Commit Graph
26 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marc-André Bombeck 27ac4c1d63 Merge origin/main into fix/v1397-tz 2026-10-01 10:39:26 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 7c5ff89def feat(lint): refuse UTC day keys outside the time zone module
`instant.toISOString().slice(0, 10)` and parsing a key back as UTC
midnight are the idioms behind every day-boundary fix this year: the
evening west of UTC and the small hours east of it land on the
neighbouring day. A new rule, healthlog/no-utc-day-key, refuses them in
src/ outside src/lib/tz and tests, and refuses a disable directive for
itself that is not next-line or gives no reason.

The time zone module now names every legitimate form: userDayKey for a
person's day, dateOnlyKey / dateOnlyAtNoonUtc / dayKeyAsUtcMidnight for
date-only values and day labels, daysBetweenDateKeys / weekdayOfDateKey /
isCalendarDateKey / statedDateKey for key arithmetic and parsing.

Of the 133 sites the rule found, 84 are gone. Most moved onto a named
helper with no change in behaviour; these changed behaviour:

- cycle calendar, insights, Coach snapshot and prediction refresh start
  their lookbacks at the first instant of the user's day
- a model-transcribed date like "June 10, 2026" no longer lands a day
  early in a process east of UTC (documents and lab scans)
- a custom report range covers exactly the picked days in the profile
  zone instead of starting the evening before west of UTC
- date-of-birth pickers cap at the user's today, not the UTC one
- an allergy onset date is stored at noon UTC like other date-only values
- the report's cycle summary, the Coach's usual BP range and the intake
  projector's rollup recompute use the user's day
- vaccination dates render as dates instead of the previous evening

49 remain, each with its reason on the line above: 39 UTC by design (15
file name stamps, rollup and object keys, the UTC-day score engines) and
10 marked baseline. A guard test requires a classified reason on every
directive and holds the baseline to a ceiling that only goes down.
2026-10-01 09:59:57 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck ac3fdfccc3 fix(jobs): keep long passes inside their expiry and alone
pg-boss gives a job fifteen minutes unless the send says otherwise,
then fails it and retries it while the handler keeps running. Several
passes can legitimately need longer and had no protection at all: the
seven nightly status passes and the pre-generation (a provider call per
account), the period-narrative warm, the record-detection cron (every
account's history, every thirty minutes), the key rotation (every
encrypted column), the content-index backfill (up to 200
transcriptions) and the on-host backup.

Each of them now carries an explicit expiry on every send and schedule,
stops between units once three quarters of it is spent (jobBudget), and
runs under a session advisory lock keyed on queue and identity
(lockedPass), so the retry pg-boss starts after the expiry does nothing
beside a run that is still going. The lock is the one the full-history
imports already held, moved into job-lock.ts.

Where a pass stops early it says so (stopped_early) and the next run
continues: the status passes and the narrative warm leave the rest to
the next night, the pre-generation and the narratives walk the stalest
accounts first, the on-host backup now backs up the oldest copies
first, the key rotation reports a partial run in its audit row and
skips rotated rows when run again, and the dose-history import fails
the delivery so its retry resumes from the committed chunk. The
off-host backup, which already stopped on its budget, gets a four-hour
expiry and the lock.
2026-10-01 09:23:45 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e9cf3c1b15 fix: carry the cross-branch rules through offhost keys, the Telegram test mock and the OIDC reason list 2026-09-26 22:07:11 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 4409529c89 Merge branch 'fix/backup-rotation-and-deletion' into release/v1.39.3
# Conflicts:
#	docs/api/openapi.yaml
#	src/lib/jobs/apple-health-import-worker.ts
2026-09-26 21:48:20 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 7da778760e fix(backup): leave the admin wipe's off-host copies in place, and correct the backup and rotation runbooks
The admin wipe of every account is the operator clearing their own host,
and the bucket's copies are the documented way back from a wipe pressed
by mistake, so it writes no off-host deletion request. Deleting an
account, deleting a managed profile and "Delete all data" still do.

The backup runbook no longer says the worker never deletes an object: it
lists the grant the worker needs (DeleteObject included), when objects
are deleted, the version-4 envelope, the lifecycle check and how to
rotate the off-host key. The rotation runbook no longer says backups are
covered: rotation reaches a backup's envelope, not the content a restore
writes back, and a retired key stays needed until no backup lists it.
The privacy notice beside account deletion says the same about off-host
copies.

