The clinical category a person picks for a medication lives in a side table
created at runtime, outside the schema. The backup builder and the restore
only walk schema models, so no backup ever carried it: after a restore every
medication read as "Other".
Both backup formats now carry the category inside its medication, and the
restore writes it back in the same transaction as the medication. A file
from before this change restores as before; a category this server does not
know reads as Other instead of refusing the file.
The backup plan gains a list for tables created with raw SQL, and a check
that every such table in the source either maps to a schema model or has a
verdict there, so the next one cannot drop out of backups unnoticed.
The All range is read from the WEEK or MONTH rollup tier once a history is
long enough, from DAY rows for a short one, and from the live table on a
coverage miss. The chart folds every path into the average day of each
week or month, but a tier row carried a cumulative metric's whole total
and a level's reading-weighted mean. A month of steps therefore read about
thirty times higher for a long history than for a short one, under a
caption that said average.
A tier row now carries the average day of its bucket on every tier: a
cumulative metric's total over the days that hold a reading, a level's
mean of its daily means. The rollup fold counts the bucket's days and adds
up their means for it. Only the web chart's series reads (the chart
endpoint and the dashboard batch) use these rows.
Antidepressants, anxiolytics, mood stabilisers and ADHD medication had no
category of their own and ended up under "Other". MENTAL_HEALTH joins the
clinical category list: the add and edit wizard offers it as its own row
with a brain icon, the card badge names it, and it is translated in all
seven languages.
The category is a text value, so no migration is needed. Clients that
read the category as a string show the new value; an app that does not
know it yet falls back to its own label for it.
A medication whose end date had passed still showed taken and skip in the
table and on its card, because the action row only looked at whether the
medication was active. The schedule engine already stops minting doses
after the end date, so reminders, the doses card and the today list were
quiet, but the medication itself kept inviting a dose that is no longer
part of the course.
The server now resolves one rule and publishes it on the list and detail
reads: `courseStatus` (UPCOMING, CURRENT or ENDED, in calendar days on the
user's clock, both ends inclusive) and `intakeActionable` (active, intake
tracked, course includes today). The table and both card variants render
their actions from it, the take-all flow skips such a medication, the card
and table name an ended course with an "Ended" badge, and no overdue
escalation is raised for it. A course that ends today keeps its actions
for the whole local day.
The detail header's "Ended" status now follows the same field. It compared
the end date's UTC midnight with the clock and so called the whole last
course day ended. Logging a past dose from the history is unchanged.
A restore writes rows back with their original updatedAt, behind every
paired client's watermarks, and removes rows without leaving tombstones.
A client that kept its cursor would miss both on its next incremental
pull. The same holds after the person deletes all their data.
`users.sync_reset_at` (migration 0363) records when the record was last
replaced: the restore stamps it as its last write and again right after
the commit, the per-account and the admin wipe stamp it inside their
transactions. Cursors now carry the time they were issued, and
/api/sync/changes answers its existing `cursorExpired` to a cursor issued
before the reset, or one without an issue time on an account that has
one. The comparison is on the issue time, because after a restore a
freshly drained cursor still carries old watermarks.
"As a table" used to drop the table's chart, so the reply offered no way
back to it. The copied table now keeps its chart and carries view: table,
which the panel opens on the table (the chart one tap away on the toggle)
and the chips read to offer "as a chart". show_result with view table
does the same. The field is optional on the result metadata; a client
that ignores it shows the chart first as before.
Table refs, step ids, chip ids, a chip's anchor ref, clarification choice
ids and a reused table's source are now validated against their exact
server-minted patterns when a stored reply is read back. Some of them are
written into the model's context on a later turn (the earlier-tables list,
the "keep looking" fetched list), so a stored row edited by hand can no
longer carry text into a prompt through them.
When the tool loop forces an answer at its round cap, the reply leads
its chips with "Keep looking". Tapping it runs a normal turn, under the
budget gate as ever, with two server-written context lines: the question
that was left unfinished (at most 1000 characters) and what the forced
turn already read, each table by the name show_result takes, so the
continued turn shows those again instead of fetching them twice.
An answer is continued at most once. The continued reply records the
message it continues in metricSource.continuationOf and offers no
further "Keep looking", even when it is forced again; a chip on a reply
that is itself a continuation is refused.
Up to three chips, derived on the server from what the turn read: the
other view of a table with a chart, the period before, a year earlier,
a wider window, and a metric a discovered pattern links to. A chip is
offered only when its read was done this turn and the record holds the
metric; the year-ago and wider-window chips also need the record's
first reading to reach back that far. The model may name chips in a
FOLLOWUPS block, but only to reorder ones the rules already allow; every
label is rendered from the catalog.
