Land every file the v1.42 work shares before any of it is built, so the
parts built side by side never edit the same file.
Schema and migrations 0379-0386: the HEALTH_CONNECT measurement source,
ImportJob.kind, the air-quality columns and the per-user switch on the
environment tables, sealed environment locations with nullable plaintext,
managed-profile handover links, the per-type HealthKit arrival ledger, lab
unit-conversion provenance, and user-defined vaccines. Every new column is
annotated for the column-reader sweep.
HEALTH_CONNECT reaches every exhaustive list: the source labels, the
read enum (not the write allowlist), the source-priority ladder cap, now
the number of sources rather than a fixed eight, and the write-path smoke
test. RMSSD gets its own priority class and a 300 ms ceiling. The batch
syncTrigger gains `manual`, with its label on the Apple Health card.
Queues for the Health Connect import, the compaction-tombstone purge and
the measurement-table maintenance are registered with stub handlers;
host-metric sampling moves to every five minutes. Environment and work_mem
variables reach the compose whitelist, the production example and the
manifest. The proxy admits the handover link and redirects it at the edge,
and the Health Connect upload bypasses the proxy body limit.
The new routes answer 501 behind their final authentication and are
published in the contract; backup, wipe and key rotation classify the new
models and columns; the seven message bundles carry the base copy. Guards
that list release-pending keys and columns fail once an entry is wired, so
those lists empty themselves before the tag.
Also re-anchor a login-throttle fixture to the wall clock, where its
expiry is compared, and re-base the aggregate bundle cap on a measured
12 KB of new locale strings.
Exporting the whole record, making a clinician share link, minting a token,
and the admin backup download, upload and restore, data wipe and password
reset ran on a live session alone. The plaintext full backup did, while the
encrypted one beside it asked for a second factor. Whoever held a stolen
session could take the record, or leave behind a credential that outlives
the session.
These now go through one gate, requireRecentProof (assertRecentCookieProof
for the routes that resolve their caller themselves). A browser session
passes after a sign-in or re-proof within five minutes: a second factor on
an account that has one, otherwise the password or a passkey. The refusal is
401 auth.reproof.required with meta.methods, and the web opens the re-proof
dialog, posts the proof to the new POST /api/auth/reproof and retries. A
password proof stamps the new Session.reproofAt (migration 0359), never
mfaVerifiedAt, so it cannot stand in for a second factor anywhere.
On Bearer, the full backup asks for an X-Step-Up elevation; the encrypted
export asks for a second-factor elevation on an account that has one. Share
links and connector tokens keep taking the token alone, because the shipped
app calls them without an elevation and reads a 401 there as a dead
session; the guard test names them.
Key rotation keeps its stricter second-factor gate.
The admin "Delete all data" action carried its delete list inline. That
list named nine tables, which was most of the schema on the day it was
written, and it stayed at nine while the schema grew to a hundred and
twenty-two models. Laboratory results, documents, cycle logs, journals,
mood, workouts, sleep and Coach conversations all survived the wipe an
operator runs before handing a box on, and the toast said it was done.
The per-account wipe had the same defect and grew a derived plan for it.
The admin route now reads that plan: ADMIN_WIPE_MODELS is WIPE_MODELS
minus a single documented subtraction, so a model added to the schema
lands in both wipes at once.
- AccountGrant is the one difference, with its reason in the plan: it is
the only access path to a managed profile, and this action preserves
accounts by definition. Deleting every grant would leave records
nobody can open, administer or delete.
- The audit history now goes with everything else. It is a record of who
did what from where, which is exactly what clearing a box is for; the
receipt written after the transaction commits replaces it.
- One transaction with the same budget as the account wipe. A
half-applied wipe is worse than none, because the person is told it
succeeded either way.
- The result line reports rows and tables instead of nine fixed names,
which is how nobody noticed: it read the same whether the wipe had
cleared nine tables or ninety.
Guards, both watched red before landing:
admin-data-wipe-completeness.test.ts fails when a user-scoped model
reaches neither the wipe nor a written exemption, and when the route
names a table inline again. The integration guard seeds every table in
the schema for two accounts, runs the route, and asks the database what
is left — drop one model from the plan and it names the surviving table.
Drop the in-app bug-report surface end to end: the user submission page,
the feedback intake and admin inbox, the optional GitHub-issue
escalation, the operator config, and the dedicated achievement badges.
- delete the /bugreport page and the bugreport / feedback / admin-feedback API routes
- drop the Feedback model, its enums, and the AppSettings GitHub-issue and enable columns (migration 0205)
- remove the admin Feedback section, the Bug Report integration card, and the system-status row
- drop the bug-report nav entry and the app-settings provider that only carried its flag
- remove the bug-hunter achievement badges and their metric
- prune the related i18n keys across every locale and the encrypted-column and key-rotation registries
The integration suite runs with `vitest isolate: false` (one worker,
one container — migration cost demands it). Each test file declared
its own `vi.mock("next/headers", ...)` whose factory closed over a
file-local `cookieJar` Map. Vitest resolves a mock factory ONCE per
worker — whichever file loaded first won the registration, and the
other files' Map writes silently disappeared.
That made `admin-data-wipe.test.ts` flake intermittently (~12.5% per
empirical 8-run sample) when `idempotency-replay.test.ts` happened to
load first: its `vi.mock("@/lib/auth/session", ...)` then leaked,
returning a stub user without an admin role, so `requireAdmin()`
returned 401 and the wipe assertion failed with `expected 401 to be
200`.
Fix: extract cookieJar + headerJar into module-singleton Maps in
`tests/integration/mock-next-headers.ts`. All three integration files
import them and resolve them via dynamic-import inside the
`vi.mock("next/headers", ...)` factory body, so the factory always
sees the same backing Maps regardless of which file's registration
won the race. The `vi.mock("@/lib/auth/session", ...)` stub in
idempotency-replay was also removed; the test now seeds a real
Session row + cookie like the other two files.
After: 10/10 consecutive `pnpm test:integration` runs green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Wipe all data" admin transaction was scoped only to measurements,
medications, intakes, API tokens, Withings connections, and auth
challenges. Notification channels (encrypted Telegram bot tokens in
NotificationChannel.config), Web Push subscriptions, and queued
Telegram message deletions survived the wipe — a scope leak first
flagged in the v1.4.6 multi-agent QA pass.
Extends the transaction with `notificationChannel.deleteMany`,
`pushSubscription.deleteMany`, and `telegramScheduledDeletion.deleteMany`.
NotificationPreference rows cascade via the schema FK.
Feedback rows are intentionally preserved (T8 v1.4.6) and the i18n
copy now states this explicitly so admins know bug reports survive a
wipe. Counts for the three new tables are returned to the UI.
Adds an integration regression test that seeds all three tables,
invokes the route handler with a real admin session, and asserts the
wipe clears them while Feedback + AuditLog survive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Marc-André Bombeck