Add the shared contract the reasoning release builds on, with no change
to how a turn runs today.
- Schema: operator reasoning controls on app_settings (0376), the
encrypted trail text on coach_messages (0377), and source,
last_used_at and source_message_id on coach_facts (0378).
- Provider contract: CompletionParams.reasoning and onReasoning,
CompletionResult.reasoning and providerState, AiMessage.providerState.
- Reasoning levels, thinking budgets and the background-job table in
src/lib/ai/reasoning/levels.ts; coachPrefsJson.reasoning, absent
meaning medium, salvaged field by field like every other pref.
- Stream: activity, memoryNote and planProposal frames, done.stop and
done.withheldResults, result.interim, a compare chart kind, eight
table refs, three more clarification kinds with an assumed choice,
the change_assumption chip, and assumptions, activity, stop,
memoryNote and planProposal on the provenance. Zod mirror, type
parity and the native-client key rule cover every new frame.
- Chat request: memoryDecision and planDecision, parsed and not yet
acted on.
- Stub contracts for the memory functions and the activity recorder,
inert until their implementations land.
- Backup, restore and rotation carry the new columns; a fact's message
reference is resolved against the restored messages like its
conversation reference.
- Message keys for the trail, memory, plans, assumptions, replies,
interim tables, comparison charts and reasoning settings in all seven
locales, each reachable from a catalog and checked both ways.
A portable file carried the day-log note, the sensitive-category envelope
and custom symptom labels as the stored ciphertext, so a restore onto a
host with another key either refused the file or wrote values nobody
could open. The portable file now carries them readable and the restore
seals them under the receiving host's key; a disaster-recovery file keeps
the ciphertext.
A file written before this still restores: each ciphertext value is
opened with this host's keys first, and one that does not open is kept
out of the row and reported in the skip summary as cycleCiphertext. The
key preflight leaves the cycle sections to that per-value check.
A restore now leaves out measurement tombstones deleted longer ago than
the tombstone retention. The nightly purge removes exactly those rows,
the delta feed answers cursorExpired for every cursor that could still
be served one, and the consolidation repairs look only inside the same
horizon. Younger tombstones keep their readers (a lagging paired client,
the undo of a recent delete, the repairs, the duplicate guard on
re-uploaded samples) and are written as before. The backup file is
unchanged. On a seeded account of 1.89 million readings whose 1.68
million tombstones were past retention, the restore on a slowed database
took 5.4 min instead of 15.
The rollup fold after the commit rebuilt five years of buckets under the
60 s request statement limit and could be dropped on a slow disk, leaving
the charts empty until the next boot. `recomputeUserRollups` takes a
`statementTimeoutMs` that scopes each aggregate and persist transaction
with SET LOCAL, and the restore passes its after-commit allowance.
Fixture tombstones in two round-trip tests were dated in July 2026 and
had aged past the retention; they are now relative to the run.
Off-host objects are now written as envelope version 4: the header names
the off-host key by fingerprint, and the object's key in the bucket
(<date>/user-<id>.json.enc) is authenticated as GCM associated data, so
a copy moved to another account or another night no longer opens.
Objects of versions 1 to 3 still read. BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_PREVIOUS_KEYS
(comma-separated, on the compose whitelist and in the env manifest)
keeps retired off-host keys readable, which is the rotation path the
off-host key did not have.
The admin backup upload counted the bytes that arrived and none after
the gunzip, so a small gzip could expand without limit into the JSON
scanner and take the app down. The inflated bytes are now held to 100
times the compressed bytes read (at least 256 MB, at most 4 GB) and a
file past that is refused with 413 before anything is stored.
A current disaster-recovery backup writes aggregationProvenance for every
measurement, null included. The restore treated null like a missing field
and marked every Apple Health stats: row without a provenance as
LEGACY_UNKNOWN, which is meant only for backups too old to carry the field.
The nightly daily-mean fold writes exactly such rows, so on a large Apple
Health account a restore changed tens of thousands of readings it was
supposed to put back as they were (#1031).
Only an absent field now takes the legacy path.