A tapped chip resolves against the chips stored on the conversation's
latest reply. "As a chart" and "as a table" are answered from the
stored table without a model call or a budget reservation: the rows are
copied unchanged and the message is tagged providerType "reuse". Other
chips run a normal turn with a server-written context line. A chip that
is no longer current falls back to a plain message.
A setting turns the chips off (absent means on).
get_metric_table reads one metric as days, weeks or months through the
chart reader, cut in the user's zone and collapsed to one source per day,
with null for a period without a reading. The model reads a bounded
summary; the full table rides the turn, encrypted at rest. show_result
shows a table an earlier reply of the same conversation fetched, resolved
only against that conversation's own messages. Workouts, labs, sleep and
adherence results project into tables, earlier tables are named in the
context by metadata alone, and result:rN marks are stripped from the reply.
A restore of an account with 1.9 million readings, most of them deleted
by the nightly consolidation and still awaiting the purge, was cancelled
in its clearing step: `DELETE FROM measurements` ran past the 60 s
statement timeout every pooled connection carries, and the whole restore
rolled back with a message that named no cause (#1031).
Most of that statement was not the delete. Two columns point into
`measurements` with ON DELETE SET NULL and had no index, so Postgres
scanned `personal_records` and `ecg_recordings` once per deleted reading:
38 of 40 s on a seeded account with 300 personal records. Migration 0362
indexes both, which also speeds up the tombstone purge and account
deletion.
The restore transaction now sets its own statement and idle-in-transaction
limits to the transaction budget with SET LOCAL, and the budget counts
the rows the account holds as well as the rows the file carries. A
rolled-back restore names what the database refused it over (timeout,
lock, constraint, storage, connection, other) on the job row, the
console, the audit row and the wide event.
GET /api/insights/chat/{id}/messages/{messageId}/results returns the
tables one assistant message read, narrowed to the conversation's owner
like the conversation read, with a table withheld as module_disabled when
its domain's module is off and as unavailable when it cannot be read. A
data read: no AI capability.
The published document now describes every stream frame as the
CoachStreamEvent union, including the suggestedAction frame it never
named, the new step, result, followUps and clarification frames, their
components, the provenance fields, the followUp and clarification request
fields, and the reuse provider type.
The home location of the environment module was rounded to 2 decimals,
about 1 km, which places a home in a neighbourhood rather than the town the
schema comment promised. The weather archive it feeds is gridded at 9 to
25 km, so the extra precision bought nothing.
Every stored coordinate of the module now goes through the same 1-decimal
rounding (about 11 km north-south, 7 km east-west at 50° N): the home, the
travel periods, the geocoder's results, the per-day weather rows, and a
restore of a file written with finer values. Migration 0361 rounds the
existing users, travel periods and per-day rows; running it twice changes
nothing more. The answers keep their shape, plain numbers. The API
descriptions and the schema comment say 1 decimal now.
The practitioner entry of the backup payload gains the optional
locationEncrypted and phoneEncrypted fields. The rotation script names each
new column once, at its call, so a dropped call is noticed rather than
covered by a comment.
The address is what single sign-on links an existing account by, and
changing it took the password or a session younger than five minutes on
every account. A remembered browser skips the second factor at sign-in and
still makes a fresh session, so the password alone could move the address
of an account the second factor was meant to protect.
On an account with a second factor only a second factor or passkey
completed in the last five minutes counts now; the password is not
checked. The refusal names it (second_factor_required in rejectedFields,
or 401 profile.update.emailSecondFactorRequired when the address was all
that changed), and the profile form opens the re-proof dialog with the
factors the account holds, then saves again, no longer offering the
password field. Accounts without a second factor keep the password or a
recent sign-in. A token cannot change the address of such an account;
the app does not change it.
With TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0 behind a proxy that sends only X-Real-IP, every
client address resolves to nothing and all anonymous sign-ins share one
rate-limit bucket, with nothing in the log to say why. The first request
that carries a forwarding header the setting does not let HealthLog read
now logs one warning naming the header and the setting to change.
X-Real-IP stood in for a missing X-Forwarded-For at any hop count. It is a
single address, so it is now read only with TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=1; with two
or more hops the chain the count describes is X-Forwarded-For.
The upload, import and native batch routes that bypass the proxy now carry
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy and Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy like every
other response, and so do the proxy's early exits.
The env examples described an unset TRUST_PROXY_HOPS as right for a
directly exposed host; unset means one hop, and that host wants 0.
The per-account password limit refused every attempt once ten failures
had landed in fifteen minutes, counted before the password was checked.
