The onboarding step keeps the preference and the adapter where the
save happens and renders the control from its inputs file, so the
three conditions belong to the surface, not to one file. The control
check is word-bounded now: a wrapper named after it passed a substring
check while rendering something else.
A partial save is a whole-class trap: any 200 read as a clean save
throws the person's correction away. The guard enumerates every
surface writing to either profile route and requires each to call the
per-field describer, or to prove its body carries a single field, for
which the partial arm is unreachable.
useRecordCapabilities answers per section now. canWriteDomain and
canManageDomain read the two lists the account payload publishes; in
one's own record they are always true, and under a refused, pending or
unproven context always false. canManage becomes the coarse switch,
true when any section is manageable, and is what the banner and the
navigation read.
Every add, edit and delete control names its own section: labs, mind,
profile, illness, cycle, medications, measurements, documents. Creates
that a WRITE route answers (visits, practitioners) ask canWriteDomain.
The generic delete button, the selection bar, the capture picker, the
dashboard quick entry and the bottom nav take the section from their
callers. Controls whose routes resolve the caller rather than the
record (settings shortcuts, chart overlay preferences, custom metrics,
the Today rail, OCR, efficacy targets, credential tabs) ask for the
caller's own record instead, and the customise-shortcut guard now
requires that shape.
The vault has no delegated write route, so its controls stay withheld
under every grant, and the documents page says so in one sentence
where the upload control would be, in all seven locales.
Every accountAccess entry on GET /api/auth/me carries writableDomains
and manageableDomains: the sections the grant opens, intersected with
the sections whose routes accept a delegated write at that level. A
READ grant gets two empty lists, a WRITE grant gets writable sections
only, a MANAGE grant gets both, and the vault appears in neither.
The client parser checks the structural invariants (no repeats, within
the grant's sections, manageable within writable, nothing below the
level) and requires the two published views of the active record to
agree on the lists. Regenerate the OpenAPI document and extend the
payload consumer guard with the active-record readers.
Add the one table of which record sections have a route declaring
requireRecordAuth("write") or ("manage"), derived from the route files,
and a structural guard that re-derives it from src/app/api on every run
and fails on a disagreement in either direction. The matcher tolerates
the line break a formatter puts after the opening parenthesis and
asserts a non-zero match count.
delegatedDomains() turns a grant's level and scope into the sections it
can add to and the sections it can change, keeping write within manage.
"Sign out everywhere" revoked every other refresh token and nothing else.
A native login is two rows, and the Bearer check consults only the
paired access token, so the other phones kept working until that token
expired, up to a day on the default policy. The route also handed
destroyOtherSessions a session-kind credential for a Bearer caller, whose
session.id is the ApiToken row id; the exception matched nothing and the
calling phone revoked its own refresh token. destroyOtherSessions now
finds the paired access tokens through the refresh rows and revokes them
inside the same transaction, reporting the count, and the route names a
Bearer caller by its access-token hash. Programmatic tokens are untouched.
rotateRefreshToken marked the consumed row under usedAt: null alone, so a
revocation landing between the read and the write was overtaken and a
pair minted after the family ended stayed live. The guard now includes
revokedAt: null; on a lost race the minted pair is retired and the reason
distinguishes a revoked family from a double consume.
withIdempotency consulted the grant only at replay time, and only for its
existence; a narrow-scoped token was checked only on the delegated arm.
Both move into the cell key: a delegated cell carries the grant's id,
level and scope fingerprint, a narrow token's cells carry the token, and
a request with no live grant neither reads nor claims a cell. Cookie and
wildcard own-record cells are keyed byte-for-byte as before.
Tests: integration for the paired access tokens (cookie and Bearer
caller), a deterministic revoke-mid-rotation race against Postgres, unit
coverage for the new cell keys, and the structural guard moved to the
new invariant.
The per-user date order reached the entry form and nothing else. A
reporter switched away from MM/DD/YYYY, the date picker followed, and
the dashboard chart axes and the measurements list kept the old order.
`makeFormatters` took `timeFormat` and `dateFormat` as optional
parameters defaulting to "AUTO", so six of the seven constructions in
the tree silently rendered the locale default and nothing anywhere
said the setting had been dropped. Drop both defaults. The compiler
then names every caller: the chart bucket labels, the legacy
`@/lib/format` helpers the measurements list renders through, the
medication compliance and efficacy charts, the doctor-report PDF and
the clinician share view.
Thread the preference:
- `makeBucketLabelFormatters` takes the order; the health and mood
charts read `useDateFormatPreference()`. The UTC pin decides which
day the label names, the preference decides how it is spelled, and
the two are separate questions.
- `format.ts` reads `readStoredDateFormat()` beside the timezone and
hour-cycle mirrors it already read.
- The PDF takes `dateFormat` as a required render option, alongside
`timeFormat`, which was optional for the same reason.
- The clinician share view spells the OWNER's dates the owner's way.
It also picked up the owner's hour cycle, which it had been ignoring
while the PDF route beside it already honoured it. Both resolve
through the new `resolveUserFormatPreferences`, the counterpart to
`resolveUserTimezone`.
Textual months stay on the UI locale. The preference pins numeric
field order by rendering through de-DE / en-US / en-CA, and a textual
month through those would change the month name's language.
Add `date-order-explicit-formatter-guard`: a raw numeric date renderer
must take its locale from the preference or carry a written reason,
and a formatter construction may not hard-code "AUTO" for the order.
Its allowlist holds thirteen calendar-day key builders, each with the
reason it has no order to get wrong. The sibling timezone guard passes
every one of them, because naming a calendar says nothing about
spelling a date.
Refs #922
crypto.randomUUID() is [SecureContext] in the Web Cryptography IDL, so a
page served over plain HTTP never gets it. Measured in Chromium against
http://<lan-ip>: isSecureContext false, randomUUID and subtle undefined,
getRandomValues still a function.