A per-medication trackIntake flag (migration 0351, default on for every
existing and new row). With it off the dose, dates and schedule stay stored,
but nothing derives a due dose from them: the reminder worker, the manual
reminder check, the today projector, the auto-miss pass, the low-stock pass,
the doses card, the today list, the outstanding-dose badge, compliance and
its heatmap, the doctor report, the Coach, the BP-status gate, insights,
targets, achievements, the efficacy view and the MCP schedule tool all skip
it.
The medication wire serves such a medication with schedules: [] and the
stored rows in an additive recordedSchedules field, so a client that arms
local reminders from schedules stays silent without an update. Switching
tracking off or back on archives a schedule revision at that instant, the
untracked stretch with an empty payload, so it never counts as missed and
the projector does not put a dose from before the switch back on the card.
A structural guard freezes the set of schedule readers: each one filters on
the flag, derives from dueSchedules, shapes the wire with scheduleWireFields,
or is allowlisted with the reason it derives nothing due. The flag travels
through backup, restore and the medication CSV export.
Restoring a large account was one request: 94 s for 1.25 million readings.
A reverse proxy that cuts a request at 60 s (nginx's default) showed the
operator an error for a restore that went on to finish on the server.
The restore request now checks the typed confirmation, that the backup
exists and that its stored copy opens, admits one job for the account and
answers 202 with its id. The `backup-restore` queue runs the restore and
records its phase, counts and outcome on a `backup_restore_jobs` row
(migration 0347), which `GET /api/admin/backups/restores` and
`GET /api/admin/backups/restores/{id}` read back.
What a restore checks and writes is unchanged. The body moved from the
route into `restoreBackup` (src/lib/export/restore-backup.ts): every
refusal still happens before the first delete and the replacement is still
one transaction, so a failure part-way leaves the account as it was. While
it runs the account keeps showing its current data, and other writes are
neither refused nor held, as before.
- One restore per account: a partial unique index admits one queued or
running job, and a second request gets 409 `backup.restore.active` naming
the running job. A per-account advisory lock inside the transaction holds
even if a worker thought gone is still writing.
- Time budget: the job's expiry is two hours and a file whose transaction
limit would run past three quarters of it is refused before anything is
deleted (`jobDeadline`, beside `jobBudget`).
- Resuming: the job writes a heartbeat every two seconds. A boot sweep
queues a job whose worker stopped again from the start, at most twice,
then fails it as interrupted. The admission check releases an abandoned
job so it never holds the account's slot.
- The staged file is the stored `DataBackup` row, already encrypted at
rest. It stays whatever the outcome, so a retry needs no new upload. The
job records a digest of the copy and refuses one that was replaced while
it waited.
- Failures carry a stable code and a sentence that says what to do.
- The console follows the job: phase and counts while it runs, the outcome
after, and after a reload it finds the job again from the server. A poll
that fails on the network is never shown as a failed restore. A web
process separate from the worker evicts the account's caches when it
first reports the restore finished. The success line goes through the
outcome module, so an empty file is not drawn as a tick.
The model is registered in the backup plan (not carried) and the wipe plan
(wiped with the account); the queue in the maintenance registrar, the
subsystem surface and the job-fact allowlist; the new code in the error
catalogue; the routes in the OpenAPI contract. The tests that pin restore
semantics now drive the real route and the real job through one helper, and
`backup-restore-job.test.ts` pins the asynchronous contract itself.
The operator switches become master, Coach, Daily Briefing, Status
notes and Reading documents. Correlations goes: it gated statistics,
not anything a model writes. Reading documents covers the document
vault, lab scans and medication extraction.
The Coach module's operator availability now follows the Coach
switch, so there is one place to turn the Coach off server-wide. The
migration folds a stored Coach availability of false into the switch,
and gives everyone who hid the Coach the AI analysis opt-out, since
hiding the Coach no longer stops nightly briefing and status notes.
A switch read that fails now fails closed. The insights module is
described as AI analysis in every locale, and the switch guard now
keeps both retired switches out and freezes the callers of the old
operator-only gate.
A disaster-recovery snapshot carries the singleton `app_settings` row —
registration, the MFA requirement, the default locale and timezone, module
availability, the notification and AI configuration, the document size cap and
quota — and the restore wrote it back as a side effect of restoring one
account. An operator putting a single record back on Wednesday reconfigured the
whole host from Monday's file, silently, with nothing on screen saying so.
