A passwordless passkey login already clears user verification and is a
phishing-resistant possession factor, but it never stamped the session, so a
passkey user could not satisfy an MFA-enforcement policy or pass a step-up
re-check. Stamp Session.mfaVerifiedAt on a primary passkey login so it counts
as a completed second factor — equivalent to a password+TOTP sign-in. The
password+TOTP path is unchanged.
On a completed sign-in (password, second-factor, or passkey) from a device or
location not seen before, send one notification through the dispatcher cascade,
honouring the user's per-channel preferences via a new SECURITY_ALERT event
type. Dedupe on a one-way, per-user fingerprint: a SHA-256 over the userId, the
coarse User-Agent family, and a country/ASN-level geo signal, stored in the new
user_known_devices ledger (migration 0203). The first sighting of a fingerprint
alerts and records; later sightings only bump last-seen and stay silent. The
raw User-Agent and IP are never persisted — only the salted hash and a coarse
label. Registration records its device silently so a fresh account does not
alert on its own first session. The whole path is fire-and-forget and never
blocks or fails a sign-in.
One-shot prettier pass so the new format:check gate starts from a clean
baseline. Formatting only — no behaviour change. Generator-owned and
vendored artifacts stay untouched via .prettierignore.
The client bundle carries only the active locale — resolved on the
server and handed to the provider with no hydration flash, halving the
dashboard route to under a megabyte parsed (288 KiB gzip). The auth
shell renders the app chrome immediately instead of a spinner while the
session resolves in parallel, the widgets request folds into the
snapshot it duplicated, and insight pills prefetch their sub-pages —
a first visit to a sub-page lands in about ninety milliseconds instead
of nearly a second.
Raising the middleware body cap to 512 MB for archive imports removed
the implicit ceiling that protected JSON routes, so any bulk endpoint
would buffer an arbitrarily large body before validation ran. Every
JSON body read under /api now carries an explicit byte cap sized to its
legitimate payload (64 KB for single-record routes up to 16 MB for the
measurement import), webhooks cap before signature work, and oversized
bodies return 413.
Harden the native auth-token surface against four confirmed findings.
- /api/auth/logout was a no-op for a bearer credential: destroySession only
clears the cookie, leaving an Authorization: Bearer hlk_ token live until
expiry. When the request carries a bearer, also flip the matching
ApiToken.revoked and revoke its paired refresh-token sibling. Cookie path
unchanged.
- A browser spoofing X-Client-Type: native was handed a 60-day refresh token
in the JSON body. Gate refresh-token issuance on a new
isCookielessNativeCaller check (no Mozilla UA, no inbound session cookie),
so the secret reaches genuine cookie-less native callers only and never
alongside a browser session. The iOS native path is unaffected; a spoofing
browser falls back to the short-lived access token with no refresh.
- Refresh-reuse revoke trusted the stored row's deviceId, so a stolen token
replayed under a fabricated X-Device-Id confined the revoke to the
attacker's own id and left the victim's family live. On a present-but-
mismatched deviceId, escalate to the user-wide family revoke (a real device
never changes its id mid-family). The matching-id and null-id cases keep
their existing scope.
- Tighten the auth:refresh rate limit from 60/15min to 10/15min, aligning the
high-value rotation endpoint with the passkey-verify tier.
Add coverage for each: logout revokes bearer + sibling, a cookie/Mozilla
caller never receives a refresh token, a device-mismatch replay triggers the
wide revoke, and the cookie-less native path still gets its refresh token.
(cherry picked from commit 14dcdefc5f40855305d8aaf573d073faebc61476)
The `setOnboardingPendingCookie` helper was called from six different
auth routes (login, passkey-verify, register, password, /me,
/onboarding/complete) by convention. A future auth surface (SSO,
magic link, social login) added without remembering the helper would
silently re-introduce the dashboard flash that v1.4.22 C4 was
designed to fix.
