Twenty-eight more verbs that exist, are called, and said nothing in the
contract: registration, password rotation, the profile patch, the SSO entry
point, passkey enrolment, the Codex device-auth flow, the device list and its
revocation cascade, four per-user preference scalars, the email channel and the
four channel self-tests, the record wipe, the privacy facts, the update check,
and the Web Push transport.
Four of them needed more care than the rest.
`GET /api/auth/oidc/login` is documented as the two-armed route it is. The
browser arm redirects to the provider; the native arm takes `client=native`
plus a mandatory S256 challenge and returns to a compile-time scheme with a
one-time code — or an MFA ticket when the account has a second factor. The two
PKCE exchanges in play are named apart, because confusing them is the way to
get this wrong.
`POST /api/auth/register` is the only genuinely anonymous surface in the set,
and its refusals are stated exactly: the SSO-only block, the 5-per-15-minutes
bucket that collapses rather than falls open, the invite that is consumed
whenever it is sent, the zero-user bootstrap that mints the first admin under a
lock, and the one 409 that covers a taken email and a taken username so it
cannot be used to enumerate accounts. `POST /api/auth/password` is a change
behind authentication, not a reset, so it is described as one.
`DELETE /api/settings/data` names what it takes and what it leaves: ninety-nine
models hard-deleted, the account's own personal columns reset, credentials and
interface preferences kept, one transaction, and a confirmation string that is
deliberately not the one account deletion wants.
Two collisions surfaced while wiring this up and are resolved rather than
worked around. `PUT /api/auth/profile` and `PATCH /api/user/profile` are two
doors onto one handler, so they now share one published request component
instead of two descriptions of one validator. Their RESPONSES differ, though —
one carries id and role, the other the display preferences, and neither is a
superset — so they are named apart and the older description no longer claims
to cover both.
The four Web Push and APNs surfaces land in their own route module rather than
beside the notification preferences: that module answers what gets sent and
whether it arrived, this one the plumbing a client sets up and then verifies.
Both self-tests report failure inside a 200, which the contract says plainly,
because a client reading only the status will tell someone their notifications
work when they do not.
The generated YAML is left out; it is regenerated once the remaining groups
land.
Introduce an operator-level ChatGPT-subscription (Codex) credential that the
operator connects once and shares server-wide, plus a per-user switch to route
AI egress through it.
- Schema (migration 0235): three encrypted columns on AppSettings for the
operator's central Codex access/refresh tokens and the ChatGPT-Account-ID
claim, plus expiry/connected-at/status; a per-user useCentralCodex flag
(default false). Register the new encrypted columns in the rotation registry
and script.
- Resolution: add the admin-codex chain type; append it to a user's resolved
chain only when they opted in AND the operator connected it. Tokens refresh
server-side against the singleton row (CAS-style), same primitives as the
per-user Codex path.
- Budget: bill an admin-codex primary against the operator cost cap, not the
user plan — it drains the operator's account.
- Consent: admin-codex is server-managed external egress, gated by the existing
consent machinery (self-snapshot and document surfaces alike). No existing
consent path is weakened.
- Document order: rank admin-codex with the subscription tier (last), so the
document class stays local-first.
- UI: admin device-code connect/disconnect card (cookie-only admin routes) with
honest copy on account pooling, shared rate limits, and training-by-default;
a per-user opt-in switch shown only once the operator has connected it, off by
default, behind a one-time honesty confirm.
- i18n across all six locales; unit tests for the chain type, budget cap,
consent gate, vision capability, and document order; a mocked e2e for both
the admin connect surface and the per-user switch.
The central credential's tokens are encrypted at rest and never returned to a
non-admin API; the opt-in only takes effect once the operator has connected the
shared account.