Rebuilding a host from a snapshot is a real case, so the write stays: it is now
`restoreInstanceSettings: true` on the request and a checkbox beside the typed
gate, off unless the operator ticks it. Restoring an account and reconfiguring
the installation are two decisions, so they are two answers.
The 422 confirmation sentence and the dialog copy drop the instance-wide claim;
the opt-in carries it instead, in all seven catalogues. Integration coverage
runs both arms: without the flag the settings row keeps its own values, with it
the file's values land.
The off-host job was said to benefit from the streaming work the weekly
in-database backup got, and it did not. Only the payload builder was
shared: `runOffhostBackup` called `buildFullBackupJson` for the whole
document, `gzipSync` over that whole string, a whole-buffer
`createCipheriv` pass over the result, and handed the finished buffer to
a single `PutObject`. Four full copies of the record alive at once, on
the same arithmetic the weekly pass had already been fixed for.
Configuring an S3 target on a long-lived record therefore restarted the
container. On an account of 445 000 measurements the JSON alone is
242 MB, and against a 1 GB container's 524 MB heap the run died of heap
exhaustion seventeen seconds in — taking every signed-in session with
it, because the job shares the app process.
The write path is a stream end to end now: `streamFullBackupJson`
produces the document a page at a time, gzip and an incremental
AES-256-GCM writer consume it as it arrives, and `@aws-sdk/lib-storage`
puts it up in two 8 MB parts. What the process holds is fixed by the
pipeline's shape rather than by the record. Measured on that same
445 000-measurement account under `--max-old-space-size=450`, with the
heap pre-loaded to what a warm server holds: the old path dies with
`Ineffective mark-compacts near heap limit`, the new one finishes with a
peak 79 MB above its baseline and writes a 9.1 MB object.
The stored envelope gains version 3, which moves the GCM tag from in
front of the ciphertext to the end. That is the only change the stream
required — the tag exists only once the last block is in, so a leading
one means the whole object must exist before its first byte can be sent.
Nothing about the authentication moves: the tag still covers every
ciphertext byte and is verified before a byte of plaintext comes back.
Versions 1 and 2 still read, so every object already in a bucket
restores through the same reader with no flag to tell them apart.
The incremental writer is the crypto module's, split into its byte-level
half so the base64 form the in-database blob uses and the raw form an
object needs are one implementation under two framings. The off-host key
handling is unchanged: a separate `BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, 64 hex or
32-byte base64, passed in rather than looked up.
A run that uploaded nothing for anybody is a failed job now, not
`ok: true` with an empty bucket behind it. Wrong credentials, a missing
bucket and an unreachable endpoint all fail every account rather than
one, and the target's own sentence rides out as the cause. A run where
some account got a copy still succeeds; retrying the whole cohort over
one object would re-upload everybody's.
The one ceiling left is structural rather than a memory bound, and it is
counted rather than discovered: a multipart upload carries 10 000 parts,
so an object past 80 GB is refused for that account with a clear message
instead of failing halfway through with an SDK error about part numbers.
`tests/integration/offhost-backup-streaming-memory.test.ts` pins the
budget from both sides — what the streaming uploader holds, and that the
materialising path does not fit the same budget on the same fixture in
the same process, so the number cannot pass by measuring nothing.
MedicationSideEffect was classified as backed up and was not carried: the
export wrote nothing and the restore had nothing to read, so a restored
account kept the drug and lost the reason someone may have stopped taking it.
Delegated write access sharpens that — a side effect is one of the things a
second person can contribute, and it was the contribution a restore dropped.
The rows ride inside their medication, like the schedules beside them. A
top-level array would have to carry `medicationId` and survive a restore that
mints a fresh id for a portable file, which is the remap the intake events
already work around by drug name; a nested create has no id to remap, because
Prisma binds the child to whatever id the parent row actually got.
The note follows the measurement contract for the same dual-column
arrangement: a portable export carries the decrypted note and no ciphertext, a
disaster-recovery payload carries the ciphertext verbatim, and the restore
re-encrypts a legacy plaintext row rather than writing plaintext back into the
column.
Move the model from COVERAGE_PENDING to TWO_ENDED_MODELS, and settle the claim
where a written verdict cannot: the round trip seeds a side effect, exports
through the real builder, empties the account and reads the row back out of
the real restore route with its category, entry, severity and note intact.
