Encrypt MedicationSideEffect.notes, MedicationDoseChange.note and
MedicationInventoryItem.notes with AES-256-GCM, closing the last plaintext
PHI columns left after the v1.23 note-encryption rollout. Add the three
*Encrypted Bytes columns (migration 0208), register them in the encrypted-
column rotation set, route every read/write through the note cipher, and add
a transactional fail-closed boot-time backfill for legacy rows. Plaintext
columns drop in a later release once the backfill reports zero remaining rows.
Require a fresh second factor on password change for MFA-enrolled accounts,
matching the existing step-up on MFA-disable and recovery-code regen. Redact
free-text note values from the Zod validation excerpt that can reach a wide
event.
Honour the OIDC dynamic-registration application_type field on the
register endpoint: validate it to the closed set (web/native) when
present, reject a malformed value with invalid_client_metadata, default
to web when omitted, and echo the resolved value back in the
client-information response.
Forward-compatible with OIDC-style clients without changing the
redirect-URI rules (still HTTPS-or-loopback, authoritatively matched at
authorize) or any other registration behaviour.
Advertise authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported in the
authorization-server metadata and echo the iss parameter on every
authorization response — both the success redirect carrying the code and
the access_denied error redirect. A client can now pin the response to
this server's issuer and reject a code substituted by a look-alike
authorization server in a multi-server deployment.
Additive and backward-compatible: existing clients that ignore iss are
unaffected; PKCE S256-only, audience binding, redirect-URI exact match
and the rate limits are untouched.
Combine the remote MCP server (stdio + remote /mcp + OAuth 2.1 + read
tools + deep-value reads + a confirmed, audience-bound write surface)
with the v1.23 account-security line (MFA, known/trusted devices,
free-text note encryption).
- schema: keep every v1.23 User relation (MFA, known/trusted devices)
alongside the McpOAuthConnection relation; the MeasurementSource enum
carries the MCP value.
- api-handler: the MCP audience guard (a token scoped to
health:read/health:write is bound to /mcp and refused a REST write)
and the step-up MFA helpers coexist.
- maintenance queues: register the MCP token-cleanup sweep next to the
note-encryption backfill and key-rotation queues; shift it to 04:00
so the two daily discovery ticks do not collide.
- migrations: renumber the MCP migrations to 0206/0207 so they follow
the v1.23 chain (0199-0205).
- MCP mood writes route the note through the v1.23 at-rest cipher.
Mirror the TOTP login path: both the security-key verify and verify-options
routes now reject any challenge whose kind is not "login" with the same generic
401, so a future step-up or non-login challenge can never mint a login session
through these endpoints. Set the registration and authentication ceremonies to
userVerification:"required" to match the server's UV enforcement — a key that
passes the browser but skips UV would otherwise fail server-side.
The encrypted-export route hand-rolled its step-up gate off totpConfirmedAt
alone, so an account whose only second factor is a WebAuthn security key
exported the full record on a plain session — no fresh-factor proof. Route it
through requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled, which covers both the TOTP and security-key
cohorts and lets single-factor accounts through unchanged. Cover the
security-key-only path in the unit suite.
Bring the scattered data-sovereignty controls into one /settings/privacy pane.
It assembles already-shipped pieces rather than rebuilding them: the encryption-
at-rest summary and configured retention windows (read from the server so the
copy stays truthful), links to the export surfaces (including the passphrase-
encrypted option) and the account-deletion / data-reset surface, the active-
session list, trusted devices, and the security-activity log. The backup↔
deletion lag is disclosed honestly — deletion is immediate, but encrypted
off-host backups still hold the data until they roll off retention.
Removing the second factor is a security-state change, so it should not leave
stale credentials behind. The disable endpoint now drops every other web
session, every native refresh token, and every trusted device, keeping only the
caller's current session. The lockout-recovery CLI does the same out of band,
clearing all sessions and trusted devices for the account.
