Commit Graph
96 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marc-André Bombeck a283211586 Describe the remaining auth, settings and notification-transport surfaces
Twenty-eight more verbs that exist, are called, and said nothing in the
contract: registration, password rotation, the profile patch, the SSO entry
point, passkey enrolment, the Codex device-auth flow, the device list and its
revocation cascade, four per-user preference scalars, the email channel and the
four channel self-tests, the record wipe, the privacy facts, the update check,
and the Web Push transport.

Four of them needed more care than the rest.

`GET /api/auth/oidc/login` is documented as the two-armed route it is. The
browser arm redirects to the provider; the native arm takes `client=native`
plus a mandatory S256 challenge and returns to a compile-time scheme with a
one-time code — or an MFA ticket when the account has a second factor. The two
PKCE exchanges in play are named apart, because confusing them is the way to
get this wrong.

`POST /api/auth/register` is the only genuinely anonymous surface in the set,
and its refusals are stated exactly: the SSO-only block, the 5-per-15-minutes
bucket that collapses rather than falls open, the invite that is consumed
whenever it is sent, the zero-user bootstrap that mints the first admin under a
lock, and the one 409 that covers a taken email and a taken username so it
cannot be used to enumerate accounts. `POST /api/auth/password` is a change
behind authentication, not a reset, so it is described as one.

`DELETE /api/settings/data` names what it takes and what it leaves: ninety-nine
models hard-deleted, the account's own personal columns reset, credentials and
interface preferences kept, one transaction, and a confirmation string that is
deliberately not the one account deletion wants.

Two collisions surfaced while wiring this up and are resolved rather than
worked around. `PUT /api/auth/profile` and `PATCH /api/user/profile` are two
doors onto one handler, so they now share one published request component
instead of two descriptions of one validator. Their RESPONSES differ, though —
one carries id and role, the other the display preferences, and neither is a
superset — so they are named apart and the older description no longer claims
to cover both.

The four Web Push and APNs surfaces land in their own route module rather than
beside the notification preferences: that module answers what gets sent and
whether it arrived, this one the plumbing a client sets up and then verifies.
Both self-tests report failure inside a 200, which the contract says plainly,
because a client reading only the status will tell someone their notifications
work when they do not.

The generated YAML is left out; it is regenerated once the remaining groups
land.
2026-08-22 13:03:11 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 63f791120a Stop the API switch hiding live tokens, and cap the unit-preference body
Four defects the registry work surfaced, each with a check that fails without
the fix.

`GET /api/tokens` no longer consults the instance-wide API switch. That switch
gates the surfaces a token is FOR — external ingest, the MCP bridge — and not a
token's ability to authenticate: nothing on the `requireAuth` path reads it, so
a token minted before an operator flipped it stays live while it is off, and
refusing the list hid exactly the credentials their owner most needed to see,
their own signed-in phone among them. The revoke keeps the gate; the asymmetry
is stated in both route comments and pinned by the test, because widening it is
a decision about what the switch means rather than a fix to the read.

`PATCH /api/auth/me/unit-preference` reads its body through `safeJson` with a
1 KB cap, like the scalar beside it. It used a bare `request.json()` and was the
one endpoint in the family with no body-size limit at all — the new test proves
it by sending 2 KB and watching the old handler answer 200. Malformed JSON now
answers 400 like every sibling instead of 422; the only caller checks `res.ok`
and never the status, so nothing depends on the old code. The existing
malformed-JSON assertion was changed deliberately: it pinned the inconsistency,
not a contract.

`PATCH /api/auth/passkeys/{id}` returns the multi-issue envelope. It answered a
flat "Invalid request", so an empty name and a 200-character name produced
byte-identical bodies and the form had nothing to show beside the field.

`GET /api/user/thresholds` has a header that describes the handler. It promised
`{ defaults, overrides, effective }` and has always returned
`{ effective, overrides }`. The guard compares the two, so the comment cannot
drift again in either direction.

The two published operations whose contracts moved are updated with them.
2026-08-22 12:39:43 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck b6efc6cb5a Register the sixteen auth, settings and discovery routes the spec never had
`pnpm openapi:check` compares the registry against the committed YAML and
never the routes against the registry, so a route that was simply never
registered stayed invisible to the gate. Sixteen of them are called by the
native client and describe nothing: sign-out, the three per-user preference
scalars, the two pre-session discovery reads, passkey login options, the
passkey rename and delete, registration status, the consent latest-receipt
reader and its revoke, account deletion, the instance service switches, the
API-token list and revoke, the threshold overrides, the version read, and the
assistant feature matrix.

Each contract is derived from the handler rather than from its docblock, so
the published statuses are the ones the code can actually produce — the 413 on
a 1 KB body cap, the 400 the consent family answers where the rest of the API
answers 422, the 403 an instance-wide API switch produces on a token READ, the
last-admin and last-Guardian refusals on account deletion, and the fresh-factor
arm that a Bearer transport cannot clear at any scope.

Four request bodies moved to the validation modules the handlers now parse
with, so the published wire cannot drift from the runtime one: the three
`/api/auth/me` preference scalars into a new `user-prefs` module, and the
passkey rename beside the login schemas. Behaviour is unchanged.

