Both routes were exempt from the contract as `shareLink` — "authenticated
by the URL credential, for a recipient with no account". That reason
holds for the page a person opens. It does not hold for two routes whose
whole purpose is to hand a practice a file it files into another system,
which is exactly the audience a contract has. `/c/{token}/d/{id}` was
published all along, one route away in the same tree.
Each entry states the gate it shares with the page, the frozen selection
it can never exceed, the flat 404 that covers every miss class including
a documents-only link, and the 20/h per-link bucket. The FHIR entry says
plainly that it is a download and not a REST face, and names the two
resource families the bundle deliberately omits.
The create-request description claimed "there is no FHIR or other
machine-readable face behind a share token", which stopped being true
when these routes landed. It now describes what a link actually serves
and records that the insurance leaf is refused outright.
The coverage guard gains the other half of its staleness check. It caught
an exemption for a route that had disappeared, and never the reverse — an
exemption left behind after the route was published, which is how these
two would have stayed on the list while the contract already carried
them. Break-proof: re-add either entry and it goes red naming it.
The gate landed with a softer mode for accounts holding no second factor,
on the premise that they could not clear it. That premise was wrong. A
passkey is a possession factor here and the codebase already says so in
three places: a primary passkey login stamps Session.mfaVerifiedAt,
passkey sits in FRESH_FACTOR_METHODS so a passkey-proved elevation reaches
the fresh-factor routes, and the enrolment policy counts a primary passkey
as satisfying it outright. The only thing refusing such an account was the
reachability pre-check inside requireFreshMfa, which counts second factors
and nothing else.
So the mode is gone and the route asks for a full freshFactor: true with
proofSource: "any-possession" — a second knob that widens which credentials
count as "could ever prove this", and changes nothing about the gate. A
passkey-only account now gets a real gate with the re-provable
auth.stepup.required rather than no gate at all, and the dead-end
auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled is reserved for an account holding nothing.
hasSecondFactorEnrolled is deliberately NOT widened. It answers a different
question, and requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled asks it before deciding whether
account deletion, the data reset, the password change, the encrypted export
and key rotation gate at all — counting a passkey there would change five
destructive actions in passing. The two predicates sit beside each other
with docblocks saying why they differ, and collapsing them turns eight
existing tests red across three files.
Recovery is named rather than assumed. On Bearer: mint an elevation with
method "passkey". On the web: sign in again, which is what stamps the
session — there is no in-page re-proof for a cookie session because the
mint endpoint is Bearer-only by design. That limit is written into the
route docblock instead of left to be discovered, and the removal's refusal
now renders its own sentence in all six locales rather than the server's
English "second-factor" prose, which was wrong for the account this card
mostly serves.
DELETE /api/auth/passkeys/{id} took a plain cookie session or a wildcard
Bearer, while DELETE /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/{id} beside it demanded a
fresh factor proof. The softer gate sat on the primary sign-in credential:
the last-method check stops an account locking itself out, but nothing
stopped a hijacked session stripping the credentials the owner signs in
with.
The route now goes through requireMfaManagementAuth, the same gate the
security-key removal uses, in a new "if-enrolled" mode. An account with a
second factor pays the full price on either transport — a freshly verified
cookie session, or a factor-proved X-Step-Up elevation on Bearer, so the
native client keeps the capability rather than being sent to the website.
An account with no second factor keeps the contract it had, because a gate
it can never satisfy is not a safeguard but a locked door in front of its
own credential list.
The elevation is spent immediately before the delete, so a foreign id or a
refused last credential does not burn a proof that then has to be minted
again. The route is added to the elevation allowlist with its reason, and
the either-factor enrolment test that was written out three times in the
API kit is now one function.
DELETE /api/user/thresholds without ?metric= erased the account's whole
override set on an omitted query parameter alone: no confirmation, no dry
run, and no rate limit of its own while the PUT beside it had one.
