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8
Commits
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58c5416bc9 |
security: destroyAllSessions wipes API tokens + refresh tokens; tighten well-known proxy bypass
Two findings from the v1.4.34.3 security audit, both with the same
shape — every authenticated surface a user owns should rotate when a
credential-rotation path fires, and unfamiliar discovery sub-paths
must not inherit "no auth" status by default.
destroyAllSessions:
Previously only ran `prisma.session.deleteMany`, leaving every
long-lived `ApiToken` row (Bearer credentials issued via
/settings/api-tokens) and every native-client `RefreshToken`
intact. A stolen iOS Bearer kept working after the user rotated
their password or after an admin reset; only the browser cookie
flipped. Wraps the cleanup in a $transaction that flips
`apiToken.revoked = true` and `refreshToken.revokedAt = now()` in
the same atomic block so the audit trail survives. Both lookups at
`src/lib/auth/api-token.ts` and `src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts`
already filter on these columns; no second code path needed.
Same destroyAllSessions call already runs from:
- POST /api/auth/password (user-initiated change)
- POST /api/admin/users/[id]/reset-password (admin reset)
- DELETE /api/settings/account (account deletion)
All three paths now wipe every transport in one shot.
Well-known proxy bypass:
`src/proxy.ts` PUBLIC_PATHS carried "/.well-known/" with a prefix
match — a future route at `/.well-known/foo` would inherit "no
auth" status silently. Tighten to an exact-match Set
(WELL_KNOWN_PUBLIC_PATHS) seeded with the one path we actually
serve (`apple-app-site-association`). New routes must be added
explicitly.
Also drops the stale `/api/auth/codex/callback` PUBLIC_PATHS
entry — that route doesn't exist in the codebase (the Codex
OAuth flow uses `/api/auth/codex/{device-poll,device-start,
disconnect}` instead).
Tests:
- New destroyAllSessions assertion in src/lib/auth/__tests__/
session.test.ts pins the three updateMany/deleteMany call
shapes inside a single $transaction.
- Existing proxy well-known + privacy + onboarding redirect
suites stay green.
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1d8b80698e |
feat(audit): wire ASN+carrier into the audit-log create/update path
Completes the v1.4.27 B3 audit-log work that landed in
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ca03c6099f |
chore(release): v1.4.24
Security + accessibility hardening release. Closes the highest-priority findings from a focused security audit of the v1.4.23 release: - Bearer auth fail-closed when a route declares no scope (api-handler) - Public /api/send Umami proxy now rate-limits 120 req/min/IP - Proxy nonce generation switched to btoa(...) for Edge portability - Session-expiry delete race uses deleteMany + catch (no more 500s) - POST /api/import returns the standard apiError envelope on 422 - Runtime Docker image pins Prisma 7.8 + worker deps to minors - Notifications page renders a real load-error alert - Accessibility: switch aria-labels, htmlFor pairing, mobile admin Overview link, deep-link anchors on notification settings - Chart overlays: per-chart comparisonBaseline pref, BMI/bodyFat/ sleep/steps overlay keys, TrendCard layout tolerates long labels Verification: pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm test (2244/2244) && pnpm format:check all green. |
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05fe89575f |
fix(auth): refresh-token reuse-detection scopes to originating device
Pre-1.4.23, a replay attempt on a single device's stale refresh token revoked every refresh token the user owned — signing them out of every device. The legitimate two-device case (iPad + iPhone, one drops into airplane mode and rotates) hit the same code path. v1.4.23 scopes the blast radius to rows matching the offending refresh row's deviceId so only the suspect device is signed out. Legacy tokens issued before v1.4.23 carry deviceId=null and fall back to the wider revoke — a safety hatch we keep until the last 60-day refresh token from the old policy expires. The native-client routes already forward X-Device-Id on every refresh, so the legitimate path always carries a deviceId. A missing deviceId on a replay is itself a suspicious signal, hence the conservative fall-through. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d7778c1085 |
feat(v1.4): multi-tenant prep — off-host backup, encryption-key versioning, worker/web split, native-Bearer UA gating (#135)
* feat(crypto): G2 — encryption-key versioning + rotation CLI
Adds backwards-compatible support for ENCRYPTION_KEYS (JSON map of
{ "id": "<key>" }) plus ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID. Ciphertext format is now
"<keyId>.<base64payload>"; legacy bare-base64 ciphertext still decrypts
under the synthetic "v1" id derived from the existing ENCRYPTION_KEY.
scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts re-encrypts every encrypted column on
User / WithingsConnection / AppSettings with the active key. Idempotent —
rows already on the active id are skipped.
