The gate landed with a softer mode for accounts holding no second factor,
on the premise that they could not clear it. That premise was wrong. A
passkey is a possession factor here and the codebase already says so in
three places: a primary passkey login stamps Session.mfaVerifiedAt,
passkey sits in FRESH_FACTOR_METHODS so a passkey-proved elevation reaches
the fresh-factor routes, and the enrolment policy counts a primary passkey
as satisfying it outright. The only thing refusing such an account was the
reachability pre-check inside requireFreshMfa, which counts second factors
and nothing else.
So the mode is gone and the route asks for a full freshFactor: true with
proofSource: "any-possession" — a second knob that widens which credentials
count as "could ever prove this", and changes nothing about the gate. A
passkey-only account now gets a real gate with the re-provable
auth.stepup.required rather than no gate at all, and the dead-end
auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled is reserved for an account holding nothing.
hasSecondFactorEnrolled is deliberately NOT widened. It answers a different
question, and requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled asks it before deciding whether
account deletion, the data reset, the password change, the encrypted export
and key rotation gate at all — counting a passkey there would change five
destructive actions in passing. The two predicates sit beside each other
with docblocks saying why they differ, and collapsing them turns eight
existing tests red across three files.
Recovery is named rather than assumed. On Bearer: mint an elevation with
method "passkey". On the web: sign in again, which is what stamps the
session — there is no in-page re-proof for a cookie session because the
mint endpoint is Bearer-only by design. That limit is written into the
route docblock instead of left to be discovered, and the removal's refusal
now renders its own sentence in all six locales rather than the server's
English "second-factor" prose, which was wrong for the account this card
mostly serves.
- require password, passkey, TOTP and WebAuthn proof choices
- order fresh-factor completion before challenge creation
- keep successful enrollment in one cookie-bound ceremony
Revert the nine-group consolidation and the card relocations back to the
flat sidebar: sessions, trusted devices, and login activity return to
Privacy, and account deletion returns inline under Advanced. Drop the
/settings/layout redirect and the now-unused group and sign-in cross-link
i18n keys across all six locales.
Keep the collapse-by-default sessions and activity cards, the medical-history
cross-link from "About me", and the chronic-conditions consolidation.
Follow-ups on the v1.25.1 settings group consolidation.
- Sign-in security is no longer split across two top-level groups. Active
sessions, trusted devices, and the login-activity feed move into Account
> Security alongside the second-factor and passkey controls, so every
"who can sign in as me" control sits in one place. The Data & Privacy
pane keeps the data / retention / encryption story and cross-links to
the security home. Sessions and activity are no longer duplicated on the
Profile tab.
- First-child sub-tabs no longer repeat their group name: the section
titles become "Profile & preferences", "Connections", and
"Privacy & retention" across all six locales.
- Account deletion moves out of Advanced into the Account group as a
standalone card; research mode and the data reset stay in Advanced.
- Disambiguate the Spanish labels for the health record vs medical
history (they both read "Historial médico"); medical history becomes
"Antecedentes médicos".
- The section heading carries its id on a single breakpoint instance to
clear a duplicate-id-aria violation; the focus hook keeps targeting
both instances and picks the visible one.
- The in-page sub-tab strip scrolls its active tab into view on a narrow
viewport, matching the group strip.
- Redirect /settings/layout to the Display landing now that nothing links
to the old personalisation hub.
- Note in code that delivery channels deliberately stay under
Integrations (a channel is a delivery provider).
Regenerating recovery codes invalidates the current set immediately, so the
action now sits behind a confirmation dialog matching the disable-MFA pattern,
with a consequence line spelling out that the existing codes stop working. While
in the card: give the disable-step TOTP input the same digit-strip + 6-char cap
and exact-length submit guard as setup, swap the static disable-code id for a
useId value, and lift the copy-secret button to a 44px touch target on phones.
Marc-André Bombeck