Commit Graph
13 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marc-André Bombeck ebf032158e Give the intake toast one decision, and stop admitting two writes nothing calls
Three surfaces record a dose and all three had to reach the same two
conclusions inside somebody else's record: name the record, and drop an
Undo the server refuses. Two learned it and the dose ledger did not,
because the ternary was written out three times. It is written once now,
in the file the other two already share, with its own test.

POST /api/allergies and POST /api/family-history leave the frozen
delegable write set. The argument that admitted them still stands — an
allergy is the single most useful thing a caregiver can contribute — but
the only surface that posts to either lives in Settings, which a switch
closes, so no delegate could reach the form at any level. That is a
permission frozen ahead of the caller for it, and the list is built the
other way round on purpose.

Both delegable READ arms stay. A caregiver reading the allergy list is
what the feature is for; only the contribute step waits, and it comes
back in the same diff as the surface that offers it.
2026-08-03 18:47:42 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 785a1eacfc Freeze the delegable write set and drive it against Postgres
The surface guard grows a write leg. Membership is decided by the argument
a module passes to the record resolver, not by the identifier, because a
delegable read and a delegable write name the same symbol and mean opposite
things. The call matcher resolves aliased and namespace-qualified calls
back to the original name, and proves it can against synthetic modules.

Two assertions carry the decision not to add a provenance column to eleven
tables. Every module in the write list has to call auditLog, which is the
only writer that stamps the acting account, and none of them may reach the
audit table through the client instead. That decision rested on the trail
existing; it now rests on a test.

The prose on the read list said the write arms keep refusing under a
switch. Eleven of them no longer do, so those sentences are rewritten
rather than left to lie.

The integration suite drives the shipped POST exports through the real
handler, resolver, grant table and Prisma. Five legs per verb: the write
lands under the owner and nowhere else, a read grant is refused with
nothing written, a caller who was never granted is refused the same way,
the request after a revocation is refused with no re-login, and a caller
who never switched is indistinguishable from before. The grant is minted
through the invitation flow rather than planted, and the audit assertion
reads both ends of the row.
2026-08-03 12:11:28 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e449a19e55 docs(sharing): say how the cycle gate actually resolves the record
The two cycle entries in the frozen list claimed the gate reads `gender` off
the resolved auth context. It does not: `requireCycleEnabled` names that
parameter `_gender` and ignores it, then re-loads gender and the profile by
the resolved user id through the module gate. The answer is the same — the
owner's — but a reviewer checking the claim would have found a dead argument
and no explanation.

The profile route is the exception and now says so: it passes the auth-context
gender to `isCycleEnabled` itself to compute the flag it returns.

A frozen-list entry is only worth the reviewing it invites, so it has to
describe the mechanism that is there rather than the one the call site looks
like it has.
2026-08-02 18:17:05 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 49ffba77f3 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into work/sharing-routes
# Conflicts:
#	src/__tests__/delegable-surface-guard.test.ts
2026-08-02 18:07:11 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 7a39a649be feat(sharing): open the medication reads to a delegate
Ten routes: the cabinet list, the medication detail, its cadence, schedule
revisions, side effects, inventory, phase config and intake history, plus the
account-wide intake list and the batched compliance read.

`GET /api/medications/compliance` is the one delegable read that spends a
quota, and its rate-limit bucket now keys on the ACTOR while everything below
it scopes to the record. Both halves matter: a delegate hammering the route
must burn their own allowance rather than lock the owner out of their own
cabinet, and switching records must not hand the same caller a fresh one. The
test reads the `rate_limits` row rather than inferring it from a 429, because
a bucket keyed on the wrong person still answers 200.

`GET /api/medications/[id]/api-endpoint` stays refused. It returns two scalar
fields and no secret, and it tells a delegate whether the owner holds a live
ingest credential and for which medication — in the same file as the PUT that
mints one that would survive revocation.

The two intake validation breadcrumbs move onto `auditLog()` for the actor
stamp. The POST arm's breadcrumb stays as it is: that arm cannot be reached
under a switch.
2026-08-02 17:06:23 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck fe765a7ae2 feat(sharing): open the cycle reads to a delegate
Four routes: the cycle history, the day log, the profile and the custom
symptom vocabulary.

All four gate on `requireCycleEnabled(user.id, user.gender)`, and both
arguments now come off the record. That is the correct reading and the one
that had to be verified rather than assumed: whether cycle tracking applies
is a property of the record, so a delegate who tracks nothing still sees the
owner's cycle, and a delegate who tracks their own sees nothing when the
owner does not. Both directions are asserted.
2026-08-02 16:57:07 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 10f9a83356 feat(sharing): open the sleep, nutrient, illness and workout reads
Eight routes: the two sleep reads, the nutrient overview and its daily
series, the illness episode list, detail and day logs, and the workout list.

The illness day-log read is the one worth reading twice. Its queries are
episode-scoped rather than user-scoped, and what makes them safe is the
`loadOwnedEpisode(id, user.id)` hop above them. That hop now resolves against
the record, so a delegate cannot reach their own episode from inside somebody
else's account — asserted, because it is the kind of thing that would look
fine and behave wrong.

