A round trip through the real handlers: post a recording, read it back
through the list and the detail routes, and check what a client actually
receives rather than a fixture rebuilt at each end. Post it twice and
the second call says updated, not inserted, and the table does not grow.
Feed the same strip to the export-archive importer afterwards and it
says skipped; feed it to the importer first and the route says
duplicate. Both directions leave one row.
The migration test drops the index, manufactures the collisions the
resolution step exists for, and runs the migration file through the same
executor the deploy uses. It checks which row survived each tiebreak,
that the salvaged event link followed the keeper, that rows differing
only by user, source or sampling rate were left alone, and that the
constraint rejects a new twin afterwards. Applying the migration to the
empty testcontainer proves none of that.
The Withings ECG tests now hand the transaction the same delegate the
shared writer uses, so they still watch the real write instead of a stub
standing in for it.
A sync failure the classifier bucketed as `transient` had no exit. The park
test read `kind === "persistent"` and the persistent streak anchor was only
ever stamped by a persistent failure, so a streak could run for a thousand
attempts with the persistent counter at zero, the state frozen at
`error_transient`, and no ladder it could climb. `transient` is a hypothesis
about retryability, and the classifier defaults every timeout, 429, 5xx and
unrecognised response to it precisely because the wire cannot tell a reboot
from a permanent break. That default is right for one attempt and wrong for a
thousand: an unbroken streak retried hourly for a full day has refuted it by
experiment. Record it as `persistent` from there, which feeds the park ladder
that already exists — 48 h of unbroken failure end to end before an
integration stops attempting.
The counters could not accumulate anyway. `IntegrationStatus` is keyed
(user, integration) while Withings runs four legs on four crons and WHOOP four
resources on four more, and a success cleared the error, every bucket, the
streak anchor and the state whatever leg had recorded them. The ECG tick at
:41 wiped what the sleep tick recorded at :15 — including a reauth park — so
the strike ladder was reset several times an hour and the card painted a green
"connected · 12 minutes ago" over a data class that had stopped arriving. A
success now clears only what it is entitled to clear.
Two columns carry it: `failing_since_at` dates the streak, `failing_leg` names
its owner. The migration backfills the anchor for rows already in an error
state so a connection broken for weeks escalates on its next attempt rather
than restarting its clock.
The Heart sync recorded only the device's atrial-fibrillation verdict per
on-device ECG. Fetch each recording's full waveform via the Heart get
endpoint and store the raw micro-volt samples so a real trace can later be
rendered.
The sample array is sensitive health data: it is held AES-256-GCM encrypted
at rest in the new EcgRecording.waveformEncrypted Bytes column (fail-closed
crypto), with the sampling frequency, sample count, duration, lead, average
heart rate, and AFib verdict kept as plaintext descriptors. A re-sync upserts
on (userId, source, externalRecordingId) so a recording is never duplicated;
a waveform fetch failure never fails the verdict ingest. Rendering UI is a
follow-up.
The Heart List endpoint returns a per-recording AFib verdict from the
ScanWatch family that no sync fetched. Capture each recording as an
IRREGULAR_RHYTHM_NOTIFICATION event row carrying the device's own verdict
in rhythm_classification, mirroring the Apple Health categorical-event
treatment. Reuses the existing enum, column, and constraint, so no
migration. Fires on the measure webhook path, which shares the metrics
scope the Heart List endpoint needs.