The document vault minted its queue id and Idempotency-Key that way, inside
the file-input change handler. On a LAN self-host the call threw before a
queue row existed, so picking a file produced no upload, no error and no
trace — the picker simply looked inert, and the only way through was to
reach the app over HTTPS. The client transport has minted a default
Idempotency-Key the same way since v1.37.18, which put every apiPost and
apiPatch on the same footing: on such a host nothing wrote at all.
Add randomId(), which prefers the platform call and otherwise assembles a
v4 UUID from getRandomValues — the same CSPRNG, the same 122 bits, no
secure context required — and route every browser-side call site through
it. Nothing in an upload needs one: the bytes travel over multipart XHR and
every cryptographic operation happens on the server. Passkeys, web push and
home-screen install still need HTTPS; browsers withhold those outright.
A structural guard fails a direct crypto.randomUUID() anywhere outside the
two server-side files that may keep it, so the class cannot return one call
site at a time.
Also point the CSV and JSON import cards straight at the import guide. They
resolved through a redirect under the integrations tree, which is the wrong
place for a guide that is not an integration runbook. The suite that
covered those links pinned the old spelling rather than the guarantee; it
now asserts an absolute docs-site URL, no internal path, and new-tab
hygiene.
Both routes 500'd in their unit tests because the change gave them
dependencies the mocks did not know about: the widgets GET reads a module
flag and probes for an SDNN row, and the analytics slim slice resolves the
module map. Neither test mocks `@/lib/modules/gate`, and the widgets test's
prisma double has no `measurement` model — so both calls threw and the
handler answered 500. Real breakage from this branch, not stale
expectations.
The widgets GET no longer resolves the whole module map for one answer.
`hrv` is the only conditionally-dead widget and `recovery` the only module
that decides it, so it reads that one flag through `isModuleEnabled`, the
way this route's neighbours read a single flag.
Both gate mocks spread the real module so only the one call is stubbed;
everything else that imports it keeps live behaviour. The widgets
`beforeEach` states the modules-on default explicitly, because
`resetAllMocks` strips a factory's implementation and every test below
assumes it.
Added coverage for the behaviour itself rather than only unbreaking the
suite: recovery off with no SDNN marks `hrv` unavailable, an account WITH
SDNN keeps the toggle, and recovery on does not run the probe at all — the
one added read on a hot cached route must not touch the common account.
Three pieces of code answered "what hour is it" for the salutation. The
snapshot builder computed a `greetingHour` in the user's zone and put it on
the payload so clients would not have to; no client ever read it. The
insights hero derived one through the shared `hourInTz`. The dashboard header
derived one through a local helper that fell back to the DEVICE clock
whenever the runtime could not resolve the configured zone, which is what
happens to an IANA entry the browser's data does not yet carry. At one
instant, for one account, those three returned 20, 21 and 05.
Keep the client end and drop the server one. The hour is a clock reading, not
a fact about the record, and the snapshot body serves stale for up to an hour
past its fresh TTL, so a stored hour can name a salutation the clock has left
behind. What the server IS authoritative for is the zone, and that already
travels on the same payload and is already what both surfaces read.
Both greetings now share `hourInTz`, so an unresolvable zone falls back to the
same default the rest of the app uses instead of to the device. The header's
private helper is gone; it had no other caller.
Two tests pinned the old shape by asserting the payload carried an hour.
Inverted rather than deleted: the payload must now be shown NOT to carry one,
which is the property that was missing when the field went unread for months.
`greetingHour` leaves the response contract, so a native client decoding it as
required needs the field made optional or dropped.
The unit suite reported all 1937 files green and then failed the job with
`EnvironmentTeardownError: Closing rpc while "onUserConsoleLog" was
pending`, naming a different scoring test each time.
Vitest replaces globalThis.console with a sink that forwards every write
to the main thread as an onUserConsoleLog RPC call. When a worker
finishes a test file it awaits the calls in flight and then rejects
whatever was started after that point, so a console write from work that
outlived its test lands in the gap and fails the run. The blame goes to
the file being torn down rather than to the test that started the work,
which is why the named file never logged anything itself.
Three paths detach a promise and log on the handle: fireAndForget, the
stale-while-revalidate cache refresh, and the offline query persister.
They now register the handled handle in a set that both suite setups
drain in afterEach, so no test leaves work in flight. The registry is
inert outside test: nothing there awaits it, and holding a reference to
an unsettled promise would retain it for the life of a worker. No
production behaviour changes, so there is no changelog entry.
Evidence. A focused harness that starts failing background tasks and
returns hit the teardown error 10 runs out of 10 before the change and
0 out of 10 after. Instrumenting the real suite showed two detached
console writes per run escaping their test, both from the rollup tail;
after the change, none, and thirteen writes per run now complete inside
the test that started them.
The guard asserts the behaviour, not a count: a registered task must
keep settleBackgroundTasks from resolving ahead of it, and the set must
drain back to empty. It goes red on unregistered work, on a disabled
registry, on an unwrapped call site, on a sweep that matches nothing,
and on a setup that drops the hook.
The column-reader sweep read every `field:` key as a write, so
`where: { ticketHash }` counted as writing `ticketHash`. All twelve columns it
reported were a lookup key or a cron's discovery predicate being filtered on,
and a review tool that has cried wolf twelve times is not consulted on the
thirteenth. It also reported only columns that already had a write, which made
a column with no write at all the one thing it could not see.
Mask each file, bracket-match every Prisma argument, and tag its contents as
write, projection or query so nesting resolves innermost-wins. Follow a payload
assembled before the call: a const handed to `update:`, a spread merged into a
`create:`, a `rows.push({...})` builder filling a typed array. Credit raw SQL
against the `@map` column name. Report a column nothing touches as its own
category, and split the output so a write with no reader reads differently from
a query predicate, a relation's foreign key and an annotated column.
