"Finish without the profile" completed the flow with no record id, and
the route then derived the child's answers onto the guardian's own
record. The server now decides: answers given for somebody else with no
record to apply them to complete and latch the flow without deriving or
seeding anything, whatever the client sent. The checklist carries the
profile instead and reads none of those answers as the guardian's own.
A record id the caller does not guard answers 404 like every
id-addressed managed-profile route, one answer for missing, not managed
and not theirs alike; the contract documents the field, the 404 and the
422 text. Pinned by two integration cases and a second child journey.
A loopback, link-local or metadata target answered
private_origin_not_approved with a message telling the user to have the
operator list it, and the parser refuses such an entry forever: a dead
end the route test even pinned. Those targets now answer
private_origin_not_grantable (catalogued, on all four routes, translated
in seven locales) with a message that says no grant can open them and
to use the relay's LAN address. Both senders carry the reason into the
outcome so the test button forwards the same code.
The malformed-entry warning printed the entry verbatim, which is where
a pasted token or userinfo sits; the parser now hands callers scheme
and host only, plus the reason in words. The Nightscout list throws a
named error with that redacted entry and reason, and the connect route
answers it as a 422 with the message instead of a bare 500, so a
self-host that listed http://localhost:1337 reads what to change.
The two settings cards translate a coded save refusal like the test
button does; the docs and the changelog name the sub-host and sibling-
port narrowing; the dispatcher floor tests assert the policy marker so
a real NXDOMAIN cannot pass for a refusal.
Refs #947
"Someone I look after" derived the child's answers onto the guardian's
own record. The completion now takes the managed record the profile
step just created, checks the same access rule the guardian's modules
route applies, and lands the same derivation and dashboard seed on that
record through the same record-keyed write; the guardian's own flow is
stamped complete and latched without touching its map. Three
integration cases pin it, and the child journey reads the child's map
through a real switch — it asserted the guardian's map before, which
pinned the wrong record.
Also from the review: the checklist's visit row read a meta the visits
list never publishes and now counts its body; the first-result tile
read the measurements list as an array and now shows the reading; the
demo allowlist admits the disclaimer and tour writes, with a structural
test over every onboarding route file; restart clears the old first
result, and the screen trusts the ledger before painting a result as
done; the headroom sweep's raw-key check matches the flow's own key
shapes; the demo migration script stops copying the dropped column; the
questions-to-pass rule and the shell's onboarding-path rule are pure and
pinned; the baseline form composes the shared action row; the schema
diff loses the unrelated formatting churn.
At 390 px with labels a third longer the action row pushed "Confirm and
continue" past the viewport; both rows now wrap. The string-headroom
sweep lengthens every word by 30% rather than hanging the whole surplus
on the last one — that manufactured an unbreakable run no locale
produces — leaves screen-reader-only boxes alone, and accepts a select
value's ellipsis, which is the primitive's design app-wide.
Run against the standalone build, the four journeys and the axe sweep
surfaced five things the unit tier could not see. The completion route
derives only once every question is settled, and Q6 stays pending for
somebody with no unit-bearing area — the confirm screen now passes the
questions the flow never showed before it completes. The dashboard seed
matched a JSON null where the unset column is a SQL NULL, so it never
landed; the retired step route carried the same filter. The auth shell's
onboarding branch matched only the front door, so every question screen
rendered inside the full app chrome with the sidebar. Inline links
relied on colour alone, the step list sat outside any landmark, and the
baseline form brought a second h1 onto the confirm screen. The two
sweeps run serially, since each drives one account through the API.
The integration file gains the seed case that would have caught the
null filter.
The done screen moves focus to its heading like every other screen; the
confirm screen's preference list holds only dt/dd pairs and the settings
link stands beside it; Back from Q1 is not offered once the flow has
been entered, because the front door would resume past the welcome and
bounce straight back; the medication task records no target on the
ledger, as the contract says, and keeps the id on the screen; and the
two success affordances go through the outcome module rather than a
hand-rolled tick. The error-code catalogue lists the answers and restart
codes and no longer the retired step ones, and the session-surface guard
learns the one new deriving helper the onboarding pages read through.
The destructive tone as 12px badge text on its own wash measures 4.08:1 in
the light theme and 3.99:1 in the dark one; the muted foreground on the
muted wash 3.6:1 in the dark one. The badge takes the shape the status rows
on the same console already use: the token paints a small indicator and the
wording stays in the foreground colour. The word states the condition, so
nothing hangs on the colour alone.