The wide form now wants { "confirm": "RESET_THRESHOLDS" } in the body — the
same typed-confirmation shape /api/settings/account and /api/settings/data
already use — and refuses 422 without writing anything. The ?metric= form
is untouched: it resets one band the person can retype, and the targets
sheet fires it in a loop. Both forms now run the PUT's 30 / 5 min limit.
The settings card's "reset all" control already opened a confirm dialog;
it now sends that answer to the server too. Its token is compared against
the route's declaration in the tests, so the two ends cannot drift apart
into a permanent 422.
Three resolvers turned a user-authored word into an internal code by
comparing it against a hand-typed English list. The app ships six
languages, so five of them resolved nothing: `Fer` and `Żelazo` came back
as `unknown_nutrient` while the settings card rendered exactly those
words, and `poids` and `sommeil` reached no series at all.
Stop transcribing. `nutrients.names.*` and `measurements.type*` already
label these concepts in every bundle, so the match index is derived from
`locales` instead — a seventh language works the day its bundle lands,
with no edit at any call site. The nutrient tool's English labels now come
out of `messages/en.json` too, so the wire wording cannot drift from the
screen.
The MCP contract is unchanged in shape and stays protocol-level English.
What moves is which words are understood: `unknown_nutrient` /
`unknown_metric` still mean "could not place this word", distinct from a
placed name answering `no_data`. Nothing turns absence into data.
Two findings the sweep did not predict:
- `Puls` resolved to pulse-wave velocity, because the English
display-name pass matches substrings and "pulse-wave velocity" contains
it. An exact name now beats a loose English fragment.
- French and Italian use one phrase for body fat and fat mass, and three
bundles use one for fat-free mass and lean body mass. A word two
metrics claim resolves to neither; answering kilograms to someone who
asked for a percentage is worse than saying the word was not
recognised. The known set is pinned so a new collision surfaces.
The medication needles are the exception: they are drug names, with no
bundle to derive from. They fold to a normalised INN stem rather than to
a language, so `Metformin`, `Metformine`, `Metformina` and `Metforminum`
are one entry, and `Semaglutyd` and `Atorwastatyna` cost nothing to add.
A guard asserts no two molecules collapse onto one stem. Iron is the one
class with no stem to fold to — it is named for the element — so its word
list is hand-tabulated and says so.
Every English resolution that worked before returns the same answer.
Three surfaces, one source. The registry the proxy answers 410 from now
also emits the tombstones into `docs/api/openapi.yaml` and rides on
`GET /api/meta/capabilities`, so a retirement cannot be honoured at
runtime and invisible everywhere a client could have read it first.
The contract publishes each retired path with 410 as its only response,
the removing version, and the replacement. `deprecated: true` is
imprecise — the word means "still works, stop using it", and these do not
work — but it is what makes a generator warn at the call site, and the
description carries the exact truth the flag approximates. `security: []`
because the answer is produced before any handler and reads no
credential; publishing it as authenticated would tell a client to sign in
to be told a path is gone.
The capability read carries the same list. That surface is the one a
client already polls on launch, so a retirement can reach it before the
failing call rather than through it.
The coverage guard gains a third state. Published and exempted both
describe a route that exists, so removing one used to leave exactly one
legal move — erase it from the contract as well — and that move is
invisible to every client already calling it. A registered path is now
required to be absent from `src/app` AND present in the contract, which
is the one combination the phantom-path case rejected outright. Both ways
out are named in the failure message.
Its docblock says what the state cannot do, because the first draft
overclaimed: a check over one commit's state cannot see a deletion, so it
cannot insist that a removal should have been registered. Proving that
needs the previous release tag, and the job running this suite checks out
at depth one with no tags, which would make the check one that silently
cannot fail. What is held instead is the registration's integrity, in
three directions and with the mutation for each written down.
The sharing-denial guard learns the same state: a retired path resolves
no record fence because it reaches no handler.
