The v1.19.0 EcgRecording.waveformEncrypted Bytes column was not added to the
key-rotation script, so an operator rotation would strand ECG waveforms on the
legacy key and dropping it would make them permanently undecryptable — the same
class as the v1.18.1 clinical-spine gap. Wire the column into the rotation and
add a schema-driven coverage test that fails CI if any encrypted Bytes column
is ever left out again.
One-shot prettier pass so the new format:check gate starts from a clean
baseline. Formatting only — no behaviour change. Generator-owned and
vendored artifacts stay untouched via .prettierignore.
The rotation script omitted the four v1.18.1 clinical-spine note columns
(LabResult.noteEncrypted, Biomarker.contextEncrypted,
IllnessEpisode.noteEncrypted, IllnessDayLog.noteEncrypted) plus a longer
pre-existing tail (Nightscout/Polar/Oura credentials, the KVNR field, the
health-profile and cycle-day-log payloads, InsightNarrative content).
Rotation reported zero legacy rows while these still held old-key
ciphertext, so dropping the legacy key left them permanently
undecryptable (decrypt is fail-closed).
Introduce src/lib/crypto/encrypted-columns.ts as the canonical registry of
every reversibly-encrypted column, drive the rotation script from it, and
add a guard test that cross-checks the registry against every encrypted
column in schema.prisma and asserts the script references each one. A new
*Encrypted column not wired into rotation now fails CI by construction.
/settings/mood manages the whole tag vocabulary: own groups (encrypted
labels, twelve per account), custom tags with a searchable icon picker
over a 75-icon catalog, hide and unhide of catalogue tags, archive
semantics that never touch historical entries (hard delete only behind
an explicit second confirm), and drag-or-arrow ordering of groups and
tags shared by the picker. One GET serves the fully ordered tree —
groups, placements, hidden and archived state — so the entry form, the
settings section and a native client all read the same resolved layout.
The picker finally renders custom tag labels (they were ignored since
v1.13.0) and offers inline tag creation per group. The mood-tag API
enters the OpenAPI contract for the first time, and the key-rotation
script now covers both encrypted tag and group labels — custom tag
labels had been missing from it since v1.13.0.
Lay the data-model foundation for the Fitbit/Pixel integration over the
Google Health API, mirroring the WHOOP provider. No OAuth, sync, or UI yet.
- Prisma: FitbitConnection (1:1 per user, encrypted access/refresh tokens)
and FitbitOAuthState models, two encrypted BYO-credential columns on User,
and FITBIT appended to the MeasurementSource enum. Migration
0117_v1120_fitbit_integration is additive only — one enum value plus two
tables and two nullable columns, no new MeasurementType (every launch
metric maps onto an existing type).
- Wire the two new encrypted columns and the FitbitConnection token columns
into scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts.
- FITBIT touchpoints: the read measurementSourceEnum (not the writable set),
the DEFAULT_SOURCE_PRIORITY and workout-source ladders, the sources-section
label map, the IntegrationKey union plus its display name, and a
fitbit()/fitbitStatus() query-key pair. The source-rank SQL and read-tier
collapse pick FITBIT up from the ladders with no code change.
- Add the FITBIT source label to all six locale bundles and regenerate the
OpenAPI contract so the source enum carries FITBIT for the iOS decoder.
Add CoachConversation.summaryEncrypted and CoachFact.factEncrypted to
the key-rotation registry, mirroring the CoachMessage.encryptedContent
Bytes round-trip, so an operator dropping a legacy key re-encrypts the
new Coach-memory columns instead of bricking them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The rotation registry missed the per-user WHOOP credential columns and
the WhoopConnection token columns, so a key rotation would skip those
rows and leave them undecryptable once the operator drops the old key.
Add whoopClientIdEncrypted / whoopClientSecretEncrypted to the User
field list and a WhoopConnection accessToken / refreshToken pass.
`scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts` enumerated columns manually and
predated three of them:
- `User.aiOpenaiKeyEncrypted` (`prisma/schema.prisma:86`, added in
v1.4.3 alongside the other AI provider keys but never threaded
into the rotation list).
- `IntegrationStatus.lastError` (`prisma/schema.prisma:1441`) — the
AES-256-GCM ciphertext of upstream error payloads from the
Withings / moodLog sync paths. Skipped on rotation, every row
stayed on whichever key wrote it.
