Version anchors, the OpenAPI document, the changelog entry, and the
README sentence that still declared immunization records out of scope
while the vaccination record has shipped since v1.37.3.
Rotation revoked the access token paired with the consumed refresh token
the instant the rotation committed. A native client with requests already
on the wire got 401 revoked on those, read that as "re-authenticate",
rotated again with the refresh token it had just spent, and tripped reuse
detection: the device's whole token family died because the client was
busy at the boundary.
Pull the paired token's expiry in to fifteen seconds instead. It is long
enough for an in-flight request on a slow mobile link to finish, including
a retry, and short enough that the token gains nothing meaningful over the
validity it already had. bearer.ts answers a passed expiry with reason
expired, which a client treats as "refresh", not as "sign in again".
LEAST(expires_at, $1) takes the minimum inside the single UPDATE, so the
write can only ever shorten: a token already inside its last seconds keeps
its own expiry, and there is no read-then-write window. The bound value is
an ISO-8601 UTC string cast in SQL so the comparison does not shift with
the host's timezone.
Reuse detection is untouched. A replayed refresh token, or one presented
under a spoofed device id, still revokes the family and its access tokens
on the spot, and so does the logout path.
The off-host job was said to benefit from the streaming work the weekly
in-database backup got, and it did not. Only the payload builder was
shared: `runOffhostBackup` called `buildFullBackupJson` for the whole
document, `gzipSync` over that whole string, a whole-buffer
`createCipheriv` pass over the result, and handed the finished buffer to
a single `PutObject`. Four full copies of the record alive at once, on
the same arithmetic the weekly pass had already been fixed for.
Configuring an S3 target on a long-lived record therefore restarted the
container. On an account of 445 000 measurements the JSON alone is
242 MB, and against a 1 GB container's 524 MB heap the run died of heap
exhaustion seventeen seconds in — taking every signed-in session with
it, because the job shares the app process.
The write path is a stream end to end now: `streamFullBackupJson`
produces the document a page at a time, gzip and an incremental
AES-256-GCM writer consume it as it arrives, and `@aws-sdk/lib-storage`
puts it up in two 8 MB parts. What the process holds is fixed by the
pipeline's shape rather than by the record. Measured on that same
445 000-measurement account under `--max-old-space-size=450`, with the
heap pre-loaded to what a warm server holds: the old path dies with
`Ineffective mark-compacts near heap limit`, the new one finishes with a
peak 79 MB above its baseline and writes a 9.1 MB object.
The stored envelope gains version 3, which moves the GCM tag from in
front of the ciphertext to the end. That is the only change the stream
required — the tag exists only once the last block is in, so a leading
one means the whole object must exist before its first byte can be sent.
Nothing about the authentication moves: the tag still covers every
ciphertext byte and is verified before a byte of plaintext comes back.
Versions 1 and 2 still read, so every object already in a bucket
restores through the same reader with no flag to tell them apart.
The incremental writer is the crypto module's, split into its byte-level
half so the base64 form the in-database blob uses and the raw form an
object needs are one implementation under two framings. The off-host key
handling is unchanged: a separate `BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, 64 hex or
32-byte base64, passed in rather than looked up.
A run that uploaded nothing for anybody is a failed job now, not
`ok: true` with an empty bucket behind it. Wrong credentials, a missing
bucket and an unreachable endpoint all fail every account rather than
one, and the target's own sentence rides out as the cause. A run where
some account got a copy still succeeds; retrying the whole cohort over
one object would re-upload everybody's.
The one ceiling left is structural rather than a memory bound, and it is
counted rather than discovered: a multipart upload carries 10 000 parts,
so an object past 80 GB is refused for that account with a clear message
instead of failing halfway through with an SDK error about part numbers.
`tests/integration/offhost-backup-streaming-memory.test.ts` pins the
budget from both sides — what the streaming uploader holds, and that the
materialising path does not fit the same budget on the same fixture in
the same process, so the number cannot pass by measuring nothing.
