Reported from the iOS side, iOS #96. `GET /api/auth/native/login` answers
location: https://0.0.0.0:3000/auth/login?flow=native
behind a proxy that does not pass `Host` through. `NextResponse.redirect`
needs an absolute URL, the route built one with `new URL(path, req.url)`,
and `req.url` there is the address the Node process bound to.
That is the primary onboarding path. ASWebAuthenticationSession follows
the redirect, iOS refuses the restricted port, and the person lands on a
browser error page with no way forward. Distributed builds carry no
associated domains on purpose, so the browser handoff is also how
passkeys are meant to work; without it a new account is down to a
password and a confirmation code.
Two things hid it. Every error branch of that route builds the fixed
healthlog:// scheme with no host at all, so the route behaved correctly
on every failure and broke only when it was supposed to succeed. And its
own test built a request whose host matched, so the absolute URL it
produced looked right. The assertion there used toContain, which is
satisfied by the broken value just as happily as the correct one.
The same line was in six more places: the error redirects of the
Withings, WHOOP and Fitbit connect routes, which send a browser to
/settings/integrations. Behind the same proxy those land on the same
unreachable address, so all seven move to a relative Location.
A relative Location is valid per RFC 7231 and the client resolves it
against the address it actually called, which is the public one by
definition. The alternative is reading X-Forwarded-Host, and that would
put one more proxy setting between a self-hoster and a working sign-in.
Three checks, as the report asked for. The route test now drives a
request whose URL names the bind address, which is what a proxy hop
looks like from inside the handler. A structural test freezes the
pattern out of the four files and, separately, requires each of them to
still reach for the helper, because a file that simply deleted its
redirect would pass the first check and fail its users. The helper
refuses a protocol-relative value, which is a host in disguise.
Verified by breaking it: putting the old call back fails four checks,
the last of them reporting the reported value verbatim.
Refs iOS #96.
The onboarding "Connect Withings" tap opened /api/withings/connect in a new
tab, which returned a raw JSON 400 for every brand-new account (Withings
credentials are per-user BYO with no env fallback, and the wizard never
collects them). WHOOP, Fitbit, Polar, Oura, and Strava shared the identical
raw-JSON-on-no-creds pattern on their own /connect routes, while every other
failure branch already redirected with a toast reason. All six now redirect
to /settings/integrations?<provider>=error&reason=nocreds instead, and the
wizard's Withings card checks the integrations-status envelope first: unless
credentials are already configured, the CTA reads "Set up in Settings" and
links straight to the credentials form rather than launching a doomed OAuth
handshake.
Also surfaces the BYO-developer-app requirement, which was invisible until a
user was deep inside a Settings card. The source-picker step now says
up front that device sources need a free developer app on the user's own
account; each of the six provider cards gets a compact 3-step guide with the
exact callback URL to register, shown until the user has saved their own
credentials.
Connect mints the PKCE pair, stashes the verifier on the OAuth-state row, and
sends the S256 challenge to the authorize endpoint. Callback reads the verifier
back and presents it on the token exchange, refusing cleanly when it is absent.
The connection-test probe hits the classic /1/user/-/profile.json endpoint.
Land the OAuth + credentials half of the Fitbit / Google Health provider,
cloning the WHOOP provider structure and adapting it to the Google identity
flow.
- Client OAuth half (src/lib/fitbit/client.ts): Google authorize-URL builder
(access_type=offline + prompt=consent), authorization-code exchange, token
refresh, and a profile fetch for the connection's external user id. Client
credentials ride in an HTTP Basic-auth header on the token endpoint; the
four launch Restricted read scopes are pinned in FITBIT_OAUTH_SCOPE. All
egress goes through safeFetch.
- Non-rotating refresh tokens: getValidToken refreshes at expiry-minus-five-
minutes, persists the new access token + expiry, and overwrites the stored
refresh token ONLY when the response carries a fresh one — Google keeps the
refresh token stable, unlike WHOOP.
- BYO credentials route (PUT/GET/DELETE /api/fitbit/credentials): per-user
client id/secret stored encrypted on the User columns, built field-by-field
under requireAuth.
- OAuth state + connect + callback routes: a random base64url nonce backed by
a 10-minute FitbitOAuthState ledger row carries the (nonce -> userId)
mapping; the callback validates the cookie/URL state with timingSafeEqual,
consumes the row atomically (replay/expired/cross-user reason tags),
exchanges the code, upserts the encrypted FitbitConnection, clears prior
reauth state, and enqueues the self-converging history backfill.
- Response classifier mirrors WHOOP's HTTP-status buckets; Google signals a
revoked grant with a 401, so there is no invalid_grant body special-case.
Tests cover the authorize URL, Basic-auth token exchange, the no-rotation
refresh branch (token preserved when omitted, overwritten when present), the
classifier status table, and the OAuth-state nonce mint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>