A failed import records its failure in a plain try block, and the
extraction test that inflates past the 64 MiB floor gets the time it
needs on a loaded runner.
2026-09-26 20:33:30 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 849748c4cd fix(backup): bind new off-host objects to their key and account, and cap what an uploaded backup may inflate to
Off-host objects are now written as envelope version 4: the header names
the off-host key by fingerprint, and the object's key in the bucket
(<date>/user-<id>.json.enc) is authenticated as GCM associated data, so
a copy moved to another account or another night no longer opens.
Objects of versions 1 to 3 still read. BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_PREVIOUS_KEYS
(comma-separated, on the compose whitelist and in the env manifest)
keeps retired off-host keys readable, which is the rotation path the
off-host key did not have.

The admin backup upload counted the bytes that arrived and none after
the gunzip, so a small gzip could expand without limit into the JSON
scanner and take the app down. The inflated bytes are now held to 100
times the compressed bytes read (at least 256 MB, at most 4 GB) and a
file past that is refused with 413 before anything is stored.
2026-09-26 20:18:55 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 1c7785c23b fix(backup): take off-host copies out with the account, and say which keys backups still need
Deleting an account, deleting a managed profile, "Delete all data" and the
admin wipe now write an off-host deletion request in the same transaction
as the deletion. A new job (offhost-backup-purge, kicked straight away and
run nightly as a backstop) lists the bucket once, deletes every
<date>/user-<id>.json.enc object of each pending account and removes the
request only when nothing of the account is left. A refused delete keeps
the request with the bucket's answer and is retried; the off-host card
shows how many deletions are outstanding and why. A copy the nightly run
was writing while the account was deleted is taken back after the upload.

The off-host card also reads the bucket's lifecycle rule and says plainly
when there is none (every nightly copy kept forever) or when the
credential may not read it.

Every stored backup now records the key ids its content was written
under, and every off-host upload records the same per key. The admin
encryption view lists, per key, the stored copies that need it with the
oldest date, and when the last off-host copy needing it expires. The
"safe to drop" badge now requires that no backup still needs a retired
key, instead of only that every row was rotated.

Migration 0358 adds data_backups.inner_key_ids, the key-use table and the
deletion requests.
2026-09-26 19:54:40 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 405c996b6a fix(backup): refuse a restore that needs a dropped key or reaches into another account
A backup carries every encrypted column as the stored ciphertext, and a
restore writes it back verbatim. Key rotation re-seals the stored copy's
envelope but cannot reach inside it, so a copy taken before a rotation
still needs the retired key. Without it the restore went through and
left rows no reader can open.

The restore, the restore preview, the admin upload and the monthly
restore drill now collect the key ids of every inner ciphertext value,
hold them against ENCRYPTION_KEYS and decrypt one value per key. A
missing key, or an id configured with different key material, is
refused before anything is deleted, with the key id named. The restore
status and the preview say which key to put back.

The restore also checks, inside its transaction, that it added no
reference from the account's rows to rows another account owns. The
check is derived from the schema's foreign keys rather than written per
section, so the tag and category upserts keyed on a global key are
covered along with every link table. The illness parent update is
scoped to the owner as well.

The off-host listing now follows every page: the first page held only
the oldest dates, so the drill could read an old object and report the
chain as stale.
2026-09-26 19:22:03 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 3c3e5ceab7 fix(config): treat an empty environment variable as unset
docker-compose.yml forwards its whitelist as "${NAME:-}", so a variable
the operator never set reaches the process as the empty string. Reads
written as a nullish fallback kept that string: the weather client built
an empty base URL and every geocode failed with ERR_INVALID_URL, and the
IP geo lookup requested a relative path.

Reads with a fallback now go through src/lib/env.ts (envValue, envOr,
envFlag), which treats empty and whitespace as unset. IP_GEO_LOOKUP_DISABLED
accepts 1, true, yes and on instead of only "1". A structural test refuses
a ?? fallback written directly against process.env anywhere in src/, and
the compose whitelist guard counts the helper's call shape as a read.
2026-09-26 15:20:42 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck b7a26d3a4d fix(backup): resume an off-host run where its last attempt stopped
The off-host backup walked every account in one job with the default
fifteen-minute expiry, and a retry started again from the first account.
On an instance with one large record next to others, an attempt that
ran out of time spent its retry uploading the accounts it had already
done (#1031).