The generated YAML is left out; it is regenerated once the remaining groups
land.
2026-08-22 12:24:52 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 97cb63a77f Report every restored section, disclose export decrypt losses, re-fold on zone change
- The restore summary counts practitioners, encounters, the three link
  tables, and vaccinations — restored in full since 08-01 but absent
  from the report, so a file carrying visits or an Impfpass read as if
  those sections were empty.
- A portable export that cannot open a field's ciphertext still nulls it
  fail-soft, but now names the loss in the file's own decryptFailures
  manifest — an export with a lost emergency note is no longer
  byte-identical to one where the note was never written.
- A timezone change enqueues the medication-compliance re-fold: the
  rollup keys its rows by the local day minted under the OLD zone, and
  the coverage probe compares counts, not keys, so nothing else could
  notice the stale bucketing.
2026-08-14 06:14:13 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 3b1314d1b0 Enforce the reminder nag cap, compare the disclaimer version, drop the unread analytics columns
- The daily Coach sweep now charges each ignored day against
  surfaceCount and auto-dismisses at three — the cap the schema comment
  promised since v1.22 but nothing enforced.
- The welcome gate compares the stored disclaimer acknowledgment
  version against the current one, so revised disclaimer text
  re-prompts; /api/auth/me carries the version for the client.
- slope90 and anomalyCount leave the analytics wire: slope90 had no
  reader anywhere (computed on every request, in SQL twice), and the
  slim path could never compute anomalyCount (it always reported 0).
  anomalyCount stays as an in-process field on summarize() for the
  insights feature builder, which is its only real consumer.
2026-08-14 05:19:05 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 0716f7a2fb Pin the declared diabetes flag's route contract with tests
GET/PATCH /api/auth/me/diabetes carried no test; the web toggle on the
Targets page and the iOS client both ride it. Cover the auth gate, the
resolved-state echo both ways, the field-by-field write, the audit row,
the 422 shape rejections, and the 429 path.
2026-08-13 02:27:05 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 0160052289 refactor(settings): retire Research Mode — the switch governed nothing
Research Mode was the opt-in behind the estimated GLP-1 drug-level curve:
turn it on, read a disclaimer, get the chart. The chart stopped consulting
the flag several releases ago and has painted for every account since, so
the switch on Settings → Advanced changed no screen in either position. An
inert control that promises to hide a chart is worse than no control.

The curve is simply part of the medication page now. Gone with the switch:
the acknowledgment dialog, `/api/auth/me/research-mode`, the shared status
DTO and its gate helper, the disclaimer-version stamp, the query key, and
the three user columns the acknowledgment wrote (migration 0321). The
Privacy page's second button pointed at the retired control and goes too.

Settings → Advanced is now what it reads as: reset the data, delete the
account.
2026-08-08 15:17:05 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 45fec0fc1b feat(02-12.1): refuse a record request whose context has moved
- both record resolvers check the fence after authentication and before
  the carrier, off the one session row that also decides the scope
- POST /api/account/switch takes an optional expectedEpoch and writes
  conditionally, so concurrent switchers resolve to one outcome
- GET /api/auth/me publishes the context a browser bootstraps from
- every response that resolved a record scope echoes it back
- regenerate the API contract
2026-08-06 18:21:40 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 508cc8a60a Let a delegate read the dashboard they land on
Ten routes on `/` refused with `undeclared_mode`, which made the first page
of account sharing the only page in it that does not work. Each one now
declares a mode, per route rather than as a class.

Eight are record reads: the dashboard snapshot, the Today digest, the badge
grid, the Coach nudge signal and reminder ledger, the medication low-stock
thresholds, and the two presentation blobs. The old objection to admitting an
aggregate — a summary can carry a finding from a module the grant does not
cover — does not hold while a grant is whole-record and all-or-nothing. Every
admission site names that, so the day per-module scope lands the aggregates
are findable.

The layout routes split their verbs. Reading the owner's arrangement is right
and, for the dashboard, forced: the snapshot already carries the layout and
the client seeds the same cache cell from it, so an actor answer would put two
people's layouts in one key. Writing it is not a caregiver's job, so the PUT
and DELETE stay bare and refuse. Same on the medication list, where the stored
order names the owner's medication ids and means nothing anywhere else.

Two are actor surfaces: the UI language belongs to the person reading the
screen and must not be transplanted onto the record, and the feature-flag
matrix reads the settings singleton and no user row at all.

Also fixes a second instance of the delegate-data-under-owner-banner defect,
on the same page: the dashboard's client-side band fallback derived blood-
pressure targets and the weight range from `/api/auth/me`, which answers about
the caller, and painted them over the record's charts. Under a switch it now
derives nothing and waits for the snapshot's own bands.

The integration suite drives every admitted route with both accounts seeded,
proves the two answers differ, and then demands the owner's back.
2026-08-03 21:12:35 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 562123d4d1 feat(sharing): publish which records an account may open
`GET /api/auth/me` grows an `accountAccess` block: the accounts this caller
may act on, the one the browser is inside right now, and the booleans a UI
binds directly — `canSwitch`, and `canWrite` per account. Every value is
resolved server-side. A client that worked out what it may do from grant rows
would be a second program deciding one person's access to a health record, and
the two answer differently the first time an expiry or a revocation appears.

`canWrite` is false for every grant in v1 because invitations write READ only.
It is resolved through the grant state machine rather than hardcoded, so the
day a WRITE grant exists the answer changes without this file being edited.

The route becomes an actor surface. It has to be: the switcher, the banner
naming whose record is open, and the way back out all read this payload, and
under a bare `requireAuth()` the whole app shell would refuse the moment a
switch was on. Every field it returns is still the caller's own.

The active record is published as a full entry, not an id to look up. A banner
that had to join two fields could render unnamed the moment they disagreed;
here the active entry is one of the listed ones, selected by the pass that
built them. A stamp left behind by a grant that lapsed reads as not switched —
the same answer the resolver gives the next delegated request.

