-scoped and was excused from having a verdict at all. It now
reads the type. That surfaced InviteToken, classified here too.
A GET must not have side effects — api-handler.ts says so next to
READ_HTTP_METHODS, where an MCP-audience token is admitted on the safe
methods precisely because they are assumed to write nothing. Three routes
broke that: the sync handshake bumped User.lastSyncedAt, the achievements
read inserted unlock rows, and the cycle calendar fired a discarded promise
at the forecast cache so a failed write left no trace anywhere.
Each write moves to the place that causes it.
The sync checkpoint is now stamped by the batch ingest endpoints for
measurements, mood and intakes. The handshake reports it. That also fixes
the watermark: the checkpoint used to advance past a window the client had
not drained, and a client trusting it would skip that window. It can only
trail a real sync now.
The unlock rows move to a nightly achievement-unlock-sweep. The badge grid
never needed them — unlocked comes from the live metrics and the completion
date is derived — so the payload is unchanged; the rows pin that date and
carry it into the backup, and the sweep reaches accounts that never open
the page.
The cycle forecast moves to a nightly cycle-prediction-refresh. The
CyclePrediction row is not a cache of a read: it is the index the reminder
cron scans, so which reminders an account received depended on whether
somebody had opened the calendar. persistPredictionCache no longer
swallows its errors either — the job reports them.
POST /api/insights/ecg takes one recording per request: the stable
recording id the client already has, the on-device timestamp, the
sampling rate, the waveform as integer micro-volts, the lead, the
average heart rate, and the device's own verdict. Same gating as the
reads (auth, the insights module, the insightStatus surface), userId
from the session, APPLE_HEALTH the only source a client may claim.
sampleCount and durationSeconds are derived here, and nothing about the
waveform is ever interpreted.
The write body now lives in one place, src/lib/ecg/persist-recording.ts,
shared by the Withings sync, the export-archive importer and the new
route. Three writers with three persistence bodies is how the two ends
of one rule drift apart.
Migration 0291 adds the second unique index on
(user_id, source, recorded_at, sampling_frequency). The archive importer
identifies a strip by a hash of its content and a live client by the
device's own sample uuid, so the same physical recording arriving
through both doors carried two different ids and would have landed
twice. One device does not record two different strips at the same
instant at the same sampling rate, so the constraint is sound and the
convergence stops being a convention.
The table already holds rows on deployed instances and two writers have
been filling it since v1.19.0, so the index cannot just be created: a
pre-existing collision would abort the migration. The migration resolves
duplicates first, keeping the row with the most samples (a stored strip
beats a verdict-only row), then the one linked to its event
measurement, then the most recently written, then the lowest id so the
choice is total. The losers' event link is salvaged onto the keeper
first, so resolving a duplicate never costs the recording its place in
the event timeline.
If that resolution is wrong on some instance, the failure is visible at
deploy time and not later: db:migrate:deploy runs on boot, so the
container crash-loops with the migration named in the logs and the
release never serves traffic. A deploy that finishes in under thirty
seconds did not run it.
The GET list and detail routes and the export-archive path are
unchanged; this is a second door, not a replacement.
Changing which pillars count is an act the person performed, not
something that happened to their health. Until now the week-over-week
comparison could not tell the difference: both windows are computed in
one request under whatever recipe is in force right now, so the pillar
sets agree, the subtraction looks legitimate, and the dashboard could
announce "your score dropped 14 points" to someone who had just come
back from the settings page.
The recipe now carries its own dated identity, and the delta guard
compares against it the same way it already compares against the global
method boundary: a recipe that changed between the two windows
suppresses the delta with a new reason, config_changed, and the surfaces
that gate on an unexplained delta stay quiet. The score record stores
the recipe version and its change date on every write, resolved from the
same stored blob the composition came from, so a row can say which
recipe produced it. A new series module reads those versions back, marks
the first day after a change as a break, refuses to join the composite
line across it, and keeps the per-pillar rows running through it: a
pillar is graded against its own reference band and stays comparable
when the average of the pillars does not.
The notice key folds the person's recipe version in beside the method
version, so a change in either raises the existing dismissible notice
once and dismissing one never dismisses the other. An account that never
chose keeps its old key untouched.
The audit script prints the annotation verbatim, so a note wrapped across
three schema comment lines came out with the comment markers folded into
the middle of the sentence.
The delete-all-data guard seeds every table straight from information_schema
so a table added next year is asserted without anyone remembering. A CHECK
constraint defeats that: the generic seeder has no way to guess a value the
constraint accepts, and the whole suite failed on the new table. A Postgres
enum carries the same closed set, the seeder reads it from pg_enum, and
Prisma now types the column instead of trusting a string.
Dropped the day-key format and non-empty-composition checks with it. The
writer builds the key through the timezone helper and refuses an empty
composition before inserting, and the restore validates both against the
wire schema before the transaction opens, so a third copy in the database
bought nothing and cost a hand-written line in a fixture whose point is not
having one. The composite range check stays: free to check, and a number
outside nought to a hundred renders as a score nobody can read.
The score is computed live from today's rows, so once the readings behind
a past day change the number the person actually saw that day is gone.
Nothing wrote it down. This adds the table that does: one row per account
per local day, holding the composite, its band, the algorithm version, the
composition that produced it, every counted pillar's own score, and a
fingerprint over exactly what those depend on.
Append-only by construction. A unique index on account plus local day gives
the writer something to conflict against, and there is no updated_at,
because a later computation of the same day must leave the earlier row
exactly as it stood.
A nullable JSONB column on users carrying which pillars the person
chose to count toward the composite score. Stored as a deselection
list so a pillar shipped later counts by default and cannot be
confused with one the person removed. NULL keeps its own meaning:
never chose, which is not the same as counting nothing.
The admin panel offered a toggle for the Health-Score explainer and
described it as the ? next to the delta line. That ? had already been
taken off the insights surface a release earlier, and the caption that
replaced it went away entirely when the health score was replaced by
the reference composite. Since then an operator could turn the switch
off, get a saved confirmation, and change absolutely nothing.
The toggle, its wording in all six languages, its place in the flag
matrix the app and the iOS client both read, and its column on
app_settings are all gone. Nothing is left to promise a control that
does not exist.
A guard goes in with it: every remaining assistant sub-flag has to be
read by some surface, and the panel and the plumbing that carry all of
them by construction do not count as proof.
Marc-André Bombeck