Commit Graph
15 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marc-André Bombeck 3ffdfe15a1 fix(api): give the shared write ceiling a code a client can branch on
The eleven single-record writes answered their shared 429 with prose and
nothing else, while the envelope's own description tells a client to
branch on `meta.errorCode`. On `POST /api/medications/[id]/intake` and
`POST /api/cycle/day-logs` a second, narrower bucket can answer 429 as
well, so the presence of the rate-limit headers was the only thing
telling the two refusals apart.

All eleven now carry `record_write.rate_limited`, the catalogue lists
it, the published 429 names it, and the contract test fails if a site
stops emitting it or the sentence stops publishing it.

The same description now states what a client could not predict from
"300 requests per 60 seconds": refused requests count too, because the
check runs before the body is read.
2026-09-10 08:39:09 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck ab6c1cd917 fix(api): put a ceiling under the single-record writes
The batch endpoints have been capped at 60 calls a minute since they
were written. The per-record siblings a naive or older client loops
over — the measurement create, the mood entry, both medication-intake
writes, a lab result, a custom-metric entry, a cycle day-log, a
vaccination, an allergy, a biomarker and an encounter — had no ceiling
at all. That is backwards from the risk: the batch endpoint is the one
a well-behaved client uses, and the unlimited path is the one a broken
loop finds.

All eleven share one generous per-account bucket, `record-write`, at
300 requests a minute. Five writes a second sustained for a full minute
is beyond any hand-driven session and any sync burst, and every one of
these routes is already wrapped in `withIdempotency`, so an honest
retry storm is deduplicated before it is counted — the bucket exists to
cut off the pathological loop, not to shape traffic. It keys on the
ACTING account, the precedent the delegable medication routes set, so a
delegate burns their own allowance rather than locking the record's
owner out of their own log.

The eleven operations publish the bucket name and the cap instead of
the generic refusal, on the shared 429 that already declares
`Retry-After` and the rate-limit triple. A test pulls the key and the
window out of the query the limiter runs and holds the published
sentence to them, so the paragraph cannot drift away from the bucket it
describes.
2026-09-10 07:42:07 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck d86358f3e4 fix: recover managed sharing boundaries 2026-08-06 00:19:35 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck da3cabb55f Give a grant a section set and a third level
A grant has meant one thing since it shipped: the whole record, to read or to
add to. This lays the words for the two shapes the rest of the sharing work
needs — part of a record, and management of one — while changing what no
existing grant does.

`ShareDomain` is a closed set of eight sections in `src/lib/sharing/scope.ts`,
clustered from the delegable read surfaces rather than invented, plus the
distinguished `record` for the routes that read across them. It never converts
to a `ModuleKey` and never imports one: two masks, two questions, no shared
spelling, because the day they share a name is the day somebody makes one
imply the other, and a module the owner enabled is not a section the owner
shared.

`account_grants.scope_json` is NULL on every row that exists, and NULL is the
entire record — the answer those rows were consented as, so no backfill and no
re-consent. A non-NULL value is read through one fail-closed normaliser: a
blob it cannot parse opens nothing, including a section the blob happened to
name. That is the deliberate inverse of the module preference normaliser,
which fails open on purpose; both do the safe thing with a value nobody can
read, and the safe thing differs because one answers an authorization question
and the other a presentation question.

`MANAGE` joins the level enum, ordered above WRITE so a write grant can never
satisfy it, and carries no scope at all: management of part of a record
promises a boundary that cannot survive an edit, so the invite path refuses to
write one.

`requireRecordAuth` takes the section as a second required argument. The
requirement is the lever — a delegable route without a classification does not
typecheck, so the set of classified routes cannot fall behind the set of
delegable ones. All fifty-seven modules carry theirs. The structural guard
freezes each against the production vocabulary, fails when a module's own arms
disagree, and pins a non-zero count of resolved sections so a matcher that
stopped reading the argument fails instead of agreeing with everything.

`requireGuardianAuth` is exported and reaches nothing yet. It gates on the
managed-profile marker rather than on the grant, so an adult who granted
management of their own record cannot arrive at that record's settings by any
argument about what MANAGE means: widening MANAGE would widen the record
resolver and would not touch this one. Its frozen list lands empty, with the
declaration site as the positive control that keeps "nothing reaches it" a
measurement rather than a renamed symbol.

`users.managed_profile_at` says since when a record is one somebody else runs.
A timestamp and not a boolean, for a reason the schema has to keep possible:
clearing it is the handover, and the grants and the activity trail span it
untouched.
2026-08-04 17:11:40 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c6be0778dc Let a delegate enter a lab result and the marker it needs
POST /api/labs and POST /api/biomarkers resolve the record. The free-text
lab path mints its biomarker under the record's catalogue rather than the
caller's — a result added to somebody's record whose marker landed on the
helper's account would leave the owner with a reading they cannot chart.

Adding a marker the record already tracks stays the ordinary 409 from the
same per-account uniqueness the owner would hit themselves. The PUT and
DELETE on the sibling routes are unchanged and still refuse under a switch.