Not published: the other account's avatar. Those bytes are owner-scoped, so a
URL here would resolve to a refusal and paint a broken image. Clients keep the
initials fallback.
2026-08-02 14:25:55 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 368eb44439 Point the score-config contract test at the pillar list that survived
Two branches met here. One retired the fitness pillar and renamed the test's
pillar list accordingly; the other, written against the eight-pillar world,
referred to it by its old name and its old count. The merge kept the new
declaration and the old references, so nothing compiled.

The name carried the count, which is why the collision was visible at all.
There are seven now.
2026-08-01 11:59:29 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck a830e8a9d3 Merge work/contract-touchups score-config registration 2026-08-01 11:58:17 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 7ddcee0445 Publish the health-score configuration route
/api/auth/me/health-score-config shipped in v1.35.0 with a settings page
in front of it and no entry in the contract at all — no path, no schemas,
nothing. A client had the surface and no way to generate against it. This
is publication only; the route does what it already did.

Both verbs are registered off what the route actually returns rather than
off a neighbour's shape. The asymmetry matters and is now written down: the
request speaks the positive selection, the pillars that should count, while
the response carries both sides resolved plus the recipe version. The column
stores the complement, which is storage and no client's business.

The response's updatedAt is documented as optional because it genuinely is
absent until a selection exists — an account that never chose has nothing to
guard a write against, and a decoder that required the field would break on
that read.

The PATCH 422 is written out rather than reusing the shared base-token
response, because this route has four of them and a client branching on
meta.errorCode needs all four: the breadth refusal with the sentence to show
the person, the validation failure, the unparseable base token, and the
non-JSON body. Naming only the token would have been a contract that omits
the refusal people actually hit.

The route test now drives the real route to produce each of those responses
and asserts the published contract names every code that comes back, so a
response the route can emit but the spec does not describe fails the suite.
That closes the base-token ledger: nine routes emit invalid_base_updated_at
and all nine now document it.
2026-08-01 11:57:31 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c60689affd Take the fitness pillar out of the health score
It could never score. The schema records VO2max but cannot tell a
measured test apart from a device estimate, so every fitness row reached
the scorer unproven and was refused - the pillar has never produced a
value on any account. Listing it on the score settings page as a thing
you can choose, with a line admitting it does nothing, was chrome over a
switch that changed no number.

So it leaves the catalogue: no pillar id, no domain, no scorer, no row,
no wire field. A stored selection that still names it reads back fine -
the resolver has always filtered stored ids against the catalogue and
drops what it no longer knows, so nobody's saved recipe throws or is
discarded over it.

That also fixes the page claiming unsaved changes forever. The save
stripped the fitness pillar out of the selection on its way to the
server, so the answer that came back could never match the form that
sent it, and 'All pillars' left the save button lit no matter how often
you pressed it.
2026-08-01 10:51:01 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 2f6f3573a2 Add the route that chooses what counts toward the score
PATCH /api/auth/me/health-score-config takes the pillars a person
wants counted and stores the rest as the deselection list. A selection
that cannot produce a score is refused with a sentence naming what is
missing, using the same rule the scorer applies at read time. The
write evicts the score caches, and so does the modules route, which
changes the same composition and never did.
2026-07-31 15:12:47 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 9e68ff525f feat(share): serve the record a link already implies, and say when there is none
Two downloads under the token — the FHIR document Bundle and the clinical PDF —
behind the same unlock cookie the document route enforces, serving exactly the
link's frozen selection. That is what the removed FHIR toggle promised, in the
form a practice actually uses: open the link, unlock it, save the file. No new
credential type, no new scope, no mint path that does not exist.

The gate is the document route's, step for step: the same live check, the same
token-scoped cookie, the same blunt 404 for every miss class so a probe cannot
tell "no such link" from "revoked" from "documents-only". It differs in one
number, because generating a bundle is far more expensive than serving a stored
blob and must not share a budget with it. Each download writes its own audit
row. The scope cannot exceed the page's: both resolve the same frozen leaf list
through the same resolver, and the insurance leaf is refused at create, so the
insurance number cannot reach this path at all.

The MCP doctor-visit summary stops claiming presence it cannot support. An
account whose owner never saved a report selection resolves to the empty one on
that surface, and an empty scope produces an empty payload — which now reads as
{ present: false, reason }, the same sentinel the other reads use, instead of a
record with every section quietly missing.

Mutation-checked: removing the unlock check, the rate limit, the documents-only
guard or the audit row reddens its own case; pointing the bucket at the document
route's key reddens the bucket assertion; making presence unconditional reddens
the absence case.

The saved profile's shape moves out of the module that reads the row. The panel
is a client component and parses the blob from the /me payload; importing the
reader dragged the database client into the browser bundle, which typecheck and
the unit suite both pass and only `next build` catches.
2026-07-26 00:45:08 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 582db8a538 feat(export): one grouped scope picker, on both surfaces that choose a scope
The export panel rendered twenty flat switches behind a collapsed disclosure,
and the share-link form rendered none at all — it posted whatever the create
schema defaulted to. Both now mount the same picker: twelve named groups, a
count on each, the leaf grid one chevron away, and a fenced tier below a
separator.

The fence is mechanical, not a label. The sensitive tier has no group
checkbox, so no single control anywhere in the picker can turn on more than
one of mood, cycle, family history, PHQ-9, GAD-7, WHO-5 or SCI at a time.
There is no select-all. The shipped template contains none of them. And the
scope line under the button restates every sensitive inclusion by name rather
than folding it into a count, because a number cannot be checked at a glance
and "incl. Mood, PHQ-9" can.