Four journeys, one account each, from the welcome screen to the
dashboard: blood pressure and weight typed in, a daily medication added
inline, a visit within a month with labs, and a child's managed profile
created on the confirm screen. Each asserts what the walk wrote — the
module map, the tile order, the checklist, the settled ledger — and the
first proves that leaving after Q3 resumes at Q4.
Two sweeps on accounts of their own drive the state through the answers
route and visit every screen by URL: axe at both widths plus one
keyboard-only answer, and every locale with every text node lengthened
by 30% before the page, the shell, every clipping box and every control
are measured. All six run in one project because each mutates the
account it walks.
The medication wizard learns to stay where it was mounted after a
create, which the first-result screen needs and the medications list
does not.
The getting-started checklist reads the answers: a visit named within a
month adds a "prepare the visit" row that is done once one is on the
calendar, and the data-source row names the wearable that was chosen.
Its per-browser state moves to one module so the done screen, the skip
and Settings write the same keys.
Settings → Account gains the two ways back in: "Set up again" through
the restart route, which resets the ledger, keeps the answers as
prefill and touches no module; and "Show the checklist again", which
forgets what this browser hid.
A page whose module is off now answers with the shared notice and the
one action that helps, in one place for every module page: the shell
maps the route to the module through the navigation model's own gate,
so a page and its nav entry cannot disagree about which switch they
follow. And the tour's two dead stops get their anchors on the
integrations and health-record group headings.
The dashboard is one click away, already ordered, and the checklist
opens on arrival. The tour is an offer here rather than an automatic
launch: pressing it sets the referrer the shell's launcher reads, and
nothing else does. Two record-shaped exits follow the answer to Q1: an
account that said "both" is offered the profile for the person it looks
after, and one that set up a record for somebody else is offered that
record through the same switch the account menu uses, so the first
entry lands where it belongs. The step is marked done on arrival, once.
Exactly one task, by the step machine's fixed priority: connect the
wearable named in Q4, add the first medication, or log one reading for
the first area. The measurement form and the medication wizard render
inline; a connection goes through the integrations page, because the
OAuth handshake cannot run inside this screen, and the screen watches
the status envelope until it comes back connected. On completion the
screen shows what the task produced — the reading on its tile, the
medication with its next dose, the connection with its first sync — and
records the result on the ledger with the server's own instant.
The offer is not recorded on arrival: somebody who leaves mid-task
resumes here rather than on the done screen.
What the answers switch on is read off the registry's derivation and
never computed here, so the list the person confirms is the list the
completion route writes. Units, language and time zone are shown once
beside it, changeable in Settings, never asked again.
The profile half keeps the baseline form and its per-field refusals:
the fields are seeded from the account so a value it holds is confirmed
rather than typed again, and a refused field still stops the flow. For
"someone I look after" the managed-profile form takes the profile's
place, because that record is created here, after the questions; an
account without a second factor can finish without it and create it
later under Settings.
Confirming posts the completion, passes the first-result step outright
when there is no task to offer, and goes where the step machine says.
One question per screen, Q1 to Q6, each a chip set with a real radio or
checkbox inside every chip so the browser owns grouping and keyboard
movement, and a focus ring the five-step picker's hidden inputs never
had. The selection is pre-filled from the stored answers, "Next"
persists it through the answers route and navigates from the state the
server hands back, and Q1 is the one question without a skip.
The questions are data (which step, which answers, one or many, may it
be passed) with two pure translations beside them — stored answers into
a selection, a selection into the strict body — so the wire never sees
a chip this file did not offer. Q6 asks only about the units the ticked
areas need and sends nothing for a value the account already had.
The step page guards every URL with the step machine and stays under
/onboarding/, which is what the first-run redirect lets through.
The front door reads the same ledger every screen reads: a record that
never entered the flow sees the welcome, one mid-way is sent to the step
it owes, a finished one is offered the questions again. The shell prints
the counter and an ordered step list off the step machine, so it shows
exactly the screens this flow has, and every screen moves focus to its
heading on arrival.
"Skip for now" is a real exit — it stamps the account past the first-run
redirect and opens the checklist on the dashboard — and the one-time
medical disclaimer now gates it as well as "Set up", because a skip that
reached the dashboard without it would be a way round the acknowledgment.