A passwordless passkey login already clears user verification and is a
phishing-resistant possession factor, but it never stamped the session, so a
passkey user could not satisfy an MFA-enforcement policy or pass a step-up
re-check. Stamp Session.mfaVerifiedAt on a primary passkey login so it counts
as a completed second factor — equivalent to a password+TOTP sign-in. The
password+TOTP path is unchanged.
Wire the previously-unused mfaEnforced flag into a real policy. An admin can
require a second factor instance-wide (an AppSettings toggle in the General
section) or per user (a toggle in user management); the effective requirement is
the OR of the two. When required and the account has no active factor — no
confirmed TOTP, no registered security key, and no primary passkey — the user is
walled behind a forced-enrollment interstitial after sign-in, with only the
security settings and sign-out reachable until a factor is enrolled.
The gate is surfaced like the onboarding gate: a hint cookie the proxy reads
without a DB round-trip, recomputed from the database on every sign-in and on
/api/auth/me so a tampered cookie self-corrects. Nobody is locked out — the
enrollment surface stays reachable, and toggling the policy off (or the
disable-mfa CLI) is the operator's recovery path.
Add an opt-in "remember this device" at the second-factor step. On opt-in
a random token is minted, set in an httpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Strict cookie,
and only its HMAC hash is stored in a new TrustedDevice table. A later sign-in
from the same browser still requires the password (factor 1); a matching,
unexpired trusted device lets the login skip factor 2 only.
The token is never accepted for step-up — a trusted-device login does not stamp
mfaVerifiedAt — so a stolen device cookie cannot reach a destructive action.
Trusted devices are listed and revocable from the security surface, are revoked
wholesale when the second factor is removed or the user signs out everywhere,
and cascade away on account deletion. A recovery-code login never trusts the
browser. Migration 0204 adds the table (and the instance-wide mfa_required
policy column that the enforcement work reads).
Stamp each passkey's last-used time on a successful assertion and return
it from the list, add a rename endpoint, and add a dismissible
add-a-passkey nudge for accounts that have none. Share the relying-party
configuration with the second-factor path.
When a password is accepted for an account with a second factor, the
login response carries a single-use ticket instead of a session. The
login page now renders a second step: a TOTP or recovery code, or a
WebAuthn security-key assertion scoped to the account's registered keys.
A WebAuthn-only account (no TOTP) is recognised at the password step and
offered the security-key path.
The security-key verify endpoints validate the open ticket, verify the
assertion against the user's second-factor credentials, and only then
mint the session through the shared login tail, so no session exists
before the factor passes. The login page also arms passkey conditional-UI
autofill on the username field.
Introduce a dedicated /settings/security section that gathers every
account-protection control in one place: TOTP enrolment (QR plus manual
secret, confirm, recovery codes shown once with copy and download),
WebAuthn security keys as a second factor (register, list with last-used,
rename, step-up-gated removal), recovery-code count and regeneration, and
primary passkey management.
The second-factor WebAuthn path keeps its own credential store, separate
from primary passkeys, and uses non-resident keys so an account can hold
many. Relying-party resolution is shared with the passkey path. A status
endpoint backs the hub; the step-up gate now recognises a registered
security key as an active second factor so a WebAuthn-only account can
still reach the gated actions.
Drop the in-app bug-report surface end to end: the user submission page,
the feedback intake and admin inbox, the optional GitHub-issue
escalation, the operator config, and the dedicated achievement badges.
- delete the /bugreport page and the bugreport / feedback / admin-feedback API routes
- drop the Feedback model, its enums, and the AppSettings GitHub-issue and enable columns (migration 0205)
- remove the admin Feedback section, the Bug Report integration card, and the system-status row
- drop the bug-report nav entry and the app-settings provider that only carried its flag
- remove the bug-hunter achievement badges and their metric
- prune the related i18n keys across every locale and the encrypted-column and key-rotation registries
Add the user-facing account-security surface in Settings:
- Active sessions (closes#64): GET /api/auth/me/sessions lists each browser
login with a coarse device label, masked IP, resolved location, the sliding
last-active stamp, and the current-session marker. DELETE the collection
signs out everywhere else (keeps the current session, revokes other sessions
and native refresh tokens, leaves API tokens alone); DELETE one revokes a
single session, scoped to the owner so a foreign id 404s.