First run opens expanded with the named standard template applied and the
fenced tier visibly empty, so the user presses Generate having seen twelve
named groups. Every later run opens collapsed carrying their own last
selection, which makes the waiting-room path two interactions.

Only leaves are ever stored. A group's checkbox is derived from its leaves, so
the two cannot disagree, and switching a group off and back on inside one
session restores the pattern instead of flooding it.

The cycle export card is deleted. It posted empty groups under a docblock
claiming every other section was off, and empty groups resolved to the
defaults — so a "cycle only" download carried weight, blood pressure, pulse,
oxygen saturation, body fat, body composition, the medication list, adherence,
labs, allergies and family history. Cycle is a fenced leaf in the one picker
now, reachable for the PDF as well as for FHIR, which is more than the card
offered.

The panel gains a 30-day preset and a custom window, and its error line says
what went wrong instead of interpolating a status code.

The Checkbox primitive learns the indeterminate state it already had the Radix
support for. A partly-selected group drawn as unchecked would say "none of
this is included", which on this surface is a false statement about what
leaves the instance.
2026-07-26 00:45:08 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 5e490f31ec feat(export): make the doctor report carry only what was chosen
The report resolved an absent key to "included". A caller that sent no
sections object, or an empty group inside one, received the full record at
server-chosen defaults: roughly fifty metrics plus the medication list, labs,
allergies and family history. The web panel sent every key explicitly so it
looked fine from the browser, but the share link, the FHIR REST face, the MCP
doctor-visit resource and the cycle-only export card all went through paths
where absence meant yes. No arrangement of booleans fixes a default that means
yes, so the shape goes.

A selection is now an inclusion list of leaf ids. A leaf is the smallest thing
that can be released or withheld: every measurement type, and thirteen
structured sections — identity, insurer, the glucose panel, labs, the drug
list, the administration ledger, adherence, the GLP-1 block, allergies,
illness episodes, family history, mood, cycle. Membership is inclusion,
absence is exclusion, and there is no defaults constant anywhere to drift.

Three locks keep a metric added later off a report chosen earlier. A stored
selection is a list of what was chosen, so a leaf that did not exist then is
not in it. The catalogue is keyed over the measurement enum, so adding a
member without deciding its group fails typecheck in the same commit. And the
aggregator's filter inverts: a type the catalogue does not know is excluded and
annotated, where it used to be passed through.

The aggregator's third parameter is now required and brand-typed, which turned
the three surfaces that had no scope at all into compile errors. Each one had
to name a source, and each now replays the owner's saved selection — the same
object reviewed in Settings. An account that never saved one gets nothing
there rather than a guess.

Identity and insurance become selectable, and a share link refuses the
insurance leaf outright. The share view never decrypted the number; that is
structural now instead of incidental. The KVNR is not even read unless the
leaf was chosen.

Two surfaces gain a record they always implied. A share link serves its frozen
selection as a FHIR bundle and as the PDF, behind the same unlock cookie the
document route uses, with its own rate bucket, its own audit row and the same
blunt 404 for every miss. That is what the removed FHIR toggle promised, in
the form a practice actually uses.

The AI summary leaves the report. Its text came from the cached briefing with
no relation to the selection, so its scope could not be proven, and prose whose
scope cannot be proven has no place on a document whose whole point is a proven
scope.

The PDF table stops being a nine-type whitelist. It prints every selected leaf
that has data, sub-headed by group, in the same order the panel shows — so
selecting resting heart rate no longer means seeing it in the bundle and not in
the PDF. The clinician view is grouped the same way and reads real labels
instead of "Phq9 score".

Migration 0273 adds the saved-selection column, drops the orphaned prefs column
and the two retired share-link scope columns, and revokes every live record
share link minted before this model. Their frozen scope was "everything except
mood and cycle", which is a scope nobody chose; narrowing it would still be a
scope nobody chose. Documents-only shares are untouched. The sharing list shows
each closed link in a pick-again state with its label, window and expiry kept.

The retired allowFhirApi and resourceTypes stay on the create and list
responses as the constant false and empty list. The request refuses them. They
come off the response once the native client confirms it does not decode them.

Six files are split at seams this change already touched: the aggregator into
its gate, its dense-bucket query, its series, its glucose panel, its medication
ledger and its clinical records; the export route's three emitters into their
own module; the clinician view into its sections, its document list and its
downloads.
2026-07-26 00:45:08 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck f90219784b test(export): pin the selection controls against going inert again
Two layers, because the defect had two halves and each needs its own kind of
proof.

The structural guard walks the panel's control shape, folds every control
through the wire schema and the resolver the route uses, and fails when
flipping one changes nothing in the resolved selection. It also checks the
panel renders a row for every control it declares, and that every resolved
flag is read downstream, either by gating measurement types or by name in the
aggregator. That is the link nobody had written: the dead switches were dead
for several releases and no test connected "the panel renders this" to "the
export honours this".

The behavioural half runs the real export route and reads what comes out. The
previously-dead measurement switches are asserted against the FHIR bundle and
the PDF table, with a positive control beside each exclusion so nothing passes
on an empty fixture. The screening totals are asserted absent for a caller
that names other sections and for a caller that sends no sections at all, then
present when asked for by name. Allergies and family history are asserted
absent from the bundle and never read from the database, and the package case
opens the zip and checks the bundle inside it agrees with the PDF beside it.

Mutation-checked: reverting the allergy gate, the medication-list gate, the
screener entries or the measurement entries turns the matching cases red and
leaves the rest green; removing a control's fold entry or its aggregator entry
turns the guard red with the control named.