The five-step wizard's welcome carousel, goal picker and source grid go
with it; the numbered step route follows in the next commit.
The write-level row listed "a vaccination dose and the booster reminder it
suggests" three paragraphs under a section table that puts the vaccination
record in Health background. Read together, that tells a self-hoster a
health-background WRITE grant can plan a booster — which the route beside it
now refuses, because the reminder it mints lives under Readings. The row lists
the dose alone, and the exceptions paragraph, which is where a reader looks for
exactly this, carries the two-section case and says the dose logs either way.
With it, the small things the same pass turned up:
The cycle-insights fixture asserted a property it could not show. Its docblock
claims the cycle-native answer survives the fence, and it seeded no symptom at
all, so `symptomPatterns` was empty in every leg and a regression that emptied
it along with the foreign columns would have passed green. One catalogue
symptom on the luteal days, asserted on the owner leg and on the cycle-only
one.
The immunization rows matched on a bare `role="button"`, which passes vacuously
the day the card becomes a real button and fails for the wrong reason if
anything else in the subtree grows one. They carry the same stable marker the
visit card took.
`/api/cycle/calendar` reads the same wrist-temperature channel the crosstab
does and is deliberately not fenced, and it was the only one of the pair with
nothing saying why: no value from it reaches the response.
The encrypted export's new 403 documented the switch refusal and not the
narrow-scope one it answers first, unlike the two settings operations beside
it. Both sheets say at the top that their Save and Delete are gated at the
caller, so a third mount reads the constraint before it violates it. And one
docblock line ran past the wrap.
The account payload resolved the setup state for the actor while its module
map, its cycle flag and every count the checklist reads beside it answer for
the active record. A guardian looking at a child's dashboard therefore got the
child's rows ordered by their own answers, and the child's reading count
tested against their own flow state. The two halves of that component have to
agree about whose record they describe, so the field is record-scoped now,
like the module map next to it.
Under a grant narrowed to one section the answers come back empty, for the
reason the module map is masked: they name the domains the record tracks, and
a grant that opens readings does not open that. The shape of the flow still
comes through.
The three write routes stay actor-only and say why: a delegable declaration is
a reviewed entry in the sharing surface guard, and a read that is wider than
its write is the honest shape while that entry is still to come.
The entry carried "Non-delegable in v1, server-side and here". That was true at
v1.36.0 and is not true now: twenty-seven `/api/insights/*` reads plus
`/api/dashboard/summary` and `/api/export/health-record` declare
`("manage", "record")`, and the AI-egress objection they were closed for is
answered by construction rather than by the flag — the record resolver stamps
`setDelegatedGenerationSuppressed`, so a delegate reads what the owner's own
account generated and causes no egress.
What keeps the door shut is the overview's own reads rather than the tiles':
`/api/insights/layout` and `/api/insights/generate` both resolve `requireAuth()`
and refuse any switch at any level. Opening the entry without first deciding
what those two mean for a delegate — whose saved layout, and whether the
briefing reads or regenerates — would hand a whole-record MANAGE delegate a page
whose chrome 403s while its tiles answer, which is the failure the presentation
inventory exists to prevent. That is a decision about two more routes, not a
flag on this one, so the comment now says what is actually load-bearing and the
Coach's own reason is stated separately.
`POST /api/vaccinations/{id}/booster` is declared `("write", "profile")`, and
that is right for the act — filing the Impfpass and arming the booster it
suggests are one thing to the person doing them. The row it writes is not: a
`MeasurementReminder` belongs to the measurements section, every direct route
over the model declares it there, and creating one needs MANAGE. So a WRITE
grant scoped to the health background alone produced a reminder on the owner's
checkup list that the delegate could neither read nor change through the
section that owns it.
The seam is fenced the way the visits service fences a checkup closure, with
one difference stated at the call site: this refuses rather than skips. There
the closure is one effect of a larger save and reporting it as not done keeps
the save honest; here the reminder is the whole request, and a 201 over a row
that was never written would tell the person their booster is planned while
nothing rings. The prompt that raises the call asks the same question client-
side, so a delegate outside the section is not offered it in the first place;
the dose itself still logs either way.
`vaccination-booster-scoped-delegate.test.ts` drives the owner, a delegate
holding both sections, a profile-only delegate and a whole-record one. The
scoped-refusal leg fails against the previous handler, which answered 201 and
left the row.