Ten guesses from two addresses therefore locked a password-only account,
the app's password sign-in included, and repeating them kept it locked
for as long as anyone cared to.
A place the account has signed in from before is now neither counted nor
held back: a remembered browser, a phone presenting the device id a login
of this account was issued to, or an address a session or device login of
this account came from in the last thirty days. Anywhere else gets five
free failures a day and then a wait that doubles with each failure, from
thirty seconds to at most fifteen minutes, instead of a wall. The per-IP
limit is unchanged, and an unknown identifier is limited the same way on
its hash.
Under an SSO-only policy, a password sign-in to an account other than the
one a pending link names is now refused before the password is checked,
so that exception no longer tells right passwords from wrong ones.
Offering access to the record took a live session alone, and an
invitation outlives the session that sent it: whoever held a stolen
session could invite their own account and keep a way into the record
after the owner signed everything out. POST /api/account/grants now takes
the recent-proof gate at every level (a sign-in or re-proof within five
minutes on the browser, with the second factor on an account that has one;
a step-up elevation on a token, which no shipped client uses here), and
the invite form opens the re-proof dialog and sends again.
Sign out everywhere now withdraws every invitation the account offered
that nobody has accepted. Accepted grants are left standing on purpose:
each is a person the owner chose, often a carer who still needs the
record, and a sign-out button must not quietly cut them off. The response
lists them as grantsKept and the sessions card shows each with a one-click
End access.
GET /api/export with type=all (the default), POST /api/export/health-record
and GET /api/fhir/Patient/$everything hand over the whole record but took a
live session alone, so a stolen browser session could still walk off with
everything the full-backup gate was meant to protect. A browser session now
needs a sign-in or re-proof within five minutes, with the second factor on
an account that has one, and the doctor-report panel opens the re-proof
dialog and retries. When a manager builds the report for a record they
manage, their own session is the one asked.
On a token the shipped app keeps working: health-record and $everything
take the token as before, including a fhir:read token, and the recent-proof
guard names both. GET /api/export?type=all, which no shipped client calls
with a token, wants a step-up elevation there. Single-type exports are
unchanged.
The API reference now also describes the enrollment rule for accounts
with a second factor and the passkey refusal it adds.
A reminder's first-due date could only be sent as a date-time, and the
web form sent the browser's local midnight, so a browser set to a zone
other than the profile's could move the day. The API now also takes a
bare calendar date and stores it as that day's midnight in the user's
zone, and the web form sends the date itself. A date-time still means the
instant it names.
Making `=true` grant nothing would stop a single-user self-host's local
model on a patch update. It is deprecated for one release cycle instead,
in a narrowed and safe form: it still grants a private host, but only to
the operator's own configurations (the instance-wide admin provider and
AI settings saved on an admin account), and only through the pinned
operator-approved dispatcher, so redirects stay forbidden and metadata,
link-local and unspecified addresses stay refused. A non-admin account's
own base URL needs an exact origin in AI_PRIVATE_ORIGINS.
Provider resolution passes the owning account's role to the client
(`operatorTrusted`); the save route and the connection test apply the
same rule to the account being configured. The boot summary now says the
setting is deprecated and names the replacement, and the admin AI
settings page shows the exact AI_PRIVATE_ORIGINS line for the private
origins saved on the instance (every account's Local and gateway URL and
the admin base URL, scheme, host and port only), so the operator can copy
it and drop the old setting.
The admin wipe of every account is the operator clearing their own host,
and the bucket's copies are the documented way back from a wipe pressed
by mistake, so it writes no off-host deletion request. Deleting an
account, deleting a managed profile and "Delete all data" still do.
The backup runbook no longer says the worker never deletes an object: it
lists the grant the worker needs (DeleteObject included), when objects
are deleted, the version-4 envelope, the lifecycle check and how to
rotate the off-host key. The rotation runbook no longer says backups are
covered: rotation reaches a backup's envelope, not the content a restore
writes back, and a retired key stays needed until no backup lists it.
The privacy notice beside account deletion says the same about off-host
copies.
A failed import records its failure in a plain try block, and the
extraction test that inflates past the 64 MiB floor gets the time it
needs on a loaded runner.
The client-IP resolver read X-Real-IP on every path: with
TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0, which means no proxy in front and no forwarding header
to believe, and on the path where the X-Forwarded-For chain was shorter
than the declared hops, which means the proxies were bypassed. A caller
sending a new X-Real-IP with each request got a new per-IP rate-limit
bucket each time.
X-Real-IP now gets the trust X-Forwarded-For gets: it is read only when at
least one proxy hop is declared and the request carries no X-Forwarded-For.