The run now stops between accounts once the job's time budget is spent
and fails, so pg-boss retries it. Every attempt of a job carries the same
creation time; an attempt skips the accounts whose ledger shows a success
since then, and keys its objects on that day, so a retry after midnight
still writes under the run's date. A new job uploads every account again,
and a retry whose accounts were all done passes.
2026-09-25 02:05:19 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 237acc0002 fix(backup): export, upload and restore a large account as streams
An account of 1.25 million measurements could not export its data or be
restored from any backup (#1031). Measured in a 1 GB container:

- The full export and the passphrase export built the whole payload and
  its JSON string in memory; the app ran out of heap and restarted.
- The weekly backup's JSON is 662 MB, longer than any string V8 can hold,
  so `unpackBackupBlob` threw on every read. Restore, download and the
  restore preview all answered "could not be decrypted".
- Upload accepted 10 MB, a fraction of a large export.

Every reader and writer of a backup file now streams it:

- `scanBackupJson` reads a backup's bytes once, keeps every section but
  the named bulk arrays, and hands their elements out one at a time.
  `readStreamedBackup` uses it twice: a first pass that validates each
  measurement against the element schema and keeps the rest of the file,
  and a second pass that hands the measurements to the writer in batches.
  Stored copies and off-host objects are authenticated whole on their
  compressed ciphertext before any plaintext is read; only the
  decompression is streamed.
- Restore writes the measurements with one `INSERT … FROM unnest` per
  batch. Prisma caches a query plan per `createMany` row count, and one
  1 000-row plan kept about 145 MB alive, which alone put the restore past
  the heap limit. The transaction budget grows with the measurement count.
  The awards and ECG sections are handed the ids they reference that were
  written, not every written id.
- The export routes write the file into the response as it is produced.
  The passphrase export spools its ciphertext to a temporary file because
  the HLX1 format puts the tag first; the format is unchanged, so existing
  archives open as before.
- Upload accepts the raw body, JSON or gzip, up to the 512 MB request
  ceiling, checks it as it arrives and stores it in the same pass; the admin
  page compresses the file in the browser before sending it. Multipart stays
  for small files.
- Download streams the stored JSON; the preview counts measurements from
  the stream. The monthly restore drill and `scripts/restore-backup.ts`
  read the off-host object the same way; the script can write `.json.gz`.

On the seeded account in a 1 GB container: export 25 s at 389 MB peak,
passphrase export 25 s, both uploads 19 s, restore of the weekly backup
94 s at 554 MB peak, and export, upload and restore round-trip to exactly
the same rows. The encrypted-column guard now also recognises the raw SQL
statement that writes `DataBackup.data`.
2026-09-25 02:05:19 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 25f0310596 feat(backups): tell an empty ledger apart from an empty bucket
On the release that adds the ledger the table is empty, so on a host that has
been uploading nightly for months every account read Never, under a sentence
saying no copy had ever reached the bucket. That sentence is untrue on exactly
the morning an operator opens the new card for the first time, and it is a
claim the host cannot make: what is empty is the record, not the bucket.

The run now records every account it walks, not only the ones an object came
of. A walk that produced nothing moves the attempt instant and leaves the
success columns alone, so the two cases separate: no row at all is no record
yet, a row without a success is never. Never now means what the word says —
a run looked at this account and has never put anything there.

The card names the last check on the never row, so the state is a fact with a
timestamp rather than an assertion. Runbook and all seven bundles carry the
same two sentences. The integration file proves both arms against real
Postgres, including that a failed run leaves the previous good copy on the
row.
2026-09-10 10:15:31 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e64435f6a5 fix(backups): size the off-host ledger column for the object the uploader allows
The column was INTEGER. A single object may occupy 8 MiB across 10 000
multipart parts, which is the 80 GB the uploader explicitly permits, and
Postgres INTEGER stops at 2.1 GB. An account between the two uploads fine and
then cannot be recorded, so the biggest account on the host is the one the
console would have to report on and could not.

BIGINT in the table, BigInt in the model, Number() where the route builds the
wire row so the payload type stays a plain number. The migration is edited in
place rather than followed by a second one: the table has not shipped, and a
column widened before its first release is one column, not a history.

The comparison with the in-database backup does not carry over, for the
record: that size is octet_length over a bytea Postgres caps at 1 GB, while
this object never touches the database at all.
2026-09-10 10:07:28 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 86823db34e fix(backups): a landed object stays a success when the ledger write does not
The per-account ledger row shared the upload's try. A pool timeout or a
connection reset on that upsert landed in the same catch as a refused upload:
the account was counted as failed, its reason pushed into the run's failure
list, and the console would go on to read never or stale for an account whose
encrypted copy was sitting in the bucket the whole time. That is the same
inversion the ledger was added to remove, on the write side.