Six page gates read `inSharedRecord || user?.modules?.X`, with a comment saying
the delegate's own module map does not govern the owner's record. That was true
when it was written and stopped being true in v1.38.14: `GET /api/auth/me` now
publishes the RECORD's map, masked to what the grant opens, so the prefix that
protected against reading the wrong map now widens the gate instead. The
navigation drops the entry correctly while a typed URL still renders the page
for a record whose owner switched the module off, and `/api/vaccinations`
carries no module gate of its own, so it renders and works.
Deleting the prefix answers both cases from the one map, which is what it is
for. A structural guard holds the six expressions: it locates each gate, proves
it is a module gate, and then asserts it does not widen on the sharing
question. It finds nothing to assert on if the expression moves, and says so,
rather than passing on an empty match. All six legs fail against the previous
gates.
Additive: `onboarding` carries the nine steps with their status, the answers as
given, the flow's own completion stamp and the one task it offered. Always
present — a record that never entered the flow reads as empty answers with nine
pending steps, so a client branches on the statuses rather than on whether the
field exists, and an unknown step id is skipped rather than refused.
It is resolved for the CALLER's own record rather than for the active one,
unlike the two module fields beside it. The three write routes are actor-only,
and publishing a setup state the browser cannot write would be a read it could
act on and never complete.
Both ends land here, because a field with no reader is the failure this
repository keeps rediscovering. The getting-started checklist orders its rows
from the answers — medication first for somebody who takes one daily, the
data-source row first for somebody who named a wearable — and it stays on screen
while the flow is unfinished. That is the second half: five readings were never
evidence that the setup finished, and now a pending step, an unconfirmed set of
answers or an offered task that produced nothing keeps the list where it is.
The ordering only applies once the answers are confirmed. Re-ordering the
dashboard under somebody who is still mid-question would be movement they did
not ask for.
`canWrite` is the grant's LEVEL and carries no scope term. Its docblock said
"May this caller ADD to that record", and the client hook republished it as
`canAdd`, so fourteen controls across measurements, medications, labs, illness
and the dashboard gated a create on a boolean that answers `true` for a WRITE
grant scoped to the document vault — a grant whose writable-section list is
empty, because the vault takes no delegated write at any level.
Nothing shipped was visibly wrong before the capture picker, because the nav
drops a section a grant does not open. That is a property of one surface, not
of the answer, and the answer is the thing many controls read.
So the coarse answer is gone from the hook, and every consumer asks
`canWriteDomain` for its own section instead: `measurements` on the two
measurement surfaces and the dashboard's empty state, `medications` on the
medication list, table, ledger, card menu and side effects, `labs` on the lab
list and biomarker detail, `illness` on the episode list. Each of those is the
section its own route declares. `canWrite` keeps its name and its wire shape —
native clients read it — and its docblock now says what it is: whether the
grant is a reading one, with the per-section lists beside it for the question a
control actually has.
The hook table gained the vault-scoped WRITE grant as its own leg: level true,
every section false. The take-all-due fixture described a grant the server
never mints — `canWrite: true` over an empty writable list — and now derives
its list from the same table the server derives it from.
The capture FAB rides the bottom bar on every authenticated page, and its
fallback arm was section-blind:
return caps.canAdd && DELEGABLE_CAPTURE_KINDS.has(kind);
`canAdd` is bound straight to the grant's LEVEL — `grantAllows(grant, "write")`,
no scope term at all. So a WRITE grant scoped to `["labs"]` published
`canAdd: true` with `writableDomains: ["labs"]`, and a delegate standing on
`/labs` was offered a weight form and a dose that the server refuses at
`grantCoversDomain`. The worst case is a WRITE grant scoped to `["documents"]`:
the vault takes no delegated write at any level, the writable list is empty, and
both kinds were still offered.
`writableDomains` is already the level × scope × route-table intersection, so
one question per kind, asked of that kind's own section, answers the scoped
case, the vault case and the mood entry's MANAGE-only create together. The
closed kind list and the separate manage arm are both dead once that lands and
are gone. The dashboard quick-entry sheets and the header menu carried the same
shape — unreachable today, because the dashboard opens only for a whole-record
grant — and move with it rather than waiting to become reachable.
The picker's legs in the affordances suite now build their capabilities from
the same table the server publishes, and four scoped cases join them: labs-only
offers nothing, measurements-only offers the reading, documents-only offers
nothing at all, and a mind-scoped manage offers the mood entry alone.