A gateway can answer a failed generation with HTTP 200 and put the reason
in the body: a top-level `error` object and no `choices`, or
`choices[0].error` beside `finish_reason: "error"` when a generation dies
mid-flight. Both fell through to the empty-content throw, so a dead credit
balance, a data-policy block, a rate limit and a model that is down all
recorded the same hop: status 0, reason "returned empty content", no
excerpt. Nothing on the provider health card told them apart.
Raise the shape a non-2xx reply raises instead, with the gateway's own
message leading and its `error.code` as the status when that code is an
HTTP error status. The chain classifier, the health ledger and the card
then see 402 / 403 / 429 / 503 and treat each of them the way they treat
the same status on the wire. Message and excerpt are bounded and
key-redacted by the same helper the non-2xx path uses, so remote text is
no more trusted here than it is there.
Gated on the gateway tag: api.openai.com signals every failure with a
status, so the pinned tags parse exactly as before, and a genuine empty
reply stays the empty-content throw it was. The local-endpoint provider
had the same hole on its buffered path, its buffered-reply fallback and
its stream, and gets the same treatment. The body classifier learned the
two account-side refusals a gateway words in its own vocabulary rather
than the vendor's.
The per-user date order reached the entry form and nothing else. A
reporter switched away from MM/DD/YYYY, the date picker followed, and
the dashboard chart axes and the measurements list kept the old order.
`makeFormatters` took `timeFormat` and `dateFormat` as optional
parameters defaulting to "AUTO", so six of the seven constructions in
the tree silently rendered the locale default and nothing anywhere
said the setting had been dropped. Drop both defaults. The compiler
then names every caller: the chart bucket labels, the legacy
`@/lib/format` helpers the measurements list renders through, the
medication compliance and efficacy charts, the doctor-report PDF and
the clinician share view.
Thread the preference:
- `makeBucketLabelFormatters` takes the order; the health and mood
charts read `useDateFormatPreference()`. The UTC pin decides which
day the label names, the preference decides how it is spelled, and
the two are separate questions.
- `format.ts` reads `readStoredDateFormat()` beside the timezone and
hour-cycle mirrors it already read.
- The PDF takes `dateFormat` as a required render option, alongside
`timeFormat`, which was optional for the same reason.
- The clinician share view spells the OWNER's dates the owner's way.
It also picked up the owner's hour cycle, which it had been ignoring
while the PDF route beside it already honoured it. Both resolve
through the new `resolveUserFormatPreferences`, the counterpart to
`resolveUserTimezone`.
Textual months stay on the UI locale. The preference pins numeric
field order by rendering through de-DE / en-US / en-CA, and a textual
month through those would change the month name's language.
Add `date-order-explicit-formatter-guard`: a raw numeric date renderer
must take its locale from the preference or carry a written reason,
and a formatter construction may not hard-code "AUTO" for the order.
Its allowlist holds thirteen calendar-day key builders, each with the
reason it has no order to get wrong. The sibling timezone guard passes
every one of them, because naming a calendar says nothing about
spelling a date.
Refs #922
crypto.randomUUID() is [SecureContext] in the Web Cryptography IDL, so a
page served over plain HTTP never gets it. Measured in Chromium against
http://<lan-ip>: isSecureContext false, randomUUID and subtle undefined,
getRandomValues still a function.
The document vault minted its queue id and Idempotency-Key that way, inside
the file-input change handler. On a LAN self-host the call threw before a
queue row existed, so picking a file produced no upload, no error and no
trace — the picker simply looked inert, and the only way through was to
reach the app over HTTPS. The client transport has minted a default
Idempotency-Key the same way since v1.37.18, which put every apiPost and
apiPatch on the same footing: on such a host nothing wrote at all.