A short chain resolves to no address. The reverse-proxy guide no longer
suggests TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0 for a proxy that sets X-Real-IP; such a proxy
takes 1.
"Sign out everywhere" ended web sessions and device logins but left every
credential that works without signing in: a connected AI assistant kept its
OAuth connection and minted the next access token from it, a connector or
ingest token kept working, and a clinician share link kept opening the
record. A password change revoked the tokens but not the assistant's
connection or the share links. Anything a stolen session had minted
outlived the remedy.
- Sign out everywhere now ends every other sign-in, every AI-assistant
connection, every programmatic token except the caller's own, and every
clinician share link. Share links are revoked by default; the web offers
a checkbox to keep them (keepShareLinks=1), and a client that sends
nothing, such as the shipped app, gets the safe default.
- A password change and an admin password reset also end AI-assistant
connections, share links and step-up elevations.
- Turning on the first second factor (TOTP or a security key) ends every
other sign-in, as a password change does. Adding a further factor does
not.
destroyOtherSessions takes an explicit reach ("sign-ins" or "everything")
so each caller says how far it goes.
The login route's description named only the four reasons the login step
itself sends. The callback, which the identity provider drives and so has
no OpenAPI entry, ends the native leg at healthlog://oidc-callback with
eight more, and nothing written listed them. An app build matched against
hyphenated shorthand (identity-conflict) while the server has always sent
oidc_identity_conflict, so every SSO error fell through to the generic
message. The values do not change; the description now names the full
set, and a structural test binds it to the literals the two routes pass
to their redirect helpers in both directions.
Regenerates docs/api/openapi.yaml, including the CSV import description
from the previous commit.
Exporting the whole record, making a clinician share link, minting a token,
and the admin backup download, upload and restore, data wipe and password
reset ran on a live session alone. The plaintext full backup did, while the
encrypted one beside it asked for a second factor. Whoever held a stolen
session could take the record, or leave behind a credential that outlives
the session.
These now go through one gate, requireRecentProof (assertRecentCookieProof
for the routes that resolve their caller themselves). A browser session
passes after a sign-in or re-proof within five minutes: a second factor on
an account that has one, otherwise the password or a passkey. The refusal is
401 auth.reproof.required with meta.methods, and the web opens the re-proof
dialog, posts the proof to the new POST /api/auth/reproof and retries. A
password proof stamps the new Session.reproofAt (migration 0359), never
mfaVerifiedAt, so it cannot stand in for a second factor anywhere.
On Bearer, the full backup asks for an X-Step-Up elevation; the encrypted
export asks for a second-factor elevation on an account that has one. Share
links and connector tokens keep taking the token alone, because the shipped
app calls them without an elevation and reads a 401 there as a dead
session; the guard test names them.
Key rotation keeps its stricter second-factor gate.
ALLOW_LOCAL_AI_PRIVATE_HOSTS=true let any user of the instance point the
Local provider or the OpenAI-compatible gateway at any private address
the server could reach, the metadata range included, and a granted host
was dialled with no connect-time pin at all.
AI_PRIVATE_ORIGINS grants a private AI endpoint with the exact-origin
grammar NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS and NIGHTSCOUT_PRIVATE_ORIGINS use.
A granted call goes through the pinned operator-approved dispatcher:
redirects forbidden, and metadata, link-local and unspecified answers
dropped at dial time even for a granted name. Everything else stays on
the public pin. The Local client (buffered and streaming) and the
gateway and admin-key tags of the OpenAI client all take their policy
from one function.
The host-list form of ALLOW_LOCAL_AI_PRIVATE_HOSTS keeps working with the
same pinning; a never-grantable literal or a host:port entry is refused
with a one-time warning. Its "true" form grants nothing any more and is
reported in the boot readiness summary with the replacement.
A failed lab-report scan no longer puts the endpoint's response body into
the wide event; status and model stay. The response to the caller never
carried it.
The SSO callback bound a verified provider email to the local account with
the same address on the spot. The local address is not verified: anyone
could register with it, or type it into their profile, and the SSO user
then landed in an account the other person still held the password to.
The callback now links nothing. It records the link it would make in a
sealed, ten-minute, HttpOnly cookie and sends the browser to the sign-in
page, and the link is made only when that browser then signs in to that
same account with its password (and second factor) or passkey. Under an
SSO-only policy the password form opens for exactly that account. The
native sign-in answers oidc_link_required; the link is confirmed once on
the web.
Moving an account to a new email address now also needs a fresh proof: a
sign-in or second factor in the last five minutes, or the current password
sent alongside the change. Without it the address is left as it was and
reported in rejectedFields; the rest of the save still lands.
Marc-André Bombeck