Admin, coach, consent, chart-overlay, device registration, insights
feedback and provider chain, ECG ingest, onboarding, search and the AI
provider settings move to parseJsonBody with the same message, error
code, status and wide-event action they answered with. A refusal whose
annotate meta is computed from the issues, or puts its keys in another
order than the helper would, keeps that annotate verbatim in onInvalid.
The routes that still call safeJson do something between the read and the
schema: an optimistic-concurrency token split off the body, a count cap
answered first, a refunded quota slot, a conditional read, a non-Zod
check, or the body handed to a service.
Output of `node scripts/strip-planning-tags.mjs --write`: 3,157 comment
lines in 1,308 files lose the work-item identifier at their head. Release
versions and issue references stay; nothing outside comment text
changes, which the script checks per file against a comment-free
printout. healthlog/no-planning-tags is enabled at error level with this
commit, so the tree it lands on is clean.
Fifty-nine 422s raised off a Zod `safeParse` answered with one opaque
sentence and nothing a client could map onto a field, while the other
166 sent `details.issues` — the multi-issue envelope that exists so a
caller with three bad fields fixes all three in one round-trip. Twelve
of the fifty-nine put a dotted machine token in `error` where the
sentence belongs, so `error` was sometimes text to show a person and
sometimes a token that must not be shown, with nothing in the payload
to tell them apart.
Every one of them now answers through `apiValidationError`, which keeps
the existing `error` string and the existing `meta` byte for byte and
adds the issue list beside them. The dotted tokens keep their place in
`error` for the clients that already match on them and are published in
`meta.errorCode` as well, which is the field a machine code belongs in
and the one a new client should read.
A guard reads the route tree per refusal site rather than per file —
per file is what let this grow, since a route that used the helper once
looked compliant to a `grep -l` sweep — and asserts it still finds the
sites it judges, so a matcher that stops matching fails instead of
reporting a clean zero.
Raising the middleware body cap to 512 MB for archive imports removed
the implicit ceiling that protected JSON routes, so any bulk endpoint
would buffer an arbitrarily large body before validation ran. Every
JSON body read under /api now carries an explicit byte cap sized to its
legitimate payload (64 KB for single-record routes up to 16 MB for the
measurement import), webhooks cap before signature work, and oversized
bodies return 413.
Pre-existing format drift accumulated across v1.4.x; running
prettier brings the whole tree back to baseline so future diffs
read clean. No behaviour change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
H5 — `POST /api/insights/feedback` had no rate limit. The unique
index `(userId, recommendationId, recommendationText)` blocks exact
replays but a malicious client could distort the daily aggregator's
bucket slice by varying recommendationId/text per request. Added
`checkRateLimit("insights-feedback:<user.id>", 60, 60 * 60 * 1000)`.
60/h is generous given a comprehensive insight rarely has >10 recs.
H6 — `<RecommendationFeedback>` invalidated the entire `["insights"]`
prefix on every thumbs click, which matches all 8 insights queries
(comprehensive + 7 per-status). None of them depend on the feedback
row. The 24h server cache absorbs the actual LLM round-trip but the
network thrash + stale-cache refetch was waste. Dropped the
invalidation; user-visible verdict state lives in localStorage +
local React state. v1.4.17's prompt-version ratchet will scope its
own invalidation when feedback feeds the next generation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
v1.4.16 phase B5e: ship the POST endpoint that backs the per-rec
thumbs-up / thumbs-down UI. Body is the four rec-attributes the
client just rendered (id, text-snapshot, severity, metric-source +
time-range) plus the boolean verdict; server-fills providerType +
promptVersion via `resolveFeedbackAttribution()` so the client cannot
poison the daily aggregator's slice by claiming a thumbs-down was
attributed to a rival provider.
Idempotent via the existing `withIdempotency()` wrapper — a retry
with the same Idempotency-Key replays the cached response with
`X-Idempotent-Replay: true`. The dedup unique key on the model
(userId, recommendationId, recommendationText) returns 409 when the
same rec-text is re-rated — that's by design, the aggregator wants
per-text signal not per-id signal so a regeneration that rewrites
the same id with new text re-rates cleanly.
The attribution helper prefers `chainProviderType` over `providerType`
in the latest insights.generate audit row so when the B5b multi-
provider chain falls through to a secondary, the feedback row
reflects the working provider not the configured one. Falls back to
"unknown" + the current PROMPT_VERSION constant when no audit row
exists yet — the aggregator buckets that separately.
Audit row: action `insights.recommendation.feedback`, details carry
the feedback id, severity, helpful, providerType, promptVersion.
Tests:
- 7 unit tests for the Zod request schema (valid path, severity
poisoning, time-range poisoning, empty fields, stringified bool,
extra-field stripping)
- 5 unit tests for `pickProviderType()` priority + fallback
- 4 integration tests: 201 happy path with provider attribution,
409 dedup, 422 validation, fallback to unknown when no audit row
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Marc-André Bombeck