Twelve false alarms become nineteen findings that hold up. Four are worth
acting on and are left for a decision rather than annotated away: the glucose
unit preference and an import job's export date have readers and no writer, and
the provider-health status code and the known-device first-seen stamp have the
opposite.
The matcher underneath is a test now, checked by breaking the fix three ways.
Derives both sets mechanically — the whitelist from docker-compose.yml, the
read set from the source — and fails when a variable is read without being
forwarded. Written red against the tree before the fix, where it named 35.
A search for process.env. alone is not the read set: four modules resolve the
name through a helper and index process.env dynamically, which hides every
OIDC_* variable and ALLOW_LOCAL_AI_PRIVATE_HOSTS. Each is registered with its
own call-shape matcher and its own non-zero assertion, so a rename fails the
file loudly instead of quietly shrinking the set. The walk and the matchers
both assert a floor, because an empty match set agrees with any allowlist.
Thirteen deliberate exceptions each carry a written reason, and the list is
kept honest from both ends: an entry that stops being read, or that later
appears in the whitelist, fails too.
The mood page called the plain `pearsonCorrelation` — strength banded from
|r| alone above a floor of five pairs, no significance test — so five days
of noise sloping the right way arrived at the reader as a "Strong" badge,
with n and r behind an info icon. The guarded twin was written for exactly
that failure and names it in its own comment, and the weight, blood-pressure
and mood-status surfaces had already moved onto it. The mood page had not.
Route the page's five cross-metric channels through
`significantPearsonCorrelation` (n >= 20 AND p < 0.05) and carry the reason
a pairing was refused, so the card can distinguish "still building" from
"twenty days and nothing in them" instead of showing the same blank for
both. New copy in all seven locales.
Add a structural guard that fails when a new caller of the unguarded helper
appears outside a written allowlist. Two callers remain on it, each named as
open work rather than as a blessing: the /insights envelope and the AI
feature payload both still band at n >= 5, and moving them changes payload
shapes their own tests pin.
Neither read is a bug a behavioural test can see: both shapes return the
right rows, and only the plan differs. So the guards split by what each
can actually answer.
The unit guard asserts on the SQL the readers build, with comments
stripped so it matches the query text and never the prose describing it:
no DISTINCT ON on this path, a LATERAL driven from an unnested type list
with a LIMIT on the per-type branch, a bound type predicate on the rollup
read sitting alongside the user and granularity filters, and the route
still calling the shared readers rather than growing a second copy. Four
of its five cases fail against the pre-change SQL.
The integration companion runs the shipped readers and the pre-change SQL
side by side over one fixture on the real Postgres and requires identical
rows. The fixture carries the cases the rewrite could have broken: a type
whose only rows are tombstoned, a type with no rows, a type whose newest
row is a tombstone over a surviving one, and coarser rollup granularities
the DAY read must ignore. Dropping the soft-delete filter or shortening
the type list makes both cases fail.
Plan assertions are deliberately not in the integration file: a
testcontainer fixture is too small for the planner to choose the access
paths a real account produces, so an EXPLAIN there would pin nothing.
The lockstep guard compared only the pins both matchers happened to
recognise, and neither matcher said so when it recognised fewer.
Workspace side: the key had to be quoted. Every entry in the file carries
an `@<selector>` suffix and therefore needs quoting, so the matcher looked
complete — but `mysql2: "^3.22.0"` is a valid pnpm override with no
selector and no quotes, and it parsed to nothing. Unquoting that key and
pointing the Dockerfile at `^1.0.0` left all six tests green.
Dockerfile side: only `npm pkg set 'overrides.X=Y'` was recognised, so
re-quoting the same line as `npm pkg set overrides.X=Y` removed the pin
from the comparison without changing what the image installs.
Both sides now parse line by line: quoted or bare keys and values on the
workspace side, any shell quoting of the same assignment on the Dockerfile
side, plus a raw JSON `"overrides"` block. What neither table can read is
collected and asserted empty, so a future spelling fails loudly instead of
shrinking the compared set in silence.
The image carries two installs. pnpm builds the app tree from
pnpm-workspace.yaml; npm builds /opt/prisma-cli and reads only its own
overrides field. The scan reported @hono/node-server@1.19.11
(GHSA-frvp-7c67-39w9, CVE-2026-39406) and valibot@1.2.0
(CVE-2026-59952) under that path while both packages were pinned and
clean in the app tree. Same shape as the deepmerge-ts finding, same
cause.
Rebuilt this exact install both ways to confirm rather than assume.
Without the two fields npm resolves @hono/node-server 1.19.11 and
valibot 1.2.0, which are the two versions the scan named. With them it
resolves 1.19.17 and 1.4.2, and prisma --version still reports 7.8.0.
Both arrive through prisma -> @prisma/dev.
The lockstep guard could not have caught this. Its workspace matcher
started a package name at [^"@], so every scoped key was invisible to
it: @hono/node-server was in the workspace file and absent from the
Dockerfile, the shared set never contained it, and the guard stayed
green. Scoped keys parse now, a test pins the reduction itself so the
blind spot cannot return quietly, and a second test asserts that the
three packages the image scan has actually flagged under /opt/prisma-cli
keep their npm-side mirror. Both fail when the pin is removed or moved
out of step.
The four raw values in the sources ladder shipped because nothing checks
the catalogues against the enum they render. The new guard reads
MeasurementSource and IntakeSource out of prisma/schema.prisma, not out
of a copy, and fails naming every member no catalogue labels; it also
asserts the key each entry names resolves in all seven bundles, since a
key that resolves nowhere renders no better than the enum value. Run red
against the tree before the labels landed, it reported seven unlabelled
measurement sources per catalogue and one unlabelled intake source.
The schema reader now carries each enum's declared members so the guard
can read them.
