A guardian with a fresh second factor mints a one-time handover link
(hlp_ token, HMAC hash stored only, 1/7/14 days, at most one open per
profile, withdrawable) with a proposed access level per guardian: end,
view only or manage, view only by default. The link is shown once with a
copy button and a QR code; nothing is mailed. The panel sits at the end
of each managed-profile row and hints when the person is under 16.
The person opens /claim/<token>, sees a minimal preview (name, expiry,
who keeps which access, no health data) and chooses a username, a
required email and a password under the registration policy. The claim
is one transaction under the managed-profile lock: the token is
consumed, the credentials are set, the marker is cleared, every pending
invitation the record offered is withdrawn, each guardian's access is
set to its proposal, the disclaimer, onboarding and AI consent are
reset, and every step is audited on the record and on each guardian's
own account. A failure anywhere leaves the profile managed and the link
unused. Each guardian is notified on their own channels.
The new owner then sees each guardian's access on the first screen after
signing in and decides finally; until then the proposal holds, and the
decision waits at the top of Shared access. A guardian whose access
moved since the claim is left alone. The same screen points the owner
at their own notification channels, since reminders no longer reach the
guardians.
Both anonymous routes refuse a single-sign-on-only instance, refuse a
live session before spending the per-address rate limit, check the link
before probing names, and answer one 404 for every unusable token. The
token travels in request bodies only; hlp_ joins the redaction and
secret-shape rules and /claim/ the path-secret registry. Usernames
starting with managed- are reserved. The session-surface and acting-
account guards list the new surfaces with their reasons.
`instant.toISOString().slice(0, 10)` and parsing a key back as UTC
midnight are the idioms behind every day-boundary fix this year: the
evening west of UTC and the small hours east of it land on the
neighbouring day. A new rule, healthlog/no-utc-day-key, refuses them in
src/ outside src/lib/tz and tests, and refuses a disable directive for
itself that is not next-line or gives no reason.
The time zone module now names every legitimate form: userDayKey for a
person's day, dateOnlyKey / dateOnlyAtNoonUtc / dayKeyAsUtcMidnight for
date-only values and day labels, daysBetweenDateKeys / weekdayOfDateKey /
isCalendarDateKey / statedDateKey for key arithmetic and parsing.
Of the 133 sites the rule found, 84 are gone. Most moved onto a named
helper with no change in behaviour; these changed behaviour:
- cycle calendar, insights, Coach snapshot and prediction refresh start
their lookbacks at the first instant of the user's day
- a model-transcribed date like "June 10, 2026" no longer lands a day
early in a process east of UTC (documents and lab scans)
- a custom report range covers exactly the picked days in the profile
zone instead of starting the evening before west of UTC
- date-of-birth pickers cap at the user's today, not the UTC one
- an allergy onset date is stored at noon UTC like other date-only values
- the report's cycle summary, the Coach's usual BP range and the intake
projector's rollup recompute use the user's day
- vaccination dates render as dates instead of the previous evening
49 remain, each with its reason on the line above: 39 UTC by design (15
file name stamps, rollup and object keys, the UTC-day score engines) and
10 marked baseline. A guard test requires a classified reason on every
directive and holds the baseline to a ceiling that only goes down.
Deleting an account, deleting a managed profile, "Delete all data" and the
admin wipe now write an off-host deletion request in the same transaction
as the deletion. A new job (offhost-backup-purge, kicked straight away and
run nightly as a backstop) lists the bucket once, deletes every
<date>/user-<id>.json.enc object of each pending account and removes the
request only when nothing of the account is left. A refused delete keeps
the request with the bucket's answer and is retried; the off-host card
shows how many deletions are outstanding and why. A copy the nightly run
was writing while the account was deleted is taken back after the upload.
The off-host card also reads the bucket's lifecycle rule and says plainly
when there is none (every nightly copy kept forever) or when the
credential may not read it.
Every stored backup now records the key ids its content was written
under, and every off-host upload records the same per key. The admin
encryption view lists, per key, the stored copies that need it with the
oldest date, and when the last off-host copy needing it expires. The
"safe to drop" badge now requires that no backup still needs a retired
key, instead of only that every row was rotated.
Migration 0358 adds data_backups.inner_key_ids, the key-use table and the
deletion requests.
A managed profile could be created and deleted and never changed. A name
typed as a placeholder was permanent, a household that moved kept the
timezone the record was created in, and there was no way to correct a date
of birth somebody finally had (#939).
PATCH /api/managed-profiles/{id} takes the fields creation takes, every
one optional and at least one required — an empty body is a refusal rather
than a save that audits a change nobody made. It carries the gate the rest
of the family carries: a cookie session with a fresh second factor, an
active Guardian grant on the record, and the same byte-identical 404 for
"no such record" and "not yours". A GET beside it answers the record as it
stands, because the account payload names a managed record and nothing
else, and a form filled from that would have had blank fields to send.
The new field is gender. Leaving it out of v1.37.0 meant every managed
record started with the column NULL, which is what the cycle module
derives its default from: a guardian creating a record for a child could
neither record the answer nor turn the module off from there. It reuses
the column and the three values every other surface writes, so there is
one word for one column rather than two.
Refs #939
- publish the roster's entry from the invitation and `{ grantId, revokedAt }`
from the removal, instead of the account-grant row Prisma returned
- drop the invitation's self refusal: it named a code no request can elicit,
because a Guardian grant's grantor is the profile and never the caller
- name the duplicate grant error rather than catching every grant refusal into
a sentence that would be wrong for any other one
- keep the rate limit and the unknown-identifier 404 free of an error code,
as their siblings elsewhere are, and say why at the call site
- add GET /api/managed-profiles/{id}/guardians, cookie-only, refusing
anybody who is not an active guardian of that profile with the same 404
an unknown id gets
- disclose the grant id, the party block already shared between grant
parties, the derived state and the two timestamps, and nothing else
- publish the route in the OpenAPI contract
- Exclude and erase egress claims with recipient-side lookup support\n- Serialize data wipes with managed-profile Guardian authorization\n- Cover last-Guardian and queued-claim wipe races
Marc-André Bombeck