`VisitsSection` asked the grant about its add button and nothing else. Every row
underneath stayed tappable into the edit sheet, whose Save is `PATCH
/api/encounters/{id}` and whose Delete is `DELETE` on the same path — both
`("manage", "profile")`. So a READ delegate opened a form that could not be
saved, and a WRITE delegate, who may file a new visit, opened one that could not
be changed. Reachable wherever the checkups page is, which is every
`profile`-scoped grant.
The row now takes its open callback only when `canManageDomain("profile")`
answers, and the card renders its content as content rather than as a button
when it does not. The add button keeps asking the write question, because that
is a different question with a different answer.
Four legs in the affordances suite over the same scoped fixtures the
immunization log uses: the owner opens the sheet, a READ and a WRITE delegate
see the row and cannot open it, a WRITE delegate still gets the add button, and
a MANAGE delegate opens it only while holding the section. Two of them fail
against the previous section.
The immunization log carried no capability check at all: not one reference to
the record hook anywhere under `src/components/vaccinations`. The page is
presentable to every `profile`-scoped grant and to every whole-record one, so a
READ delegate was shown the add button, a clickable row that opens the edit
sheet, and the delete inside it — three controls the server refuses with a 403
each. A WRITE delegate was shown two of them.
`POST /api/vaccinations` answers at WRITE; the edit, the delete and the restore
behind it are `("manage", "profile")`. The two add buttons now ask
`canWriteDomain("profile")` and the row's edit affordance asks
`canManageDomain("profile")`, which is the split the address book next door
already gets right. The list already renders a non-interactive card when it is
handed no edit callback, and the sheet is only reachable through one of the two
gated entries, so nothing needs a second check that could drift from the first.
`delegated-write-affordances.test.tsx` gained a scoped-grant fixture — every
fixture in it was `sections: null`, which is why nothing noticed — and six legs
over the log: the owner, a READ, a WRITE and a MANAGE delegate holding
`profile`, a MANAGE delegate holding another section, and the empty state's own
add. Four of them fail against the previous view.
Four smaller things around the same card.
The configured flag came from the environment of whichever process serves the
request. A hand-rolled split that gives BACKUP_S3_* to the worker and not to
the web process would have shown an operator "nothing leaves this host" over a
ledger full of fresh rows. The ledger is queried either way now, and a row in
it outranks an environment read: a row is proof an upload happened.
Rows sorted by username put the one account that needs attention wherever the
alphabet leaves it, which on a hundred-account cohort is the crowd problem the
card exists to end, moved from a count into a list. Worst verdict first,
alphabetical within a verdict, decided server-side so the tests and the
accessibility fixture see the order the operator does.
The card's docblock claimed the worker holds PutObject and GetObject. The
runbook is right and the multipart path needs AbortMultipartUpload too, so the
prose no longer documents a grant that would break the uploader.
And the byte formatter moved to lib. The off-host card was importing it out of
a thousand-line client component, which costs nothing while both cards render
on one route and becomes a cost the moment either moves.
The badge read the enabled flag plus a DSN that parses. Neither says anything
about the target accepting a report: a wrong public key, a wrong project id and
a host that stopped answering all parse, and every one of them showed green
with a line naming the host. That is the false reassurance an operator finds
out about when they go looking for a crash that was never reported.
Nothing in the tree recorded an outcome, so there was nothing to read. The
sender now stamps one next to the DSN it used — instant on a success, a short
classification on a failure. Never the response body: that is text from a
remote host and has no business in this database or on this page.
The badge is green only while a report has left inside the last fortnight,
amber while a target is set and nothing has come back, and it names the reason
underneath. The clock lives with the ledger, so the verdict is resolved in the
route and the card paints what it is handed. A failure that a later success
superseded is not shown at all. Pressing Test records like any other send, so
the button proves the target on demand.
On the release that adds the ledger the table is empty, so on a host that has
been uploading nightly for months every account read Never, under a sentence
saying no copy had ever reached the bucket. That sentence is untrue on exactly
the morning an operator opens the new card for the first time, and it is a
claim the host cannot make: what is empty is the record, not the bucket.
The run now records every account it walks, not only the ones an object came
of. A walk that produced nothing moves the attempt instant and leaves the
success columns alone, so the two cases separate: no row at all is no record
yet, a row without a success is never. Never now means what the word says —
a run looked at this account and has never put anything there.