The upload's boundary now ends where the object is durable. uploadEncryptedBackup
resolves only after the multipart completes, so the count and the largest-object
figure are taken there, and the row is written afterwards under its own boundary.
A write that fails warns with the account it belongs to and adds a run-level
count, which is a different fact from a failed upload and reads as one.

Two arms that were correct by construction and unasserted now have tests: a
failed upload writes no success row, so the previous timestamp stands, and a
run whose ledger write rejects after the object landed still reports it
uploaded.
2026-09-10 10:04:06 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 1c10bbbde8 feat(admin): say per account how fresh the off-host copy is
The nightly off-host job reports counts — uploaded, failed, total — and a
count cannot name the account it is failing for. A cohort where one object
has been refused every night for a month reads as "99 uploaded, 1 failed"
each time, which looks like weather rather than like an account with no
disaster-recovery copy at all.

The worker now writes a ledger row when an object lands (account, instant,
size), and Admin → Backups gains a second card that rates every account
against the nightly schedule: fresh inside one run, due when one run
produced nothing, stale when two did not, never when no object has ever
landed. On a host without BACKUP_S3_* the card says off-host backup is not
configured and stops there.

The verdicts are computed from the ledger, never from a bucket listing: the
worker's grant is deliberately PutObject + GetObject, and an admin page must
not put the operator's credentials on its render path to state a number the
database already holds.
2026-09-10 09:27:58 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 7f54f339b2 refactor(backup): drop the retention value nothing could ever read
E2. `loadOffhostConfig` parsed BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS, clamped it to a
minimum of one day and put it on the config object, where no caller read
it. Neither annotation fits: it is not deliberately internal, because
there is no internal use, and no consumer is pending. The design forbids
one outright — the worker's grant excludes DeleteObject on purpose, so
nothing here can act on a retention window without giving a compromised
worker the ability to wipe the history. A clamp that guards nothing only
read as an enforcer the worker is not.

So the field and the clamp go, and the reason sits where the parse was.
The variable keeps its place in the two example files and on the compose
whitelist: it is the number the operator sets the bucket's own lifecycle
rule to. The docs table said "defaults to 30", which implied the app had
an opinion; it now says the app does not read it.
2026-09-10 01:38:40 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 13a9aacf20 fix(backup): stream the nightly off-host upload instead of building it
The off-host job was said to benefit from the streaming work the weekly
in-database backup got, and it did not. Only the payload builder was
shared: `runOffhostBackup` called `buildFullBackupJson` for the whole
document, `gzipSync` over that whole string, a whole-buffer
`createCipheriv` pass over the result, and handed the finished buffer to
a single `PutObject`. Four full copies of the record alive at once, on
the same arithmetic the weekly pass had already been fixed for.

Configuring an S3 target on a long-lived record therefore restarted the
container. On an account of 445 000 measurements the JSON alone is
242 MB, and against a 1 GB container's 524 MB heap the run died of heap
exhaustion seventeen seconds in — taking every signed-in session with
it, because the job shares the app process.

The write path is a stream end to end now: `streamFullBackupJson`
produces the document a page at a time, gzip and an incremental
AES-256-GCM writer consume it as it arrives, and `@aws-sdk/lib-storage`
puts it up in two 8 MB parts. What the process holds is fixed by the
pipeline's shape rather than by the record. Measured on that same
445 000-measurement account under `--max-old-space-size=450`, with the
heap pre-loaded to what a warm server holds: the old path dies with
`Ineffective mark-compacts near heap limit`, the new one finishes with a
peak 79 MB above its baseline and writes a 9.1 MB object.

The stored envelope gains version 3, which moves the GCM tag from in
front of the ciphertext to the end. That is the only change the stream
required — the tag exists only once the last block is in, so a leading
one means the whole object must exist before its first byte can be sent.
Nothing about the authentication moves: the tag still covers every
ciphertext byte and is verified before a byte of plaintext comes back.
Versions 1 and 2 still read, so every object already in a bucket
restores through the same reader with no flag to tell them apart.

The incremental writer is the crypto module's, split into its byte-level
half so the base64 form the in-database blob uses and the raw form an
object needs are one implementation under two framings. The off-host key
handling is unchanged: a separate `BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, 64 hex or
32-byte base64, passed in rather than looked up.