Settings, Sources listed GOOGLE_HEALTH, OURA, POLAR and STRAVA by their
internal name: the catalogue was written for seven sources and every
provider added since fell through to the raw value. The measurement list
carried the same fall-through in its source filter and its table column,
and the medication intake history read "via APPLE_HEALTH" for a dose
synced from Apple Health.
The three catalogues move into one module keyed by the enum, so an
omission is a type error rather than a raw value on screen, and the sleep
discrepancy tooltip drops the private brand-name map it had grown to work
around the gap.
Account deletion and the record wipe both demand a fresh second-factor
proof once a factor is enrolled, and that proof lived on the session row.
A native client has no session row, so an account with TOTP or a security
key could not delete itself from the app on any request it could build:
requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled fell through to requireFreshMfa, which resolves
via getSession and answers 401 to a perfectly valid token. App Store
guideline 5.1.1(v) asks for exactly that deletion.
Add requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled beside the cookie-only sibling
rather than softening it. Its cookie arm is the sibling's, unchanged;
its Bearer arm takes the single-use elevation the second-factor
management routes already accept, with the fresh-factor rule pinned on,
so a password-proved elevation cannot erase an account any more than a
password login satisfies the gate on the web. No factor rides the request
body: one mint surface, one redemption path. Scope stays fail-closed, so
a narrow token is refused before the header is read.
The elevation is spent immediately before the erasure, after the typed
confirmation and the last-admin check, so a rejected request does not
burn a proof against a 5-per-15-minute mint ceiling. The Bearer branch
of requireMfaManagementAuth moves into a shared helper so both gates read
and claim in the same place.
The elevation guard grows a section naming the two routes, because the
set of surfaces an elevation can unlock only stays small if adding to it
is a visible edit.
Every background path that resolved a user row's locale collapsed a
NULL column to English: the nightly briefing warm, the status crons,
the period-narrative warm, reaction lines, the morning refresh, the
briefing push, coach nudges, the reminder workers, and the document and
workout summaries each carried their own copy of
`locales.includes(x) ? x : defaultLocale` or called
`normalizeLocale(user.locale)`. None consulted the instance's configured
default language, so an account that never touched the language picker
got English prose and English pushes on a German-language instance.
Add resolveJobLocale (src/lib/i18n/job-locale.ts): stored user locale
when valid, else the operator's app_settings.default_locale when valid,
else English. The settings read lives beside the other app-settings
accessors. Every job and daily path resolves through it once, where it
has the row; the template helpers keep coerceLocale for a value that is
already resolved, and queue payloads keep normalizeLocale.
The briefing push hands its resolved locale down to the digest, and the
digest to the snapshot read, so the push copy and the digest lines are
in the same language instead of two different fallbacks.
A structural test walks src/lib/jobs and src/lib/daily and fails on a
hand-rolled coercion, a validator applied to a row column, or a row
reader that does not import the helper. It was red against the previous
tree on all three counts.
The v1.38.0 notice that warns when the configured OAuth callback origin
differs from the origin the browser is on never rendered in the published
image, and the copyable callback address in the redirect guide showed a
bare path. `integrationCallbackUrl()` read `process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL`
inside a "use client" module. Next.js inlines NEXT_PUBLIC_* into client
bundles at build time, and the GHCR image is built without that variable
(only the version, build-sha and built-at args reach the build), so the
base compiled to an empty string, `new URL("/api/<provider>/callback")`
threw, and the notice returned null on every card for every self-hoster.
The value now comes from the server at request time. A new map
(`src/lib/integrations/callback-urls.ts`) calls each provider's own
redirect-URI function (the four private `getRedirectUri()` helpers are
exported under provider-specific names; Polar, Oura and Strava already
exported theirs), so the page shows exactly what the handshake registers,
explicit `*_REDIRECT_URI` override included. The settings route resolves
the map and passes it as a prop through `IntegrationsSection` and
`ConnectionsPanel` to every card. Fitbit and Google Health validate their
URI and throw on a bad configuration; that surfaces as `null`, the notice
skips the comparison and the guide falls back to the fixed path.
Tests: a map test proving the explicit override wins and the derived form
is used otherwise, a component test rendering the notice from a passed
value (mismatch renders, match does not), and a structural guard that
fails when any "use client" file under src/components/settings/integrations
reads NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL.
Since v1.30.17 there has been no self-service path to a token that can
write a measurement. That release made the Bearer scope default
fail-closed, which closed a real privilege-escalation hole, and removed
the generic mint at POST /api/tokens along with it. The generic mint had
been the only way to get a token that could reach /api/measurements, so
a local sensor pushed through Home Assistant or Node-RED lost its door
while the OAuth integrations kept theirs.
Add a narrow scope accepted by exactly two routes, both writes, both on
the holder's own record.
The scope constant is a leaf module beside the surface that consumes it,
matching FHIR_READ_SCOPE and the MCP scopes. requireRecordAuth grows an
options object rather than a sibling function, because the sharing
surface guard keys every leg on that one identifier and a second name
would mean two copies of the delegable declaration. AuthContext carries
the admitting scope as a single nullable string rather than the token's
permission array, so nothing downstream can re-derive an authorisation
decision from it.
A scoped credential is refused a record selector before any grant is
read. Placing the refusal above the sharing check rather than beside it
means no future widening of what a grant permits can reach one of these
tokens.
Rows are attributed MANUAL. An entry that explicitly names APPLE_HEALTH
is refused 422 rather than relabelled: that source is half the
(userId, type, source, externalId) dedup key the iOS client writes into,
it participates in the cross-source merge, and it gates the HealthKit
sync fields. For the same reason a scoped write no longer advances
User.lastSyncedAt, which the phone reads to size its undelivered window.
Also closes a narrower gap found while building this. The idempotency
wrapper resolved a replayed delegated response against a live grant
without considering which credential was presenting it, so a cached
response about a shared record could be returned to a token the handler
itself would refuse. No write was reachable that way; the response body
was.
