A disaster-recovery snapshot carries the singleton `app_settings` row —
registration, the MFA requirement, the default locale and timezone, module
availability, the notification and AI configuration, the document size cap and
quota — and the restore wrote it back as a side effect of restoring one
account. An operator putting a single record back on Wednesday reconfigured the
whole host from Monday's file, silently, with nothing on screen saying so.
Rebuilding a host from a snapshot is a real case, so the write stays: it is now
`restoreInstanceSettings: true` on the request and a checkbox beside the typed
gate, off unless the operator ticks it. Restoring an account and reconfiguring
the installation are two decisions, so they are two answers.
The 422 confirmation sentence and the dialog copy drop the instance-wide claim;
the opt-in carries it instead, in all seven catalogues. Integration coverage
runs both arms: without the flag the settings row keeps its own values, with it
the file's values land.
POST /api/admin/backups/[id]/restore replaces the target user's
personal data with the contents of the snapshot. This is the riskiest
endpoint in the backup family, hardened with five independent gates:
1. requireAdmin() — cookie-session admins only, never a Bearer token.
2. Body must carry confirm: "RESTORE" (rejected with 422 + audit
denial otherwise).
3. UI gates the destructive button behind a typed-string match —
three independent steps before fire (open dialog, read warning,
type RESTORE).
4. withIdempotency() wraps the handler so duplicate clicks with the
same Idempotency-Key replay the original outcome instead of
re-executing the destructive transaction.
5. Pre-validation of measurement-type / measurement-source /
intake-source enums OUTSIDE the transaction so a malformed
payload can't half-wipe the user before failing the create step.
Restore scope mirrors the v1.4.14 wipe (DELETE /api/admin/data) plus
the mood-entries table the wipe didn't cover. AuditLog rows are
intentionally PRESERVED across the restore — the audit trail is the
last thing that should be touched by a destructive op.
Transaction:
- Delete user's measurements, medications (cascades to schedules +
intake events + reminder configs + telegram messages), mood
entries, notification channels, push subscriptions, telegram
scheduled deletions.
- Re-create from payload: measurements (skipDuplicates), medications
+ their schedules in one create call, intake events keyed by
medication name -> id (orphans dropped silently), mood entries
(skipDuplicates).
Audit:
- admin.backups.restore.start (intent, before transaction)
- admin.backups.restore (success, after transaction)
- admin.backups.restore.denied (5 reasons, no transaction ran)
- admin.backups.restore.failed (decrypt / schema / enum / tx error)
UI:
- New <RestoreRowDialog> subcomponent renders an AlertDialog gated
on a typed-RESTORE Input. Description carries the target username
and the snapshot timestamp so the admin sees exactly which
backup they're about to restore. Confirm button stays disabled
until typed string matches.
- Restore button sits next to Download in each row's action column.
- Idempotency-Key built client-side as restore-<rowId>-<uuid> to
de-duplicate accidental double-clicks.
Tests: 3 new integration tests in
tests/integration/admin-backups-restore.test.ts covering the round-
trip (wipes pre-existing data + recreates from snapshot),
confirmation-token rejection, and 404 on unknown id. 21/21
integration tests pass; 69/69 unit tests on src/lib/validations and
src/components/admin still green.
Note for v1.4.16: the restore test queries `medication_schedules`
with explicit field selection because a sibling branch added
`days_of_week` to the schema without a matching migration; the
default `findMany` would 500 against the deployed test DB. When that
migration lands, the explicit select can be relaxed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Marc-André Bombeck