The GLP-1 side-effect chips in the mood form write the localised label into
the flat `MoodEntry.tags` column, and three readers matched that label against
a hand-written list of English and German words: the therapy timeline, the
Coach snapshot, and the doctor report's GLP-1 block. The app ships six locales.
Tap the nausea chip with the UI in French, Spanish, Italian or Polish and the
day never reached the timeline, the Coach grounded its answers on an empty
side-effect list, and a clinician read an empty table over a record that had
three months of symptoms. Nothing on any of those surfaces said the table was a
filter rather than the truth. The three lists had also drifted apart from each
other.
The chips are a closed set with stable keys, so matching the label was the
defect and the key is the fix. `glp1-side-effect-tags.ts` holds the catalogue —
seven keys, each with the i18n key its chip renders — and the mood form now
draws its strip from it, so the write side and the read side cannot diverge
again. `glp1-side-effect-tag-match.ts` builds the label-to-key index by reading
`messages/<locale>.json` for every entry in `locales`, rather than transcribing
the labels into a second list. Transcribing would have fixed today's four
locales and reopened the same hole on the day a seventh is added; deriving
means a new bundle is matchable as soon as it lands, with no edit in the
matcher. Comparison folds case, accents and separators, so the English and
German tags already in the database keep resolving and a straight apostrophe
matches the typographic one the French bundle uses.
All three readers now report the catalogue key instead of the stored string.
The same recorded symptom yields one key whatever language it was tagged in,
which also fixes the mixed-language output an account gets after switching UI
locale; the doctor-report PDF resolves the key through the label map so the
clinician reads it in the report's language.
A tag outside the catalogue is still never counted — a free-text mood tag must
not reach a doctor as an invented symptom, and the rest of somebody's day does
not belong on a therapy timeline. It is no longer dropped without trace: the
timeline route annotates the unresolved count on its wide event, so the
classification rate stays answerable while the tag text stays in the database.
The Coach's copy of the list also carried `vomiting`, `reflux` and `erbrechen`.
Those are removed. No chip writes them, so they only ever matched a hand-typed
tag in two of six languages; keeping them would have rebuilt the defect inside
its own fix. Restoring either symptom means giving it a chip and a label in all
six bundles.
The response schema for `GET /api/insights/glp1-timeline` now enumerates the
keys, and its description no longer documents the bilingual match as if it were
the contract.
The generated document is the whole visible effect of both halves, so it
conflicted line for line. Regenerated from the merged registry rather
than resolved by hand.
`.meta()` clones the schema in Zod 4 and registers the clone, so a bare
`schema.meta({ id, description })` statement registers nothing at all.
Forty-one of them sat across nine route modules. The ids they named —
`MeasurementType`, `MeasurementSource`, `LoginPasswordRequest`,
`CreateMeasurementRequest`, `CreateBatchWorkoutRequest` and thirty more —
reached `components.schemas` zero times, the descriptions written for them
were published nowhere, and every use site inlined an anonymous copy. A client
generated from the contract got duplicated nameless types where one named
model belongs, which is the part that matters, because the iOS client is why
the contract is published.
Forty of them now bind their clone, and every use site points at it. Where the
schema comes from `src/lib/validations/*` the import is aliased and the clone
takes the name the use sites already spell, so nothing mutates the runtime
validation schema. The seven that cross module boundaries are exported from
`./shared` and the eight consumers import them from there; importing the raw
schema from the validation module instead is exactly what inlined them.
Thirty-four named components appear where inline copies stood. Fully
dereferenced, the document differs by eighty-six added descriptions and
nothing else: no operation's request or response shape moves. `CoachPrefs`
was already force-registered in the index and finally carries its description.
Five ids legitimately stay out of `components.schemas` —
`ListMeasurementsQuery`, `ListAllergiesQuery`, `ListEncountersQuery`,
`SuggestEncounterQuery` and `ListPractitionersQuery`. The emitter expands a
`requestParams.query` object into inline `parameters`, so a query id has
nowhere to land; they stay in the assigning form for consistency.
