Commit Graph
7 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marc-André Bombeck 386e92e6f9 test(sharing): carry the two domain lists through the account-access contract
The account-access integration contract compares whole entries, so the
two lists the payload now publishes belong in its expected shapes. The
managed-record leg posts the mood entry with the logged-at instant the
create schema requires.
2026-09-09 20:06:48 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 9456b18497 Carry the owner's full name through the account-access round trip test
The account payload gained a full-name field; this integration test
built its expected entries without it, so the exact-match assertions
disagreed with the response. The fixtures name the field now, null for
an owner who set no full name.
2026-08-08 18:02:21 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck b2e225470b test: read the account payload as the release publishes it
Four cases in the accountAccess integration test were written against a
contract this release rejected. They asserted an entry of seven fields and a
block of three, both of which gained one; and they asserted that a MANAGE
grant publishes `access: "manage"`.

It does not, by design. `access` is the v1.36.0 name and its union is
`read | write` — a client compiled against that release decodes it as a
closed set. MANAGE therefore publishes as `write` there and as `manage` on
`level`, and the entry schema raises a validation issue unless a manage
entry carries exactly legacy write access and whole scope. The expectations
move; the schema does not.

`recordKind` is required on an entry and on the block. Both are asserted
now, including the block-level value moving from `self` to `shared` across
a switch, so a value stuck on either reads as two cases disagreeing.
2026-08-07 06:00:29 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 3a99de312e fix(02-12.1): check record context before an idempotent replay
- evaluate the fence in the wrapper above findCached, so a stale request
  neither replays a body, learns a cell exists, nor inserts a claim
- return the refusal rather than throwing: one route composes the
  wrapper outside apiHandler, where a throw escapes the envelope
- read the claim and the session's own context on one session lookup
2026-08-06 18:54:20 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck ab14fdb6f3 Let an invitation name its sections and offer management
An owner can now narrow a grant to the parts of their record they mean to
share, and can offer the third level. Both decisions are made once, on the
invitation, and neither widens afterwards.

The invite schema takes `scope`: absent or null is the entire record, which
is what every stored grant means and what an owner who does not narrow still
gets. An empty array, a key outside the vocabulary and the whole-record
sentinel are each refused with a 422 naming the field; `inviteGrant` refuses
the same three underneath, and its `invalid_scope` now has an HTTP mapping
instead of falling into the generic refusal.

Offering MANAGE asks for a fresh second factor when the account has one. That
gate resolves through the session cookie and has no Bearer fall-through, so a
token caller is refused first with `sharing.invite.manage_browser_only` rather
than being told it is not authenticated by a route that had just
authenticated it. The consequence is deliberate: management of a health
record is offered from a browser.

The account payload gains `sections` and `level` beside `access` and
`canWrite`, resolved server-side and ordered as the consent screen reads.
`access` was `grant.access === "WRITE" ? "write" : "read"`, which would have
published a grant that can delete entries as read-only; it is a total map
now, so the next level cannot ship silent. The capabilities hook carries both
facts and turns neither into an affordance yet — the edit and delete controls
come back in the release where the routes behind them answer.

The consent surface asks two questions in order rather than laying out a
nineteen-cell grid. The level is three radios, narrowest preselected. What
they can open is two radios, the entire record preselected, and only the
narrow branch expands the eight sections with a sentence each. Both honest
limits are stated above the checkboxes, where the decision is being made: a
section shares everything written in it, and the cross-record surfaces do not
appear for a narrowed grant. Documents carries its own warning, cycle appears
only for an owner who tracks it, and Manage collapses the question to the one
line that answers it.

The Manage sentence says the other person can add, change and remove entries,
including ones the owner entered themselves, and says in the same breath what
it does not reach. The acceptance side gets its own responsibility line rather
than the write one wearing a stronger adjective.

Six locales.
2026-08-05 23:37:00 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck f9ad2d3986 Format the account-access round trip 2026-08-02 15:43:49 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 562123d4d1 feat(sharing): publish which records an account may open
`GET /api/auth/me` grows an `accountAccess` block: the accounts this caller
may act on, the one the browser is inside right now, and the booleans a UI
binds directly — `canSwitch`, and `canWrite` per account. Every value is
resolved server-side. A client that worked out what it may do from grant rows
would be a second program deciding one person's access to a health record, and
the two answer differently the first time an expiry or a revocation appears.

`canWrite` is false for every grant in v1 because invitations write READ only.
It is resolved through the grant state machine rather than hardcoded, so the
day a WRITE grant exists the answer changes without this file being edited.

The route becomes an actor surface. It has to be: the switcher, the banner
naming whose record is open, and the way back out all read this payload, and
under a bare `requireAuth()` the whole app shell would refuse the moment a
switch was on. Every field it returns is still the caller's own.

The active record is published as a full entry, not an id to look up. A banner
that had to join two fields could render unnamed the moment they disagreed;
here the active entry is one of the listed ones, selected by the pass that
built them. A stamp left behind by a grant that lapsed reads as not switched —
the same answer the resolver gives the next delegated request.

Not published: the other account's avatar. Those bytes are owner-scoped, so a
URL here would resolve to a refusal and paint a broken image. Clients keep the
initials fallback.
2026-08-02 14:25:55 +02:00