Commit Graph
2687 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marc-André Bombeck 110511ff31 feat: create managed profiles from shared access
- add a managed-profile card to Settings -> Shared access, between the
  invitation card and the standing-state cards
- collect exactly the four fields the create route accepts, with the date
  of birth genuinely optional and never derived from a year
- refresh the account payload on success, so the new record reaches the
  switcher and the banner without a reload
- assert the section is reachable for an owner and refused for a Guardian
  inside a profile and for an adult manager
2026-08-07 01:53:26 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 6ae0cc993f fix: close four small gaps around the record surface
The privacy dashboard re-implemented the audit-retention resolver with its own
default and its own floor. Two implementations of one disclosure, quoted to the
same person on two pages and by the purge job; it uses the shared resolver now.

The record-content branch in the settings gate matched a classification rather
than a page, so a second manage-writable destination would have rendered the
allergy and family-history managers under its own heading without anybody
choosing that. It resolves through a slug map, and the contract test fails if
the map and the classification disagree in either direction — a destination
cannot join the kind without somebody deciding what it renders.

The managed-profile nav filter assumed a guardian grant is always manage. It is
today, which is why the check was easy to leave out; an entry below that level
would have listed destinations the gate refuses.

Interpolation used a replacement string, and String.replace reads $&, $`, $',
$1 and $$ out of one. A display name containing $' rewrote the sentence around
it — and display names land in exactly the sentences that say who did what in
somebody's health record. A replacer function has no $ grammar at all, which
removes the class rather than escaping the members of it somebody thought of.
2026-08-07 01:00:02 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 5de488c35c docs: state the sharing boundary that is actually enforced
Two sentences promised that a manage grant reaches no settings at all. Both
were true when they were written and stopped being true when the anamnesis
destination opened, and both are in the worst places for a stale promise: one
is the access description generated into the public contract and read by the
native client, the other is the paragraph a delegate meets on a page sharing
does not cover.

Both now name the boundary the code draws — record content versus account
configuration — and say which part of the record a manage grant reaches. What
stays with the account owner is spelled out rather than implied: login, the
second factor, provider connections, tokens, notification routing, module and
threshold configuration, and who else has access.

A guard checks the copy against the classification rather than against itself,
so opening a second destination or closing this one moves the sentence with it.
The contract is regenerated.
2026-08-07 00:52:25 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c7e847a766 fix: bound the activity feed to the window it promises
The revoke dialog tells an owner that "who entered what" stays answerable for
N days, and the activity list prints the same number under its heading. The
query behind that list had no date filter: on an instance whose retention was
shortened it showed rows the sentence said were already gone, and the number
was a caption over an unbounded read rather than its limit. It is the filter
now, resolved once so the bound and the sentence cannot drift apart.

The list also stopped at a hundred rows and said nothing about it, which is the
more dangerous of the two silences — an owner who scrolls to the bottom reads
the oldest visible line as the beginning, and a busy household reaches the cap
in a fraction of the window. The response says which of the two limits it hit,
and the view states it only when it did: a caveat that is always on is one
people learn to skip.

The self-hosting page said an empty list means nobody opened the record. It
means nobody did so within the window. Corrected, with the row cap named
alongside it.
2026-08-07 00:48:58 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck f91f701e13 fix: say what a refused request actually was
Every delegable route files a breadcrumb when a request does not parse, and it
files it through auditLog on purpose: that helper is what stamps the actor, and
without the stamp a delegate's malformed request would read as the owner's own.
The rows are meant to be attributable. None of them had a sentence, so all of
them rendered in the owner's activity view as "made a change in your record" —
including one a view-only delegate can trigger by sending a query the route
cannot parse. Nothing had changed and nothing could have.

Thirty-three actions now have honest lines. A refusal says it was an attempt
and says it was refused; it never borrows the language of something that
happened. Two of them are filed by library modules the routes import — a
background import's completion row and a medication lifecycle reconciliation —
and a walk over route files alone could not see either.

The inventory guard was asking a different question from the feed. It kept only
awaited audit calls while the feed shows fire-and-forget rows identically, and
it read route files while the feed shows whatever the request reached. Both
criteria now match the feed's, the three rows the feed structurally cannot show
are excluded by name with the reason written down, and the exclusion list is
pinned at three. A leg asserts the shape of the sentence for every refusal, so
a future arm cannot map an attempt onto an ordinary verb and pass on coverage.