- A sliding last-active stamp on the session, written throttled and
fire-and-forget off the request-resolution path.
- Security activity: GET /api/auth/me/security-activity, the shared read over
the audit log filtered to sign-ins, second-factor changes, password changes,
session revocations, exports, and deletions, with masked IPs.
OpenAPI regenerated for the new endpoints.
On a completed sign-in (password, second-factor, or passkey) from a device or
location not seen before, send one notification through the dispatcher cascade,
honouring the user's per-channel preferences via a new SECURITY_ALERT event
type. Dedupe on a one-way, per-user fingerprint: a SHA-256 over the userId, the
coarse User-Agent family, and a country/ASN-level geo signal, stored in the new
user_known_devices ledger (migration 0203). The first sighting of a fingerprint
alerts and records; later sightings only bump last-seen and stay silent. The
raw User-Agent and IP are never persisted — only the salted hash and a coarse
label. Registration records its device silently so a fresh account does not
alert on its own first session. The whole path is fire-and-forget and never
blocks or fails a sign-in.
Check a newly chosen password against HaveIBeenPwned through the k-anonymity
range API: only the first five hex characters of the SHA-1 digest leave the
host, the suffix is matched locally, and Add-Padding hides the bucket size.
A confirmed match is rejected so a fresh credential is never a known-breached
one; the check fails open, so an unreachable HIBP never blocks the operation.
Covers registration, password change, and admin reset. Existing passwords are
never retroactively blocked at login.
Also lands the six-locale strings for the password-breach notice and the
account-security surfaces that follow.
Account deletion and the keep-account data reset now demand a recent
second-factor re-verification for accounts that have a second factor
active; single-factor accounts are unaffected and keep the typed-
confirmation-only contract. The gate runs through requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled,
which is cookie-only by construction — a Bearer transport for an MFA-enrolled
account cannot satisfy step-up and surfaces the auth.stepup.required envelope
so the UI can launch a re-verification flow.
Add an optional admin-triggered key rotation on pg-boss that re-encrypts
the whole encrypted-column corpus to the active key, reusing the same
column registry as the command-line tool (which stays the canonical path).
POST /api/admin/encryption/rotate enqueues a singleton run and is gated by
cookie-only admin plus a fresh second factor. The run is idempotent
(rows already on the active key are skipped), active-key-only, and never
adds or drops a key — the env key map stays operator-owned, so a key drop
remains a deliberate redeploy. It fails closed per row and reports totals
into the audit trail the status view reads.
Add a read-only admin Encryption section that surfaces what the rotation
tooling computes: per encrypted-column rows-per-key-id, legacy-key row
counts, and overall rotation progress, plus a 'safe to drop the legacy
key' state once every column sits on the active key. GET
/api/admin/encryption/status drives it and returns only key ids and
counts — never key material. A shared scan over the canonical encrypted-
column registry backs both this view and the rotation run. Cookie-only
admin.
Add an opt-in to download the full backup as an encrypted archive instead
of a plaintext JSON file. The user supplies a passphrase over the request;
the server derives a 256-bit key with Argon2id and seals the export bytes
with AES-256-GCM into a self-describing HLX1 archive (magic, version, KDF
params, salt, iv, tag, ciphertext), mirroring the off-host backup envelope.
POST /api/export/encrypted returns the binary archive and is step-up gated
for accounts with a second factor; single-factor accounts use a normal
session. The passphrase is never stored and never logged, and there is no
server-side recovery — the UI states this. A standalone decryptor
(scripts/decrypt-export.ts) opens the archive with the passphrase outside
the app. The plaintext full-backup route now shares one payload builder so
both variants emit the same restore-compatible shape.
Reject any challenge that is not a login challenge before minting a session,
cap the disable and confirm request bodies through safeJson, and correct the
recovery-code scan comment to match its early-return-on-match behaviour.