A run that uploaded nothing for anybody is a failed job now, not
`ok: true` with an empty bucket behind it. Wrong credentials, a missing
bucket and an unreachable endpoint all fail every account rather than
one, and the target's own sentence rides out as the cause. A run where
some account got a copy still succeeds; retrying the whole cohort over
one object would re-upload everybody's.

The one ceiling left is structural rather than a memory bound, and it is
counted rather than discovered: a multipart upload carries 10 000 parts,
so an object past 80 GB is refused for that account with a clear message
instead of failing halfway through with an SDK error about part numbers.

`tests/integration/offhost-backup-streaming-memory.test.ts` pins the
budget from both sides — what the streaming uploader holds, and that the
materialising path does not fit the same budget on the same fixture in
the same process, so the number cannot pass by measuring nothing.
2026-09-05 19:13:11 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck d8196d5208 fix: compress the stored backup before encrypting it
The weekly pass built the whole account in memory, serialised it whole,
encrypted the string whole, and handed the result to the database whole.
That is four full copies of the record at the same moment — the object
graph, the JSON, the base64 ciphertext at 1.33x the JSON, and the copy the
driver makes of that parameter. Measured against a seeded account of
445 000 readings, the JSON alone is 242 MB and the run dies of heap
exhaustion; under a modest heap it never reaches the insert. The pass was
not slow, it could not finish.

A health record's JSON is extremely repetitive, so gzip takes that 242 MB
to 14 MB and every copy after it shrinks with it. The same run completes
in about twenty seconds with a peak heap of 434 MB and a stored row of
25 MB instead of 322 MB — which also matters because the copy lives inside
the database it would be needed to restore. Both backup jobs now hand the
serialised form back from a frame of its own, so the payload graph is
released before the compress step allocates anything.

The marker sits inside the ciphertext, so the stored column keeps the one
shape `decrypt()` already understands and rows written before this still
restore. The off-host object gets the same treatment through the version
byte its envelope always carried; version 1 objects still read back, which
both the restore drill and the restore script depend on.

The obvious saving — dropping soft-deleted readings, four rows in five on
a real record — is not taken, and the round-trip test now seeds a
tombstone and asserts it makes the journey. A tombstone inside the
retention window is what tells a synced client the row is gone and what
makes a re-sent sample a no-op; a restore without them brings back every
measurement the account ever deleted on the next device sync.
2026-09-03 02:22:21 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck f8b0a64d69 fix(backups): preserve canonical recovery integrity 2026-07-20 11:44:29 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 3fcae204f7 perf(backup): keyset-page the intake/mood/cycle reads in the off-host DR dump
Measurements were already paged, but the medication-intake, mood, and
cycle tables in the same per-user payload were still unbounded full-table
findMany reads — peak heap tracked the largest tenant's history. Give
them the same id-keyset page walk (full row projection, so payload bytes
are unchanged) so at most one page is resident per round-trip.
2026-07-08 23:45:04 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 84683f4ce9 perf: bound heavy-tenant memory on feature, consolidation, backup and auth paths
Cap and page the unbounded reads that let a multi-year tenant pull its
whole measurement history into memory on hot paths.

- extractFeatures: read newest-first with a 6000-row cap (mirrors the
  Coach snapshot) and reverse to ascending, so a 365-400 day window no
  longer materialises hundreds of thousands of PULSE / glucose rows per
  Coach turn and nightly briefing. Full-history extremes still come from
  readAllTimeExtremes, so the cap never relabels an extreme.
- Add a (userId, measuredAt) index on measurements (migration 0210) for
  the type-less range scans that extractFeatures and the consolidation
  passes drive; the existing (userId, type, measuredAt) cannot serve them
  as a prefix.
- runConsolidation: keyset-paginate the per-(user, type) source scan on
  (measuredAt, id) instead of one unbounded findMany, removing the giant
  single result-set allocation that drove the boot storm. Output is
  identical; covered by a paging unit test.
- Stagger the boot-time backfill enqueues with increasing startAfter
  offsets so the heavy full-history loads no longer all drain in parallel
  onto one tenant at startup. Non-boot callers keep their immediate send.
- Backups: replace load-all-then-stringify with paged narrow-select reads
  for the weekly and off-host writers, bounding transient heap. Off-host
  still includes soft-deleted rows. Covered by a serialize/restore
  round-trip test.
- Drop the per-request auth.bearer.success audit insert; the wide event
  already records auth_method and user_id, so the polling client no longer
  drives a write + pool checkout on every request. Failure-path audit
  stays.
- Coach conversation detail: cap the message include to the newest 200 so
  a long thread no longer decrypts every message on each open; response
  shape unchanged.
- Admin audit-log: floor the scan at the retention horizon so the listing
  and its count stop sweeping open-ended over the substring filters.
2026-06-28 03:07:15 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 410c62c292 refactor(jobs,dashboard): a thin worker registry and a composed dashboard
The reminder worker becomes a registry over twelve queue modules cut
along the existing test structure, and the dashboard page sheds its
quick-entry sheets, header and range logic into components — same
behaviour, pinned by the existing suites.
2026-06-11 00:10:01 +02:00
Marc-André BombeckandClaude Opus 4.8 e984ada5f1 feat(cycle): import Apple Health reproductive data into cycle, add cycle export
Promote the reproductive HealthKit category types out of the
Apple-Health-import privacy-hold list and route them into cycle day-logs
instead of measurements, and surface cycle data on the three export
surfaces.