The whole round trip is covered against real Postgres: a view-only delegate
sends a malformed query, the row lands attributed to them under the owner, and
the sentence the owner reads is an attempt.
2026-08-07 00:40:40 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck ef242f33bb feat: open the anamnesis record surface to managers
POST /api/allergies and POST /api/family-history have resolved
requireRecordAuth("manage", "profile") since the level shipped, while the only
form in the product that posts to either sat behind a Settings destination
classified unavailable. The write was admitted, audited and owner-scoped, and
nobody could reach it — the one-ended change this repository keeps
rediscovering, with the permission shipped and the surface left as a follow-up.

The destination now carries a classification that means what the routes mean:
reachable by everybody they already admit, which is a guardian inside the
profile they administer and an adult delegate holding manage. The four places
that decided visibility on the guardian-only literal were each updated
deliberately, and the shell that refused every settings path in an adult share
now admits exactly the destinations classified as record content. Record
configuration — modules, thresholds, notification routing — stays with the
owner at every level.

The page inside a record is its own component holding the two managers whose
routes answer for a delegate. Mounting the personal section would have put
three more forms on screen that refuse on submit. The family-history card says
whose statement the row is, which the route comment could not.

Both routes carried a long paragraph arguing the write was deliberately
unreachable. It is gone rather than left to send the next reader back to close
what this opens.

The integration coverage moves from the undeclared-mode refusal to a manage
contract: a manage delegate and a guardian each write and the row lands under
the owner with the delegate named as actor, while read and write delegates get
the insufficient-access refusal. Nothing exercised either route at manage
before.
2026-08-07 00:01:27 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c92a80ee4c feat: describe managed sharing activity
Every action a manage-level route files now renders as its own sentence in
the owner's activity view, in all six locales. A write delegate can only add,
so the generic "made a change" was at least the right shape of fact; a manager
changes and removes entries the owner made themselves, and the generic line
withholds the only part that matters — whether a reading was corrected or
deleted, whether a dose history was purged.

The inventory reads the routes and calls the map rather than matching `case`
in its source, so an action that falls through to the fallback fails, and it
follows each resolved key into all six bundles. Every sentence interpolates
the actor's name and nothing else: the audit table is not encrypted and a
value in a verb line would be a health figure in a second store.

The revoke dialog's retention disclosure no longer depends on which of two
requests answers first. `retentionDays` rides the grant list, so a client
holding a row to revoke holds the window it must state, and the branch that
omitted the sentence is gone.
2026-08-06 23:30:07 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 120323d995 test(02-12.1): prove Vary on the serving path, not only the contents
Removing the Vary block left the disk-layer case green: it asserted what
is IN the cache, and the claim is what the cache will SERVE. On the
external-switch path nothing wipes those entries — the app never
initiated the switch — so Vary is the only thing between a cached
delegated response and the next request under another context.