`GET /api/workouts/[id]` stays refused. It differs from the list beside it by
one conditional include that decrypts a paragraph written about the owner.
2026-08-02 16:52:59 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 8c070c953b feat(sharing): open the mood, custom-metric and record reads to a delegate
Six routes: the mood-entry list and detail, the custom-metric list, detail
and entries, and the personal-record list. The custom-metric entries read
establishes ownership on the metric before it queries by metric id, and that
hop now resolves against the record — a delegate cannot reach their own
metric from inside somebody else's account.

`GET /api/mood/tags` stays refused. It looks like plain record vocabulary and
one select in the middle of it pulls the owner's tag layout, which is a
presentation preference and belongs to the person rather than the record.

The mood list's validation breadcrumb moves onto `auditLog()` for the actor
stamp, the same change the measurement reads took.
2026-08-02 16:44:52 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck af0f749740 feat(sharing): open the lab and clinical-record reads to a delegate
Ten routes: lab results and their detail, the biomarker catalogue and its
detail, allergies, family history, the mental-health screener history, and
the health-profile facts. All GET arms; every write arm in the same files
keeps `requireAuth()` and refuses under a switch.

The family-history payload is the one admitted read that carries third-party
health information by design — it describes the owner's relatives — and it is
admitted because a caregiver reading a family history is what the feature is
for and the rows are the owner's own.

The mental-health module gate resolves against the record, not the caller.
That is the recorded decision: the module map says which parts of a record
exist, so a delegate who enabled the screener on their own account gains no
screener view inside somebody else's. The integration test asserts both
directions.
2026-08-02 16:38:39 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 255cbf5fe0 feat(sharing): open the measurement reads to a delegate
Six routes move from `requireAuth()` to `requireRecordAuth("read")`: the
measurement list, the single reading, the two series reads, and the two
reminder reads. Each is admitted in the delegable classification with its
five answers written; each enters the frozen list with the argument for why
a delegate reading through it cannot extend their own reach.

Only the GET arms move. The POST, PUT and DELETE arms in the same files keep
`requireAuth()`, which refuses outright while a switch is active, so a file
entering the list admits a read and nothing else.

The two validation breadcrumbs on the list and series reads now write through
`auditLog()` rather than a bare `prisma.auditLog.create`. That helper is the
only writer that stamps `actorUserId`, and without the stamp a delegate's
malformed query lands on the owner's record looking like the owner's own.

Integration coverage drives the shipped GET exports against real Postgres:
the owner's rows reach a delegate holding a live grant, the delegate's own
rows do not, a caller without a grant is refused `sharing.access.denied`, the
request after a revocation is refused with no re-login, and a caller who
never switched sees exactly what they saw before.
2026-08-02 16:30:46 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 562123d4d1 feat(sharing): publish which records an account may open
`GET /api/auth/me` grows an `accountAccess` block: the accounts this caller
may act on, the one the browser is inside right now, and the booleans a UI
binds directly — `canSwitch`, and `canWrite` per account. Every value is
resolved server-side. A client that worked out what it may do from grant rows
would be a second program deciding one person's access to a health record, and
the two answer differently the first time an expiry or a revocation appears.

`canWrite` is false for every grant in v1 because invitations write READ only.
It is resolved through the grant state machine rather than hardcoded, so the
day a WRITE grant exists the answer changes without this file being edited.

The route becomes an actor surface. It has to be: the switcher, the banner
naming whose record is open, and the way back out all read this payload, and
under a bare `requireAuth()` the whole app shell would refuse the moment a
switch was on. Every field it returns is still the caller's own.

The active record is published as a full entry, not an id to look up. A banner
that had to join two fields could render unnamed the moment they disagreed;
here the active entry is one of the listed ones, selected by the pass that
built them. A stamp left behind by a grant that lapsed reads as not switched —
the same answer the resolver gives the next delegated request.

Not published: the other account's avatar. Those bytes are owner-scoped, so a
URL here would resolve to a refusal and paint a broken image. Clients keep the
initials fallback.
2026-08-02 14:25:55 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 6a096a75eb test(sharing): admit the switch endpoint to the actor-surface list
The first entry in either frozen list. It is the way back out of a
switch: every other route refuses while one is active, so a browser that
could not reach this one would be stuck inside a record it entered. The
entry names why it may say what it says — one session row, the caller's
own, nothing of the owner's rendered and nothing granted.

The entry count moves with it, so an addition has to be made twice
rather than once.
2026-08-02 13:05:43 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e4b1718924 test(sharing): freeze the delegable and actor-surface route lists
Both resolvers land with empty allowlists. That is the correct start and
also the shape that hides a broken matcher: a scan that finds nothing
agrees with a list that holds nothing, and the two look identical from
outside. So every leg pins a count that does not start at zero. The scan
asserts it found route modules, the two frozen legs assert the matcher
still finds the declaration site, the co-occurrence leg asserts each
cookie-only helper is present in the tree it reads, and the two
out-of-band Bearer surfaces assert they still resolve a token of their
own before asserting they reach no resolver.

Membership is decided from the parsed module rather than the source text,
so a route may explain in a comment why it is not delegable without being
enrolled by saying so, and an aliased import cannot hide one. The
synthetic modules at the top prove both halves of that.

Enumerates with a recursive readdir rather than a glob: globSync skips
dot directories, so it drops the three route handlers under
src/app/.well-known and leaves the sweep looking healthy at 444 modules
instead of 447. One of the three is pinned by name.

Scans 447 route modules and 2338 source files, and finds nothing.
2026-08-02 12:10:43 +02:00