Three findings the wiring turned up:
`CreateShareLinkRequest` and `HealthRecordExportRequest` were annotated in the
Coach module, which imported the two schemas for no other reason and never
referenced them. Both operations that send these bodies live in the
health-record module, so the annotations move there. Both descriptions
described a `sections` field: the export body has no such field and rejects it
with a 422, and the share-link body freezes scope through `selection` plus
`documentIds` / `documentOnly`. Publishing either sentence verbatim would have
published a lie, so both are corrected to the shape the routes actually take.
`CoachPlansListQuery` — the forty-first — named a component that nothing
referenced and that a query object could never reach. The operation publishes
its two parameters by hand, because the schema carries a cross-field
refinement the expansion cannot express, and every clause of the annotation is
already published on the operation and on both parameters. It is deleted
rather than left registering nothing.
The annotation was already in the assigning form and still never reached
the document, because both consumers extend the base rather than
reference it and .extend() builds a new object. Same shape as Medication
and CoachPrefs, same remedy: name it in the forced-registration block.
Zod 4's `.meta()` clones the schema and registers the clone, so a bare
`someSchema.meta({ id })` statement registers nothing at all. Thirty-nine of
those across eleven route modules published neither the name nor the
description written for it: the schema inlined anonymously at every use site,
and a client generated from the contract got a duplicated nameless type where
one named model belongs. That last part is the cost that matters, because the
native client is the reason the contract is published.
Bind each annotated clone to a const and point the route table at that const.
Twenty-nine ids now emit under `components.schemas`, referenced from their
thirty use sites. Seven stay absent by design: they annotate
`requestParams.query` objects, which the emitter expands into inline
`parameters` rather than a component. `MoodTagLayout` stays absent too, for
the reason `Medication` and `CoachPrefs` already carry a forced registration
in the components block: its only consumer is an `.extend()`, and extending
builds a new object rather than referencing the base.
Two annotations in the illness module named ids that no route ever referenced,
`GetIllnessDayLogQuery` and `ListIllnessDayLogsQuery` — the day-log path
publishes the merged `GetIllnessDayLogsQuery` instead. They were dead twice
over, so they go rather than get wired to nothing.
`docs/api/openapi.yaml` grows the twenty-nine components and their refs. The
only other movement in it is thirty descriptions appearing where the text had
never reached the document. No request or response shape changes.
The document defined bearerAuth and cookieAuth and referenced neither,
so the schemes were decoration: a client generated from the contract
wires no credential and reads the whole surface as open.
The default now offers the two as alternatives, and the ten operations
reachable before a credential exists opt out with an empty array. The
opt-out list is derived from what each handler accepts, not from the
proxy's public-path list — /api/ingest/medication is on that list and
requires a Bearer token, so reading it as the answer would publish an
authenticated route as open. Writing the list from the proxy is exactly
the mistake the guard caught: /api/auth/oidc/callback went on it and is
not published at all.
`withIdempotency` has made writes safe to retry since v1.5.x. It was described
in route comments and in no schema, so an app generated against
`docs/api/openapi.yaml` could not learn that a retry was safe. The iOS side
asked for it; the mechanism does not change, only what it says about itself.
34 operations now declare `Idempotency-Key` and the `X-Idempotent-Replay`
header, plus the 409 that refuses a duplicate still in flight. The description
leads with the one silent failure in the mechanism: a key that misses
`^[A-Za-z0-9_\-:.]{8,128}$` is IGNORED rather than refused, so the write
proceeds unprotected and looks exactly like a request that carried no key.
## What the work turned up
Three things the contract had wrong or missing, none of them the thing being
built:
- `/api/insights/chat` describes `withIdempotency()` in its header comment and
applies it nowhere. The Coach chat is not retry-safe. Its prose says it is.
- `/api/measurements` exports GET, POST, PUT and DELETE and wraps only POST.