The card names the last check on the never row, so the state is a fact with a
timestamp rather than an assertion. Runbook and all seven bundles carry the
same two sentences. The integration file proves both arms against real
Postgres, including that a failed run leaves the previous good copy on the
row.
The unit tests either side of this mock Prisma, so neither proves the
migration applies or that the writer and the reader agree on a shape. The
integration file runs the real nightly job against real Postgres with an
in-memory bucket, then reads the row back and asks the console's own
classifier what it says: fresh after a run, one row across two runs, stale
once it ages past two nightly periods, gone when the account is.
The component test pins the case an operator most needs stated: a host with
no bucket configured says so, rather than painting an empty list that reads
as "no problems". The accessibility scan's admin-backups response gains one
row in each state, because a card that paints only its header proves nothing
about the rows anybody reads.
Two small corrections ride along, both from writing the tests. The freshness
badge composes its classes through `cn` like every other surface, and the
error-reporting line waits for the settings to arrive instead of asserting
"nothing is sent" while the answer is still loading.
There is no default error-reporting DSN in this tree and there should not be:
a self-hoster's crash reports must not leave their host because nobody told
them not to. That part was already right, so nothing here adds a default.
What was wrong is what the console said about it. The GlitchTip card showed a
green "Configured" badge as soon as a DSN existed, whether or not the switch
that actually sends anything was on, and it never said where reports go. An
operator reading that badge has been told their errors are being collected
somewhere, which may be true of neither half.
The badge now tracks reports actually leaving, and one line under the switch
states the case: the host they go to, or that they stay here, or that tracking
is on with no target. The host only — the public key in the DSN answers a
different question. The deploy runbook says the same thing for a
maintainer-operated instance.
The nightly off-host job reports counts — uploaded, failed, total — and a
count cannot name the account it is failing for. A cohort where one object
has been refused every night for a month reads as "99 uploaded, 1 failed"
each time, which looks like weather rather than like an account with no
disaster-recovery copy at all.
The worker now writes a ledger row when an object lands (account, instant,
size), and Admin → Backups gains a second card that rates every account
against the nightly schedule: fresh inside one run, due when one run
produced nothing, stale when two did not, never when no object has ever
landed. On a host without BACKUP_S3_* the card says off-host backup is not
configured and stops there.
The verdicts are computed from the ledger, never from a bucket listing: the
worker's grant is deliberately PutObject + GetObject, and an admin page must
not put the operator's credentials on its render path to state a number the
database already holds.
The admin snapshot paints its worker row in `--destructive` whenever the
process serving the page is not the worker: a split deployment running
`HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web`, or a worker that stopped answering. The token
is AA on a card (4.85:1 in the light theme) but the stat tile lays a
`bg-muted/50` wash over that card, and axe measured the tinted wording at
3.97:1 there, under the 4.5:1 AA floor. `e2e/a11y.spec.ts` went red in
exactly that state and green in every other one, which is why the console
could ship it.
The status grids now name a tone instead of spelling a class at every call
site. Success and warning keep their tint, both clear AA on the tile.
Destructive takes the shape the other status rows already use, the
medication detail row and the invite chips: the token paints a small
indicator and the wording stays in `text-foreground`. The word itself
("Stopped", "Error") states the condition, so nothing hangs on the colour
alone. The database, Umami and GlitchTip rows sit on the same surface with
the same tint and move with it.
The success-affordance guard's two pinned entries for the status grids went
stale in the process: the tint they carried now lives once in the tone
table, so the pins follow it there.
Checked against a standalone build on a throwaway database: the whole a11y
spec green in both themes and both viewports with `HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE`
at `web` (the failing state) and at `all`. jsdom cannot measure a contrast
ratio, so the new unit test pins the token choice for both arms instead.
The file claimed it stayed inside its own account. "Backup now" enqueues the
pass for every account on the instance, so the header says that now, and says
what is confined instead: the restore's transaction, and the instance-wide
settings the dialog's opt-in leaves alone — which the journey asserts is clear
before it confirms, because a default that flipped would hand this file the
power to rewrite the document size cap for every spec sharing the server.
The run's own answer is asserted where it happens. Without it a missing worker
cost two minutes of polling and then blamed the backup pass for a 503 about
something else; the failure now names the endpoint in two seconds.