The remaining changes update fixtures the new shapes touch: prefs objects now
resolve the added flags from the defaults, and the share-link fixtures drop
the retired FHIR scope, with a case pinning that the create route now refuses
those keys instead of ignoring them.
2026-07-26 00:45:08 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 574367737f fix(coach-prefs): return the pure default with no token for a never-saved user
The GET spread the optimistic-concurrency `updatedAt` into the response even
when the user had never saved preferences, which broke the strict-equality
contract that a never-saved read is exactly `DEFAULT_COACH_PREFS`. Mirror the
insights-layout never-saved GET: a null `coachPrefsJson` returns the pure
default with no token (the first save is the tokenless unconditional write), and
only a saved row and the PUT response carry `updatedAt`. Update the integration
round-trip to expect the token on the saved GET and PUT while keeping the
`coachPrefsJson` column assertion pure.
2026-07-24 18:28:41 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck f9afa794e9 test(concurrency): cover the prefs guards, the inventory lock, and the privacy re-check
Add interleaved-writer, tokenless-compat, and malformed-token coverage for the
notification-prefs, modules, coach-prefs, and mood-tag-layout write guards,
including the notification-prefs case where a stale web write must not revert
the app-managed medication flag. Pin the inventory PATCH and DELETE routing
through the advisory lock, and cover the insight-generation privacy re-check on
both the main commit and the reroll arm.
2026-07-24 18:08:01 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 8849f2cecd feat(concurrency): guard the prefs writes and serialise inventory + privacy races
Apply the shared optimistic-concurrency guard (takeBaseToken + guardedUserUpdate)
to the notification-prefs, mood-tag-layout, modules, and coach-prefs write
endpoints so an interleaved edit can no longer silently overwrite a category a
fresher writer just set; a tokenless request keeps the prior unconditional
write. Route the inventory stock-correction PATCH and DELETE through the same
per-medication advisory lock intake consumption takes, so an absolute stock
write can no longer clobber a concurrent dose decrement. Guard every insight
cache commit on the privacy mode still being what the generation read, so a
privacy-mode change is respected by a generation that was already running.
2026-07-24 17:31:34 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck f1c977a7a7 test(auth): give the MFA fixtures a Bearer transport
The disable-route suite only ever supplied a cookie-shaped context, which is why
the token-id-as-session-id defect was invisible to it. It now covers both arms
and asserts the credential shape handed to the session revoker, plus that the
elevation is spent before the teardown and not spent when the factor code is
wrong.
2026-07-19 14:43:05 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 0991d754e4 fix(auth): make the re-proved factor decide what an elevation reaches
A step-up elevation minted from the account password satisfied the fresh-factor
routes. That is a second-factor bypass: a stolen token plus a known password
could rotate the recovery codes — which take no factor in the body — and then
spend one of them to disable the second factor outright. The web has never
allowed that chain, because a password login does not stamp mfaVerifiedAt.

The method is now an authorisation input. Only totp, webauthn, and passkey
satisfy a fresh-factor gate, which is exactly the set of ceremonies the web
stamps a session for; password reaches what a plain cookie session reaches and
stops. The mint gains TOTP and security-key arms so a TOTP-only account can
still manage its factor natively, and the response says which reach it bought.

The gate also returns a discriminated context. session.id meant a session row on
one arm and a token row on the other, and the disable route passed the token id
to a session-scoped query — excluding nothing, so it deleted every browser
session and revoked the caller's own device login. The transport is now in the
type and the compiler refuses the confusion.

Redemption splits into validate-then-commit so a 429, a 422, or a wrong code no
longer burns a proof against a five-per-fifteen-minute mint ceiling. The claim
is UPDATE ... RETURNING, so the statement that decides is the one that reports.
The mint is transactional behind a partial unique index. Sign-out-everywhere and
both password-reset paths clear elevations. The status read drops to plain
requireAuth — it carries no credential material — and every mutation stays gated.
2026-07-19 13:48:46 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck ba45a25cb0 test(auth): retarget the MFA route mocks at the shared gate
The three unit suites that stubbed `requireCookieAuth` / `requireFreshMfa`
directly now stub `requireMfaManagementAuth`, and the password-change suite
stubs the elevation revocation the route gained. Adds the unit checks that need
no database: the elevation TTL is pinned to the cookie path's step-up window so
the two cannot drift apart, the minted value is a prefixed CSPRNG secret whose
plaintext never reaches the row, and a value carrying another credential's
prefix is refused without costing a query.
2026-07-19 13:14:38 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e557d9e9e6 feat(auth): add token-bound step-up elevations for second-factor management
Second-factor management has been cookie-only since v1.23. The gate is right:
a Bearer token is a credential whose provenance the server cannot see, and
tearing down a second factor must not be reachable from the weaker of an
interactive login and a value pasted into a script. What was missing was never
Bearer access to those routes — it was a way to say, over a transport with no
session row, that the human holding this device just re-proved a factor.