Guards: T3 gains the mint site, T4's vocabulary gains the scope and
learns to read the requireRecordAuth form (without which this change
would open a way to widen a route that the closed vocabulary could not
see), and a new T5 freezes the set of delegable routes naming a scope.
The sharing surface guard's AST matcher reads only the first two
arguments, so it needed prose but no code.
Six suites pinned the old rule as the rule. Each inversion, and why it is
one:
`breadth.test.ts` — the case table asserted a refusal reason per set; it
asserts a tier and a `physiological` flag now. Every row in it except the
empty set used to be a refusal, and each is a number somebody gets to see.
Adds the tier boundaries (one pillar, two areas, physiological-absent), a
case proving the same pillars produce the same number at `partial` and at
`full`, and a block whose only job is the counter-case: the empty verdict
still carries a reason and no tier, and a composite whose selected pillars
all came back short still refuses with `no_usable_data`. A rule that has
stopped refusing anything is a deleted rule, not a graded one.
`composite.test.ts` — "requires three domains and one measured
physiological domain" asserted the refusal that no longer happens; it now
asserts the score and the basis block on the same fixture. The coverage
case keeps its fixture and its arithmetic and flips its outcome: two of
three used to be a refusal and is a scored account with a real coverage
fraction. Adds the one-area case and the zero-pillar counter-case, and the
`SCORE_VERSION` floor moves 2 -> 3 because widening who gets a score is
exactly the kind of change that must not ship without a version bump.
`record.test.ts` — "records nothing when the composite did not resolve"
used a two-pillar fixture to prove a below-the-floor day stored nothing.
That day has a number now and the table has to keep it, or an account that
starts narrow and widens later has a hole where its early days were. The
assertion is now that a one-pillar day builds a draft AND reaches the
database; the absence case survives on the fixture that genuinely produces
no score.
`composition-source.test.ts` — three recipes asserted as refused at read
time. Two of them score. What the block proves is unchanged — the reader
publishes the shared rule's verdict on the reader's own resolved set, so a
second copy of the rule would still surface here — but the agreement is
over a tier rather than over a refusal.
`route.test.ts` (score config) — the two too-narrow refusals become
acceptances, because a write that refuses what the read is willing to serve
is the two layers disagreeing. The empty selection keeps its 422 and gains
the assertions the old cases carried: errorCode, reason, and the sentence.
The errorCode driver loses the two selections that no longer 422.
`score-refusal-consumer-guard.test.ts` — its non-zero control anchored on
`three_domains_required`; it anchors on `no_pillars_selected`.
New: `health-score-basis-additive-contract.test.ts` pins that `scoreBasis`
is published, is optional on all three carriers, and points at the one
shared component — a required field on a cached surface would invalidate
every cached payload with nothing failing anywhere. It also pins that the
walk does not confuse the composite's basis with the older per-pillar
`scoreBasis` that blood pressure uses for its axis, since they share a key.
Fixtures: the notice-key assertions derive the method half from
`SCORE_VERSION` rather than restating 3. Three fixtures that named
`three_domains_required` now name `no_usable_data`, a reason the server can
still emit. The settings e2e drove its refusal through a two-pillar
selection that now succeeds; it deselects every pillar instead.
The per-user retry ledger has recorded every AI delivery outcome for a
long time, but no surface ever read it for the operator: a central
provider could fail on every call for weeks and the admin console said
nothing. The AI settings section now carries a health card, backed by a
new admin-only endpoint that folds the ledger into one row per provider
type: users tracked, users currently failing, the worst uninterrupted
failure run, and the last success and failure instants. Operator-managed
types sort first because their failure takes the shared fallback down
for everyone whose chain relies on it. Counts and timestamps only; the
response never names a user.
Registering `ko` in the `Locale` union left seven locale-keyed tables
without an entry, so the build could not type-check and the safety
screens, the citation-coverage grader and the reference-range parser
read nothing at all for a Korean reader.
Three failures were not missing keys but wrong assumptions:
- The shared fold decomposes with NFD and strips U+0300-U+036F. Latin
accents become plain letters, but Hangul decomposes into jamo, which
are not in that range and survived — so folded Korean text was a jamo
sequence no precomposed table entry could ever match. It recomposes to
NFC now; every Latin, Polish and German fold is byte-identical.
- `normaliseLabKey` kept `[a-z0-9]`, which reduced every Korean analyte
name to the empty string, so the derived index held none of them and a
Korean cholesterol result reached a FHIR export uncoded.
- The reference-range parser had the hyphen and the dashes but not the
tilde a Korean lab actually prints (`3.5~5.0`).
The Korean safety banks carry no `\b` next to a Hangul token — `\b` is
an ASCII `\w` boundary and Hangul is not `\w`, so `/\b증량/` matches
nothing — and the clause order is the mirror of the Latin banks, since
Korean closes with the verb. The dose patterns require a target-marking
particle for the same reason the Latin banks require "to"/"by": without
it the permitted restatement "7.5mg을 복용 중이고, 체중은 내려가고
있어요" tripped the lowering pattern.
The Coach and Insights prompts route `ko` down the reviewed English body
plus a Korean reply directive; there is no `safety-contracts.ko.yaml`, so
the native builder has no Korean ground rules to compose from.
Register `ko` in the locale list, language names, and labels, and ship
messages/ko.json so the whole UI — dashboard, settings, share views,
clinician PDF, notifications, and AI prompts — renders in Korean.
Extend the locale-parity, English-leak, plural-completeness, and copy
guard tests to cover the new locale, and update README/CONTRIBUTING to
list Korean among the supported languages.
`GET /api/insights/derived` accepts `windowDays`, bounded to 1..90, and
threads it to the dispatcher. Omitting it changes nothing: every engine
keeps its own default, so a caller that asks for nothing reads exactly
what it read before.