- assert cache.match() hits under the stored context and misses under
  the new one; it fails when the Vary is removed
- correct the acceptance map and the client docblock to claim exactly
  what executes: no zero-entry count, no offline leg
2026-08-06 23:04:29 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck bcf2322f65 feat(02-12.1): vary the record echo on the headers that produced it
A shared cache is one reverse proxy away, and without Vary the first one
to appear would key a delegated record response on URL alone and hand it
to the next request under a different context. Appends rather than
replaces, so a route that already varies keeps what it had.
2026-08-06 20:51:29 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck dc343f434c docs(02-12.1): narrow two overstated claims
- the idempotency arm refuses only a wrongly-asserted context; an admin
  route behind unfenced requireAdmin still serves a headerless request
- the epoch trigger does not fire on a statement that names record_epoch
  without moving the selector; the source guard is what covers that
2026-08-06 20:48:50 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 8fcbdcc0df test(02-12.1): prove the record-session fence end to end
- give every acceptance case a stable id and assert the mapping from a
  runnable artifact, recording which cases execute in the ordinary gate
  and which await the browser stage
- add the browser spec for the cases no cooperative layer can reach:
  peers reconciling to an exact context, an aborted switch response, a
  closed initiator, a delayed response, and the offline disk layers
2026-08-06 19:33:15 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 31b4857d8b feat(02-12.1): carry and verify the record context from the browser
- attach the asserted context to every same-origin request inside the
  three fetch entries, so no call site classifies itself
- discard a response whose echoed context contradicts the adopted one;
  serve one that carries no echo, which is what keeps the public poll
  and every actor surface working
- adopt from /api/auth/me and the switch response, and from nothing else
- send the epoch on every switch and retry once after reconciling
- hold and reconcile on the 409 instead of leaving the record
2026-08-06 19:10:02 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 3a99de312e fix(02-12.1): check record context before an idempotent replay
- evaluate the fence in the wrapper above findCached, so a stale request
  neither replays a body, learns a cell exists, nor inserts a claim
- return the refusal rather than throwing: one route composes the
  wrapper outside apiHandler, where a throw escapes the envelope
- read the claim and the session's own context on one session lookup
2026-08-06 18:54:20 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 45fec0fc1b feat(02-12.1): refuse a record request whose context has moved
- both record resolvers check the fence after authentication and before
  the carrier, off the one session row that also decides the scope
- POST /api/account/switch takes an optional expectedEpoch and writes
  conditionally, so concurrent switchers resolve to one outcome
- GET /api/auth/me publishes the context a browser bootstraps from
- every response that resolved a record scope echoes it back
- regenerate the API contract
2026-08-06 18:21:40 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 59359738c8 feat(02-12.1): decide record-session context in one place
- add an import-free contract module both bundles can name, holding the
  header names, the parse and the verdict
- add the server fence: header read, wide-event stamp, and the refusal
- add RecordSessionChangedError as a third sibling on the existing
  sharing-error arm, so the 409 needs no new serialisation branch
2026-08-06 17:59:07 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 5c9befc0ae feat(02-12.1): stamp a record-context epoch on every session
- add sessions.record_epoch, owned by a BEFORE UPDATE trigger so the
  ON DELETE SET NULL path and raw SQL writes cannot skip it
- normalise pre-existing rows so epoch zero means never switched
- project the epoch off the row getSession already loads
2026-08-06 17:52:10 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck a08e82d0be Merge commit '38214e472' into work/v137-record-session-fence 2026-08-06 17:10:56 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 38214e4726 fix(02-12): hold peer tabs during record switches
- Clear scoped reads before the server session changes
- Reconcile every tab with a fresh access response
2026-08-06 15:06:12 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c42df8cbc3 fix(02-12): gate record preload scope
- Wait for a validated account scope before warming record reads
- Abort scoped preloads and discard handoffs across record transitions
- Cover malformed scope reloads and fresh own-record recovery
2026-08-06 14:32:32 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 2ae3a66816 fix(02-11): bound APNs provider delivery
- Time out stalled provider sends without unhandled late rejections\n- Record a transient timeout outcome for cascade fallback\n- Cover timeout fallback with unit and integration tests
2026-08-06 14:10:28 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c56d1ca50b fix(02-11): protect guardian egress data lifecycle
- Exclude and erase egress claims with recipient-side lookup support\n- Serialize data wipes with managed-profile Guardian authorization\n- Cover last-Guardian and queued-claim wipe races
2026-08-06 14:05:59 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 21e111c06c fix(02-12): refuse malformed record access
- Preserve absent-server compatibility while rejecting published invalid blocks\n- Partition refused record reads and withhold protected presentation
2026-08-06 14:03:13 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 4b79f83cf7 fix(02-11): release guardian lock before provider egress
- Commit a final authorization claim under the lifecycle lock\n- Keep provider calls and retry outcomes outside database transactions\n- Retain authorization claims with notification delivery diagnostics