An elevation is that proof. It is minted only against a re-proved account
password or primary passkey, bound to the exact token that re-proved, single-use
via a conditional UPDATE, five-minute-lived to match the cookie path's step-up
window, and stored hashed. A stolen token mints nothing; a second token cannot
redeem another's elevation; a password change drops every one the account holds.

requireMfaManagementAuth is the one gate the management routes share. On a
cookie session it delegates to the original helpers unchanged, so the web flow
runs the code it always did. requireAdmin stays cookie-only and out of reach.
2026-07-19 12:42:00 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck fd9603a578 chore(release): v1.30.33 — the session cookie becomes a secret
Also closes the device list's exposure of the same value, refuses a
cross-device refresh rotation, replaces a vacuous expiry test with one
that fails when the check is removed, and asserts the Nightscout host
guard at save time rather than relying on the probe's placement.
2026-07-19 12:09:17 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 2ab21bb433 chore(release): v1.30.32 — consent that stays withdrawn; quotes that come from the document 2026-07-19 11:59:28 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 0627648bea Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/work/document-and-model-correctness' into release/v1.30.32 2026-07-19 11:52:41 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 1c2cfffdb8 fix(consent): a withdrawn AI consent stays withdrawn, and the web can withdraw
The settings mount fires an idempotent consent heal so an account that
predates the gate does not fall into the no-key state. It looked only for
an active receipt, so a deliberate withdrawal — which sets revokedAt —
read the same as never having consented, and the next visit to the AI
settings granted again, writing an audit row for an act the user never
performed. GDPR Art. 7 (3) puts withdrawal on the same footing as the
grant; one undone by a page load is not a withdrawal.

The mint now distinguishes the two callers. The mount heal grants only to
an account with no consent history at all and leaves a revocation
standing; switching document auto-read on is the consent act itself and
may supersede an earlier revocation. The revocation is re-checked inside
the transaction so a withdrawal landing mid-mint is not overwritten.

The revoke endpoint has existed since v1.4.40 but only the native client
called it: on the web, consent could be given and never taken back. The
AI settings now carry the standing decision and the control that changes
it, in all six languages.
2026-07-19 11:52:34 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 80258914f2 feat(documents): catch up unread documents when auto-read is switched on
The per-document summary job is enqueued at upload time and no-ops while the
documentsAutoAiRead opt-in is OFF. Nothing ever re-enqueued it, so the switch
only applied to documents uploaded AFTER the flip — a user who filled the vault
first and opted in later had documents that would never be read, and the
setting looked inert.

A genuine OFF->ON transition now schedules one bounded catch-up pass over the
user's un-summarised documents. It grants nothing of its own: it only enqueues
the ordinary summary job, which still re-reads the opt-in, re-asserts the
per-document egress consent and reserves the daily token budget. The pass
itself re-reads the opt-in first, so a toggle flipped back OFF before it runs
egresses nothing.

Bounded by an id-cursor walk capped at 200 documents per pass (a summary is a
provider call, unlike the local-compute thumbnail backfill). Idempotent at four
levels: the trigger fires only on a real transition, the per-user singleton
collapses a double toggle, the candidate set excludes summarised documents, and
the summary job skips one that already has a summary.
2026-07-19 11:09:57 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 0796d9fe14 chore(release): v1.28.45 — doctor-report + privacy fixes
Three CONFIRMED findings from the campaign's feature-wiring audit + structural
verification:

- Sleep rendered nothing in the doctor-report PDF: the sleep section is
  default-on and the data layer reconstructs per-night SLEEP_DURATION rows, but
  DOCTOR_REPORT_VITAL_TYPES omitted SLEEP_DURATION, so the vitals table showed
  nothing (FHIR already emitted it). Added it to the allowlist with a
  minutes-to-hours conversion; corrected the stale 'intentionally excluded'
  comment.
- Glucose had no doctor-report section toggle — it rendered whenever the global
  glucose module was on, with no report-level privacy control. The toggle
  actually already existed in the UI (with i18n) but was dead because the prefs
  fold dropped the key. Wired it end to end (glucose added to the prefs Zod
  schema + defaults, default-on to preserve behaviour; gated the render loop +
  the query). Also fixed a grouped-vs-flat prefs mis-detection: 'glucose' in
  GROUPED_SECTION_KEYS would have flagged flat blobs (incl. EMPTY prefs) as
  grouped and defaulted them all on. No migration (prefs is a JSON blob).
- environment fed the coach with no exclusion: MODULE_EXCLUDED_SOURCES omitted
  it, so module-off still leaked audio_env/audio_headphone/audio_event/daylight/
  skin_temp to the snapshot. Added, scoped exactly to the environment cluster's
  five sources.

Regression test per fix.
2026-07-16 05:51:04 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck d7e616eaa8 feat(ai): add operator-shared central Codex connection with per-user opt-in
Introduce an operator-level ChatGPT-subscription (Codex) credential that the
operator connects once and shares server-wide, plus a per-user switch to route
AI egress through it.

- Schema (migration 0235): three encrypted columns on AppSettings for the
  operator's central Codex access/refresh tokens and the ChatGPT-Account-ID
  claim, plus expiry/connected-at/status; a per-user useCentralCodex flag
  (default false). Register the new encrypted columns in the rotation registry
  and script.
- Resolution: add the admin-codex chain type; append it to a user's resolved
  chain only when they opted in AND the operator connected it. Tokens refresh
  server-side against the singleton row (CAS-style), same primitives as the
  per-user Codex path.
- Budget: bill an admin-codex primary against the operator cost cap, not the
  user plan — it drains the operator's account.
- Consent: admin-codex is server-managed external egress, gated by the existing
  consent machinery (self-snapshot and document surfaces alike). No existing
  consent path is weakened.
- Document order: rank admin-codex with the subscription tier (last), so the
  document class stays local-first.
- UI: admin device-code connect/disconnect card (cookie-only admin routes) with
  honest copy on account pooling, shared rate limits, and training-by-default;
  a per-user opt-in switch shown only once the operator has connected it, off by
  default, behind a one-time honesty confirm.
- i18n across all six locales; unit tests for the chain type, budget cap,
  consent gate, vision capability, and document order; a mocked e2e for both
  the admin connect surface and the per-user switch.