Add randomId(), which prefers the platform call and otherwise assembles a
v4 UUID from getRandomValues — the same CSPRNG, the same 122 bits, no
secure context required — and route every browser-side call site through
it. Nothing in an upload needs one: the bytes travel over multipart XHR and
every cryptographic operation happens on the server. Passkeys, web push and
home-screen install still need HTTPS; browsers withhold those outright.
A structural guard fails a direct crypto.randomUUID() anywhere outside the
two server-side files that may keep it, so the class cannot return one call
site at a time.
Also point the CSV and JSON import cards straight at the import guide. They
resolved through a redirect under the integrations tree, which is the wrong
place for a guide that is not an integration runbook. The suite that
covered those links pinned the old spelling rather than the guarantee; it
now asserts an absolute docs-site URL, no internal path, and new-tab
hygiene.
Only CHANGELOG.md conflicted: v1.38.7 released while this branch was open,
so the new release heading landed where the branch's [Unreleased] section
sits. The HRV entries stay under [Unreleased] above 1.38.7; everything from
1.38.7 down is upstream's file verbatim.
docs/api/openapi.yaml auto-merged. Upstream's only change there was the
`info.version` bump to 1.38.7, which the merge took while keeping this
branch's DashboardLayoutReadResult, and package.json now reads 1.38.7 to
match — so the merged file should equal a fresh generate. It is a generated
file, though, so confirm with `pnpm openapi:generate` rather than trusting
the three-way merge.
The writer added in v1.38.6 compared the process's live heap usage against
80 % of V8's heap limit and aborted above it. That reading is not the
backup's footprint; it is the whole process's, garbage included. A
long-running app sits at 400 MB of largely collectable heap, so on a 1 GB
container (a 419 MB budget) the weekly pass aborted the first flush of every
account: four out of four in seven seconds, the smallest of them a demo
record whose entire stored copy is 1.2 MB, each told its record was too large
and its operator to buy memory.
Drop the gauge. What the writer holds is bounded by its shape and needs no
reading to prove: the three unbounded tables are pulled a page at a time,
every other section is released as soon as its JSON is in the sink, and at
most one flush of text is pending. The one copy that does grow with the
record is the stored blob, so the bound moves there — counted in the
ciphertext bytes actually produced, against a fifth of this process's heap
limit, which is what two copies of the answer plus a live set have to fit
inside. The message names both numbers.
A pass that wrote nothing for anybody now fails its job instead of reporting
`ok: true` with `backed: 0`, so the failing-queue panel and the backups page
read the same thing an operator would. A pass where some accounts were
written keeps passing with the failures as counts.
Measured under --max-old-space-size=450 from a heap deliberately dirtied
first: 445 000 measurements peak at 28 MB held by the backup, a one-row
record at under 1 MB.
Five points from the review, in the order they were raised.
1. The RMSSD marker did not survive. The tile label paints truncated,
uppercase and on one line, so an appended `· RMSSD` was the first thing
dropped in the longer locales — the part a reader needs to tell a 40 ms
RMSSD night from a collapsed SDNN one. `measurements.typeHrvRmssd` already
exists in all seven bundles, so each series now carries its own key.
`pickHrvSummary` returns that key beside the series it chose, which keeps
one mapping from series to label rather than a conditional at the call site.
2. The module gate bit on one path only. `gateSummariesByModules` was
private to the snapshot builder, and with the snapshot flag off the tiles
are fed by `/api/analytics`, which filtered nothing — so recovery-off plus
RMSSD-only still painted the tile, on the exact path the helper's docblock
promised it could not. The filter moves next to the map it reads, and both
analytics slices apply it. Gated after the cache read, so the cached cell
stays module-independent and toggling a module takes effect on the next
request instead of waiting out the TTL.
3. The same class one step on: recovery off plus RMSSD only left a switch
that was on, a tile that could never paint, and no explanation. The repo
already calls that a dead switch and hides the row; HRV is only dead
sometimes, so the answer needs one fact the Settings screen does not have.
The server resolves it — `unavailableWidgetIds` on the widgets payload —
and Settings drops those rows. An account with SDNN keeps the toggle: its
tile still works with recovery off, because SDNN is a vital no module owns.