Both validation breadcrumbs move to auditLog(), the only writer that stamps
the acting account.
2026-08-03 12:10:49 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck af0f749740 feat(sharing): open the lab and clinical-record reads to a delegate
Ten routes: lab results and their detail, the biomarker catalogue and its
detail, allergies, family history, the mental-health screener history, and
the health-profile facts. All GET arms; every write arm in the same files
keeps `requireAuth()` and refuses under a switch.

The family-history payload is the one admitted read that carries third-party
health information by design — it describes the owner's relatives — and it is
admitted because a caregiver reading a family history is what the feature is
for and the rows are the owner's own.

The mental-health module gate resolves against the record, not the caller.
That is the recorded decision: the module map says which parts of a record
exist, so a delegate who enabled the screener on their own account gains no
screener view inside somebody else's. The integration test asserts both
directions.
2026-08-02 16:38:39 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c91558f18f feat(analytics): replace health score with reference composite 2026-07-28 21:10:15 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 62eb431d66 release: v1.32.0 — hardening and scalability (#580)
* release: prepare v1.32.0

* test: stabilize water capture re-entry
2026-07-22 04:14:15 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck f17131dbdf test(labs): cover the biomarker assessment, detail page, and marker delete/range
Add coverage for the new biomarker-assessment seam and the marker detail
surface:

- the generator serves today's cache, re-stamps unchanged readings without an
  LLM call, and regenerates only when the latest-reading fingerprint changes
- the read-only endpoint returns the envelope, 422s a missing id, and honours
  the auth + insightStatus gates
- the detail page paints the stat strip, the chart placeholder, and the
  assessment card
- the biomarker resource route drops the marker with its readings in one
  userId-narrowed transaction and rejects an inverted target range

Hold the input gate independent of the worker's forced run so an idle marker
re-stamps cached text instead of regenerating, and list the new route on the
non-Coach gate allowlist.
2026-06-28 13:58:43 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 51aa37f654 feat(labs): delete a biomarker together with its values
Deleting a biomarker now removes its recorded values in the same
userId-narrowed transaction instead of unlinking them via the SetNull
FK. Removing a marker is a deliberate "drop this and its history"
action, so leaving orphaned, unlinked readings behind was surprising.

Update the delete-confirmation copy in all six locales to state that
the values are removed too.
2026-06-28 13:21:28 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e097e57c84 feat(labs): add a hidden flag to the biomarker catalog
Add a `hidden` boolean to the Biomarker model (migration
0195_biomarker_hidden) so a marker the user no longer needs can be
soft-removed instead of deleted: it leaves the active catalog and the
lab-entry pickers but keeps its readings and canonical unit/range.

Thread `hidden` through the DTO, the update schema, the PUT handler
(field-by-field), and the list endpoint (visible markers first). Regen
the OpenAPI contract.
2026-06-27 12:48:48 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck bc94a5893f feat(modules): default the illness journal on
The illness module shipped opt-in/default-off via a bornGated flag, the
inverse of the standard disabled-allowlist. Make it a normal optional
module that defaults on (opt-out), matching labs and its siblings.

No module used bornGated other than illness, so drop the flag, its
isBornGatedModule helper, and the gate resolver's born-gated branch
entirely. The module stays a normal toggle under What you track and the
operator-level availability override is unchanged; an account that wants
it off sets an explicit false. Refresh the gate, doctor-report, labs and
biomarkers comments plus the OpenAPI route descriptions accordingly.
2026-06-17 14:10:46 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 6df0c64d85 fix(labs): fail-soft the biomarker list context decrypt
The catalog GET eagerly threw on the first un-decryptable context row,
500ing the whole list. The list serializer now decrypts fail-soft (null
on a bad-key/malformed row) via decryptContextSoft, bounding the
fail-closed blast radius to one marker; the single-resource GET stays the
authoritative throwing read for the plaintext context.
2026-06-16 23:11:54 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 9141b8f74f fix(labs): guard partial bound edits against an inverted range
A PUT that moves a single reference bound past the row's stored other
bound slipped through the schema refine (which only fires when both bounds
arrive together). Both the lab-result and biomarker routes now merge the
effective bounds and 422 on low > high. Editing catalog-resolved fields
(analyte/unit/panel/range) on a linked reading is also rejected rather than
silently no-oped. Shared isInvertedRange/effectiveBound helpers with tests.
2026-06-16 23:11:48 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e9037a0d92 feat(labs): biomarker catalog with server-resolved reference ranges
Add a user-scoped Biomarker catalog so a marker is defined once — name,
unit, lower/upper bound, optional encrypted context, panel — and every
later reading just links it. New /api/biomarkers CRUD plus a structured
/api/labs create path: a biomarkerId resolves the unit + reference range
server-side, so the list and detail DTOs carry the resolved values and
the client never recomputes the range. Lab reads include the linked
marker and fall back to the legacy free-text fields for unlinked rows.

Add a lab-result restore endpoint for the delete-Undo affordance, a
shared serialiser, a static common-panel seed list, and tests for
catalog validation, structured-entry resolution, and the context codec.
2026-06-16 21:05:51 +02:00