The central credential's tokens are encrypted at rest and never returned to a
non-admin API; the opt-in only takes effect once the operator has connected the
shared account.
2026-07-10 00:10:56 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 813dc2547b feat(documents): add per-user automatic AI reading opt-in
Add the documentsAutoAiRead per-user Boolean (migration 0231, default
false) that authorises ambient AI reading of uploaded vault documents.
OFF by default keeps the vault local-first for every self-hoster.

- schema column + migration 0231_documents_auto_ai_read
- documentAutoReadEnabled(userId) read helper
- GET/PATCH /api/auth/me/documents-auto-ai-read toggle route; the ON
  write mints an ai_full consent receipt for the audit trail
- the document consent gate short-circuits an external pick when the
  toggle is ON; a local pick stays ungated and OFF still requires a
  receipt for any external egress
2026-07-09 10:32:59 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e9692f0b81 fix(i18n): survive Safari's 7-day cookie cap on the chosen locale
The first-paint ladder consulted only the healthlog-locale cookie and
Accept-Language — never User.locale. The cookie is written client-side
via document.cookie, which Safari ITP caps at 7 days, so a chosen
language silently reverted to the browser language once a week.

Three seams close it:
- resolveInitialLocale (extracted to src/lib/i18n/resolve-initial-locale.ts)
  now reads User.locale on a cookie miss via a lightweight session read
  (no sliding-expiry write, no cookie mutation, fail-soft) before the
  Accept-Language fallback.
- PUT /api/auth/me/locale mirrors the accepted locale into the cookie
  via Set-Cookie (365 days, SameSite=Lax, not HttpOnly, Secure via
  shouldEmitSecureCookie) — server-set cookies are exempt from the ITP
  cap, and the mount-time backfill hitting the route doubles as the
  weekly refresh.
- getSession re-emits the cookie when the user has a persisted locale
  but the cookie is absent (absent-only, so a mid-switch cookie is
  never reverted before the PUT lands).

Users who never chose a language stay on Accept-Language.
2026-07-05 21:01:50 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 5a7a13c934 test(records): cover the new report-section toggles in the prefs route fixtures
The doctor-report prefs route resolves every toggle to the full
canonical shape; the fixtures predate the allergies/familyHistory
sections and asserted the seven-key shape.
2026-07-05 18:40:59 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e216a9d678 feat(coach): warm, localized proactive nudge with opt-in AI enrichment
Rework the proactive Coach nudge so it reads like one human checking in on
another instead of a terse English alert.

Copy: the title is a name-led greeting that rotates day to day ("Guten
Morgen, …" / "Hey …"; the 05:15 frame makes a morning opener safe) and the
body is one calm observation plus a gentle invite — never an imperative.
Drop the verbatim quoting of the user's decrypted self-context sentence:
the focus is referenced only by presence, abstractly, and is no longer
decrypted at all. Remove the 80-char mid-word clamp; each channel composes
to a length budget instead.

Cadence: suppress the nudge when the user already talked to the Coach in
the last ~24 h. With the existing rolling frequency cap (never two in a
window) and the no-trigger-no-nudge rule, the surface stays anti-nag.

AI enrichment (opt-in via the coach prefs blob, default off): when a
provider is healthy the body is composed through the model under hard
guards — a per-user budget gate, a tight per-call timeout, a per-tick
ceiling so the sequential tick can't stall across the user base, and the
outbound safety screen on the output. Any error, timeout, budget refusal
or unsafe reply falls silently back to the deterministic template, which is
always the default and the fail-closed fallback.

Localized greetings, per-trigger bodies and the focus note across all six
locales; the prefs opt-in is surfaced in the notification settings.
2026-06-28 16:50:49 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 54c9b4206f fix(i18n): persist User.locale so background messages match the UI language
The language switcher wrote the choice to localStorage, the
`healthlog-locale` cookie and `<html lang>` only — never to the user row.
Server-side background work (the proactive Coach nudge, the Telegram test
message) has no request cookie to read and falls back to `User.locale`;
with the column left null those messages went out in English regardless of
the language the user reads the app in.

Add `PUT /api/auth/me/locale` (idempotent, validated against the supported
locales) and have the i18n provider mirror the active locale onto the row —
on every switch and once on mount, so the column is backfilled for users
who set their language before this landed. Fire-and-forget: a 401 on a
public page or an offline blip never blocks the UI flip; the cookie stays
the first-paint source of truth.
2026-06-28 16:50:32 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c862b4880f feat(coach): add an opt-out for proactive ambient suggestions
Add a per-user toggle that turns off the proactive ambient example suggestions
(the daily seeded opener on the Coach hero). The flag rides the existing coach
notification-prefs blob (coach.ambientSuggestions, default on) — no schema
change — and a shared hook makes it the single source every ambient suggestion
surface consults, so the seeded opener and its fetch both stand down when off.
2026-06-28 16:04:22 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c44eed365d fix(security): revoke other sessions when the second factor is removed
Removing the second factor is a security-state change, so it should not leave
stale credentials behind. The disable endpoint now drops every other web
session, every native refresh token, and every trusted device, keeping only the
caller's current session. The lockout-recovery CLI does the same out of band,
clearing all sessions and trusted devices for the account.
2026-06-27 21:50:16 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c8bef61344 feat(security): let an operator require a second factor
Wire the previously-unused mfaEnforced flag into a real policy. An admin can
require a second factor instance-wide (an AppSettings toggle in the General
section) or per user (a toggle in user management); the effective requirement is
the OR of the two. When required and the account has no active factor — no
confirmed TOTP, no registered security key, and no primary passkey — the user is
walled behind a forced-enrollment interstitial after sign-in, with only the
security settings and sign-out reachable until a factor is enrolled.