Both halves were excised to check the test can fail — the restore branch turns
the count red, the payload turns the field values red.
Three of the restore's lookups resolve a key against a seeded catalogue:
cycle symptoms, illness symptoms, mood factors. Each threw on a key it
could not resolve, inside the one transaction that wipes and rebuilds the
account. So a single renamed symptom rolled everything back and answered
500. No measurements, no doses, no notes, nothing. A year-old backup read
by a newer instance is the ordinary case for a backup, and the catalogue
drifts between those two dates by design.
The unresolvable link is dropped and named now. What it costs is one
association between a row and a symptom; the day-log, the mood entry, the
flow, the temperature and the encrypted note all come back. The count and
the exact keys ride the response, the audit row and the wide event, and
the admin surface shows them in a panel that stays put instead of a toast
that leaves. A quiet drop would be the older failure of this same seam
wearing a success message.
A dangling `cycleId` or a dose recorded against a medication the file
never carried still throws. Those name rows the file was supposed to hold,
so a missing one means the file contradicts itself. A catalogue key names
a row the instance owns, which is why it gets the other answer.
`IllnessSymptom` carries no owner column at all, so a key that will not
resolve there can only ever be drift; the file was never able to supply it.
The restore does not mint the missing catalogue row back. That would
preserve the link at the price of reference data colliding with whatever
the next migration seeds under that key, and a label nothing can translate.
The admin panel offered a toggle for the Health-Score explainer and
described it as the ? next to the delta line. That ? had already been
taken off the insights surface a release earlier, and the caption that
replaced it went away entirely when the health score was replaced by
the reference composite. Since then an operator could turn the switch
off, get a saved confirmation, and change absolutely nothing.
The toggle, its wording in all six languages, its place in the flag
matrix the app and the iOS client both read, and its column on
app_settings are all gone. Nothing is left to promise a control that
does not exist.
A guard goes in with it: every remaining assistant sub-flag has to be
read by some surface, and the panel and the plumbing that carry all of
them by construction do not count as proof.
The disaster-recovery backup selected every Measurement scalar except the
aggregation fields, so a restore brought every `stats:` aggregate back with no
provenance and the Apple Health authority ladder came back flat: an export.xml
source-day estimate could then overwrite a native HealthKit statistic.
`aggregationProvenance` now rides the select, the disaster-recovery
serialization, the payload schema and the restore mapping, following
`externalSourceVersion` exactly — including staying out of the reduced
portable shape, which carries the human-readable subset only. The schema field
is optional, so every backup written before this parses unchanged.
Restoring one of those older backups no longer recreates the ambiguity
migration 0263 repaired: an Apple Health row under a `stats:` identity with no
provenance comes back as LEGACY_UNKNOWN, the sentinel the cumulative drain
already writes in that situation, so a native sync or archive reprocess can
repair it. The gate is scoped as 0263 scoped its backfill — other providers
mint `stats:` identities for their cumulative dailies and have never carried
provenance, and ordinary point rows keep NULL.
Mood has been a first-class module here for a long time, with entries,
structured tags, rated factors and notes. The bridge to the external moodLog
service had nothing left to add, and its Settings card was withdrawn in
a56e6fe61 on the promise of a dedicated removal. This delivers it.
Removed: the hourly `moodlog-sync` queue, cron and handler binding; the
inbound webhook and its shared-secret handling; the reverse push and its four
call sites; the pull-sync module; the per-user credential routes and the
instance-wide toggle; the entry on the `/api/integrations/status` envelope,
the `IntegrationKey` union, the cadence map and the display-name table; the
boot-time secret rotation pass; 22 message keys per locale.
Migration 0271 drops the five `users` credential columns and
`app_settings.mood_log_global`, clears the ledger row for the provider, and
deletes the retired pg-boss schedule so no cron keeps enqueuing work no
handler drains.
Mood data is untouched. `mood_entries` is not named anywhere in the migration
and cannot be reached from it: the dropped columns carry no index, constraint
or foreign key, and `mood_entries.user_id` references `users(id)`, not any of
them. Rows the bridge imported keep `source = 'MOODLOG'`, and every read path
- list filter, source badge, exports, backups - still resolves that value.
`src/lib/validations/moodlog.ts` held the native mood-entry schemas alongside
the bridge's own; it is now `validations/mood.ts` and carries only the former.