A save of a person's provider settings and of the operator's admin AI
settings forget the health ledger's record and close the status notes'
negative windows. The two Codex sign-ins, the operator's central one and a
person's own, forgot the ledger record only, so a fixed connection still
had every note wait out the window the refused one earned, up to two hours.
The central sign-in now closes every record's windows, since every account
may fall back on that connection, and a person's own sign-in closes theirs.
Proven against the real rows in the Codex sign-in integration suite.
Refs #1279
Under the refresh lock, with the row still holding the token just spent,
no peer rotated it, so refresh_token_reused is the issuer refusing the
whole family: it now parks the sign-in instead of being asked again
after every cooldown. Outside the lock it stays a lost race. A refresh
whose compare-and-set write finds the connection gone (the person
disconnected Codex meanwhile) now refuses with reconnect-required
instead of using the rotated token once more.
Two callers refreshing one Codex token raced: the loser heard
refresh_token_reused, read it as a dead grant and parked the connection
before the winner wrote its rotated tokens, leaving fresh tokens beside
an expired status. Refreshes now share one flight per process and queue
on the per-credential advisory lock across processes, re-read the row
inside it, use a token a peer already rotated, write the rotated tokens
compare-and-set on the spent one together with connected, and re-read
after a refusal before parking. refresh_token_reused no longer counts as
a dead grant, and neither does a bare 403 without an OAuth error code:
an edge challenge answers a valid grant so, and it keeps the ledger's
timed cooldown instead of parking until the next sign-in.
A dead refresh token was asked again on every hop of every run: the
proactive refresh failed and was swallowed, the request 401'd, the on-401
refresh failed again, and the nightly warm repeated that for the briefing
and every card. A refusal that proves the grant dead now flips the
connection to the existing expired state (compare-and-set on the refused
token, one signal per transition), so the chain, the presence probe and
the AI capabilities stop counting it. A new device-code sign-in clears the
refused credential's ledger rows so the fresh one resumes in place.
Marc-André Bombeck