The SDNN probe is an index-only existence check that runs only when
recovery is off, outside the layout cache so the row goes the moment the
module does.
4. The brittle test sliced from the helper to the end of the file, so any
function added below it would have gone red pointing at HRV. Bounded to the
function's own body, with a guard on the bound itself. The three wiring
assertions matched formatted source text — they would have passed just as
well if the tile never rendered — and are replaced by a test that renders
the tile through a real TrendCard and asserts the reading is on screen.
One negative source check is kept, naming the expression the bug lived on
rather than the formatting of its replacement.
5. Rebased onto v1.38.6; the changelog entry sits under [Unreleased].
Not verified here: `pnpm db:generate` cannot run in this container (the
Prisma engine download is refused), so snapshot.test.ts, the widgets route
test and the analytics route test could not load, and typecheck is
incomplete. Lint, format and the HRV suite (17 tests) pass.
HRV lives under two measurement types and they are not the same measure:
Apple Health / Fitbit / Google Health write SDNN as
`HEART_RATE_VARIABILITY`, while Oura / Polar / WHOOP — and a bridge
pushing a watch that reports it that way — write nightly RMSSD as
`HRV_RMSSD`. Every HRV surface unions the two: `/insights/hrv` through
`fallbackMeasurementType`, the Coach through
`COACH_SOURCE_MEASUREMENT_TYPES.hrv`, the MCP reads through
`withHrvFallback`. `sub-page-metric.ts` even says listing both is what
keeps "the tab, pill, and dashboard tile lit whichever source the user
has".
The dashboard tile did not. It read SDNN alone, so an RMSSD-only account
got a Settings → Dashboard toggle that turned on and rendered nothing,
with no explanation, while the insights page charted the same readings —
which is why it reads as a broken layout rather than a missing series.
`pickHrvSummary` picks the series with the same rule `withHrvFallback`
uses: the primary wins whenever it has any rows, the fallback only when it
has none. Never a merge — the two share `ms` but measure different things,
so blending them would invent a number no device reported. The caller gets
the winning type back, because the freshness caption has to read the
series on show and the label has to name the measure when it is not SDNN
(`· RMSSD`, as the insights chart title already does).
Second, less visible half: `HRV_RMSSD` is recovery-owned in
`METRIC_STATUS_MODULE_OWNERS`, but the dashboard snapshot gates off
`SUMMARY_TYPE_MODULE`, a different map, and that one did not list it. The
omission was inert while the tile read SDNN alone; adding the fallback
without it would hand a recovery-off account a tile built from
recovery-owned rows — the exact hazard the owner map documents. The entry
goes in beside the four sibling recovery types, so the gate stays server
side and the client keeps no competing copy.
`DataBackup.data` holds every weekly disaster-recovery snapshot and every
uploaded pack, AES-256-GCM at rest like everything else, under a column
called `data`. The rotation registry was keyed on the `*Encrypted` naming
convention, so the script never read a backup, reported zero rows
remaining, and the runbook read that zero as permission to retire the
previous key. Following the documented procedure destroyed every stored
backup — the copy an operator reaches for precisely when nothing else
works.
Register it, and register the idempotent-replay response cache the same
sweep turned up. The backup column walks in bounded batches (one row is a
whole compressed account) and re-seals the ciphertext without reading the
plaintext, so both stored envelopes come back byte-identical and so will
any later one. The cache is marked disposable: a row it cannot read is
dropped rather than counted as an error, because keeping it only
guarantees the next replay gets a body it cannot parse.
Running the script against a seeded database rather than reading it turned
up two more. It died on the mood day-context note, whose table is keyed on
the entry rather than on an `id`, and abandoned every column after it —
the backups included. And the document index's verbatim text rotated
without ever being named in the summary.