When a password is accepted for an account with a confirmed TOTP factor, the
login route no longer mints a session or token. It creates a single-use,
~5-minute MfaChallenge (the opaque ticket is stored only as a hash) and
returns HTTP 200 with data:null, error:null and meta.mfaRequired + mfaTicket +
methods. The client completes the login at POST /api/auth/mfa/verify with the
ticket + a TOTP or recovery code, receiving the exact same token bundle the
password path issues, with the session stamped second-factor-verified.
- The ticket is claimed once, atomically, only after the factor verifies, so
two concurrent submissions can mint at most one session; no session ever
exists before factor two.
- Wrong codes increment the ticket attempt counter and burn it at the cap
(throttle, not an account lock); the anonymous verify surface is also
rate-limited per IP.
- meta.mfaRequired is returned only after a valid password and the
invalid-credentials response is identical regardless of MFA state, so an
attacker without the password cannot enumerate MFA.
- The session/token tail is extracted to login-response.ts and shared by both
the password path and the verify path, keeping the transport contract
identical. OpenAPI registers the verify endpoint, the MFA management
endpoints, and the mfaRequired login variant.
Add the TOTP enroll/confirm/disable surface and Argon2id-hashed recovery
codes as the v1.23 second factor.
- totp.ts wraps otpauth (zero-dep) pinned to the interop floor (SHA-1, 6
digits, 30 s) with a +/-1 drift window. Replay protection persists the last
accepted time-step per account (User.totpLastStep, migration
0202_v123_totp_laststep) and rejects any step that is not strictly newer,
so a captured code dies the instant it is accepted once.
- recovery-codes.ts issues ten single-use, high-entropy codes, Argon2id-
hashed at rest, shown once; regeneration replaces the entire prior set in a
transaction and verification burns the matched code with a guarded update.
- The TOTP secret is stored AES-256-GCM encrypted (already registered in the
encrypted-columns registry + rotation script); decrypt is fail-closed.
- Routes: setup (pending secret), confirm (activate + issue recovery codes),
disable (step-up + current factor), recovery-codes/regenerate (step-up).
Setup/confirm are cookie-only; disable/regenerate add requireFreshMfa.
- scripts/disable-mfa.ts is the operator escape hatch for a locked-out
self-hoster, audited, run via pnpm dlx tsx.
Wrap GET /api/measurements/:id through shapeMeasurementNotes like the list,
create, and update paths already do, so the encrypted note column is decrypted
into notes and the raw ciphertext is stripped from the response. Harden the
rotation-coverage guard to require both the field literal and the model
delegate, so a same-named encrypted column whose table is not rotated is caught.
Lay the account-security and data-sovereignty substrate for v1.23. No
user-facing behaviour yet — schema, crypto registry, redaction, and the
note-encryption data path only.
Schema + migrations:
- 0199 — User totp_secret_encrypted / totp_confirmed_at / mfa_enforced /
passkey_upgrade_nudge_dismissed; Session mfa_verified_at / last_active_at;
Passkey last_used_at. All additive, nullable / defaulted.
- 0200 — mfa_challenges (single-use step-up ticket; only the ticket hash is
stored, so no session or token is ever minted before the second factor),
mfa_recovery_codes (Argon2id at rest), webauthn_mfa_credentials (second-factor
keys, kept separate from passkeys, which remain the passwordless-primary set).
- 0201 — mood_entries.note_encrypted + measurements.notes_encrypted (BYTEA),
matching the existing free-text encrypted-note convention.
Free-text health notes:
- New writes encrypt the mood / measurement note into the *_encrypted column and
null the legacy plaintext column; reads prefer the ciphertext and fall back to
plaintext only for not-yet-migrated rows, via a single read/write helper.
- A boot-time job migrates existing plaintext rows in an idempotent,
transactional, fail-closed pass (encrypt, then null the plaintext, per row in
one transaction; safe to re-run; a row with content is never left both-null).
- The legacy plaintext columns are kept this release and dropped in a follow-up
once the backfill reports zero remaining rows — the same boundary the
key-rotation playbook uses before dropping a legacy key.
Crypto coverage:
- Register the three new encrypted columns and wire them into the key-rotation
script so a rotation never orphans them.
