A read-failure primitive decided from the status alone, so a 401 from a
step-up or re-proof gate would have read as an ended session and sent
the reader to sign-in. The code now decides first and the status is the
fallback for codes it does not know.
The two invitation routes answer an unknown name or e-mail with
sharing.invite.no_account. Both have a second 404 with a different next
step, and since every error now carries a code the clients match on it
instead of on the status. The status defaults move into a module the
client can import, and the contract text no longer says these arms
carry no code.
Every error envelope now carries a fresh meta.requestId. The unknown-id and
the not-yours refusal still have to match byte for byte on everything else;
compare them through the shared helper, as the other enumeration checks do.
Freezes the authority split the third level ships with. A token exercises a
MANAGE grant, and a Guardian's authority over a managed profile, exactly as a
browser does — proved at the resolver, where neither had a Bearer case before.
A token cannot offer MANAGE and cannot create a managed profile at all, because
both gates resolve through the session cookie; the second had no test until now,
and it runs against a real database with a wildcard token to make the width of
the permission irrelevant.
The claim set is held together by a map naming, per claim, the file and the test
title that proves it, so removing any one of them fails rather than quietly
narrowing what a native client may do.
The fence's client-facing half is frozen beside it: the account payload publishes
the record context on a cookie session and null on a token, and the published
contract says so under the same header names the server matches on.
- publish the roster's entry from the invitation and `{ grantId, revokedAt }`
from the removal, instead of the account-grant row Prisma returned
- drop the invitation's self refusal: it named a code no request can elicit,
because a Guardian grant's grantor is the profile and never the caller
- name the duplicate grant error rather than catching every grant refusal into
a sentence that would be wrong for any other one
- keep the rate limit and the unknown-identifier 404 free of an error code,
as their siblings elsewhere are, and say why at the call site
- bound profile creation at ten an hour per account, the ceiling its
guardian sibling has carried since it shipped
- distinguish a failed roster read from a slow one, with the way back
- cover the three caller states the roster read has to refuse: an
unaccepted invitation, an expired grant, and MANAGE held elsewhere
- cover what deletion does to a guardian standing inside the record
- list who looks after a profile, invite another guardian and end an
existing access from the profile's own row
- state the last-guardian floor from the real roster before the act, and
say plainly that an invitation counts only once it is accepted
- give each of the invitation refusals its own sentence, branching on
status for the two the route sends without an error code
- cover every call the card can make against the real routes
- add GET /api/managed-profiles/{id}/guardians, cookie-only, refusing
anybody who is not an active guardian of that profile with the same 404
an unknown id gets
- disclose the grant id, the party block already shared between grant
parties, the derived state and the two timestamps, and nothing else
- publish the route in the OpenAPI contract
Marc-André Bombeck