Restoring a large account was one request: 94 s for 1.25 million readings.
A reverse proxy that cuts a request at 60 s (nginx's default) showed the
operator an error for a restore that went on to finish on the server.
The restore request now checks the typed confirmation, that the backup
exists and that its stored copy opens, admits one job for the account and
answers 202 with its id. The `backup-restore` queue runs the restore and
records its phase, counts and outcome on a `backup_restore_jobs` row
(migration 0347), which `GET /api/admin/backups/restores` and
`GET /api/admin/backups/restores/{id}` read back.
What a restore checks and writes is unchanged. The body moved from the
route into `restoreBackup` (src/lib/export/restore-backup.ts): every
refusal still happens before the first delete and the replacement is still
one transaction, so a failure part-way leaves the account as it was. While
it runs the account keeps showing its current data, and other writes are
neither refused nor held, as before.
- One restore per account: a partial unique index admits one queued or
running job, and a second request gets 409 `backup.restore.active` naming
the running job. A per-account advisory lock inside the transaction holds
even if a worker thought gone is still writing.
- Time budget: the job's expiry is two hours and a file whose transaction
limit would run past three quarters of it is refused before anything is
deleted (`jobDeadline`, beside `jobBudget`).
- Resuming: the job writes a heartbeat every two seconds. A boot sweep
queues a job whose worker stopped again from the start, at most twice,
then fails it as interrupted. The admission check releases an abandoned
job so it never holds the account's slot.
- The staged file is the stored `DataBackup` row, already encrypted at
rest. It stays whatever the outcome, so a retry needs no new upload. The
job records a digest of the copy and refuses one that was replaced while
it waited.
- Failures carry a stable code and a sentence that says what to do.
- The console follows the job: phase and counts while it runs, the outcome
after, and after a reload it finds the job again from the server. A poll
that fails on the network is never shown as a failed restore. A web
process separate from the worker evicts the account's caches when it
first reports the restore finished. The success line goes through the
outcome module, so an empty file is not drawn as a tick.
The model is registered in the backup plan (not carried) and the wipe plan
(wiped with the account); the queue in the maintenance registrar, the
subsystem surface and the job-fact allowlist; the new code in the error
catalogue; the routes in the OpenAPI contract. The tests that pin restore
semantics now drive the real route and the real job through one helper, and
`backup-restore-job.test.ts` pins the asynchronous contract itself.
Migration 0343 moved the operator's Coach answer from module availability
into the Coach switch and folded every live row. Restoring the instance
settings from an older file wrote the dead coach key back into module
availability and left the Coach switch on, so a Coach the operator had off
came back.
The restore now applies the same fold: coach false in the file's module
availability switches the Coach off, and the key is dropped either way.
A disaster-recovery snapshot carries the singleton `app_settings` row —
registration, the MFA requirement, the default locale and timezone, module
availability, the notification and AI configuration, the document size cap and
quota — and the restore wrote it back as a side effect of restoring one
account. An operator putting a single record back on Wednesday reconfigured the
whole host from Monday's file, silently, with nothing on screen saying so.
Rebuilding a host from a snapshot is a real case, so the write stays: it is now
`restoreInstanceSettings: true` on the request and a checkbox beside the typed
gate, off unless the operator ticks it. Restoring an account and reconfiguring
the installation are two decisions, so they are two answers.
The 422 confirmation sentence and the dialog copy drop the instance-wide claim;
the opt-in carries it instead, in all seven catalogues. Integration coverage
runs both arms: without the flag the settings row keeps its own values, with it
the file's values land.
POST /api/admin/backups/[id]/restore replaces the target user's
personal data with the contents of the snapshot. This is the riskiest
endpoint in the backup family, hardened with five independent gates:
1. requireAdmin() — cookie-session admins only, never a Bearer token.
2. Body must carry confirm: "RESTORE" (rejected with 422 + audit
denial otherwise).
3. UI gates the destructive button behind a typed-string match —
three independent steps before fire (open dialog, read warning,
type RESTORE).
4. withIdempotency() wraps the handler so duplicate clicks with the
same Idempotency-Key replay the original outcome instead of
re-executing the destructive transaction.
5. Pre-validation of measurement-type / measurement-source /
intake-source enums OUTSIDE the transaction so a malformed
payload can't half-wipe the user before failing the create step.
Restore scope mirrors the v1.4.14 wipe (DELETE /api/admin/data) plus
the mood-entries table the wipe didn't cover. AuditLog rows are
intentionally PRESERVED across the restore — the audit trail is the
last thing that should be touched by a destructive op.
Transaction:
- Delete user's measurements, medications (cascades to schedules +
intake events + reminder configs + telegram messages), mood
entries, notification channels, push subscriptions, telegram
scheduled deletions.
- Re-create from payload: measurements (skipDuplicates), medications
+ their schedules in one create call, intake events keyed by
medication name -> id (orphans dropped silently), mood entries
(skipDuplicates).
Audit:
- admin.backups.restore.start (intent, before transaction)
- admin.backups.restore (success, after transaction)
- admin.backups.restore.denied (5 reasons, no transaction ran)
- admin.backups.restore.failed (decrypt / schema / enum / tx error)
UI:
- New <RestoreRowDialog> subcomponent renders an AlertDialog gated
on a typed-RESTORE Input. Description carries the target username
and the snapshot timestamp so the admin sees exactly which
backup they're about to restore. Confirm button stays disabled
until typed string matches.
- Restore button sits next to Download in each row's action column.
- Idempotency-Key built client-side as restore-<rowId>-<uuid> to
de-duplicate accidental double-clicks.
Tests: 3 new integration tests in
tests/integration/admin-backups-restore.test.ts covering the round-
trip (wipes pre-existing data + recreates from snapshot),
confirmation-token rejection, and 404 on unknown id. 21/21
integration tests pass; 69/69 unit tests on src/lib/validations and
src/components/admin still green.
Note for v1.4.16: the restore test queries `medication_schedules`
with explicit field selection because a sibling branch added
`days_of_week` to the schema without a matching migration; the
default `findMany` would 500 against the deployed test DB. When that
migration lands, the explicit select can be relaxed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Marc-André Bombeck