Ninety is where the tier this route promises runs out. The rollup router
opens its WEEK floor at 91 days, and the baseline engines cannot compose
a spread from WEEK buckets, so a 91-day request falls through to a raw
`measurement.findMany` with no row cap — for a densely sampled type that
is a full history scan, and the analytics-read budget allows 120 of them
a minute per account. The trailing `series` is capped at 30 points
regardless, so past the ceiling a wider window would only broaden the
mean behind the value. Out of range is a 422 rather than a clamp.
An unhonoured window is visible rather than silent. `provenance.windowDays`
is the window the engine actually used and `coverage.historyDays` the days
that actually backed it, so a three-week record answering a thirty-day
request reports both numbers instead of implying coverage it does not
have. `HEALTH_SCORE` composes fixed per-pillar windows and reports the
widest; a new suite freezes that it is the only metric that does, so an
arm added later cannot quietly drop the parameter.
Recovery keeps its canonical resolution under the wider window. A worn
band stamps the wake morning and the computed proxy the night before, and
only `resolveCanonicalRecovery` pairs them; a test seeds forty such
nights, asks for sixty days, and holds the answer to forty nights with a
flat trend — a bypass leaves eighty rows and a false climb.
Contract: model `WellnessScoreValue` field for field and publish it. The
envelope's `value` has to stay an open record because one route serves
eighteen differently-shaped metrics, so nothing can `$ref` the shape and
it went out undocumented — `series`, `daysInWindow` and `asOf` were on
the wire with no way to find them short of inspecting a live response. It
is registered in the forced-components slot instead, held against the
runtime interface by a test, and the fields it does not cover are named
in the schema comment so the remaining gap is known rather than invisible.
Both routes were exempt from the contract as `shareLink` — "authenticated
by the URL credential, for a recipient with no account". That reason
holds for the page a person opens. It does not hold for two routes whose
whole purpose is to hand a practice a file it files into another system,
which is exactly the audience a contract has. `/c/{token}/d/{id}` was
published all along, one route away in the same tree.
Each entry states the gate it shares with the page, the frozen selection
it can never exceed, the flat 404 that covers every miss class including
a documents-only link, and the 20/h per-link bucket. The FHIR entry says
plainly that it is a download and not a REST face, and names the two
resource families the bundle deliberately omits.
The create-request description claimed "there is no FHIR or other
machine-readable face behind a share token", which stopped being true
when these routes landed. It now describes what a link actually serves
and records that the insurance leaf is refused outright.
The coverage guard gains the other half of its staleness check. It caught
an exemption for a route that had disappeared, and never the reverse — an
exemption left behind after the route was published, which is how these
two would have stayed on the list while the contract already carried
them. Break-proof: re-add either entry and it goes red naming it.
Eleven leaves stayed invisible for eleven releases because nothing
connected the two lists. The picker-to-aggregator guard was satisfied and
kept being satisfied; the page was not on either end of it.
`DISPOSITIONS` is `Record<StructuredLeafId, …>`, so an eighteenth
structured leaf fails `pnpm typecheck` until someone writes down whether
it renders or why it cannot. Per leaf the suite then renders the real
view over a real fixture and asserts the marker appears; re-renders with
that leaf alone removed from the frozen selection, payload untouched, and
asserts it is gone; and for a refusal, reads the list that enforces it
rather than trusting the note.
Once over the whole set: a carried leaf with nothing behind it says so, a
leaf whose module is off says something else, and a leaf the link never
carried says nothing at all.
The `share-downloads` row is asserted here too. Its test id had zero
references anywhere in the tree, so the two buttons a practice clicks
could have lost a link, pointed at the wrong path, or vanished from a
documents-only share unnoticed.
Break-proofs, each confirmed red then restored: drop a section element
(that leaf's render case); gate `LeafSection` on data instead of scope
(thirteen withholding cases); collapse the switched-off arm (the
distinction case); empty `SHARE_LINK_FORBIDDEN_LEAVES` (the refusal
case); add an eighteenth leaf (typecheck).
Three surfaces built the label key by interpolation — the doctor-report
PDF's visit table, the daily digest's upcoming-visit line and the
clinician share view. `EncounterKind` is `ROUTINE` and the bundle leaf is
`routine`, so all three rendered `encounters.kind.ROUTINE` verbatim: into
a document a practice files, onto a lock screen, and onto the page.
Route them through `encounterKindLabelKey`, a literal switch beside the
existing `encounterKindLabel`, so the mapping is written down once.
The enum-derived i18n guard could not have caught this: it only knows
key spaces of the form `prefix + member`, and this one is not. It gains a
second arm for spaces whose mapping is a function, with `encounters.kind`
as its first entry. Break-proof: point one arm of the resolver back at
the uppercase key and six locale cases go red.
The gate landed with a softer mode for accounts holding no second factor,
on the premise that they could not clear it. That premise was wrong. A
passkey is a possession factor here and the codebase already says so in
three places: a primary passkey login stamps Session.mfaVerifiedAt,
passkey sits in FRESH_FACTOR_METHODS so a passkey-proved elevation reaches
the fresh-factor routes, and the enrolment policy counts a primary passkey
as satisfying it outright. The only thing refusing such an account was the
reachability pre-check inside requireFreshMfa, which counts second factors
and nothing else.
So the mode is gone and the route asks for a full freshFactor: true with
proofSource: "any-possession" — a second knob that widens which credentials
count as "could ever prove this", and changes nothing about the gate. A
passkey-only account now gets a real gate with the re-provable
auth.stepup.required rather than no gate at all, and the dead-end
auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled is reserved for an account holding nothing.
hasSecondFactorEnrolled is deliberately NOT widened. It answers a different
question, and requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled asks it before deciding whether
account deletion, the data reset, the password change, the encrypted export
and key rotation gate at all — counting a passkey there would change five
destructive actions in passing. The two predicates sit beside each other
with docblocks saying why they differ, and collapsing them turns eight
existing tests red across three files.
