Harden the native auth-token surface against four confirmed findings.
- /api/auth/logout was a no-op for a bearer credential: destroySession only
clears the cookie, leaving an Authorization: Bearer hlk_ token live until
expiry. When the request carries a bearer, also flip the matching
ApiToken.revoked and revoke its paired refresh-token sibling. Cookie path
unchanged.
- A browser spoofing X-Client-Type: native was handed a 60-day refresh token
in the JSON body. Gate refresh-token issuance on a new
isCookielessNativeCaller check (no Mozilla UA, no inbound session cookie),
so the secret reaches genuine cookie-less native callers only and never
alongside a browser session. The iOS native path is unaffected; a spoofing
browser falls back to the short-lived access token with no refresh.
- Refresh-reuse revoke trusted the stored row's deviceId, so a stolen token
replayed under a fabricated X-Device-Id confined the revoke to the
attacker's own id and left the victim's family live. On a present-but-
mismatched deviceId, escalate to the user-wide family revoke (a real device
never changes its id mid-family). The matching-id and null-id cases keep
their existing scope.
- Tighten the auth:refresh rate limit from 60/15min to 10/15min, aligning the
high-value rotation endpoint with the passkey-verify tier.
Add coverage for each: logout revokes bearer + sibling, a cookie/Mozilla
caller never receives a refresh token, a device-mismatch replay triggers the
wide revoke, and the cookie-less native path still gets its refresh token.
(cherry picked from commit 14dcdefc5f40855305d8aaf573d073faebc61476)
HealthLog — personal health-tracking PWA with weight, blood pressure,
pulse, mood tracking, medication compliance, Withings integration,
doctor report PDF export, and Dracula-themed UI.
Marc-André Bombeck