Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marc-André Bombeck 79cb08efc7 test(ops): prove the journey's redactor on a key-shaped body
Low, review 2. The self-test walked every leg but never once asked whether
the redactor actually holds. The excerpt path is the only thing between a
token in a failure body and the run log, so it gets its own case: a body
carrying this project's own key prefix must come back with the token
replaced.
2026-09-10 01:26:40 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 3ba2fe3b82 fix(ops): prove the journey's reading is gone, not just accepted
Low, review 2. The delete leg asserted HTTP 200 and printed "account left
clean". An instance that answers 200 and keeps the row would have printed
the same line, which is the failure mode the journey exists to catch.

The leg now reads the id back and requires a 404. The self-test carries a
mock that answers 200 without deleting; with the read-back removed that
case goes green, which is the proof the check can fail.
2026-09-10 01:26:24 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 25cb79ecfc fix(ops): let no failed journey leg leave a reading behind
S2. The legs ran in one loop that returned on the first red one, so a
failed read back never reached the delete and the probe account kept the
row. Worse, the id was assigned only after the write's await returned: a
POST that timed out once the server had already committed left a row the
script could not even name.

Legs 3 to 5 now sit in a try/finally. The finally sweeps whatever the
delete leg did not, and when there is no id it asks the instance for the
row by a marker the write puts in `notes`, unique per run and known before
the request goes out. The sweep never throws — the red leg is the verdict,
and it says out loud what it could not remove.

--self-test asserts the mock holds no rows after every case that got as
far as the write, so a red read that skipped the delete is caught.
2026-09-10 01:26:04 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 742eeaad3c fix(ops): refuse a synthetic-journey target that is not ours
S1. The journey signs in with a real account and POSTs that account's
password to whatever BASE_URL names, and the workflow took BASE_URL as
free text. Anyone with repo write, or a leaked token, could dispatch the
run at a collector of their own and keep a working credential; secret
masking guards the log, never the egress.

The host now has to be on a short const allowlist in the script, checked
before anything is sent, with exit 2 and a named refusal otherwise. The
workflow input is a choice between the two hosted instances, so the form
cannot offer a third; the script's own check still stands behind it for a
dispatch that goes round the form.

--self-test covers the refusal, the prefix lookalike a startsWith check
would have waved through included.
2026-09-10 01:25:01 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 8995bef61c feat(ops): synthetic post-deploy journey
Post-publish verify proves the published image boots. Nothing proved that
on a running instance a person can sign in, write a reading and read it
back — which is exactly the shape of the defects this line keeps
rediscovering: a value written and never read.

`scripts/synthetic-journey.mjs` walks that journey in plain Node 22 with no
dependencies, so it runs from a workstation, a runner or the deploy host.
It warms `/`, `/api/health`, `/api/version` and the measurements list first
and discards those timings (the first hit on each route after a deploy is a
cold start), then asserts five legs in order: the served version equals the
expected one, the password flow signs in through a cookie jar, a weight
reading is written with an Idempotency-Key, the same row reads back with
its value, unit and source, and the reversible delete leaves the account
clean. One line per leg with the elapsed time; the first failure ends the
run non-zero with the status and a body excerpt that has every token shape
redacted out of it.

The workflow is `workflow_dispatch` only, with `base_url` and
`expected_version` as inputs and the credentials read from repository
secrets. It is deliberately not wired into the deploy path: the target
instance and the secrets are the maintainer's call.

Mutation proof, against a production build served from
`.next/standalone/server.js` on a throwaway Postgres.

Green:

    warm      35 ms  (discarded)
    ok        version         2 ms  serves 1.38.13
    ok        sign in        78 ms  session cookie held
    ok        write          64 ms  wrote cmtup9lwu0007zhovn0mxajdz
    ok        read back       8 ms  77.7 kg (MANUAL)
    ok        delete         27 ms  account left clean

    synthetic journey green

Read leg broken deliberately — the same server behind a throwaway forwarder
that empties the `GET /api/measurements` list and changes nothing else:

    ok        version         4 ms  serves 1.38.13
    ok        sign in        38 ms  session cookie held
    ok        write          40 ms  wrote cmtupa4ck000gzhovwnij64fz
    FAILED    read back       8 ms  read back: the list came back without the reading
              status 200
              body   {"data":{"measurements":[],"meta":{"total":0}},"error":null}

    synthetic journey RED on "read back"

Version leg broken the same way, by asking the instance for the previous
tag:

    FAILED    version         3 ms  version: instance serves "1.38.13", expected "v1.38.12"

    synthetic journey RED on "version"

`--self-test` carries that proof in the repository: it runs the journey
against an in-process instance nine times, once with nothing broken and
once per broken leg, and fails if a broken leg still comes back green. The
workflow runs it before it touches the real instance.

Gates: typecheck, `node --check`, lint (the three known warnings, no
errors), prettier, the workflow and CI-determinism guards.
2026-09-10 01:04:30 +02:00