- Extend the observability and log redaction denylists so TOTP secrets, MFA /
recovery / backup codes, and export passphrases never reach a wide event.
Let a user opt a connector token into logging. The settings card gains a
write toggle; the mint endpoint accepts a closed scope choice (read, or
read_write) and builds the permission array explicitly — it can mint only
[health:read] or [health:read, health:write], never a wildcard or any other
grant. The OAuth flow grants health:write only when a client requests it, and
the consent screen states in plain language that the app will be able to read
AND log/write health data when write is requested; the token endpoint grants
exactly the approved scopes and never widens. Read-only behaviour is
unchanged. Add the English and German strings for the new toggle and warning.
Code-review and design follow-ups before the v1.22 cut. No behaviour change
beyond the items below.
Coach / insights:
- Coach SSE route: a non-provider error raised inside the open producer (e.g. a
DB failure persisting the reply) now records on the wide event and forwards to
GlitchTip instead of masquerading as a provider outage; it still surfaces an
error frame since the stream is open.
- Lab ↔ outcome correlations: hedge faint-tier pairs ("a faint hint, if
anything … too small to lean on") so the narrated confidence never outruns the
effect, matching the daily engine.
- Reminder sweep: mint the plan-review reminder and clear the plan's reviewDate
in one transaction so a half-applied write can't duplicate the reminder.
- Fold the two raw provider-fallback runners onto one shared chain walker.
Design / accessibility:
- Lift sub-44px tap targets to the 44px mobile floor (suggested-action card,
Coach bubble affordances), brighten the resting timestamp clock for non-text
contrast, and route the lab chart height through the shared constant.
- Replace ad-hoc arbitrary type sizes with the scale token and static size-11
icon buttons with the named icon-lg variant.
- Settings: add the missing About card-header descriptions, normalise the
low-stock numeric widths, and relax the notification-status rows from nested
cards to a divided list.
Housekeeping:
- Drop three unused exported types (and the now-orphaned source const), re-stamp
v1.21.5 comments to v1.22, and register the live-judge eval harness as a knip
entry so the script-only module resolves.
Add three per-user AI settings, all configured in the app (no new env vars),
behind one migration (0198):
- Response timeout (seconds). A per-user upstream timeout threaded onto the
provider call. A local/self-hosted backend can take more than the legacy
60 s default to load a model on the first request, which timed the Coach
out before the first token. Defaults to a generous ~180 s when unset;
validated to 10–600 s.
- True token streaming for the local OpenAI-compatible client. The client now
POSTs with stream:true and parses the SSE delta chunks, emitting tokens as
they arrive, with a per-idle-gap timeout instead of a whole-call ceiling and
a graceful fallback to the buffered path when a server cannot stream. The
Coach route runs the provider call inside the response stream behind a
keepalive heartbeat so a reverse proxy no longer idle-drops the connection
during model load or generation. Grounding, refusal, and sentinel-stripping
still run on the complete reply before any token reaches the client.
- Dedicated document-scan (Lab-OCR) provider. Off by default — the OCR path
uses the main provider chain. When enabled, lab-report processing resolves a
separate provider/model/key, with a hint when the chosen model is not
vision-capable. The new key column is AES-256-GCM at rest and registered in
the encrypted-columns registry and the rotation script.
i18n: EN + DE translations for the new Settings → AI strings (other locales
carry interim copies to keep locale parity green).
Harden the remote MCP endpoint and the in-repo OAuth bridge against the
adversarial review of the milestone branch. The two ship-blockers made the
"read-only, revocable" promise false; the rest tightened the surface.
Audience binding at the resource server: a token whose only grant is the new
`health:read` scope is the MCP read credential. The REST edge now accepts it on
safe (read) methods and refuses it on writes/deletes with 403, so a connector
token can read over `/mcp` and GET routes but can never POST/DELETE the record
despite a "read-only" consent. The `/mcp` resolver is unaffected.
Revocable, theft-detectable refresh tokens: refresh artifacts now anchor to a
persistent connection row. Revoking a connection stops every future refresh and
kills its access tokens; a replayed (already-rotated) refresh is treated as
theft and revokes the whole connection. Connections surface in settings as the
unit a user can disconnect. The old access token is revoked on rotation.
