- Wait for a validated account scope before warming record reads
- Abort scoped preloads and discard handoffs across record transitions
- Cover malformed scope reloads and fresh own-record recovery
Each behaviour here was verified by removing the code that provides it and
confirming the test went red, then putting it back. Two of them did not, and
both were rewritten rather than kept:
The restore-side persister check asserted that the delegate's own dashboard
could not be read back inside a shared record. Deleting the guard left it
green, because the record-scoped hash already makes a snapshot written in one
record unreadable in another. It now counts what landed in the cache, so the
guard it names is the thing it measures — and the weaker line is kept beside
it with a note saying why.
The switcher's account rows were asserted from server-rendered markup. Radix
portals do not render server-side at all, so an earlier draft was measuring
the renderer. Those rows moved to the browser suite; what stays here is the
gate, which fails sharply — with the `canSwitch` bail removed the two cases do
not return different markup, they throw.
Two more shapes worth naming. The cache dimension is exercised through a real
QueryClient built from the app's own defaults, because "the hash string
changed" and "one record's data cannot be read while inside another" are
different claims. And the invalidation is a plain function over a client with
three live entries seeded, with a test that asserts they start valid — without
it, a client that failed to seed and one where everything was invalidated look
the same from every other assertion.
Every cached read in this app is about one health record, and nothing in the
key factory said which one — there was only ever the signed-in account's. Once
a browser can act on somebody else's, `["dashboard","snapshot"]` names two
different answers and the cache cannot tell them apart. That is this repo's
known cache-poison class, on health data, across two people.
One line at the root rather than a dimension threaded through twenty-three key
modules: a `queryKeyHashFn` that folds the record id into the cache identity of
every entry. Key arrays are untouched, which is the part that matters — prefix
invalidation and the import-time dependent-key bundles both match on the array
and keep working. Prefixing the arrays would have broken every bundle silently.
The hash is defence in depth. Switching is a full page reload, so the
in-memory cache is empty on the other side of it; the layers that survive a
reload are the IndexedDB snapshot and the service worker's data cache, and
those are handled by refusing to write either while a switch is on, and by
skipping the restore. Nothing of the owner's record ever reaches the disk of a
delegate's device, so a stale scope marker can cost an empty restore and never
another person's data.
The persister's per-account binding read the account payload's id, which under
a switch is the delegate in both states — it could not tell the two apart. It
now asks the record scope, which can.
Marc-André Bombeck