Make `onboardingPending` a required parameter on `createSession`
(not optional) so issuing a session without anchoring the cookie is
type-impossible. The five primary auth surfaces now thread the
user's `onboardingCompletedAt == null` value through; the
`/api/auth/me` mirror remains as a fall-back for legacy sessions
that predate the cookie. The `/api/onboarding/complete` clear stays
where it is — it is a value flip after a DB write, not a session
issuance.
Three new integration tests pin: createSession sets the cookie when
pending, clears it when completed, and destroySession clears it
alongside the session cookie.
Closes Sr-H1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The post-hydration redirect for users with `onboardingCompletedAt ===
null` caused a brief dashboard flash before the client-side effect
could fire. The redirect now lives in `src/proxy.ts` so it lands on the
first server response.
The proxy runs in the Edge runtime and can't reach Prisma, so the auth
routes (login / passkey-verify / register / password / /api/auth/me)
mirror the DB `onboardingCompletedAt` column into a non-httpOnly
`hl_onboarding` cookie. The cookie is a UX hint, not a security
signal — a user editing it locally only skips the dashboard flash;
they still can't bypass any server check. `/api/onboarding/complete`
clears the cookie so the next navigation drops the redirect
immediately, and `destroySession` + expired-session purge wipe it
alongside the session cookie.
The e2e onboarding-flicker spec can return to testing the actual
incomplete-onboarding case: the proxy reads the cookie (absent for
the fully-onboarded storage-state user), not the mocked `/api/auth/me`
response, so the test now sets `onboardingCompletedAt: null` honestly
instead of pinning it to a non-null value as a workaround.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Long-overdue prettier sweep; prettier had drifted vs. checked-in code
across ~130 files (mostly long-argument line-break wrapping in TS and
table-padding in markdown). Pure formatting — no semantic changes —
and required to clear the v1.4.6 release gate's `pnpm format:check`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(crypto): G2 — encryption-key versioning + rotation CLI
Adds backwards-compatible support for ENCRYPTION_KEYS (JSON map of
{ "id": "<key>" }) plus ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID. Ciphertext format is now
"<keyId>.<base64payload>"; legacy bare-base64 ciphertext still decrypts
under the synthetic "v1" id derived from the existing ENCRYPTION_KEY.
scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts re-encrypts every encrypted column on
User / WithingsConnection / AppSettings with the active key. Idempotent —
rows already on the active id are skipped.
Why: enables zero-downtime rotation when a key is suspected leaked,
without forcing every encrypted row through a single big-bang rewrite.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): G4 — native-Bearer UA gating + rotating refresh tokens
Web callers (UA contains 'Mozilla/') keep the legacy 90d Bearer when they
explicitly opt in via X-Client-Type: native. Native callers (HealthLog-iOS,
HealthLog-iPad, n8n, Health-Connect, unrecognised UAs) now receive a 24h
access token plus a 60d rotating refresh token in the login response.
New /api/auth/refresh endpoint atomically validates + rotates the refresh
token (one-time-use), revokes the previously paired access token, and
audit-logs every refresh + revoke. Reuse of an already-consumed refresh
token revokes the entire family for the user/device — defence against a
stolen refresh token.
Migration 0025_refresh_tokens adds the table; the only DDL is CREATE
TABLE so it is forward-compatible. Down migration documented at
docs/ops/migrations/0025-down.sql.
Why: the V3 audit (still-V2-A) flagged that 90d tokens are too long for
native callers when refresh-token rotation is now table-stakes for mobile
apps. Web flows are unchanged so existing browser sessions keep working.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(infra): G3 — web/worker container split via HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE
Adds a tiny startup gate (src/lib/process-type.ts) so the same Docker image
can run as web-only, worker-only, or 'all' (default — single-container,
backwards compatible). assertSubsystemEnabled() refuses to boot the
reminder worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web, preventing accidental
double-cron when an operator splits the deployment.
docker-compose.yml ships the optional app-worker service block commented
out so 'docker compose up' keeps working out of the box; uncommenting it
+ flipping app to HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web is the only change to scale
HTTP horizontally. Healthchecks are isolated per service so neither
startup deadlocks the other; both wait on db: service_healthy.
docs/self-hosting/scaling.md walks through when + how to split.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(jobs): G1 — daily off-host encrypted backup to S3-compatible storage
New pg-boss queue 'data-backup-offhost' runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin, dumps
each user's measurements + medications + intake events + mood entries,
encrypts the JSON under a SEPARATE key (BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, isolated
from the application ENCRYPTION_KEY), and uploads to any S3-compatible
target via @aws-sdk/client-s3.