Also: fail closed on the OAuth/`/mcp` surface when no canonical origin is
configured and mark the discovery documents non-cacheable; honour the global API
kill-switch on `/mcp`, `/token`, `/authorize`, and `/register`; cap the CIMD and
registration body reads while streaming instead of after; show the verified
client origin on consent; validate CIMD redirect-URI schemes; assert same-origin
on the consent POST; and add a daily prune for expired connector tokens.
New migration 0195 adds the connection anchor and links access tokens to it.
Feed the user's own usual blood-pressure range — the median plus or minus
MAD band, computed from the readings already in the snapshot — into the Coach
context with a clause to quote those bounds verbatim, so a band is never
invented from window means. Thread the stored first name into the prompt and
surface it sparingly on roughly one turn in three, never as a rote greeting.
Add the context-layer rule that names the relevant context before a
suggestion, a single-chart-token allowance that works on every provider, and
a per-turn opener hint.
Wire the already-shipped suggested-action SSE frame to render: the streaming
hook collects it and the message thread shows the action card, mirroring the
reminder-suggestion path. Extend the eval golden set with band-verbatim,
chart-token, and no-overclaim cases, and pin a red-team case proving the
chart-token syntax cannot smuggle a dose past the outbound screen.
Replace the fixed three-beat assessment skeleton with a menu of moves the
model orders freely, and reframe the daily briefing from per-signal
enumeration to a verdict-first read that weaves the few salient signals into
one associative story. Score cards now name both the helped and the hurt
contributors, translate the band into a forward read for the day, and close
on one grounded nudge; the deterministic fallback gains the same band-meaning
sentence so provider-less and demo accounts read as well.
Add a hash-seeded opener-archetype rotation (deterministic, testable) so
consecutive cards and days no longer open the same way, a day-rotated sampling
seed for the period narrative in place of the fixed reference seed, and a
shared paragraph formatting contract. Add a score-number grounding gate and
extend the briefing grounding allow-set to the glucose, labs, preventive-care
and workout aggregate blocks so real figures can be cited without opening the
gate. Gate the daily score warm on an input fingerprint so a quiet day skips
the model call.
A dedicated Settings card co-locates the off-by-default MCP module toggle
with token management for connecting an external assistant:
- Mint / list / revoke a dedicated `health:read`-scoped token (shown once,
copy to clipboard) via new `/api/mcp/tokens` routes — never the
`medication:ingest` scope, never the wildcard.
- Surface the connector URL and the enable switch in one place, wired to
the existing module-preference endpoint.
- New section wired into the Settings shell next to API & Tokens, with
EN + DE strings (and the other locales) under `settings.mcp` and
`settings.sections.mcp`.
Let a remote MCP client (Claude.ai, ChatGPT) self-register and connect to
the `/mcp` endpoint over OAuth 2.1 + PKCE, bridged onto the existing `hlk_`
Bearer model — no parallel identity store.
- Discovery: RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata and RFC 8414 Authorization
Server Metadata at `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` and
`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` (added to the proxy allowlist).
- `/api/mcp/oauth/authorize` — consent gate backed by the existing session;
a code is only issued on an authenticated POST decision, never on a GET.
- `/api/mcp/oauth/token` — authorization-code and refresh-token grants with
mandatory PKCE S256, single-use codes, and rotating refresh tokens. The
access token is an ordinary short-lived `hlk_` token scoped `health:read`.
- `/api/mcp/oauth/register` — RFC 7591 DCR fallback; CIMD (SEP-991) is the
preferred path and resolves client metadata through `safeFetch`.
- Audience binding (RFC 8707): every token is bound to the canonical `/mcp`
resource URI; a mismatched `resource` is rejected at authorize and token.
- The grant artifacts (code, refresh, DCR client id) are HMAC-signed,
self-describing, and domain-separated; the central log redactors scrub
them plus the PKCE verifier.