Import promotion:
- A new HealthKit -> cycle mapping module is the single source of truth for
  how MenstrualFlow, IntermenstrualBleeding, CervicalMucusQuality,
  OvulationTestResult, SexualActivity, PregnancyTestResult,
  ProgesteroneTestResult, Contraceptive and the symptom category types fold
  into CycleDayLog fields / seeded symptom keys. The XML importer
  accumulates same-day reproductive samples and writes one canonical
  day-log per day with source APPLE_HEALTH and a synthetic per-day
  externalId for idempotent re-import. The fold is gated on cycle tracking
  being enabled, so a non-cycle export never provisions cycle rows. A
  contraceptive method nudges the profile goal toward avoiding pregnancy
  only when the goal is still on its default. Basal body temperature stays
  a measurement and mirrors onto the day-log. Pregnancy/Lactation status
  and the pregnancy-bleeding types stay deferred; the cycle awareness types
  remain server-derived.

Export:
- FHIR emits LMP (LOINC 8665-2), average cycle length (64700-8), period
  length (64698-4) and the current phase as opt-in reproductive-health
  observations grouped into their own document section.
- The doctor PDF gains an opt-in cycle section (recent cycles, average
  length and variability, current phase), privacy-default off like mood.
- The full-backup export, the weekly backup worker and the off-host DR
  snapshot include the cycle tables, and the admin restore re-creates them;
  the day-log note round-trips as ciphertext and is never decrypted onto a
  report surface.

Mapping table documented in docs/api/cycle-healthkit-mapping.md. Adds unit
+ integration coverage for the mapping, the import routing, the FHIR
observations and the backup round-trip. OpenAPI regenerated. Six-locale
strings added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-06 10:16:54 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 9b6e237f5f chore(release): v1.4.42 — Knip enforcing, queryKey factory closed, iOS Workouts dedup, Withings off-response classification
Six touch-disjoint waves landed on develop before this release:

- W1-KNIP — exports/types tiers flipped to enforcing-mode on main;
  35 unused exports + 52 unused types triaged to 0/0; shadcn surface
  + zod-infer contract types scoped via knip.json ignore-block.
- W2-ZOD-MULTI-ISSUE — `returnAllZodIssues` shared helper +
  `/api/dashboard/widgets` 422 now returns every Zod issue + worker
  audit-ledger breadcrumb. 41 sibling routes documented for v1.4.43.
- W3-QUERYKEY-LONGTAIL — 40 settings/medications/admin/hooks files
  migrated to the queryKeys factory; 9 new factory entries; ESLint
  rule + test-guard scope extended in lockstep.
- W4-ARCH-HYGIENE — BERLIN_DAY_FORMATTER consolidated across nine
  sites (seven status helpers + bucket-series + bp-in-target);
  Suspense double-comment consolidated; doctor-report sanitiser regex
  rewritten to escape-form so diffs are reviewable; pr-detection-
  worker soft-delete filter; offhost-backup DR-intent comment.
- W5-IOS-WORKOUTS — `dedupeWorkoutBatch` write-time cross-source
  dedup helper for the v1.5 iOS HealthKit observer ingest; dashboard
  tile-strip placeholder parity with the live TrendCard chrome.
- W6-WITHINGS-OFF + ENV-CHECK — Withings off-response classifier
  (transient/reauth/persistent) + WithingsApiError typed throw + the
  `pnpm check-env` CLI. APNs `allOrNone: true` closes the AP-2
  silent-disable gap the wave was conceived to close.