Wire format documented in docs/ops/backup-restore.md:
magic "HLBK" || version 0x01 || iv(12) || authTag(16) || ciphertext
The worker prunes objects older than BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30);
operators are encouraged to also configure a bucket-level lifecycle rule.
Admin endpoint POST /api/admin/backup/test issues a 1-byte PUT+GET
roundtrip and returns endpoint + bucket + per-call latency. Credentials
are never returned.
scripts/restore-backup.ts downloads + decrypts a single object so
operators can verify the chain end-to-end without standing up a separate
restore harness.
Why: GDPR Art. 32 + V3 audit "data durability" — without an off-host copy
the only line of defence against a Postgres volume loss is the in-DB
DataBackup model on the same host. Separate-key isolation means a leak of
the application encryption key does not also expose every user's archive.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(multi-tenant): address review findings — rotation coverage, hard decrypt errors, web/worker gates
Multi-agent review on PR #135 caught several CRITICAL + HIGH issues that
would have shipped silent data corruption or weakened the threat model:
Encryption + rotation
- scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts: stop selecting `bugReportTokenEncrypted`
(column doesn't exist in the schema; the script crashed on the AppSettings
step). Add the three encrypted columns it was missing —
NotificationChannel.config, PushSubscription.p256dh, PushSubscription.auth
— so rotating to a new key actually re-encrypts every encrypted row.
Without this, dropping the old key id from ENCRYPTION_KEYS would leave
notification channels and web-push subscriptions permanently
undecryptable.
- src/lib/crypto.ts: refuse to silently fall back to the active key when a
legacy bare-base64 row is decrypted but no v1 entry is configured. Throws
a clear "Restore ENCRYPTION_KEY (or add a v1 entry to ENCRYPTION_KEYS)
and run scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts before removing it" so an
operator who pulled the v1 too early notices immediately instead of
hitting opaque GCM tag errors.
- docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md: full step-by-step + rollback note +
troubleshooting section. Spells out that rotation is a forward-only
operation and what to do if the rollback path is needed.
Web / worker split (G3)
- src/proxy.ts: refuse HTTP traffic with a 503 +
X-HealthLog-Process-Type: worker header when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=worker.
The worker container (which still runs `node server.js` for now) no
longer accepts requests, so a misrouted client gets a clear hint instead
of a partially-served response.
- src/instrumentation.ts: short-circuit before importing the reminder
worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web — avoids the noisy
"[instrumentation] CRITICAL" stderr line we emitted on every web boot.
- /api/version added to PUBLIC_PATHS so the compose healthcheck doesn't
silently 302-redirect through the auth gate (the prior wget treated the
login page as a 200 success and would never notice an unhealthy backend).
Refresh-token rotation (G4)
- src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts: reuse-detection now revokes ALL active
refresh tokens for the user, not only those scoped to the same deviceId.
An attacker who rotated without an X-Device-Id header would otherwise
keep their family alive on the no-device branch. Defence-in-depth.
- revokeRefreshToken() also revokes the paired access token so a leaked
access token cannot outlive the refresh-token sibling that the caller
just killed (logout-on-device).
Off-host backup (G1)
- src/lib/jobs/offhost-backup.ts: drop the worker-side DeleteObject path.
Retention is the bucket's lifecycle-policy job; the worker keeps a
PutObject + GetObject grant only. A compromised worker can no longer
wipe the backup history. Per-user errors are now surfaced as Wide
Event warnings + a structured failures[] array on the report so an
operator can tell which user failed and why.