Make the naming assumption stop carrying weight. A new guard traces the
encryption helpers through their wrappers, walks every Prisma write
payload, and fails when a column receives ciphertext without being
registered. It asserts an anchored, non-zero match count so a matcher that
stops matching fails instead of passing. A second check pins each model's
primary key against the schema.
The script now ends by naming the registered columns it did NOT walk and
exiting non-zero when any is missing: a zero that means "nothing left" and
a zero that means "never looked" must not print the same. The runbook's
retire-the-key step was rewritten around that signal, and tells an
operator who already rotated on an older release how to get their backups
back.
The compression that landed last release was real and was measured in the
wrong place. On a development machine with a multi-gigabyte heap the pass
finished; the container the job runs in is capped at 1 GB, which gives V8
a 524 MB limit, and there the same pass died of memory about fifteen
seconds in. Because the job shares the application process, that was not
one failed backup — it was a restart, and every signed-in session on the
host went with it.
Reproduced before touching anything, under `--max-old-space-size=450`
against a seeded account of 445 000 measurements, 30 000 mood entries and
60 000 intake events: `FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit` at 34 s. The same
fixture doubled to 890 000 measurements now completes inside a 296 MB
limit, holding 16 MB of live heap where the old writer held 168 MB.
The document is written incrementally now. `buildFullBackupPayload` takes
a `deferBulk` mode that declares the three unbounded tables instead of
reading them, and `streamFullBackupJson` walks the payload in key order,
pulls those tables through page by page, and releases every other section
as soon as its JSON reaches the sink. `packBackupBlobStreaming` feeds that
into gzip and an AES-256-GCM stream, so nothing between the database rows
and the stored value ever exists whole. Both writers go through the same
per-row serialisers, and the round-trip suite pins their output byte for
byte rather than trusting that they agree.
The intake and mood reads are ordered totally now. A keyset cursor needs
it, and a partial order also let two exports of one account differ over a
tie, which every multi-dose day has.
The streamed ciphertext is a new shape at rest, because GCM only produces
its tag once the last block is in and a leading tag is what makes the old
layout unstreamable. It carries a marker no older writer can produce, so
the two families are disjoint by construction rather than by sniffing.
All three stored shapes — plain, compressed, streamed — restore, proved
both ways.
The writer also watches its own live heap and stops at 80 % of V8's
limit. An account too large for its host is now one failed backup,
counted in the run's meta, instead of a restart for everybody on it.
The stored column is the ceiling that is left: `data_backups.data` is a
single `text` value, so the finished artifact has to exist as one string,
and that is the only part of the job still growing with the record. The
operator runbook says so, with the number at which it starts to matter.
The correction was inserted mid-bullet, which left the off-host sentence
trailing after it and the paragraph unwrapped. The off-host sentence goes
back with the technical description it belongs to, and the correction
reads last.
A `z.object()` without `.strict()` strips an unknown key and parses
clean, so a caller that misspells a field name gets a 200 and loses the
value with nothing to tell it. The worst of them was the Coach
question-dismiss endpoint, where an omitted `question` means "dismiss
all": a typo in that key wiped every pending question and answered as
though one had been dismissed.
Twenty-four inline schemas across twenty-two endpoints are strict now —
the settings toggles, the restore and bulk-delete endpoints, message
feedback, the admin user update, the onboarding acknowledgements, the
provider chain, the chart overlay preferences, the medication extractor
and the two client-side reporters.
The strip stays where it carries weight. Sync ingest, device
registration and the layout PUTs are built out of fields that shipped as
additive and optional, on the promise that a server which does not know
one ignores it; an app running ahead of the install it talks to is
routine here rather than exceptional, and refusing would turn a dropped
field into a refused batch — a year of history lost to one row, a
dashboard that will not save, a phone that quietly stops registering for
push. A read filter discards nothing when a stray query parameter rides
along, the OAuth endpoints are required by RFC 6749 and RFC 7591 to
ignore parameters they do not recognise, and an import file comes from
another version or another tool by definition. Each is registered with
its reason in a new inventory test, so a schema cannot join them without
someone making the call. That test parses the tree rather than grepping
it: fourteen of these schemas are written `z\n .object({…})` and a
`z.object(` sweep never saw them.