The gate is surfaced like the onboarding gate: a hint cookie the proxy reads
without a DB round-trip, recomputed from the database on every sign-in and on
/api/auth/me so a tampered cookie self-corrects. Nobody is locked out — the
enrollment surface stays reachable, and toggling the policy off (or the
disable-mfa CLI) is the operator's recovery path.
2026-06-27 21:49:53 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 135bb04f0d feat(auth): allow trusting a device to skip the second factor
Add an opt-in "remember this device" at the second-factor step. On opt-in
a random token is minted, set in an httpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Strict cookie,
and only its HMAC hash is stored in a new TrustedDevice table. A later sign-in
from the same browser still requires the password (factor 1); a matching,
unexpired trusted device lets the login skip factor 2 only.

The token is never accepted for step-up — a trusted-device login does not stamp
mfaVerifiedAt — so a stolen device cookie cannot reach a destructive action.
Trusted devices are listed and revocable from the security surface, are revoked
wholesale when the second factor is removed or the user signs out everywhere,
and cascade away on account deletion. A recovery-code login never trusts the
browser. Migration 0204 adds the table (and the instance-wide mfa_required
policy column that the enforcement work reads).
2026-06-27 21:49:39 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c458d955e4 merge: integrate the v1.23 security settings and MFA wave
# Conflicts:
#	messages/de.json
#	messages/en.json
#	messages/es.json
#	messages/fr.json
#	messages/it.json
#	messages/pl.json
#	src/lib/openapi/routes/auth.ts
#	src/lib/query-keys/auth.ts
2026-06-27 20:46:03 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 4c4231838c merge: integrate the v1.23 sessions and login-alert wave 2026-06-27 20:42:57 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 64ea8e4102 feat(passkeys): surface last-used, rename, and an upgrade nudge
Stamp each passkey's last-used time on a successful assertion and return
it from the list, add a rename endpoint, and add a dismissible
add-a-passkey nudge for accounts that have none. Share the relying-party
configuration with the second-factor path.
2026-06-27 20:40:53 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 402ea90d45 feat(security): add a TOTP and security-key setup hub
Introduce a dedicated /settings/security section that gathers every
account-protection control in one place: TOTP enrolment (QR plus manual
secret, confirm, recovery codes shown once with copy and download),
WebAuthn security keys as a second factor (register, list with last-used,
rename, step-up-gated removal), recovery-code count and regeneration, and
primary passkey management.

The second-factor WebAuthn path keeps its own credential store, separate
from primary passkeys, and uses non-resident keys so an account can hold
many. Relying-party resolution is shared with the passkey path. A status
endpoint backs the hub; the step-up gate now recognises a registered
security key as an active second factor so a WebAuthn-only account can
still reach the gated actions.
2026-06-27 20:40:36 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 9269043e91 feat(security): list active sessions, sign out everywhere, and show security activity
Add the user-facing account-security surface in Settings:

- Active sessions (closes #64): GET /api/auth/me/sessions lists each browser
  login with a coarse device label, masked IP, resolved location, the sliding
  last-active stamp, and the current-session marker. DELETE the collection
  signs out everywhere else (keeps the current session, revokes other sessions
  and native refresh tokens, leaves API tokens alone); DELETE one revokes a
  single session, scoped to the owner so a foreign id 404s.
- A sliding last-active stamp on the session, written throttled and
  fire-and-forget off the request-resolution path.
- Security activity: GET /api/auth/me/security-activity, the shared read over
  the audit log filtered to sign-ins, second-factor changes, password changes,
  session revocations, exports, and deletions, with masked IPs.

OpenAPI regenerated for the new endpoints.
2026-06-27 20:34:43 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 8f56ac95d8 fix(auth): harden the second-factor verify and disable surfaces
Reject any challenge that is not a login challenge before minting a session,
cap the disable and confirm request bodies through safeJson, and correct the
recovery-code scan comment to match its early-return-on-match behaviour.
2026-06-27 20:08:10 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck b446a66753 feat(auth): add TOTP second factor and recovery codes
Add the TOTP enroll/confirm/disable surface and Argon2id-hashed recovery
codes as the v1.23 second factor.

- totp.ts wraps otpauth (zero-dep) pinned to the interop floor (SHA-1, 6
  digits, 30 s) with a +/-1 drift window. Replay protection persists the last
  accepted time-step per account (User.totpLastStep, migration
  0202_v123_totp_laststep) and rejects any step that is not strictly newer,
  so a captured code dies the instant it is accepted once.
- recovery-codes.ts issues ten single-use, high-entropy codes, Argon2id-
  hashed at rest, shown once; regeneration replaces the entire prior set in a
  transaction and verification burns the matched code with a guarded update.
- The TOTP secret is stored AES-256-GCM encrypted (already registered in the
  encrypted-columns registry + rotation script); decrypt is fail-closed.
- Routes: setup (pending secret), confirm (activate + issue recovery codes),
  disable (step-up + current factor), recovery-codes/regenerate (step-up).
  Setup/confirm are cookie-only; disable/regenerate add requireFreshMfa.
- scripts/disable-mfa.ts is the operator escape hatch for a locked-out
  self-hoster, audited, run via pnpm dlx tsx.
2026-06-27 19:56:16 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 86a9ca2e1e feat(profile): persist and expose the date-format preference
Accept dateFormat on the profile PATCH field-by-field, echo it from
the profile + /me reads, mirror it into the client auth user, and add
the field to the OpenAPI request/response schemas.
2026-06-26 12:15:09 +02:00