resolveBearerToken took an optional permission, and an unset one admitted
any valid token. 324 of the 330 route files pass no permission, so a token
minted with a narrow scope reached the full-backup export, the labs and
measurement surfaces, the coach, and the bulk deletes — the settings copy
tells users to hand exactly that token to third-party automations.
Invert the default. The scope argument becomes a required ScopeRequirement
union: a route that names no scope now accepts cookie sessions and
cookie-equivalent ["*"] tokens only, and refuses a narrow token with 403 and
an undeclared_scope audit row. A route that means to accept a narrow token
names it, as the FHIR routes already do.
No route file changes. The absence of an argument becomes a positive
statement rather than an omission, so a newly added route denies a newly
minted narrow scope by default — the safe outcome is the one you get by
doing nothing.
/mcp keeps its own posture through an explicit any-valid-token requirement:
it authenticates here and authorises downstream on audience and write scope.
That is the single deliberate fail-open call site in the tree, and making the
parameter required is what keeps it greppable.
An MCP-audience token loses its REST read leg as a result, narrowing it to
/mcp only. The isMcpAudienceToken guard stays as defence in depth.
Move the canonical Bearer-token validation out of the api-handler request
wrapper into src/lib/auth/bearer.ts so it can run outside a Next.js request
scope without dragging next/server, next/headers, or the Wide-Event machinery
into the import graph. requireAuth's Bearer path now delegates to it and keeps
the existing auth.bearer.* audit trail and Wide-Event annotation, so the
revoked / expired / scope / lastUsedAt semantics live in one place and cannot
drift between callers.
Covered by a focused unit test pinning the hash-only lookup and the
revoked / expired / insufficient-permission rejections; the existing
require-auth Bearer suite stays green.