Publishing the header per PATH would have promised a safe retry on two
methods that do not honour one — the dangerous direction, so the guard works
per OPERATION.
- `/api/insights/feedback` and `/api/admin/backups/{id}/restore` are not in the
document at all. Both are named in the guard's exemption list with a reason,
not filtered out silently.
## The guard
`idempotency-contract-publication.test.ts` reads the expected set out of the
route tree on every run — nothing is hand-listed, so it cannot fall behind the
code. It fails in both directions: a new wrapped route that forgets to publish,
and a published claim no handler honours.
A fourth assertion checks the exemption list itself is still true. It earned
its place immediately: the first draft exempted the whole `/api/medications`
family on the strength of a grep for path literals that came back empty. The
paths are not written as literals there; the emitted document carries 19 of
them. The test went red, the claim was wrong, the list is two entries now.
Measure the artefact, not the source that builds it.
Refs A3-8. The per-item PHQ-9 / GAD-7 / WHO-5 / SCI answers have been
stored encrypted since the assessments shipped, and nothing ever read
them back — the clinical detail (item 9 included) was invisible. A new
by-id read decrypts them for whoever holds the mind read grant (the same
grant that already serves the mood diary's prose and the item-9 flag),
degrades to an honest items-unavailable state on any decrypt or shape
problem, and the history rows gain an expandable breakdown rendering the
official instrument texts the check-in flow already carries — nothing
retranslated, no alarm styling on item 9 beyond what the house already
does.
Rides along: the guard inventories learn the branch's new routes (frozen
counts moved with reasons), the reminder-engine test harnesses carry the
ledger delegate, and the custom-metric restore toast keys sit in their
right namespace in all six locales.
Refs A3-11. Deleting a logged custom-metric value was the one hard delete
left on an entry surface — everywhere else a deletion tombstones and the
toast offers Undo. The DELETE verb now stamps deletedAt, every read
(list, latest-value, counts, revive check) filters the tombstone, and the
new entries/restore endpoint clears it scoped to owner and parent metric —
a foreign, live or mismatched id is a silent no-op, never an existence
leak. The history table's delete toast carries the Undo action.
Refs #223. A due Vorsorge item could only be done, deleted or ignored;
Telegram's postpone moved the date with no trace. Both decisions are
first-class now, and both are honest:
- POST /{id}/skip (no body): the interval restarts from the skip instant
through the recurrence engine, lastSkippedAt is stamped, skipCount
increments, any snooze clears. lastSatisfiedAt is NEVER touched — done
and skipped stay distinguishable forever, enforced in the primitive and
pinned by tests.
- POST /{id}/snooze ({until: YYYY-MM-DD}): the server resolves the day to
the notifyHour in the profile timezone and moves snoozedUntil and
nextDueAt to the same instant, so every due-state consumer follows
without knowing snooze exists. At least tomorrow, at most five years.
- GET /{id}/history: the new append-only completion ledger
(MeasurementReminderEvent), one row per satisfy from every engine path
and per skip, onTime derived at write time against the due instant that
was current when the event landed.
Two anchor fixes close the backdated-event gaps: the auto-resolve floor is
now the later of last satisfy and last skip (an old reading synced late no
longer resolves the cycle the user just skipped), and a backdated real
result re-anchors the next due at the later of its own instant and the
skip decision.
Screenings stay skippable and snoozable — the satisfy-side 409 guards
claimed fulfilment; a skip claims the opposite. Appointment reminders 404
on all three routes, in the lookup, like every by-id sibling. /checkups
gains the postpone sheet (quick chips, date field, the skip zone with its
own confirm) in both view branches, with muted meta lines and no card
colour change. The MCP preventive-care tool carries the resolved fields;
the OpenAPI contract publishes all three paths and the widened DTO.
- MedicationIntakeEvent declares the full row both intake responses
actually return: autoMissed, attributionSource, injectionSite,
doseTaken, inventoryConsumption, externalId, updatedAt, syncVersion,
deletedAt were served but undeclared.