Why: enables zero-downtime rotation when a key is suspected leaked,
without forcing every encrypted row through a single big-bang rewrite.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): G4 — native-Bearer UA gating + rotating refresh tokens
Web callers (UA contains 'Mozilla/') keep the legacy 90d Bearer when they
explicitly opt in via X-Client-Type: native. Native callers (HealthLog-iOS,
HealthLog-iPad, n8n, Health-Connect, unrecognised UAs) now receive a 24h
access token plus a 60d rotating refresh token in the login response.
New /api/auth/refresh endpoint atomically validates + rotates the refresh
token (one-time-use), revokes the previously paired access token, and
audit-logs every refresh + revoke. Reuse of an already-consumed refresh
token revokes the entire family for the user/device — defence against a
stolen refresh token.
Migration 0025_refresh_tokens adds the table; the only DDL is CREATE
TABLE so it is forward-compatible. Down migration documented at
docs/ops/migrations/0025-down.sql.
Why: the V3 audit (still-V2-A) flagged that 90d tokens are too long for
native callers when refresh-token rotation is now table-stakes for mobile
apps. Web flows are unchanged so existing browser sessions keep working.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(infra): G3 — web/worker container split via HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE
Adds a tiny startup gate (src/lib/process-type.ts) so the same Docker image
can run as web-only, worker-only, or 'all' (default — single-container,
backwards compatible). assertSubsystemEnabled() refuses to boot the
reminder worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web, preventing accidental
double-cron when an operator splits the deployment.
docker-compose.yml ships the optional app-worker service block commented
out so 'docker compose up' keeps working out of the box; uncommenting it
+ flipping app to HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web is the only change to scale
HTTP horizontally. Healthchecks are isolated per service so neither
startup deadlocks the other; both wait on db: service_healthy.
docs/self-hosting/scaling.md walks through when + how to split.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(jobs): G1 — daily off-host encrypted backup to S3-compatible storage
New pg-boss queue 'data-backup-offhost' runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin, dumps
each user's measurements + medications + intake events + mood entries,
encrypts the JSON under a SEPARATE key (BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, isolated
from the application ENCRYPTION_KEY), and uploads to any S3-compatible
target via @aws-sdk/client-s3.
Wire format documented in docs/ops/backup-restore.md:
magic "HLBK" || version 0x01 || iv(12) || authTag(16) || ciphertext
The worker prunes objects older than BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30);
operators are encouraged to also configure a bucket-level lifecycle rule.
Admin endpoint POST /api/admin/backup/test issues a 1-byte PUT+GET
roundtrip and returns endpoint + bucket + per-call latency. Credentials
are never returned.
scripts/restore-backup.ts downloads + decrypts a single object so
operators can verify the chain end-to-end without standing up a separate
restore harness.
Why: GDPR Art. 32 + V3 audit "data durability" — without an off-host copy
the only line of defence against a Postgres volume loss is the in-DB
DataBackup model on the same host. Separate-key isolation means a leak of
the application encryption key does not also expose every user's archive.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(multi-tenant): address review findings — rotation coverage, hard decrypt errors, web/worker gates
Multi-agent review on PR #135 caught several CRITICAL + HIGH issues that
would have shipped silent data corruption or weakened the threat model:
Encryption + rotation
- scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts: stop selecting `bugReportTokenEncrypted`
(column doesn't exist in the schema; the script crashed on the AppSettings
step). Add the three encrypted columns it was missing —
NotificationChannel.config, PushSubscription.p256dh, PushSubscription.auth
— so rotating to a new key actually re-encrypts every encrypted row.
Without this, dropping the old key id from ENCRYPTION_KEYS would leave
notification channels and web-push subscriptions permanently
undecryptable.
- src/lib/crypto.ts: refuse to silently fall back to the active key when a
legacy bare-base64 row is decrypted but no v1 entry is configured. Throws
a clear "Restore ENCRYPTION_KEY (or add a v1 entry to ENCRYPTION_KEYS)
and run scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts before removing it" so an
operator who pulled the v1 too early notices immediately instead of
hitting opaque GCM tag errors.
- docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md: full step-by-step + rollback note +
troubleshooting section. Spells out that rotation is a forward-only
operation and what to do if the rollback path is needed.
Web / worker split (G3)
- src/proxy.ts: refuse HTTP traffic with a 503 +
X-HealthLog-Process-Type: worker header when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=worker.
The worker container (which still runs `node server.js` for now) no
longer accepts requests, so a misrouted client gets a clear hint instead
of a partially-served response.
- src/instrumentation.ts: short-circuit before importing the reminder
worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web — avoids the noisy
"[instrumentation] CRITICAL" stderr line we emitted on every web boot.
