The session lookup and the Bearer resolver loaded the whole users row on
every authenticated request, including the profile picture bytes, the
cached briefing text and every stored integration credential. Both now
select SESSION_USER_SELECT, a named allowlist of the small columns the
request path reads, and so does the owner load for a switched record.
The few routes that need a credential or a large column read it
themselves at the moment of use: the factor verifiers load the password
hash and TOTP secret, the profile response loads the insurance number,
and the snapshot read loads the cached briefing text. A structural guard
holds the lookups to the projection and keeps every Bytes and
secret-shaped column out of it.
An account whose only strong credential is a primary passkey was refused
auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled on every action behind requireFreshMfa, so it
could not create, edit, hand over or delete a managed profile or manage its
guardians, although a passkey sign-in or re-proof already stamps the
session the gate reads.
requireFreshMfa now defaults to the any-possession proof source: a passkey
makes the gate reachable, and a passkey re-proof through the dialog clears
it. The refusal offers passkey in meta.methods, never the password.
hasSecondFactorEnrolled keeps its narrow meaning on purpose. It decides
whether the conditional gates apply at all (account deletion, the data
reset, the password change, the export, offering manage access, the
recent-proof branches and the native Bearer rules), so none of those
change, and password sign-in still challenges only TOTP and security keys.
The MFA-management routes keep the second-factor source. The decision and
its limits are written beside FreshFactorProofSource.
Copy, the OpenAPI description and the sharing and key-rotation docs say
"second factor or passkey" where this gate applies.
Refs #959
On an account with a second factor, TOTP setup, security-key registration
and passkey registration no longer accept the password, a password re-proof
or a session younger than five minutes. A remembered browser skips the
second factor at sign-in and still creates a fresh session, so the password
alone could add a key that then satisfies every gate the factor protected.
Only a TOTP code, a security key, a passkey or a completed second factor
within five minutes opens enrollment there; the Bearer arm of TOTP setup and
security-key registration asks the same of its elevation. Accounts without
a second factor keep the previous rules.
The refusal names the proofs the account can give, and the enrollment
dialogs offer exactly those. A proof that verifies now gives its attempt
back to the shared re-proof budget, including the current password on a
password change.
Marc-André Bombeck