Recovery is named rather than assumed. On Bearer: mint an elevation with
method "passkey". On the web: sign in again, which is what stamps the
session — there is no in-page re-proof for a cookie session because the
mint endpoint is Bearer-only by design. That limit is written into the
route docblock instead of left to be discovered, and the removal's refusal
now renders its own sentence in all six locales rather than the server's
English "second-factor" prose, which was wrong for the account this card
mostly serves.
Four surfaces assembled the correlation-discovery matrix and three carried a
different channel set. The Coach `get_correlations` tool had neither the
environmental-exposure channels nor the custom-metric ones, so asking it
whether air pressure relates to your sleep met a matrix the pair had never
been in. Its own file header said the opposite - "the SAME full-matrix scan
the route runs" - and had said it since the weather channels arrived in
v1.25. The period narrative was missing those two families and the
compliance / symptom pair on top.
`src/lib/insights/discovery-matrix.ts` is now the one place a matrix is
built. v1.30.3 hoisted the fetch discipline into a shared module for exactly
this reason and left the assembly duplicated behind; this finishes it. The
route, the per-metric card, the Coach tool and the period narrative all call
`assembleDiscoveryMatrix` and get the same families. What still differs is
declared as an option with its reason at the declaration: the measurement
read mode (a read-cost choice, left per surface), the extra metric types the
narrative's delta beat needs, and the RATED mood factors.
Mood factors stay on the narrative alone. That capture kind is frozen, the
two surfaces that persist a discovered pair write its channel key into a
plaintext column, and a custom factor's key is an opaque id - so admitting
them elsewhere is a decision about what to ask, not a parity fix.
Restore the per-metric filter on the assessment card's relations. It was
written in place of the pattern-dismissal filter rather than chained with it,
so a weight card's prompt had been receiving every surviving pair in the
record while the function name, the docstring and the early-return guard all
still said one metric.
`discovery-matrix-guard.test.ts` freezes who may fetch a channel, who may
construct one, and who may scan. Each matcher asserts a non-zero match count,
so a matcher that has stopped matching fails rather than agreeing with the
allowlist.
The statistics are untouched - same Pearson, same exact p-value, same
Benjamini-Hochberg, same floors. The Coach's family is larger now, which is
the point: it is corrected over the same family the insights page is.
DELETE /api/auth/passkeys/{id} took a plain cookie session or a wildcard
Bearer, while DELETE /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/{id} beside it demanded a
fresh factor proof. The softer gate sat on the primary sign-in credential:
the last-method check stops an account locking itself out, but nothing
stopped a hijacked session stripping the credentials the owner signs in
with.
The route now goes through requireMfaManagementAuth, the same gate the
security-key removal uses, in a new "if-enrolled" mode. An account with a
second factor pays the full price on either transport — a freshly verified
cookie session, or a factor-proved X-Step-Up elevation on Bearer, so the
native client keeps the capability rather than being sent to the website.
An account with no second factor keeps the contract it had, because a gate
it can never satisfy is not a safeguard but a locked door in front of its
own credential list.
The elevation is spent immediately before the delete, so a foreign id or a
refused last credential does not burn a proof that then has to be minted
again. The route is added to the elevation allowlist with its reason, and
the either-factor enrolment test that was written out three times in the
API kit is now one function.
Three surfaces, one source. The registry the proxy answers 410 from now
also emits the tombstones into `docs/api/openapi.yaml` and rides on
`GET /api/meta/capabilities`, so a retirement cannot be honoured at
runtime and invisible everywhere a client could have read it first.
The contract publishes each retired path with 410 as its only response,
the removing version, and the replacement. `deprecated: true` is
imprecise — the word means "still works, stop using it", and these do not
work — but it is what makes a generator warn at the call site, and the
description carries the exact truth the flag approximates. `security: []`
because the answer is produced before any handler and reads no
credential; publishing it as authenticated would tell a client to sign in
to be told a path is gone.
The capability read carries the same list. That surface is the one a
client already polls on launch, so a retirement can reach it before the
failing call rather than through it.
The coverage guard gains a third state. Published and exempted both
describe a route that exists, so removing one used to leave exactly one
legal move — erase it from the contract as well — and that move is
invisible to every client already calling it. A registered path is now
required to be absent from `src/app` AND present in the contract, which
is the one combination the phantom-path case rejected outright. Both ways
out are named in the failure message.
Its docblock says what the state cannot do, because the first draft
overclaimed: a check over one commit's state cannot see a deletion, so it
cannot insist that a removal should have been registered. Proving that
needs the previous release tag, and the job running this suite checks out
at depth one with no tags, which would make the check one that silently
cannot fail. What is held instead is the registration's integrity, in
three directions and with the mutation for each written down.
The sharing-denial guard learns the same state: a retired path resolves
no record fence because it reaches no handler.
A route removed on purpose still leaves a client calling it. As reported
in iOS #94: between 2026-08-08 and 2026-08-20 the native client asked
`/api/auth/me/research-mode` on every GLP-1 detail screen, got a bare
404, and painted a permanent error card with a retry button aimed at the
same removed path. Twelve days, on every reachable instance including the
public demo, which was built after the removal. Deleting the route was
right and the removing commit reasons it out in full; the answer said
nothing. A 404 from a deployment is indistinguishable from a broken
build, a reverse proxy pointed at the wrong upstream, or a typo in the
caller's own path, so reading it as transient and retrying was the
correct reading of the only evidence there was.
One registry, `src/lib/http/retired-routes.ts`, carrying the path, the
release that removed it, the replacement where there is one, and one
sentence on why. Every other surface reads it.
410 over a 404 with an error code because it is the status whose entire
meaning is "this existed here and is gone": a client that understands
nothing else about this API still learns not to retry. The code is not
dropped, it rides in the same envelope with `removedIn` and `replacedBy`
for a client that reads further. The status is the floor, the code is the
detail.