The rest are the assertions that pinned incidentals rather than promises: the
Argon2 cost comes from the constant the writer exports, so a legitimate cost
bump is not a red spec; the document is found by id rather than by position;
the poll compares the row against the row it saw before the click rather than
against the runner's clock; the non-admin bounce is pinned by pathname; the
empty-state CTA has its own test id, so nothing has to pick between two
buttons that share one; the deliberately corrupted copy is deleted when the
control is done with it instead of sitting in the console's list; and the
fixture orders by id after the timestamp so a tie cannot present as a change.
A disaster-recovery snapshot carries the singleton `app_settings` row —
registration, the MFA requirement, the default locale and timezone, module
availability, the notification and AI configuration, the document size cap and
quota — and the restore wrote it back as a side effect of restoring one
account. An operator putting a single record back on Wednesday reconfigured the
whole host from Monday's file, silently, with nothing on screen saying so.
Rebuilding a host from a snapshot is a real case, so the write stays: it is now
`restoreInstanceSettings: true` on the request and a checkbox beside the typed
gate, off unless the operator ticks it. Restoring an account and reconfiguring
the installation are two decisions, so they are two answers.
The 422 confirmation sentence and the dialog copy drop the instance-wide claim;
the opt-in carries it instead, in all seven catalogues. Integration coverage
runs both arms: without the flag the settings row keeps its own values, with it
the file's values land.
One journey across the whole path: an account writes readings in three
domains and files a PDF, downloads its own record as the passphrase-sealed
archive, an admin snapshots it from the backups console, and the snapshot is
restored over an account that has since lost a reading and a dose and gained
one the snapshot never saw.
The assertions address what the documentation promises rather than what the
implementation happens to do. The archive is checked byte by byte against the
HLX1 header in src/lib/export/passphrase-archive.ts — magic, version, KDF id
and the Argon2 cost the file carries — because "a file arrived" is equally
true of plaintext JSON under a new extension. The restored reading and dose
are checked by their ORIGINAL ids, because a restore that re-created them
under fresh ones would have written a different record that reads the same.
The reading created after the snapshot is asserted GONE: the runbook says the
restore replaces the account's data tables, and replacing is not merging.
Two refusing controls. A stored copy with one flipped ciphertext byte is
refused with the route's decrypt failure and leaves the record untouched — the
envelope is AES-256-GCM and its tag covers every byte, so the flip is caught
before the transaction opens. A delegate holding whole-record READ inside the
account gets the not-covered panel instead of the export card, never reaches
the console, and is refused 403 by the list, the manual run and the restore,
the last of them naming the real snapshot so the refusal cannot be mistaken
for a missing row.
Waiting is on the job's own evidence: the console's endpoint is polled until
this account's stored copy is newer than the click, so nothing in the file
guesses at a queue. The journey has its own account, its own delegate and its
own cookie jars; only the reset between repetitions and the deliberate
corruption reach Postgres directly, because a browser cannot express either.
The backups console gains data-testid hooks and a data-backup-id on each row
so the spec addresses controls rather than translated labels.
The spec re-declared the server's algorithm, digit count and period as
literals, so a change to any of them would leave the spec generating codes the
server no longer verifies and blaming the product. It imports the three
exported constants instead; the recovery-batch size stays a literal, because
its module pulls in the database client and would drag the generated client
into the Playwright process.
The two credential fields on the login form are addressed by test id now, like
the submit button beside them, and the recovery toggle at the challenge is
renamed to the house's noun-verb order.
The confirming click on both alert dialogs in the TOTP card calls
preventDefault(), which is what keeps the dialog up and its button disabled
while the request is in flight. Nothing took the dialog down again, so a
refused rotation left the confirmation open over the card, and the card is the
only place the refusal explains itself: the step-up message painted behind the
overlay, inside the aria-hidden region the modal creates, with the confirm
button live again. A success hid it, because the fresh-codes panel replaces the
branch the dialog lives in and it unmounted anyway.
Both dialogs are controlled now, and each mutation closes its own when the
request settles, whichever way it went. The disable arm carried the same shape
and a mistyped six-digit code there is routine, so it is fixed with it.
The card test pins the sentence a step-up refusal shows and the wiring that
takes the dialog down; what a person sees is asserted against a real browser in
e2e/mfa-step-up-journey.spec.ts.
