Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marc-André Bombeck 70295f45cb fix(push): bring Web Push back after turning it on again
A channel switched off because the last browser's endpoint answered 410
(app removed from the Home Screen, site data cleared) stayed off when push
was turned on again: the subscription was stored and the test push
arrived, but no reminder ever did. Subscribing now re-enables a disabled
channel through reEnableChannel, the same reset the status card's button
runs.

Turning push off on the last browser deleted the subscription and left
the channel on, and each later reminder was booked as a failed send
(web_push_no_subscriptions) until the channel gave up after five. The
dispatcher now leaves channel state alone when a sender had nobody to
send to; APNs without a paired iPhone and email without an address or
SMTP had the same problem and are covered by the same rule.
2026-11-11 20:38:39 +01:00
Marc-André Bombeck de0876b215 fix(settings): refuse enabling a channel the operator switched off
With the switches now enforced at dispatch, a user could still flip a
channel on, see the toggle stick, and get nothing. Refuse the enable
instead, with 403 and a message that names the reason: the ntfy and
Telegram config endpoints on both accepted body shapes, and the Web Push
subscribe endpoint, which is the enable step for that channel because it
creates the channel row.

Telegram is checked before the webhook registration, so a refused enable
makes no outbound call and stores nothing. Disabling a channel keeps
working while the switch is off — a user must always be able to turn a
channel off, whatever the operator has done.

The three refusals are published in the contract; `/api/settings/global-services`
already exposes the switches so a client can hide the control instead of
provoking the refusal.
2026-09-03 02:02:15 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck aa80cb45c1 Say which rule a rejected Web Push subscription broke
`POST` and `DELETE /api/notifications/web-push` both answered a flat
`apiError("Invalid data", 422)` and discarded the Zod issues. A non-HTTPS
endpoint, an endpoint aimed at an internal host, an over-long one and a missing
subscription key produced byte-identical bodies, so a browser whose
subscription was refused could not tell a fixable client bug from a policy this
instance will never satisfy. Both now answer the multi-issue envelope every
other body-parsing route in the tree uses.

Echoing the issues is safe here and the route says why, because it is the kind
of thing that gets re-derived wrongly later: the endpoint is a subscription's
routing secret and `keys` is its crypto material, but `sanitiseZodIssues` emits
`path`, `code` and `message` only — the rejected value lives in `issue.params`
and stays server-side — and every message this schema can produce is a fixed
string or a length/format default rather than an interpolation. A test pins
that none of the four secrets reaches the wire, so a future schema change that
adds an interpolating message fails here instead of leaking quietly.

The tests assert on content rather than status: a status-only check passes
against the flat error it replaces, which is how this survived. Two of them
compare whole bodies between two different refusals and require them to differ.

The two `/test` routes were checked in the same pass and need nothing. Neither
accepts a body — they take no parameters at all — so neither runs a Zod parse
to discard. Their 422s already carry `not_configured`, `vapid_not_configured`
and `rate_limited_self` as machine-readable codes.
2026-08-22 13:17:45 +02:00