Add unit coverage for the closed when-grammar and `---REMEMBER---` capture
(propose-free active write, recall-only note, malformed drop, per-user cap),
the closed action-card allowlist (off-list and bad-interval rejection, no
auto-apply), the daily sweep (due flip, plan-review mint, undecryptable
skip), and the routes (owner-scoped no-IDOR 404, field-by-field build, the
off-allowlist 422, and the module gate).
Add the management surface for the reminder memory: list, create, confirm,
done/dismiss, and soft-delete, every query scoped to the session owner with
the same no-IDOR posture as the plans routes (a cross-user or unknown id is
a 0-count no-op, never a leaked existence). The note is the only writable
field; timing is resolved server-side from the closed grammar.
Add the confirm endpoint behind the generalised action card. It switches on
a closed action-type allowlist and builds each entity field-by-field from a
server-resolved spec: a preventive-care reminder whose schedule comes from a
closed interval catalog, or a reminder note. It never auto-applies, and the
allowlist excludes any medication or clinical change.
Regenerate the OpenAPI contract for the new routes.
Capture the casual "remember this / remind me about X" utterance the Coach
used to drop. The model emits a provider-neutral `---REMEMBER---` sentinel
that the chat route strips inline on EVERY turn — so a short conversation,
where the request usually happens, no longer waits for the long-chat memory
worker. The note is the user's own explicit request, so it is stored
silently as active; a validated closed grammar (ISO date, relative +Nd/+Nw,
or a context cue) sets the trigger, and a malformed block is dropped.
Surface the stored reminders two ways. A snapshot recall sub-block injects
near, overdue, and already-surfaced reminders so the Coach references them
unprompted next turn. A daily sweep flips overdue reminders to due and
mints a one-off review reminder from a plan whose review date has passed,
finally activating the plan review-date column. In-app surfacing only here;
push delivery follows later.
Also generalise the propose-then-confirm action card: a closed
`---SUGGEST-ACTION---` allowlist (a preventive-care item or a reminder note)
rides an additive SSE frame. Nothing is created until the user confirms.
Thread the rolling early-detection pass and the labs -> outcome pass through the
correlations route and the coach correlations reader, both of which already
build the same daily series. The route response gains an optional `emerging`
block (recent-window pairs not yet established, flagged provisional) and a
`labCorrelations` block; the coach reader gains matching `emerging` and
`labDrivers` fields. Regenerate the OpenAPI contract for the new response shape.
The bottom-right launcher opened a blank new chat on an unread proactive
message instead of the thread the Coach wrote. Return the owning
conversation id from the nudge-status endpoint, have the launcher open
/coach?c=<id> on the unread path, and stamp the same deep link on the push
metadata so the notification lands in the exact conversation rather than
relying on a most-recent heuristic.
Add a `hidden` boolean to the Biomarker model (migration
0195_biomarker_hidden) so a marker the user no longer needs can be
soft-removed instead of deleted: it leaves the active catalog and the
lab-entry pickers but keeps its readings and canonical unit/range.
Thread `hidden` through the DTO, the update schema, the PUT handler
(field-by-field), and the list endpoint (visible markers first). Regen
the OpenAPI contract.
The comprehensive insight that feeds both the daily briefing and the
insights trend narrative is a single reasoning-heavy generation over the
full feature snapshot. On a large account it runs past the provider
client's fixed 60 s timeout and is aborted mid-stream, so the chain
reports an all-failed outcome, no cached block is written, and the
surface falls back to its static placeholder on every visit. The warm
paths bounded the same generation tighter still (45 s) and counted the
failure with no observable signal, so the blank state was permanent and
silent.
Make the per-request upstream timeout configurable
(CompletionParams.timeoutMs, default 60 s for every existing caller) and
raise it to 120 s for the comprehensive surface only, across all three
generation paths: the on-demand regenerate, the on-demand warm, and the
nightly pre-generation. Raise the warm-pass budget to 130 s so the
provider's own timeout governs a genuine completion rather than clipping
it early. Annotate the comprehensive failure in both the generator and
the nightly loop so a generation that keeps failing is queryable instead
of leaving the surface empty without a trace.
Marc-André Bombeck