One-shot prettier pass so the new format:check gate starts from a clean
baseline. Formatting only — no behaviour change. Generator-owned and
vendored artifacts stay untouched via .prettierignore.
Two connect-in-app enhancements for the native client.
return_scheme: GET /api/whoop/connect accepts an optional custom scheme,
threaded through the server-side OAuth-state row so it survives the round
trip without ever riding in the URL or cookie. When a valid scheme is
present, the callback's final redirect targets <scheme>://whoop?whoop=
connected|error&reason=... so an in-app web session auto-completes on its
custom-scheme match; absent or invalid, the web settings redirect is
unchanged. Schemes validate against a strict allowlist (custom app scheme
only, ^[a-z][a-z0-9.+-]*$, http/https/javascript/data/file/vbscript
rejected, pinned to dev.healthlog.app). A rejected scheme falls back to
the web redirect and never reflects an arbitrary value.
Bearer connect ticket: a purely Bearer-authenticated client holds no web
session cookie, so it cannot start the handshake through the cookie-gated
connect route. POST /api/whoop/connect/ticket (Bearer) mints a one-time,
~60s, opaque ticket bound to the user; only its HMAC-SHA256 hash is stored
(the raw value never persists). GET /api/whoop/connect?ticket=<opaque>
accepts the ticket in lieu of a cookie, consumes it atomically (single-use,
reuse rejected), sets the nonce cookie, and 302s to WHOOP exactly as the
cookie path. Expired, consumed, or invalid tickets return a typed 401. The
two combine. The daily WHOOP OAuth-state cleanup also sweeps expired ticket
rows.
The ticket query param is added to the egress redaction denylist so the
opaque value never reaches logs or error reports.
Migration 0124 adds whoop_connect_tickets (id, user_id FK cascade,
token_hash unique, expires_at, consumed_at, created_at) and a nullable
return_scheme column on whoop_oauth_states.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 221b362011d52dda314139e0be7cc195c47d016e)
Connect mints the state nonce into the WhoopOAuthState ledger and redirects
to the WHOOP authorize page; callback verifies the nonce (atomic
delete-first consume, four distinguished reason tags), exchanges the code,
fetches the WHOOP profile for the user id, persists the encrypted
WhoopConnection, and enqueues the self-converging history backfill.
The webhook handler rate-limits per source first, verifies the
WHOOP_WEBHOOK_SECRET path segment, then verifies the HMAC-SHA256 body
signature over the raw bytes (timestamp + body, timingSafeEqual, stale
timestamp reject) before any work. Valid *.updated enqueues the matching
per-resource sync; *.deleted soft-deletes (workouts hard-delete, no
soft-delete column). Unknown users return 200 to stop retries.
CSP gates api.prod.whoop.com to the WHOOP settings surface + /api/whoop/*;
the webhook path joins the public-path allowlist and the path-secret redact
registry. Env wiring adds WHOOP_WEBHOOK_SECRET + WHOOP_REDIRECT_URI to the
compose whitelist and .env.production.example.
Marc-André Bombeck