- GET /api/medications/{id}/intake is published (query schema, paged
envelope); the spec only knew the POST while the client-facing
history list has consumed the GET since v1.4.37.
- WorkoutListEntry's sportType/startedAt/endedAt/durationSec become
nullable, matching the DTO — declaring them non-null was a
strict-decoder bomb for the Swift client.
- OpenAPI regenerated.
A medication whose slots carry different doses (a whole tablet in the
morning, a half at noon — #219) was consumed correctly but reported
wrongly: the wire shipped only the raw nullable per-slot column (clients
had to derive the inheritance), stockDosesRemaining divided by the
medication-level units alone, and no runway figure existed outside the
low-stock push.
- Every schedule now carries resolvedUnitsPerDose, resolved server-side
exactly like the intake consumption resolver.
- stockDosesRemaining divides the units pool by the schedule-weighted
average units per dose.
- runwayDays (whole days of supply under the slot-aware burn rate) rides
the list AND detail payloads; the detail GET also gains the stock
aggregates the list already had.
- The low-stock engine runs the same slot-aware math, so the push and
the wire cannot disagree; the web cards, table, and detail Übersicht
prefer the server figure over their client estimate.
- OpenAPI regenerated with the new fields.
The iOS tracker was told both endpoints were in the spec; neither was
registered. Publish POST /api/vaccinations/{id}/booster (201 mint /
200 re-anchor with the resolved MeasurementReminder DTO) and
GET /api/vaccinations/suggest (the server-decided one/many/none
verdict), and regenerate the YAML. A structural guard now derives the
expected path set from the route files so the next vaccination route
cannot ship unpublished.
A content-index attempt that failed (raster failure, a scan with no
text layer, a provider error) recorded its reason only in the server's
observability stream. In the vault, hasContentIndex false looked
identical for a document nobody ever tried and one that failed three
times, and the detail sheet had nothing to say about either.
Apply the summaryState pattern to the index. Two additive columns on
InboundDocument (migration 0333) record when the last attempt finished
and why it produced no index, as a closed reason set: local-empty,
local-unsupported, decrypt-error, raster-failed, provider-error,
pdf-needs-anthropic, empty-transcription. The writer sits at the choke
point the auto job and the corpus backfill share, and in the manual
index route; a success clears the reason. The provider path's specific
failure now survives the local fallback, since "no text" is less
actionable than "the PDF would not render". rasterizePdf names its
failure class so a build that cannot rasterize at all is distinguished
from a PDF that would not render. New guard in both index paths: an
empty provider transcription never becomes a successful empty index.
The detail sheet renders the reason in plain words (muted, six
locales). The DTO and OpenAPI carry the two fields; the disaster
recovery backup and restore carry them verbatim like their summary
siblings.
Refs #776
The index-all trigger returned Boolean(jobId) while the client typed
the field as a number, so the toast read "Indexing true document(s)".
The route now answers with the count of live documents still lacking a
content index, computed from the same live-scoped counts the usage
gauge reads, and an honest 0 when no job was created. OpenAPI schema
updated to the integer shape; the hook's type carries a contract note
so the wire and the toast cannot drift apart again. Route test pins
the number, a component test pins that the toast renders the count and
never the word "true".
Refs #776
Navigating away mid-reply aborts the SSE fetch; the provider call tears
down, but the conversation was left with the user message dangling and
no trace of the interruption. Persist an empty assistant row tagged
providerType "cancelled" (the refusal/nudge sentinel channel) when the
request signal is aborted, refund stays intact, and the abort is
annotated as insights.coach.cancelled instead of a provider failure or
a GlitchTip defect. Cancelled markers are filtered out of the provider
transcript on later turns. Refs #781
POST /api/consent/ai/web now accepts an optional { intent } body. Without
one (the AI-settings mount heal) a standing revocation still blocks the
mint; intent "affirmative" is the user's own consent act and may
supersede an earlier revocation, exactly as a first grant would. The
consent card offers the explicit grant control whenever consent does not
stand, and the audit row records which intent minted the receipt.
