Token verification: jwtVerify now carries a closed asymmetric algorithm
allowlist (RS256/PS256/ES256/EdDSA — an HMAC alg would let anyone with
the client secret forge identities) and a 60 s clock tolerance for the
usual self-host drift between IdP and app box. The JWKS fetch — jose's
own, outside safeFetch by design — is disciplined instead by pinning
the jwks_uri host to the configured issuer's host byte-exact and
passing the same 15 s timeout safeFetch defaults to. requirePublicHost
stays deliberately unused on this surface: LAN/Tailscale-only IdPs are
a legitimate topology and the issuer is operator config, not user
input.
Discovery: the issuer comparison now tolerates exactly one trailing
slash on either side (a recurring IdP/operator mismatch); token
verification still matches the provider-sent issuer byte-exact.
State cookie: the cookie is set under Path=/api/auth/oidc but was
deleted without a path — RFC 6265 keys cookies by (name, domain,
path), so the deletion never matched and the single-use blob survived
its whole TTL. Every delete now repeats the exact path, via a shared
constant.
Also: the IdP error code recorded in the wide event is whitelisted
against the closed OAuth error-code set (unknown values collapse to
"other"); the status route drops an unreachable try/catch and a
duplicated annotate; the passkey conditional-UI autofill stays unarmed
under OIDC_ONLY (passkey login is a server-enforced dead end there);
env-manifest gains the three optional OIDC_* tuning vars; the env
example notes why the issuer should be HTTPS.
Two second-factor gaps in the OIDC callback:
The session was minted with mfaVerifiedAt stamped to the login instant,
letting a bare SSO login satisfy requireFreshMfa step-up (MFA disable,
encryption-key rotation, encrypted export, account deletion). OIDC is a
delegated factor — whatever the IdP checked, this app did not see a
second factor — so the stamp is now null, the same treatment a
trusted-device login gets.
An account with a confirmed TOTP secret or a registered security key
was logged straight in, silently downgrading its native 2FA to
IdP-only. The callback now mints the same single-use MFA ticket
password login uses and hands it to the login page through a
short-lived, login-page-scoped cookie (the callback ends on a browser
redirect, so the ticket cannot ride an envelope meta like the password
flow). The login page picks it up once, clears it, and renders the
same challenge step; the login completes at /api/auth/mfa/verify with
identical continuation semantics. The cookie is deliberately not
httpOnly — the login page script must read the ticket, exactly the
exposure the password flow already has — and the ticket alone carries
no session authority (single-use, hashed at rest, 5-minute TTL,
attempt-capped).
Direct (factor-less) OIDC logins now also sync the admin-enforced-MFA
enrollment hint cookie, matching password login.
An OIDC login now resolves the account by the durable (issuer, sub)
pair instead of the email claim. First contact stamps the pair — by
auto-provision or a one-time link against an existing account matched
by verified email — and every later login matches on it alone, so an
IdP-side email change refreshes the display email but can never
re-point the login at a different account. An email that matches an
account already bound to a different identity is rejected and audited
(auth.oidc.link_conflict), never silently re-bound.
The email gate tightens with it: linking and provisioning now require
an explicit email_verified: true — an absent claim is a reject
(oidc_email_unverified) rather than a benefit of the doubt, since an
IdP that does not assert verification cannot anchor the account match.
Provisioned accounts get a lowercased email and the same server-default
timezone resolution the register route uses.
Migration 0240 adds the nullable users.oidc_issuer / users.oidc_sub
columns with a composite unique index.
Adds an OpenID Connect relying-party login path (PKCE authorization-code
flow) against a single env-configured identity provider — additive to
password/passkey login by default, with an operator opt-in (OIDC_ONLY,
enforced server-side on every auth route) to disable them entirely.
First-time sign-in auto-provisions or links an account by verified email.
Closes an open redirect in the post-login `next` parameter (both the new
OIDC path and the pre-existing password/passkey flow shared the same
backslash-normalization bypass) by resolving the target through a real
URL parse and comparing origins instead of a prefix check.
Marc-André Bombeck