No migration, no env-var change, no API contract break for iOS v0.5.4.
The new `/api/dashboard/widgets` 422 envelope is additively extended.

pnpm test --run green at 4815 passing / 1 skipped.
pnpm typecheck, pnpm lint, pnpm knip (no --include flag) green.
2026-05-21 19:33:07 +02:00
Marc-André BombeckandMarc-André Bombeck d7778c1085 feat(v1.4): multi-tenant prep — off-host backup, encryption-key versioning, worker/web split, native-Bearer UA gating (#135)
* feat(crypto): G2 — encryption-key versioning + rotation CLI

Adds backwards-compatible support for ENCRYPTION_KEYS (JSON map of
{ "id": "<key>" }) plus ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID. Ciphertext format is now
"<keyId>.<base64payload>"; legacy bare-base64 ciphertext still decrypts
under the synthetic "v1" id derived from the existing ENCRYPTION_KEY.

scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts re-encrypts every encrypted column on
User / WithingsConnection / AppSettings with the active key. Idempotent —
rows already on the active id are skipped.

Why: enables zero-downtime rotation when a key is suspected leaked,
without forcing every encrypted row through a single big-bang rewrite.

Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): G4 — native-Bearer UA gating + rotating refresh tokens

Web callers (UA contains 'Mozilla/') keep the legacy 90d Bearer when they
explicitly opt in via X-Client-Type: native. Native callers (HealthLog-iOS,
HealthLog-iPad, n8n, Health-Connect, unrecognised UAs) now receive a 24h
access token plus a 60d rotating refresh token in the login response.

New /api/auth/refresh endpoint atomically validates + rotates the refresh
token (one-time-use), revokes the previously paired access token, and
audit-logs every refresh + revoke. Reuse of an already-consumed refresh
token revokes the entire family for the user/device — defence against a
stolen refresh token.

Migration 0025_refresh_tokens adds the table; the only DDL is CREATE
TABLE so it is forward-compatible. Down migration documented at
docs/ops/migrations/0025-down.sql.

Why: the V3 audit (still-V2-A) flagged that 90d tokens are too long for
native callers when refresh-token rotation is now table-stakes for mobile
apps. Web flows are unchanged so existing browser sessions keep working.

Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(infra): G3 — web/worker container split via HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE

Adds a tiny startup gate (src/lib/process-type.ts) so the same Docker image
can run as web-only, worker-only, or 'all' (default — single-container,
backwards compatible). assertSubsystemEnabled() refuses to boot the
reminder worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web, preventing accidental
double-cron when an operator splits the deployment.

docker-compose.yml ships the optional app-worker service block commented
out so 'docker compose up' keeps working out of the box; uncommenting it
+ flipping app to HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web is the only change to scale
HTTP horizontally. Healthchecks are isolated per service so neither
startup deadlocks the other; both wait on db: service_healthy.

docs/self-hosting/scaling.md walks through when + how to split.

Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(jobs): G1 — daily off-host encrypted backup to S3-compatible storage

New pg-boss queue 'data-backup-offhost' runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin, dumps
each user's measurements + medications + intake events + mood entries,
encrypts the JSON under a SEPARATE key (BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, isolated
from the application ENCRYPTION_KEY), and uploads to any S3-compatible
target via @aws-sdk/client-s3.

Wire format documented in docs/ops/backup-restore.md:
  magic "HLBK" || version 0x01 || iv(12) || authTag(16) || ciphertext

The worker prunes objects older than BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30);
operators are encouraged to also configure a bucket-level lifecycle rule.

Admin endpoint POST /api/admin/backup/test issues a 1-byte PUT+GET
roundtrip and returns endpoint + bucket + per-call latency. Credentials
are never returned.

scripts/restore-backup.ts downloads + decrypts a single object so
operators can verify the chain end-to-end without standing up a separate
restore harness.

Why: GDPR Art. 32 + V3 audit "data durability" — without an off-host copy
the only line of defence against a Postgres volume loss is the in-DB
DataBackup model on the same host. Separate-key isolation means a leak of
the application encryption key does not also expose every user's archive.

Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(multi-tenant): address review findings — rotation coverage, hard decrypt errors, web/worker gates

Multi-agent review on PR #135 caught several CRITICAL + HIGH issues that
would have shipped silent data corruption or weakened the threat model:

Encryption + rotation
- scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts: stop selecting `bugReportTokenEncrypted`
  (column doesn't exist in the schema; the script crashed on the AppSettings
  step). Add the three encrypted columns it was missing —
  NotificationChannel.config, PushSubscription.p256dh, PushSubscription.auth
  — so rotating to a new key actually re-encrypts every encrypted row.
  Without this, dropping the old key id from ENCRYPTION_KEYS would leave
  notification channels and web-push subscriptions permanently
  undecryptable.
- src/lib/crypto.ts: refuse to silently fall back to the active key when a
  legacy bare-base64 row is decrypted but no v1 entry is configured. Throws
  a clear "Restore ENCRYPTION_KEY (or add a v1 entry to ENCRYPTION_KEYS)
  and run scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts before removing it" so an
  operator who pulled the v1 too early notices immediately instead of
  hitting opaque GCM tag errors.
- docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md: full step-by-step + rollback note +
  troubleshooting section. Spells out that rotation is a forward-only
  operation and what to do if the rollback path is needed.

Web / worker split (G3)
- src/proxy.ts: refuse HTTP traffic with a 503 +
  X-HealthLog-Process-Type: worker header when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=worker.
  The worker container (which still runs `node server.js` for now) no
  longer accepts requests, so a misrouted client gets a clear hint instead
  of a partially-served response.
- src/instrumentation.ts: short-circuit before importing the reminder
  worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web — avoids the noisy
  "[instrumentation] CRITICAL" stderr line we emitted on every web boot.
- /api/version added to PUBLIC_PATHS so the compose healthcheck doesn't
  silently 302-redirect through the auth gate (the prior wget treated the
  login page as a 200 success and would never notice an unhealthy backend).

Refresh-token rotation (G4)
- src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts: reuse-detection now revokes ALL active
  refresh tokens for the user, not only those scoped to the same deviceId.
  An attacker who rotated without an X-Device-Id header would otherwise
  keep their family alive on the no-device branch. Defence-in-depth.
- revokeRefreshToken() also revokes the paired access token so a leaked
  access token cannot outlive the refresh-token sibling that the caller
  just killed (logout-on-device).

Off-host backup (G1)
- src/lib/jobs/offhost-backup.ts: drop the worker-side DeleteObject path.
  Retention is the bucket's lifecycle-policy job; the worker keeps a
  PutObject + GetObject grant only. A compromised worker can no longer
  wipe the backup history. Per-user errors are now surfaced as Wide
  Event warnings + a structured failures[] array on the report so an
  operator can tell which user failed and why.
- scripts/restore-backup.ts: schema-validate the decrypted payload before
  writing to disk, plus an optional --user-id=<id> flag that refuses to
  proceed unless the dump's userId matches. Prevents silent
  cross-tenant restores when an operator points the script at the wrong
  S3 key.

Idempotency
- src/lib/idempotency.ts: the leak-guard already blocked `hlk_`
  (access-token prefix); also block `hlr_` so a future caller wrapping
  the new /api/auth/refresh endpoint with withIdempotency() can't
  accidentally cache a freshly-issued refresh token.

Migration / schema
- prisma/migrations/0025_refresh_tokens/migration.sql: wrap in a single
  transaction; switch to CREATE { TABLE | INDEX } IF NOT EXISTS so a
  partial-deploy retry is a no-op instead of "relation already exists";
  guard the FK ADD with information_schema lookup for the same reason.
- Schema replaces the single-column `@@index([deviceId])` with a
  composite `@@index([userId, deviceId])` (every lookup also filters on
  userId; the old index would never have been used). Comment on
  accessTokenHash corrected to HMAC-SHA-256.

Container / ops
- Dockerfile: install tzdata + ENV TZ=Europe/Berlin so the daily
  pg-boss schedule (`30 2 * * *` Europe/Berlin) actually fires at 02:30
  Berlin instead of silently falling back to UTC on the alpine base.
- docker-compose.yml: tighten the healthcheck to `wget --spider` (matches
  the Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK style, doesn't pipe the body), pass through
  BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS so a custom retention env reaches the container.
- .env.example: document every new env var added in this PR
  (HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE, ENCRYPTION_KEYS, ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID,
  BACKUP_S3_*, BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS) with
  comments and the all-or-none semantics for the backup block.

491 tests still green, typecheck clean.

* chore: retrigger CI

---------

Co-authored-by: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 14:33:39 +02:00