`sanitiseZodIssues` renders `unrecognized_keys` instead of passing it
through. Zod leaves `path` empty and puts the names in `issue.keys`, so
the sanitised issue named nothing at all and the caller was told only
that its body had failed. The names now ride a bounded `keys` field and
the message is rebuilt from them, capped at ten keys of 64 characters
and restricted to identifier characters, so a caller-supplied key cannot
echo back verbatim through the error path or into the audit ledger. The
names survive `stripValuesFromMessage` because a field name is
structure, not user-typed content.
The entry said the weekly pass finishes again. It was written from a
measurement taken on a development machine with a multi-gigabyte heap,
and it does not hold on a small container: capped at 1 GB the runtime
gets a 524 MB heap, and the pass still runs out of memory there. It gets
roughly three times further than before, which is a real improvement and
is now described as one, but it does not complete, and the failure takes
the whole process down rather than failing as a job.
Building the record incrementally instead of whole is the fix and has not
landed. Until it does, an instance backing up a large record needs more
than 1 GB, and the entry says so.
The column-reader sweep read every `field:` key as a write, so
`where: { ticketHash }` counted as writing `ticketHash`. All twelve columns it
reported were a lookup key or a cron's discovery predicate being filtered on,
and a review tool that has cried wolf twelve times is not consulted on the
thirteenth. It also reported only columns that already had a write, which made
a column with no write at all the one thing it could not see.
Mask each file, bracket-match every Prisma argument, and tag its contents as
write, projection or query so nesting resolves innermost-wins. Follow a payload
assembled before the call: a const handed to `update:`, a spread merged into a
`create:`, a `rows.push({...})` builder filling a typed array. Credit raw SQL
against the `@map` column name. Report a column nothing touches as its own
category, and split the output so a write with no reader reads differently from
a query predicate, a relation's foreign key and an annotated column.
Twelve false alarms become nineteen findings that hold up. Four are worth
acting on and are left for a decision rather than annotated away: the glucose
unit preference and an import job's export date have readers and no writer, and
the provider-health status code and the known-device first-seen stamp have the
opposite.
The matcher underneath is a test now, checked by breaking the fix three ways.
Carries the night's audit work: the weekly backup ran out of memory
rather than out of time and now completes, two dashboard reads stopped
scanning the largest tables, six webhook verbs compare a secret behind a
rate limit, three global channel switches actually stop delivery,
thirty-five settings reach the container, four guarded helpers are used
where their naive twins were, and three guards now see what they claim.
The weekly pass can stop and leave no trace where anyone looks. The
handler's own error never runs when the job is killed rather than thrown;
`recordError()` increments an unnamed counter; and the admin status page's
failing-queue panel looks back 72 hours, which for a weekly queue means a
permanent failure is on screen three days in seven. The backups page
itself showed an ordinary row with an ordinary timestamp, because a copy
made six weeks ago reads exactly like Sunday's until somebody subtracts
the dates.
The listing now carries two facts that fail at different times: the age of
the newest scheduled copy, which never leaves any retention window, and
the terminal state of the last scheduled run, which is the only place the
reason is written down. `readLastQueueRun` takes the newest run rather
than a window, so a weekly queue's outcome stays readable until the next
one replaces it, and it unwraps the value pg-boss stores a thrown error
under, so the page says "job timed out" instead of raw JSON. The
failing-queue reader gets the same unwrap.
Manual uploads are excluded from the cadence judgement by the shape of the
input, so an ad-hoc upload cannot make a dead cron look alive, and a fresh
instance is not called overdue for having no copy yet.
The listing also stops reading every blob into the web process to measure
it; `octet_length` answers that in the database, which on an instance with
large records was its own way of running out of memory.
Marc-André Bombeck