- `CoachMessage.encryptedContent` (`prisma/schema.prisma:1983`) —
the only `Bytes` column in the encrypted set, so it needed a
Buffer round-trip rather than the standard string path. Mirrors
the `encryptToBytes` / `decryptFromBytes` pattern at
`src/lib/ai/coach/persistence.ts:60-71`.
Without these three, the documented rotation flow ends with the
operator removing `v1` from `ENCRYPTION_KEYS` while rows still live
on the legacy key — and the next read of an affected row throws,
breaking AI Settings, the integration-status panel, or the Coach
history page depending on which column was missed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(crypto): G2 — encryption-key versioning + rotation CLI
Adds backwards-compatible support for ENCRYPTION_KEYS (JSON map of
{ "id": "<key>" }) plus ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID. Ciphertext format is now
"<keyId>.<base64payload>"; legacy bare-base64 ciphertext still decrypts
under the synthetic "v1" id derived from the existing ENCRYPTION_KEY.
scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts re-encrypts every encrypted column on
User / WithingsConnection / AppSettings with the active key. Idempotent —
rows already on the active id are skipped.
Why: enables zero-downtime rotation when a key is suspected leaked,
without forcing every encrypted row through a single big-bang rewrite.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): G4 — native-Bearer UA gating + rotating refresh tokens
Web callers (UA contains 'Mozilla/') keep the legacy 90d Bearer when they
explicitly opt in via X-Client-Type: native. Native callers (HealthLog-iOS,
HealthLog-iPad, n8n, Health-Connect, unrecognised UAs) now receive a 24h
access token plus a 60d rotating refresh token in the login response.
New /api/auth/refresh endpoint atomically validates + rotates the refresh
token (one-time-use), revokes the previously paired access token, and
audit-logs every refresh + revoke. Reuse of an already-consumed refresh
token revokes the entire family for the user/device — defence against a
stolen refresh token.
Migration 0025_refresh_tokens adds the table; the only DDL is CREATE
TABLE so it is forward-compatible. Down migration documented at
docs/ops/migrations/0025-down.sql.
Why: the V3 audit (still-V2-A) flagged that 90d tokens are too long for
native callers when refresh-token rotation is now table-stakes for mobile
apps. Web flows are unchanged so existing browser sessions keep working.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(infra): G3 — web/worker container split via HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE
Adds a tiny startup gate (src/lib/process-type.ts) so the same Docker image
can run as web-only, worker-only, or 'all' (default — single-container,
backwards compatible). assertSubsystemEnabled() refuses to boot the
reminder worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web, preventing accidental
double-cron when an operator splits the deployment.
docker-compose.yml ships the optional app-worker service block commented
out so 'docker compose up' keeps working out of the box; uncommenting it
+ flipping app to HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web is the only change to scale
HTTP horizontally. Healthchecks are isolated per service so neither
startup deadlocks the other; both wait on db: service_healthy.
docs/self-hosting/scaling.md walks through when + how to split.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(jobs): G1 — daily off-host encrypted backup to S3-compatible storage
New pg-boss queue 'data-backup-offhost' runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin, dumps
each user's measurements + medications + intake events + mood entries,
encrypts the JSON under a SEPARATE key (BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, isolated
from the application ENCRYPTION_KEY), and uploads to any S3-compatible
target via @aws-sdk/client-s3.
Wire format documented in docs/ops/backup-restore.md:
magic "HLBK" || version 0x01 || iv(12) || authTag(16) || ciphertext
The worker prunes objects older than BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30);
operators are encouraged to also configure a bucket-level lifecycle rule.
Admin endpoint POST /api/admin/backup/test issues a 1-byte PUT+GET
roundtrip and returns endpoint + bucket + per-call latency. Credentials
are never returned.
scripts/restore-backup.ts downloads + decrypts a single object so
operators can verify the chain end-to-end without standing up a separate
restore harness.
Why: GDPR Art. 32 + V3 audit "data durability" — without an off-host copy
the only line of defence against a Postgres volume loss is the in-DB
DataBackup model on the same host. Separate-key isolation means a leak of
the application encryption key does not also expose every user's archive.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(multi-tenant): address review findings — rotation coverage, hard decrypt errors, web/worker gates
Multi-agent review on PR #135 caught several CRITICAL + HIGH issues that
would have shipped silent data corruption or weakened the threat model:
Encryption + rotation
- scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts: stop selecting `bugReportTokenEncrypted`
(column doesn't exist in the schema; the script crashed on the AppSettings
step). Add the three encrypted columns it was missing —
NotificationChannel.config, PushSubscription.p256dh, PushSubscription.auth
— so rotating to a new key actually re-encrypts every encrypted row.
