Deleting an account, a guardian deleting a managed profile, and "Delete
all data" were final the moment they were confirmed: the account row
cascaded into every table and every stored copy, and the off-host objects
were purged in the same breath. Nothing short of rolling the whole
instance back could return one account.
ACCOUNT_DELETION_GRACE_DAYS (14 by default, at most 30, 0 erases at once
as before) now sets a window:
- Account and managed-profile deletion lock the account (migration 0488:
deletion_requested_at, deletion_purge_at, deletion_requested_by_id).
Every session, refresh token, API token, connector, share link and
step-up elevation is revoked in the same transaction, and the record,
its stored copies and its off-host objects are left as they are.
- Sign-in is refused with 403 auth.account.deletion_pending and the
erasure date, after the credential was proved and before a second
factor is asked for. The session and Bearer resolvers and the acting-
account resolver refuse a pending account too, so a credential minted
in the moment before the lock is useless.
- POST /api/admin/users/{id}/undo-deletion (cookie-only, audit-logged)
clears the lock. The admin users list reports the pending state.
- The hourly account-deletion-purge job erases accounts whose window has
ended, exactly as the immediate deletion did, with the off-host purge
request committed alongside. The Guardian invariant is decided again;
a refused erasure stays pending and is reported.
- A wipe first stores the whole record as a PRE_WIPE_<ms> copy through
the writer the weekly copy uses, keeps it out of the wipe, and holds
its off-host purge back with a new not_before on the request. The
ordinary restore brings the record back; restoring that copy withdraws
the held purge. The purge job deletes the copy when its window ends.
Background work skips accounts pending deletion through one shared
predicate (src/lib/account-deletion/active-account.ts): every reminder,
digest, Coach, sync, backfill, rollup, score and backup enumeration
filters with it, and account-deletion-enumeration-guard.test.ts fails on
a query in background work that neither filters nor says why it need
not. Notification delivery and the AI capability loader refuse a pending
account as chokepoints behind it, and the Withings, WHOOP and Telegram
webhooks and the notification quick actions ignore one.
The privacy summary publishes the window. Two pieces of the reminder tick
and the off-host pass moved into modules of their own to keep the files
inside their size ratchet.
Account deletion and the record wipe both demand a fresh second-factor
proof once a factor is enrolled, and that proof lived on the session row.
A native client has no session row, so an account with TOTP or a security
key could not delete itself from the app on any request it could build:
requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled fell through to requireFreshMfa, which resolves
via getSession and answers 401 to a perfectly valid token. App Store
guideline 5.1.1(v) asks for exactly that deletion.
Add requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled beside the cookie-only sibling
rather than softening it. Its cookie arm is the sibling's, unchanged;
its Bearer arm takes the single-use elevation the second-factor
management routes already accept, with the fresh-factor rule pinned on,
so a password-proved elevation cannot erase an account any more than a
password login satisfies the gate on the web. No factor rides the request
body: one mint surface, one redemption path. Scope stays fail-closed, so
a narrow token is refused before the header is read.
The elevation is spent immediately before the erasure, after the typed
confirmation and the last-admin check, so a rejected request does not
burn a proof against a 5-per-15-minute mint ceiling. The Bearer branch
of requireMfaManagementAuth moves into a shared helper so both gates read
and claim in the same place.
The elevation guard grows a section naming the two routes, because the
set of surfaces an elevation can unlock only stays small if adding to it
is a visible edit.
Marc-André Bombeck