Answered in the proxy, before routing, rather than by a catch-all route
module: a catch-all under `/api` would intercept every unmatched path and
make the ordinary 404 ours to manufacture, which is a far wider blast
radius than the problem. The proxy already owns the exact-path decisions
of this shape. It reads nothing off the request but the path, so an
anonymous caller and an authenticated one get identical bytes and the
tombstone cannot become an authentication oracle.
Seeded from the removed-route set: every route path under `src/app` at
every release tag, unioned and differenced against the current tree.
Twenty-seven paths have been removed over the project's history; the five
registered here are the ones that were published or client-facing, and
each removal is pinned to its release by the route's presence at one tag
and absence at the next. Whether any client still calls one of them is a
separate question that evidence in this repository cannot answer, and the
registry deliberately makes no claim about it.
The document defined bearerAuth and cookieAuth and referenced neither,
so the schemes were decoration: a client generated from the contract
wires no credential and reads the whole surface as open.
The default now offers the two as alternatives, and the ten operations
reachable before a credential exists opt out with an empty array. The
opt-out list is derived from what each handler accepts, not from the
proxy's public-path list — /api/ingest/medication is on that list and
requires a Bearer token, so reading it as the answer would publish an
authenticated route as open. Writing the list from the proxy is exactly
the mistake the guard caught: /api/auth/oidc/callback went on it and is
not published at all.
Two groups created environment.ts independently; one carried all six
paths, the other only the overview read, so the fuller side stands and
the barrel keeps one import.
Twenty-five path entries across nine domains, all of them served and none
of them described. Same cause as the first batch: `openapi:check`
compares the registry against the YAML and never the route tree against
the registry, so a route registered nowhere drifts with every gate green.
Four groups where the contract had to say more than the shape does.
The full backup is the download that carries a whole record in plain
text, so what it contains is a safety question. It has two modes and this
route reaches only one: called with no options, it always emits the
PORTABLE form — decrypted columns, no tombstones, no row ids — while the
disaster-recovery form belongs to the worker and the admin path. Three
things it leaves out say so in the payload's own manifest: document
bytes, workout GPS and per-sample series, and the sensitive pair, where
the screener answers include the PHQ-9 self-harm item and a consent
receipt restored elsewhere would assert an agreement that operator never
obtained. The undeclared gap is named too, since roughly thirty models
the plan marks as backed up still have no reader or restore branch.
The four intake mutations differ in ways a caller has to know before
firing one. The by-id delete, the bulk delete and the purge all
tombstone, so the sync feed carries each removal; only the purge's
compliance rollups are dropped outright, and those recompute. The first
two refund the inventory stamp because not taking a dose puts the units
back; the purge deliberately does not, because refunding a whole history
would inflate the current container count instead. The bulk delete drops
unmatched ids silently, so a partial match succeeds with a lower count
than the ids sent.
The two provider-configuration surfaces are documented by what they do
NOT return. The chain answers provider types and boolean state, never a
credential. The per-medication ingest endpoint returns a raw token
exactly once, on the PUT that mints it, and a re-enable answers a null
token with `created: false` rather than re-issuing — the stored value is
an HMAC and there is no path back.
Insight generation costs money, so both gates are published with the
refusals they produce: the hourly per-user limit, and the day's token
ceiling, which is refused at reservation time before any provider is
contacted and carries its own code so a client can tell "too often" from
"the day's spend is gone". A 200 there does not mean a provider ran.
Two things the code said that were no longer true. The seeded-question
route's docblock declared it deliberately unregistered; it is registered
now, and a comment contradicting the registry is worse than none. And
the idempotency guard went red on `/api/insights/feedback`, whose
exemption said the path could not be published — which is exactly what
that leg exists to catch, so the entry is gone rather than the assertion.
`docs/api/openapi.yaml` is regenerated separately.
The drift check compares the registry to the emitted YAML. It has never
compared the routes on disk to the registry, so a route that was never
registered produced no drift and no failure: the document stayed
internally consistent while going quietly incomplete. Two hundred and
twenty-two paths reached that state.
The coverage guard walks src/app, reads the verbs each module exports,
and requires every verb to be either published or named with a reason.
The reasons are kinds rather than free text, because these fall into a
small number of genuinely different shapes and writing one sentence
seventy-three times would hide the entry whose sentence is different.
The security guard is the same idea one level down. The document defined
bearerAuth and cookieAuth and referenced neither, so a generated client
wired no credential and read the whole surface as open. The schemes
being present is what hid it. The document now declares them as
alternatives, and the guard checks the reference rather than the
declaration.
Both are red until the routes are documented, which is the point.
`GET /api/medications/{id}/glp1` resolved the caller as themselves while
the POST beside it has resolved the record since v1.37.0. A manager
inside a shared record could therefore add a titration step to a
medication whose history the same path refused them: may write, may not
read. No reading of the sharing model produces that shape, and the
sibling reads on the same medication — `/inventory`, `/side-effects`,
`/cadence` — have all resolved the record at READ level for releases.
The read joins them at that level rather than at the POST's MANAGE,
because it is strictly narrower than the write already admitted. The
module was already on both reviewed allowlists, so nothing is newly
delegable; its reason line said the module was reached through the
MANAGE arm alone, which is no longer true and now says so.
The gap survived this long because a route that refuses every switched
caller is indistinguishable from a route nobody classified. Three legs
close that: a delegate scoped to medications reads the owner's titration
history and still cannot reach their own medication, a delegate scoped
elsewhere is refused, and a caller who never switched is unchanged. Both
delegate legs assert the refusal CODE rather than the status, because the
pre-fix answer was also a 403 — verified by reverting the handler, at
which point the first leg reads 403 for 200 and the second reads
`sharing.not_permitted` for `sharing.access.denied`.
Marc-André Bombeck