2026-08-06 13:46:42 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck b844d04676 fix(02-12): reject divergent shared-record state
- Verify the active record matches its canonical switcher entry\n- Skip the owner OCR probe in delegated Labs records
2026-08-06 13:39:37 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 1818bd874b fix(02-11): authorize guardian egress under lock
- Hold the managed-profile lock through every provider send\n- Add the notification event retention index and race coverage
2026-08-06 09:42:47 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 358bb39465 fix(02-12): keep scoped record polls dormant
- suppress whole-record achievements reads for narrowed grants\n- stabilize record journey response assertions
2026-08-06 08:34:02 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 60b4845fea feat(02-11): secure guardian notification delivery
- Remove record-mutating affordances from Guardian channel payloads\n- Reject managed Telegram callbacks and verify channel attribution
2026-08-06 05:44:41 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck accb98e223 test(02-11): cover guardian notification channel safety
- Cover non-interactive Guardian payloads across delivery channels\n- Reject Telegram callbacks tied to managed records
2026-08-06 05:37:05 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 59de92b62e fix: isolate guardian notification preferences 2026-08-06 05:33:02 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck a78189b7f6 feat: add guardian notification fanout 2026-08-06 05:23:38 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 5e8b90bcc1 Merge notification delivery identity 2026-08-06 05:12:42 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck f6b9c8e882 fix(02-12): fail closed in record presentation
- retain elevated chrome only for internally consistent payloads\n- fall back to the caller record on malformed access entries
2026-08-06 05:07:27 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 6c4dd2d96b feat(02-12): route scoped records to granted domains
- keep shared navigation independent of actor module preferences\n- open scoped records at their first allowed destination\n- announce record access and kind in doorway names
2026-08-06 05:02:37 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck affd356677 test: retain sustained safety event claims
- exercise the shared notification claim boundary\n- preserve rolling sustained-run dedup coverage
2026-08-06 04:59:50 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 9eab70f032 feat(02-12): add scoped profile summary
- expose bounded read-only profile facts for shared records\n- keep profile navigation separate from Settings mutations
2026-08-06 04:59:25 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 9ba37342d7 fix: claim notification events atomically
- serialize rolling event claims before delivery\n- keep provider egress outside the transaction
2026-08-06 04:57:50 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck ba7bf49fae test: cover atomic notification event claims
- race record event claims through PostgreSQL\n- require safety producers to honor the claim
2026-08-06 04:53:50 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 60f91d27d7 fix: validate account access payloads
- Share the closed access schema with OpenAPI\n- Fail closed on malformed or stale record metadata
2026-08-06 04:52:46 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 69f97b268c fix: erase notification anchors with record data
- remove record event anchors during data deletion\n- retain sustained safety dedup coverage
2026-08-06 04:48:47 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 9c4c7b2b7d fix: retain notification anchor boundaries
- classify local notification anchors outside backups\n- keep reminder dedup fixtures on record events
2026-08-06 04:46:45 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c6b5d5df63 test: cover account access payload parsing
- Preserve canonical shared and manage payloads\n- Reject malformed and stale access metadata
2026-08-06 04:46:15 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 10a58a7e6a test: cover recipient-scoped Telegram persistence
- retain independent recipient reminder slots\n- verify chat updates and recipient cascade cleanup
2026-08-06 04:44:08 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 027f2b4355 fix: suppress premature managed safety delivery
- keep direct safety notifications to ordinary self-delivery\n- move safety dedup anchors out of delivery diagnostics
2026-08-06 04:41:40 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck ce94f4773f fix: reject partial notification attribution
- retain only complete delivery principal pairs\n- preserve legacy self-delivery records
2026-08-06 04:39:36 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 8b275c87db test: cover partial notification attribution
- reject one-sided delivery identities\n- avoid ambiguous push-attempt ledger writes
2026-08-06 04:38:48 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck fa46f27b01 feat: scope Telegram reminder tracking to recipients
- keep delegated recipient slots independent\n- bind callback cleanup to the recipient account
2026-08-06 04:38:09 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 5807879439 test: cover recipient-scoped telegram reminders
- Keep identical slots separate for each recipient\n- Update one slot when a recipient changes chat
2026-08-06 04:33:35 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 9380ea0f18 feat: separate notification event anchors
- Store record-scoped scheduler events outside delivery attempts\n- Keep delivery diagnostics free of bookkeeping rows
2026-08-06 04:32:52 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 2999b75ea6 test: cover notification event anchors
- Require record-scoped reminder deduplication\n- Keep anchors independent of delivery recipients
2026-08-06 04:29:54 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 1ba73a4d51 fix: enforce notification delivery authority
- Require active Guardian authority before cross-record delivery\n- Serialize managed delivery checks with lifecycle changes
2026-08-06 04:29:18 +02:00