Two structural guards caught the new gate. The error-code catalogue is derived
from the route tree on every run and fails in both directions, so a code the
server emits and does not publish is a client that cannot branch on it; the
session-surface guard freezes the short list of files under `src/app` that
resolve a caller without `requireAuth`, and the register route now belongs on
it — `requireAuth` is the wrong gate there twice over, since it would throw at
the anonymous caller the route exists for and this route wants the ABSENCE of a
session.
The code is `auth.already_authenticated` rather than the bare
`already_authenticated`: the catalogue's own header rules that new codes are
dot.case, and it sits beside `auth.mfa.code_invalid` in the same family. The
OpenAPI document renders the catalogue into the ErrorEnvelope description, so
it is regenerated.
Every layer of the invite chain had unit coverage and the chain was broken
anyway: the proxy test proved the edge admits the landing, the page test proved
it redirects onto the registration form, and neither could see that the
redirect arrives in an RSC flight payload after the shell has already flushed.
The operator's path — mint an invitation, open the URL in a private window,
reach a usable form — was exercised by no spec at any level.
The new spec mints a real invitation in the admin UI and opens it twice: once
in a genuinely cookie-less context, asserting both where the visitor lands and
that they never passed through the sign-in page, and once in the admin's own
window, asserting the explaining panel and that the admin's session survives. A
third case pins the server half through the wire. Against `origin/main` all
three fail — the anonymous visitor lands on `/auth/login`, the panel does not
exist, and the registration POST answers 201 over a live session.
The minted URL gains a test id so the spec reads it from its own element
rather than from the first paragraph in the ticket.
Marc-André Bombeck