`GET /api/auth/me` publishes a boolean per module, and three different
situations collapse into the same `false`: the record has the module switched
off, the active grant's sections do not open it, or the operator switched it
off for the whole instance. A client holding the boolean has to guess between
them, so the empty state either says nothing or says something that may be
untrue -- offering a delegate a switch that is not theirs to reach, or telling
an account holder to turn on a module the operator removed.
`moduleAccess` carries the reason beside the booleans, which keep their exact
meaning: `enabled`, `disabled`, `not_granted`, `unavailable`, resolved
outside-in so the reason published is the one nothing further in can change.
`modules[key]` stays exactly `moduleAccess[key] === "enabled"` for every key,
and the two halves are built independently -- the boolean still runs through
`maskModulesToSections` -- so the test of that pairing is an assertion rather
than a restatement of a derivation. It is checked on the pure builder across a
matrix of grants, records and operator blobs, and again on the real route for a
scoped delegate, an unscoped one, and an operator-disabled module.
Both ends in one change, because a payload field with no reader is the failure
this repository keeps rediscovering. The reader is `ModuleDisabledNotice`, the
shared module-off empty state the empty-states audit asks for: it names the
reason in the reader's own language and offers the enable control only when the
record's own switch is what is off, since neither of the other two is fixable
from that page. The nutrients page adopts it and drops its bespoke block, which
had been handing every delegate a button that would refuse them.
Registered in the OpenAPI registry as `ModuleAccessMap` and carried on the
account payload; the native contract gains a field and loses nothing, since a
Bearer request carries no switch and never reads `not_granted`.
Enrol TOTP from the settings surface, sign out, sign back in through the
challenge, and step up for a recovery-code rotation — in a browser, against
a real server, on a throwaway account the journey seeds and drops itself.
Four refusals ride alongside the four positives: a wrong code at the
challenge (401, no session cookie, and the ticket's attempt counter moved),
the enrolment code replayed (401, refused by the monotonic totpLastStep
floor), the rotation once the session's mfaVerifiedAt has aged past the
five-minute window (401 with meta.errorCode auth.stepup.required), and a
recovery code presented a second time (401). Each was proved to fail by
removing the control it stands on and watching that one assertion break.
Codes are computed from the enrolment secret with the otpauth dependency the
server verifies against, at explicit timestamps, so nothing waits on a step
boundary: the sign-in code is generated one step ahead of now, inside the
±1 drift window and necessarily above the replay floor.
The fixture reaches Postgres for the two things that have no endpoint by
design — ageing the step-up stamp, and emptying the per-IP auth buckets
this journey would otherwise exhaust. The account carries the Playwright
project name so the two browser projects never drive one factor state.
Adds data-testid hooks on the TOTP card, the login step, and the password
form so the spec asserts on stable attributes instead of rendered text.
`data-latest-rate` is a production attribute whose only reader was the browser
suite, so a change to the rate's shape would have surfaced three minutes and a
whole server away from the gate that should own it. One unit test now renders
the chart over a loaded window and asserts the root carries the last day's
rate.
Two comments were wrong. The card's take / skip buttons do not collapse to
icons at narrow widths — both render their label unconditionally beside the
icon — so only the true half of the reason for addressing them by `data-slot`
survives: the labels are translated copy.
And the Enter press in the wizard's times-of-day helper is not decoration.
The field's overlay input holds what is being typed and hands it to the form
only on Enter or on blur (`src/components/ui/time-field.tsx:175-184`), while
the add button is disabled on an empty draft — so a fill followed straight by
a click waits out the actionability timeout on a button that never enables.
Proven by removing it: the flow died at exactly that click. The line stays,
with the reason written beside it.
`PATCH /api/managed-profiles/{id}` had none, while creating a record and
inviting a Guardian have both been capped at ten an hour since they shipped —
one family answering the same abuse three ways. It matters more here than the
count suggests: `updateManagedProfile` opens a transaction and takes an
advisory lock on the id it was HANDED before it decides the caller is not a
Guardian of it, so an unthrottled caller can name any id and make the database
hold a lock about it.
The refusal now lands before the id is read, on the same bucket convention and
with the same ceiling as creation. The GET beside it stays unlimited, matching
the guardian roster read next to it: both are cheap identity reads a Guardian
may already make. The 429 is documented on the contract and the edit form's
message mapping grew the arm creation already had.
Marc-André Bombeck