The document auto-read opt-in already declared "affirmative" on enable;
the settings-mount heal posts no body. Both stay as they are.
The server chain existed end to end (extract stages PENDING facts, per-fact
edit clears the low-confidence gate, confirm is the only write into the
structured stores) but the document detail offered no control over any of
it: it counted observation facts and linked to Labs. A user whose automatic
staging run was skipped had to re-upload the same PDF through Labs > Scan a
report.
- The detail sheet gains a staged-facts block with honest states: pending
facts open an inline review (approve/reject per fact; a low-confidence
fact is checked and saved first via the existing per-fact edit); a
lab-filed, already-read document with nothing staged offers "Extract lab
values" over its stored text; otherwise nothing renders.
- The extract route gains { mode: "stored" }: the same text-structuring
pass the automatic worker runs, over the document's own content index.
No re-upload, no second read of the original; full gauntlet including
the shared document-AI bucket with charge-at-dispatch honesty; 422
notIndexed when no stored text exists.
- A manual "Read with AI" / "Read again" now continues into the same
lab auto-staging the background worker performs; the response reports
labFactsStaged and the toast names the values waiting for review.
- Unchecked values are rejected and the copy says so; an unverified
low-confidence fact receives no decision and stays pending rather than
being silently discarded. Confirmation remains the only write into
Labs, conditions, and medications; approved facts carry the
committedRecordId link back to the source document (existing model, no
schema change).
- The "lab values from this document" link now counts APPROVED facts
only — it claims values that actually exist in Labs.
- Copy in all six locales; OpenAPI regenerated for the new extract mode
and the index response field.
The document-AI actions (read/index, extract, suggest, summarise) shared a
hard-coded 6/hour bucket that lied twice: the 429 said "try again in a few
minutes" while the window is an hour, and several failure paths burned a
slot before any provider was dispatched.
- DOCUMENT_AI_LIMIT_PER_HOUR configures the shared per-user ceiling
(default 6, clamped 1-1000), wired end to end: compose environment
whitelist, .env.production.example, env manifest, operator docs.
- INSIGHTS_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR joins the compose whitelist and manifest;
it was documented but never listed, so an operator value could not reach
the container.
- The 429 mirrors the bucket's reset instant into meta.retryAt (plus the
existing X-RateLimit-Reset header); the client derives "try again in
about N minutes" from it in all six locales, with a plural-aware key.
- A slot is consumed only when a request actually reaches the provider (or
the local index/echo work): malformed bodies, unreadable originals,
refused consent, and exhausted daily budgets refund the charged slot via
a window-scoped refundRateLimit primitive. Consistent across all four
routes sharing the bucket.
GET/PATCH /api/anamnesis/emergency, wrapped in apiHandler. The PATCH
validates a partial body with per-field length caps, builds the Prisma
data field-by-field from the parsed input (never a spread), narrows the
user from requireAuth rather than the body, encrypts the free text on
write, and audits the change. The GET decrypts fail-soft for the form
prefill. Registers the OpenAPI operations and schema. An integration
test reads the row back to prove the write lands.
Add get_visits, a bounded read of past visits (default the last 12
months, optional practitioner-name filter) returning date, status,
kind, practitioner, specialty, the visit's own reason and outcome, and
the linked condition labels, newest first. Absence is explicit: an
account that has never recorded a visit reads { present: false }, never
{ present: true, visits: [] }.
Fold upcoming appointments into get_preventive_care as their own named
field rather than minting a second due-list tool, so a question about
what is coming up gets one answer. The Vorsorge arm stays free of
ENCOUNTER-origin reminders; the appointments are read from Encounter
directly. Reason and outcome ride the USER_TEXT wrapping, and every row
is scoped to the caller by construction.
Marc-André Bombeck