Without this, dropping the old key id from ENCRYPTION_KEYS would leave
notification channels and web-push subscriptions permanently
undecryptable.
- src/lib/crypto.ts: refuse to silently fall back to the active key when a
legacy bare-base64 row is decrypted but no v1 entry is configured. Throws
a clear "Restore ENCRYPTION_KEY (or add a v1 entry to ENCRYPTION_KEYS)
and run scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts before removing it" so an
operator who pulled the v1 too early notices immediately instead of
hitting opaque GCM tag errors.
- docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md: full step-by-step + rollback note +
troubleshooting section. Spells out that rotation is a forward-only
operation and what to do if the rollback path is needed.
Web / worker split (G3)
- src/proxy.ts: refuse HTTP traffic with a 503 +
X-HealthLog-Process-Type: worker header when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=worker.
The worker container (which still runs `node server.js` for now) no
longer accepts requests, so a misrouted client gets a clear hint instead
of a partially-served response.
- src/instrumentation.ts: short-circuit before importing the reminder
worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web — avoids the noisy
"[instrumentation] CRITICAL" stderr line we emitted on every web boot.
- /api/version added to PUBLIC_PATHS so the compose healthcheck doesn't
silently 302-redirect through the auth gate (the prior wget treated the
login page as a 200 success and would never notice an unhealthy backend).
Refresh-token rotation (G4)
- src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts: reuse-detection now revokes ALL active
refresh tokens for the user, not only those scoped to the same deviceId.
An attacker who rotated without an X-Device-Id header would otherwise
keep their family alive on the no-device branch. Defence-in-depth.
- revokeRefreshToken() also revokes the paired access token so a leaked
access token cannot outlive the refresh-token sibling that the caller
just killed (logout-on-device).
Off-host backup (G1)
- src/lib/jobs/offhost-backup.ts: drop the worker-side DeleteObject path.
Retention is the bucket's lifecycle-policy job; the worker keeps a
PutObject + GetObject grant only. A compromised worker can no longer
wipe the backup history. Per-user errors are now surfaced as Wide
Event warnings + a structured failures[] array on the report so an
operator can tell which user failed and why.
- scripts/restore-backup.ts: schema-validate the decrypted payload before
writing to disk, plus an optional --user-id=<id> flag that refuses to
proceed unless the dump's userId matches. Prevents silent
cross-tenant restores when an operator points the script at the wrong
S3 key.
Idempotency
- src/lib/idempotency.ts: the leak-guard already blocked `hlk_`
(access-token prefix); also block `hlr_` so a future caller wrapping
the new /api/auth/refresh endpoint with withIdempotency() can't
accidentally cache a freshly-issued refresh token.
Migration / schema
- prisma/migrations/0025_refresh_tokens/migration.sql: wrap in a single
transaction; switch to CREATE { TABLE | INDEX } IF NOT EXISTS so a
partial-deploy retry is a no-op instead of "relation already exists";
guard the FK ADD with information_schema lookup for the same reason.
- Schema replaces the single-column `@@index([deviceId])` with a
composite `@@index([userId, deviceId])` (every lookup also filters on
userId; the old index would never have been used). Comment on
accessTokenHash corrected to HMAC-SHA-256.
Container / ops
- Dockerfile: install tzdata + ENV TZ=Europe/Berlin so the daily
pg-boss schedule (`30 2 * * *` Europe/Berlin) actually fires at 02:30
Berlin instead of silently falling back to UTC on the alpine base.
- docker-compose.yml: tighten the healthcheck to `wget --spider` (matches
the Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK style, doesn't pipe the body), pass through
BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS so a custom retention env reaches the container.
- .env.example: document every new env var added in this PR
(HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE, ENCRYPTION_KEYS, ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID,
BACKUP_S3_*, BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS) with
comments and the all-or-none semantics for the backup block.
491 tests still green, typecheck clean.
* chore: retrigger CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
Marc-André Bombeck