- /api/version added to PUBLIC_PATHS so the compose healthcheck doesn't
silently 302-redirect through the auth gate (the prior wget treated the
login page as a 200 success and would never notice an unhealthy backend).
Refresh-token rotation (G4)
- src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts: reuse-detection now revokes ALL active
refresh tokens for the user, not only those scoped to the same deviceId.
An attacker who rotated without an X-Device-Id header would otherwise
keep their family alive on the no-device branch. Defence-in-depth.
- revokeRefreshToken() also revokes the paired access token so a leaked
access token cannot outlive the refresh-token sibling that the caller
just killed (logout-on-device).
Off-host backup (G1)
- src/lib/jobs/offhost-backup.ts: drop the worker-side DeleteObject path.
Retention is the bucket's lifecycle-policy job; the worker keeps a
PutObject + GetObject grant only. A compromised worker can no longer
wipe the backup history. Per-user errors are now surfaced as Wide
Event warnings + a structured failures[] array on the report so an
operator can tell which user failed and why.
- scripts/restore-backup.ts: schema-validate the decrypted payload before
writing to disk, plus an optional --user-id=<id> flag that refuses to
proceed unless the dump's userId matches. Prevents silent
cross-tenant restores when an operator points the script at the wrong
S3 key.
Idempotency
- src/lib/idempotency.ts: the leak-guard already blocked `hlk_`
(access-token prefix); also block `hlr_` so a future caller wrapping
the new /api/auth/refresh endpoint with withIdempotency() can't
accidentally cache a freshly-issued refresh token.
Migration / schema
- prisma/migrations/0025_refresh_tokens/migration.sql: wrap in a single
transaction; switch to CREATE { TABLE | INDEX } IF NOT EXISTS so a
partial-deploy retry is a no-op instead of "relation already exists";
guard the FK ADD with information_schema lookup for the same reason.
- Schema replaces the single-column `@@index([deviceId])` with a
composite `@@index([userId, deviceId])` (every lookup also filters on
userId; the old index would never have been used). Comment on
accessTokenHash corrected to HMAC-SHA-256.
Container / ops
- Dockerfile: install tzdata + ENV TZ=Europe/Berlin so the daily
pg-boss schedule (`30 2 * * *` Europe/Berlin) actually fires at 02:30
Berlin instead of silently falling back to UTC on the alpine base.
- docker-compose.yml: tighten the healthcheck to `wget --spider` (matches
the Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK style, doesn't pipe the body), pass through
BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS so a custom retention env reaches the container.
- .env.example: document every new env var added in this PR
(HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE, ENCRYPTION_KEYS, ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID,
BACKUP_S3_*, BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS) with
comments and the all-or-none semantics for the backup block.
491 tests still green, typecheck clean.
* chore: retrigger CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
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6e74612efc |
test(coverage): real-behaviour tests for audit + webhook routes (~80% line coverage) (#142)
Adds vitest unit tests covering the four zero-coverage webhook / monitoring surfaces external systems hit. Each test mocks at the module boundary (per existing project pattern in src/app/api/auth/login/ __tests__/native-token.test.ts) and asserts on actual call arguments — no test theatre. Per-file line coverage: - src/lib/auth/audit.ts 100.00% - src/app/api/withings/webhook/route.ts 98.11% - src/app/api/integrations/moodlog/webhook/route.ts 95.23% - src/app/api/telegram/webhook/route.ts 95.12% Test count: +61 (494 -> 555). |
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b5bd730ec2 |
test(auth): tighten native-token hash assertions, isolate hmac env, expand coverage scope (#136)
Three small follow-ups to the v1.3.3 audit: - src/lib/auth/__tests__/hmac.test.ts now stubs API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY via vi.stubEnv per test instead of mutating process.env in beforeAll, so the variable is restored cleanly after every case (and worker leaks under --no-isolate are gone). - The two native-token issuance tests (password login + passkey login) now mock hashToken as (raw) => "hashed:" + raw and assert the persisted tokenHash equals hashToken(plaintext) instead of accepting any string. Catches a regression where the route would hash the wrong value. - vitest.config.mts adopts coverage.include for the full src/ tree (the vitest 4 replacement for coverage.all=true) so untouched files surface with 0% rather than being silently omitted, and excludes the future tests/integration/** suite so unit-test runs stay fast. No production code touched; suite stays at 454 green. |
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38309932f3 |
Initial release v1.0.0
HealthLog — personal health-tracking PWA with weight, blood pressure, pulse, mood tracking, medication compliance, Withings integration, doctor report PDF export, and Dracula-themed UI. |