- scripts/restore-backup.ts: schema-validate the decrypted payload before
writing to disk, plus an optional --user-id=<id> flag that refuses to
proceed unless the dump's userId matches. Prevents silent
cross-tenant restores when an operator points the script at the wrong
S3 key.
Idempotency
- src/lib/idempotency.ts: the leak-guard already blocked `hlk_`
(access-token prefix); also block `hlr_` so a future caller wrapping
the new /api/auth/refresh endpoint with withIdempotency() can't
accidentally cache a freshly-issued refresh token.
Migration / schema
- prisma/migrations/0025_refresh_tokens/migration.sql: wrap in a single
transaction; switch to CREATE { TABLE | INDEX } IF NOT EXISTS so a
partial-deploy retry is a no-op instead of "relation already exists";
guard the FK ADD with information_schema lookup for the same reason.
- Schema replaces the single-column `@@index([deviceId])` with a
composite `@@index([userId, deviceId])` (every lookup also filters on
userId; the old index would never have been used). Comment on
accessTokenHash corrected to HMAC-SHA-256.
Container / ops
- Dockerfile: install tzdata + ENV TZ=Europe/Berlin so the daily
pg-boss schedule (`30 2 * * *` Europe/Berlin) actually fires at 02:30
Berlin instead of silently falling back to UTC on the alpine base.
- docker-compose.yml: tighten the healthcheck to `wget --spider` (matches
the Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK style, doesn't pipe the body), pass through
BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS so a custom retention env reaches the container.
- .env.example: document every new env var added in this PR
(HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE, ENCRYPTION_KEYS, ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID,
BACKUP_S3_*, BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS) with
comments and the all-or-none semantics for the backup block.
491 tests still green, typecheck clean.
* chore: retrigger CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three small follow-ups to the v1.3.3 audit:
- src/lib/auth/__tests__/hmac.test.ts now stubs API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY via
vi.stubEnv per test instead of mutating process.env in beforeAll, so the
variable is restored cleanly after every case (and worker leaks under
--no-isolate are gone).
- The two native-token issuance tests (password login + passkey login) now
mock hashToken as (raw) => "hashed:" + raw and assert the persisted
tokenHash equals hashToken(plaintext) instead of accepting any string.
Catches a regression where the route would hash the wrong value.
- vitest.config.mts adopts coverage.include for the full src/ tree (the
vitest 4 replacement for coverage.all=true) so untouched files surface
with 0% rather than being silently omitted, and excludes the future
tests/integration/** suite so unit-test runs stay fast.
No production code touched; suite stays at 454 green.
When a request to `/api/auth/login` or `/api/auth/passkey/login-verify`
carries `X-Client-Type: native` (or a `User-Agent` matching `HealthLog-iOS`),
the response now also contains a 90-day `hlk_*` Bearer token alongside
the user object. Browser sessions continue to receive the cookie only —
no extra payload, no behaviour change for them.
Token issuance is gated by header detection in `src/lib/auth/issue-token.ts`
and re-uses the existing `ApiToken` table + HMAC pipeline; nothing new on
the storage side. Audit log records `auth.token.autoissue.native` so each
auto-issued token is traceable to its login event.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Switch defaultLocale from "de" to "en" and make English the code-level
language throughout. All ~145 hardcoded German strings translated:
- API error messages (52 routes) now return English
- Zod validation messages in English
- Classification/analytics functions return English categories
- Notification type labels in English
- Component strings use i18n t() calls (heatmap, mood chart,
medication form, intake history, password strength, insights card)
- ~50 new i18n keys in both de.json and en.json
Route migration:
- /stimmung → /mood, /zielwerte → /targets (new pages)
- 301 redirects in proxy.ts for legacy URLs
- Sidebar + bottom nav updated
Bump version to 1.0.1.
HealthLog — personal health-tracking PWA with weight, blood pressure,
pulse, mood tracking, medication compliance, Withings integration,
doctor report PDF export, and Dracula-themed UI.
Marc-André Bombeck