The server answers before pg-boss is bound, and a producer rebinds in
the background after losing its connection. A request in either window
read the boss as null and skipped its enqueue: OAuth callbacks lost the
first sync and the history backfill, measurement and mood writes lost
their rollup recompute, WHOOP webhook deliveries were dropped.
whenBossReady() waits for the boss while a start is under way (boot or
reconnect), bounded at 60 s and logged when it gives up, and answers
null at once when nothing is coming. enqueueWhenBossReady() sends at
once through a bound boss and otherwise defers the send to the
background, so the request is not held for the boot.
Fold the ledger state, liveness verdict, plan and scope gaps and the
provider reauth flag into ok / limited / degraded / action_required with a
reason code, the one action, the unavailable types and redacted
diagnostics. Keep the last ten sync attempts per connection for those
diagnostics, publish the state on the integrations envelope, every
per-provider status route and the Apple Health config read, and page the
operator once per failure streak instead of once a day.
A loopback, link-local or metadata target answered
private_origin_not_approved with a message telling the user to have the
operator list it, and the parser refuses such an entry forever: a dead
end the route test even pinned. Those targets now answer
private_origin_not_grantable (catalogued, on all four routes, translated
in seven locales) with a message that says no grant can open them and
to use the relay's LAN address. Both senders carry the reason into the
outcome so the test button forwards the same code.
The malformed-entry warning printed the entry verbatim, which is where
a pasted token or userinfo sits; the parser now hands callers scheme
and host only, plus the reason in words. The Nightscout list throws a
named error with that redacted entry and reason, and the connect route
answers it as a 422 with the message instead of a bare 500, so a
self-host that listed http://localhost:1337 reads what to change.
The two settings cards translate a coded save refusal like the test
button does; the docs and the changelog name the sub-host and sibling-
port narrowing; the dispatcher floor tests assert the policy marker so
a real NXDOMAIN cannot pass for a refusal.
Refs #947
Fifty-nine 422s raised off a Zod `safeParse` answered with one opaque
sentence and nothing a client could map onto a field, while the other
166 sent `details.issues` — the multi-issue envelope that exists so a
caller with three bad fields fixes all three in one round-trip. Twelve
of the fifty-nine put a dotted machine token in `error` where the
sentence belongs, so `error` was sometimes text to show a person and
sometimes a token that must not be shown, with nothing in the payload
to tell them apart.
Every one of them now answers through `apiValidationError`, which keeps
the existing `error` string and the existing `meta` byte for byte and
adds the issue list beside them. The dotted tokens keep their place in
`error` for the clients that already match on them and are published in
`meta.errorCode` as well, which is the field a machine code belongs in
and the one a new client should read.
A guard reads the route tree per refusal site rather than per file —
per file is what let this grow, since a route that used the helper once
looked compliant to a `grep -l` sweep — and asserts it still finds the
sites it judges, so a matcher that stops matching fails instead of
reporting a clean zero.
Six provider syncs returned a bare count, which narrowed their failures away:
a Nightscout window in which every SGV row was refused by a constraint
returned the same 0 as a quiet night, and an Oura or Polar run whose
collections all failed returned 0 too. The routes then answered 200 with a
count and the settings card drew a green tick over it.
Every sync now reports what it imported AND whether any part of it did not
land, and the route resolves the outcome server-side so the web card and the
native client cannot disagree. Google Health keeps its 502 for a run that
failed and wrote nothing, but a run that failed after writing some resources
is now a partial rather than a discarded result. The labs OCR commit carries
the same resolved outcome.
Mutation-checked against the production paths they cover: the escalation
verdict, the leg guard in `recordSyncSuccess`, the streak anchor the verdict
dates itself by, the status envelope threading it, and the pill's relative
timestamp.
Also give the four legacy per-provider status routes the verdict the
consolidated envelope already carries. They answered `connected: true` plus a
`state` string and nothing else, so a client reading one of them saw a live
connection over a pipe that had delivered nothing for weeks.
These four were the only connected providers with no way to ask for a
sync; they ran on their scheduled pass and nothing else. Each gets a POST
sync route on the hardened Fitbit and Google Health template: session auth,
a 5-per-minute per-user bucket, and a fixed 502 on failure. No body and no
full-sync flag, because none of the four entry points has a full-history
arm to call. Polar goes through the shared legs entry point so both legs
run with the attribution rules built for them.
The Nightscout error arm is the one that matters: a base URL carries the
API token as a query parameter, so the caught message can hold the user's
secret and never reaches the response body. The classified failure is
already on the ledger, recorded with the provider's own redaction.
Connecting also starts the first sync now. The poll handler has accepted a
single-user payload since it was written and never had a producer, so a
fresh connection sat empty for up to an hour waiting for the schedule. The
Oura and Polar callbacks and the Nightscout connect route enqueue one
targeted job each, best effort, with the hourly tick still the safety net.
Strava needs none: its callback already enqueues the history backfill,
which covers the recent window.
The four poll-queue names move into their own module so a request-path
caller can name a queue without dragging the whole worker handler graph
into the request bundle, following the backfill-queue precedent. Creation,
scheduling and handler binding stay in the registrar, and the dead-queue
guard follows the declarations.
Egress was already correct — the client fetches through safeFetch with
requirePublicHost pinned off the user's opt-in, manual redirects and a
timeout — but the check on the value we STORE was only a side effect of
the live probe the connect route happens to run first. That makes the
guard contingent on the probe's placement rather than on the input.
Run isPublicUrl at input time, gated on the same self-hoster opt-in, so
the URL that gets encrypted onto the row is the URL that was validated.
Cover the alt-notation classes the helper knows about; each case asserts
the probe was never reached, which is what distinguishes the input-time
refusal from the fetch-time one.
One-shot prettier pass so the new format:check gate starts from a clean
baseline. Formatting only — no behaviour change. Generator-owned and
vendored artifacts stay untouched via .prettierignore.
Pull continuous glucose readings from a self-hosted Nightscout instance
and store them as immutable BLOOD_GLUCOSE mg/dL measurements
(source=NIGHTSCOUT), giving the glucose panel real CGM density.
- client over safeFetch: public-host pin by default, relaxed only on the
per-user private-network opt-in; redirect pinned manual + timeout
- credentials encrypted at rest on User; URL is the connect marker
- sync maps SGV entries first-write-wins on (userId,type,source,externalId)
- connect/disconnect/status routes: apiHandler + requireAuth + rate limit;
connect validates by a live test fetch with clear errors
- hourly poll-cohort job registered in the all-queues registry
- settings card with URL, token, and the private-network toggle
- i18n across all six locales
Marc-André Bombeck